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1 Introduction:  Towards  a  Pragmatist  Theory  of  Crisis
Management in the Public Domain
1.1 The World of Crisis
Crisis management has become one of the core challenges of governments in Europe and around
the globe. Recent examples are manifold. Terrorist attacks have hit many countries, including the
US,  France,  Belgium,  Germany,  Turkey,  Iraq and Pakistan.  The European “refugee  crisis”  has
given rise to right-wing movements that challenge elected governments, established political norms
and values, even the coherence of the European Union. Natural disasters like Hurricane Matthew in
Haiti  or  the  earthquakes  in  Nepal  and Italy  have  served as  reminders  that  modern  civilization
remains vulnerable to the follies of nature. Today’s “risk society” (Beck 1992) harbors a whole
range of novel threats that range from state-sponsored hacking and cyberwarfare to data breaches
and information leaks (Boin, Rhinard, and Ekengren 2014; Harknett and Stever 2011; Perrow 2008;
Robinson, Jones, and Janicke 2015; Schulman and Roe 2007; Van Eeten and Bauer 2009).
Crises are not a recent phenomenon. The term “crisis” dates back to Ancient Greek where it “meant
not only 'divorce' and 'quarrel', but also 'decision' in the sense of reaching a crucial point that would
tip the scales” (Koselleck 2006, 358). The term crisis has since become part of the different national
languages in Europe. This expansive development was decisively fueled by the social revolutions
throughout Europe during the 18th and 19th century and the advent of economic crises which made
it a key term in modern political-economic thought (Masur 1968). As a result, the term began to be
increasingly  taken  up by the  social  sciences  (J.  A.  Robinson 1968).  By the  1960s  “crisis  had
become a broad and expanding catchword […] for practically any challenge-and-response situation
or scenario” (Starn 2005, 501).
The term crisis, as it evolved over time, included several dimensions. First, crises were understood
as conflicts that could be a threat or an opportunity to an established order (J. A. Robinson 1968;
Lalonde 2004). Second, the concept of crisis included the idea of judgment as a decision point both
in  the  judicial  and  theological  sense.  Finally,  crises  were  always  seen  as  situations  of  high
uncertainty (Koselleck 2006). These dimensions clearly resonate in a dominant definition in the
academic literature on crisis management, offered by Boin and 't Hart (2007, 42): “We speak of
crisis when a community of people – an organization, a town, or a nation – perceives an urgent
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threat to core values or life-sustaining functions,  which must be dealt  with under conditions of
uncertainty.” 
Three elements are crucial in this definition of crisis: urgency/time pressure, threat and uncertainty.
Urgency refers to the aspect that crises are situations where decisions have to be made under high
time pressure. Threat highlights that crises challenge a society’s core values, norms and beliefs or –
in the case of terrorist attacks and natural disasters for example – the conditions of its survival. 
Uncertainty plays  a  key  role  in  all  phases  of  a  crisis.  I  understand uncertainty  as  the  general
unpredictability and uncontrollability of our environment which varies in degree and perception
over time. In the words of former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, this understanding of deep
uncertainty mainly points to the “unknown unknowns”, the things “we don't know we don't know”
(Rumsfeld 2002; also see Žižek 2004). Before a crisis even happens, uncertainty is present in our
impossibility to predict the next crisis while knowing that it will eventually come. During crises
uncertainty arises in the form of a broad set of questions: “[W]hat is happening and how did it
happen? What's next? How bad will it  be? More importantly, uncertainty clouds the search for
solutions: what can we do? What happens if we select this option?” (Boin et al. 2005, 3–4).
This  definition  of  crisis  differs  from the  two  related  concepts  of  disaster and  catastrophe.  A
disaster, in the understanding of this study, is regarded “as a crisis with a devastating ending” (Boin
and ‘t Hart 2007, 42). A catastrophe is qualitatively different from a disaster because of its scope
and intensity. A catastrophe such as Hurricane Katrina is different from a disaster because of its
massive physical impact, the insufficiency of local organizations in coping with it and the fact that
most everyday community functions are interrupted (Quarantelli 1998, 2000; Rodríguez, Trainor,
and Quarantelli 2006, 87). 
This indicates that every disaster or catastrophe is a crisis – or more precisely: began as a crisis –
but not every crisis necessarily turns out to become a disaster or catastrophe. As crisis researchers
have argued, by concentrating on the broader concept of crisis we can learn more “about the origins
and development of disaster” (Boin and ‘t Hart 2007, 42). The crisis approach also highlights the
potential  open-endedness  of  crises:  as  opportunities  they  can  also trigger  reforms and promote
social learning. 
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1.2 The Importance of Crisis Leadership
Public leadership is often thought to be crucial in handling crises (Janis 1989; Rosenthal et al 1989,
2001; Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1997; Boin and ‘t Hart 2003). In times of crisis, citizens expect their
political leaders to mitigate the threats and dangers of a crisis, to explain why it happened in the
first place and to outline how similar crises can be prevented in the future. I understand public
leadership as “a number of distinctive functions that need to be performed in order for a polity to
govern itself effectively and democratically” (‘t Hart and Uhr 2008, 3). 
In this research project, public leaders are those officials who act on the strategic level of a society
(an organization, a city, a policy system, or a nation).  Strategic crisis management is concerned
with setting the general parameters of a crisis response, but also with making the critical decisions
that  shape  that  society’s  future  commitments.  Operational crisis  management  focuses  on  the
response’s implementation by crisis responders “on the ground” (‘t Hart, Rosenthal, and Kouzmin
2008, 230; Boin and Renaud 2013). 
This project will focus on a particular subset of public leaders in crisis: political crisis managers
(elected officials at the very top of a polity). Managing “issues of authority, legitimacy and power
that are inextricably connected to the way in which crises are defined and handled” (’t Hart 2008,
100) is at the heart of political crisis management in this study.
For public leaders, managing a crisis is a credibility and legitimacy challenge. Public leaders and
the institutions they command are measured by how they perform during crises. Their performance
cannot only affect general trust in government but also have significant effects on the re-election
chances of public leaders and governments (Chanley 2002; Bytzek 2008; Olmeda 2008). Under the
scrutiny of the general public and the media, effective crisis management is critical to foster public
trust in democratic leadership and institutions (OECD 2015; Boin et al. 2005, 8). Crises can thus be
regarded as stress tests for modern democracies and their leaders.
Following Boin et al. (2005) I understand strategic crisis management in the public domain as the
preparation, organization and execution of a set of critical tasks that, together, will likely lead to a
“better” response (in terms of effectiveness and legitimacy). While public leaders do not need to
execute all of these tasks personally they have the formal responsibility as elected officials to ensure
that these tasks are addressed (Boin et al. 2005, 9). I focus on two executive tasks in particular:
decision making and meaning making.
Decision  making is  probably  the  most  salient  and  most  thoroughly  explored  part  of  public
8
leadership during crises and regarded as one of the main task of public leaders (see Allison 1971 for
one of the most prominent examples). Crisis scholars often describe a tendency towards political
centralization during crises (’t Hart, Rosenthal, and Kouzmin 2008). Carl Schmitt has developed this
argument most systematically in his theory on the “state of exception” (Schmitt 1985). For Schmitt
crises are states of exception that require temporary dictatorship in order to lead a democracy out of
a crisis. Such a temporary dictatorship has to (partially) suspend the existing constitution of a polity
in order to defend it  (Schmitt 1988). Other scholars,  while rejecting Schmitt’s  authoritarianism,
have agreed that crises require an increased level of political centralization (Corwin 1947; Rossiter
1948). Studies on the American Presidency have added empirical substance to this argument by
showing an increased level of presidential power during wartime (Schlesinger 1973, 2004; Howell,
Jackman, and Rogowski 2013). 
While most democratic systems have mechanisms in place to concentrate decision-making power in
the hands of leaders, research also shows that such powers are usually exercised within a shared-
power context. The U.S. Congress can and often does play a strong role during crises (Kriner 2010;
Polsky 2012). Decisions during crisis are not solely made by single individuals such as presidents or
prime  ministers.  Instead  crisis  decision  making  is  embedded  in  the  wider  context  of  group
dynamics, advisory systems or institutional settings (Boin et al. 2005, 64; Janis 1982; ‘t Hart 2011;
Rosenthal and ‘t Hart 2008).
Decision making as I understand it is deeply interrelated with sense making (Weick 1995). While
focusing on decision making I keep in mind how decisions are based on the sense that is being
made of a crisis. In order to tame the uncertainty of a crisis and to make decisions, crisis managers
have to gain an understanding of the crisis. Based on this understanding of a crisis decisions are
evaluated  and  made  accountable  (Weick  1993,  635).  Sense  making  and  decision  making  are
reciprocal  processes  with  decision  making  both  preceding  and  following  from  sense  making
(Maitlis and Christianson 2013, 64).
Meaning making is the task that is concerned with explaining these decisions publicly and offering
a convincing interpretation of the crisis.1 Public leaders have to consider the political implications
of their decisions and make sure that the explanation and interpretation of the crisis they offer is
accepted  by  the  parliament,  public  agencies,  the  media  and  the  general  public:  “Political,
1 Crisis communication is a critical part of meaning making, using press releases, press conferences and
interviews  to  distribute  the  “official”  interpretation  of  the  crisis  and  offering  explanations  for  the
decisions that are made.
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bureaucratic, economic and other special interests do not automatically pull together and give up
their  self-interest  just  because  a  crisis  has  occurred.  They  engage  in  a  struggle  to  produce  a
dominant interpretation of the implications of the crisis” (Boin, McConnell, and ’t Hart 2008a, 9).
1.3 Studying Crisis Management: A Focus on Failure
Public crisis management has received a growing amount of academic attention in recent years (e.g.
Hillyard 2000; Rosenthal, Boin, and Comfort 2001; Boin et al. 2005; Underhill 2008; Moynihan
2009; Lodge and Wegrich 2012; Helsloot et al. 2012; Lodge 2013; Duit 2016; Roe and Schulman
2016). The study of political crisis management is now a distinct and swiftly expanding field in
political science and public administration. While studies on political crisis management initially
focused on international relations and international conflicts (Lauren 1979), domestic crises have
increasingly  complemented  this  focus  over  the  last  decades,  prompting  new  questions  on  the
political aspect of crisis management (’t Hart, Rosenthal, and Kouzmin 2008, 229–30).
Intriguingly, this growing body of literature is marked by a focus on failed or misguided attempts of
crisis managament (see Anheier and Moulton 1999; Howitt  and Leonard 2009; Rosenthal et  al.
2001).2 These  failures  may  pertain  to  organizational  behavior  (disintegration,  conflicts,  blind
corners, etc.) that undermine an effective crisis response (Hermann 1963; Turner, 1978) or with
stress that affects the performance of leaders during crises (Janis 1982; M. Hermann 1979; Walker
2009; Dyson and ‘t Hart 2013). This focus on failure can be found both in the studies on operational
crisis  management,  i.e.  crisis  responders  on  the  ground,  and  the  literature  on  strategic  crisis
management.
A vast amount of case studies has identified failure factors in crisis decision making. Case studies
of  industrial  crises  have  documented  how  wrong  decisions  have  led  to  the  catastrophes  of
Chernobyl and Bhopal (Shrivastava 1987; Ebel 1994; Czada 1991; Sen and Egelhoff 1991) and the
accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant (Perrow 1984, 2001). McConnell and Stark
have shown how the governmental decision to reduce control measures because of an upcoming
election prolonged the foot-and-mouth disease crisis in the UK (McConnell and Stark 2002). 
Other scholars have highlighted how the underestimation of the heat waves in Chicago and France
have led to faulty decisions by (local) governments and caused many casualties especially among
2 Anheier  and  Moulton  (1999,  3)  argue  that  this  focus  on  failures  and  breakdowns  stands  in  a  long
tradition of social science that dates back to the works of Durkheim, Marx and Weber.
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the poor parts of the population (Klinenberg 2002; Lagadec 2004). Perrow and Guillen (1990) have
described  how  personal  biases  and  political  ideologies  of  decision  makers  have  hindered  an
effective response to the early AIDS epidemic in the U.S. In all these cases, decisions makers were
not able to identify and make crucial decisions on how respond to the crisis because the crisis was
underestimated, misunderstood or denied. 
Scholars have found similar patterns that show how failures to convincingly explain and frame a
crisis and the response to it have put heavy pressure on decision makers. After the Exxon Valdez oil
spill in 1989, the oil company Exxon was heavily criticized for downplaying the effects of the crisis
while staging inefficient clean-up operations and distracting media campaigns to improve its public
image (Daley and O’Neill 1991; Small 1991; Williams and Treadaway 1992). Forbes has shown
how similar failures of communication and conflicting frames have intensified the BSE crisis in the
UK (Forbes 2004; also see Zwanenberg and Millstone 2005; Grönvall 2001). After a tsunami hit
Southeast Asia in 2004 and left 230.000 people dead, among them nearly 550 Swedish tourists, the
slow response by the Swedish government to publicly confront and explain the crisis was heavily
criticized and led to a political crisis in Sweden (Strömbäck and Nord 2006; Boin et al. 2005, 80).
The mishandling of the Hurricane Katrina catastrophe has led to the widespread conception that
president  Bush had shown not  enough interest  in  the  crisis  and was not  involved in  the  crisis
response (Benoit and Henson 2008; Spence, Lachlan, and Burke 2008; Sylves 2006). 
1.4 Focusing on Success?
Taken together, all these cases show that many crisis managers perform very poorly when measured
on the tasks of decision making and meaning making. But there is also research that shows how
some crisis managers do better than one might expect based on these case studies. 
One particularly well-known example of successful crisis management is the NASA mission of
Apollo 13 in 1970. After an oxygen tank exploded and damaged the life-support systems of the
spaceship on its way to the moon, the NASA engineers on the ground had to find a way to bring the
three astronauts safely back to earth (“Houston we have a problem”). Since the explosion had also
affected the energy supply and the navigation system of the spaceship, the NASA engineers could
not rely on established routines and procedures. Together with the astronauts of Apollo 13 they had
to improvise and invent creative solutions. After four days in space the three astronauts finally
returned  to  earth.  The  safe  return  boosted  NASA’s  public  image  and  increased  public  and
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Congressional  support  for  future  manned  space  missions  (Kauffman  2002;  Lovell  and  Kluger
2006). 
Some firefighters make better crisis decisions than others. Gary Klein (1998) studied a team of
firefighters that entered a building under the assumption that a fire had broken out in the kitchen.
Yet, the team commander noticed that several things were at odds with this assumption. The fire
was too hot for a small  kitchen fire and could not be tamed by spraying water on it.  The fire
commander quickly ordered his team to evacuate the building. Only seconds after the firefighters
had left the house, the ground floor collapsed. The firefighters quickly realized that the fire in the
kitchen had only  been a  small  part  of  a  bigger  fire  that  had  started  in  the  cellar.  If  the  team
commander hadn’t ordered the immediate evacuation the fire would have killed the entire team
(Klein 1998; also see Flin 1996). 
The research on so-called High Reliability Organizations (HROs) shows that some organizations
such as aircraft carriers or traffic control centers perform much better in response to unexpected
turbulence  than  other  organizations  (LaPorte  and  Consolini  1991;  Roberts  1990;  Sagan  1994;
Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 2008). These HROs are able to perform almost failure-free despite
the complex tasks they have to accomplish in a dynamic and uncontrollable environment. Naval
aircraft carriers, for instance, are able to carry out complex tasks because they rely on redundancy
and collective monitoring. When a plane lands on an aircraft carrier, the process is controlled and
monitored by different people on different parts of the ship. These people are engaged in a constant
stream of conversation and verification on several different channels. The landing process is thus
continuously evaluated from many different perspectives that allow to identify any deviations or
problems (Rochlin, La Porte, and Roberts 1987).
Political scientists have shown that some political leaders perform better in times of crises than their
peers (Greenstein 2011; ‘t Hart 2011; Mitchell 2005; Pious 2008; Preston 2001; Walker 2009). How
U.S. president Kennedy (and Russian leader Khrushchev) handled the Cuban Missile Crisis has
been lauded as a successful example of crisis management that prevented a nuclear war (Allison
and Zelikow 1999; Schwarz 2013). After the Elbe flood hit the Eastern part of Germany in 2002,
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder was publicly perceived as such an efficient crisis manager that his
Social Democratic party won the national elections few weeks later (Bytzek 2008). 
Other public leaders were less successful in handling major political crises. When several bomb
explosions left 192 people dead in Madrid in March 2004 only days before a national election, the
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conservative Spanish government, led by prime minister Aznar, blamed the Basque ETA for the
terrorist attacks. After evidence emerged that the attacks were carried out by Islamist terrorists as a
reaction to Spain’s participation in the Iraq War, the Conservative Party – which had comfortably
lead in the polls – lost the elections to the Socialist Party (Olmeda 2008). U.S. president Carter’s
handling of the Iran Hostage Crisis was marked by internal conflicts between key advisors and ill-
advised decisions that contributed to the landslide victory of Ronald Reagan in 1980 (Sigelman and
Conover  1981;  Houghton 2001).  Following  Hurricane  Katrina  in  2005,  president  Bush’s  crisis
management  was  perceived  as  inefficient  and  detached  and  his  public  approval  ratings  fell
drastically (Fletcher and Morin 2005).
This observation about variance in crisis management performance prompts a powerful question:
Why do some organizations and their leaders seem to cope so much better with crisis threats than
others? In other words, how can we explain the variance in crisis management performance?
1.5 Towards a Theory of  Effective Crisis  Management:  A Pragmatist
Turn
An overarching theory of effective public crisis management does not exist. Much of the literature
that portends to say anything about crisis management performance focuses on crisis responders
“on the ground”, i.e. the operational level of crisis management; it has little to say about the specific
challenges that top-level public leaders face during crises. 
But  the  studies  on  crisis  management  performance  offer  important  cues.  Karl  Weick  has
emphasized how improvisation, creativity and the probing of solutions are crucial elements of crisis
management (Weick 1988; 1993; 1995). Psychologist Gary Klein has identified similar qualities of
effective  crisis  management  in  his  analyses  of  how  first  responders  deal  with  the  ambiguous
situations they routinely face. Developing a distinct theory of “naturalistic decision making”, Klein
aims  to  debunk rationalist  models  that  regard  decision  making  as  a  process  of  comprehensive
comparison of different options (Kahneman and Klein 2009; Klein 2009). Instead Klein highlights
how successful decision making during crises is a process that is based on mental simulations,
metaphors, hypothesis testing and experimentation (Klein 1998). The HRO research group around
Todd LaPorte has highlighted how high reliability organizations have employed similar techniques
of flexibility, redundancy and decentralized decision making to reach a high level of reliability and
to reduce the chances of failures and errors (LaPorte 1996; LaPorte and Consolini 1991).
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Weick, Klein and the HRO researchers have witnessed what was successful in the practice of crisis
management.  In describing these “success stories” these researchers have developed a different
perspective on crisis management using distinct terms and concepts. They have analyzed effective
crisis management as a process of learning-while-doing, as enactment, as adaption, as bricolage, as
trial-and-error or as hypothesis testing. 
These characteristics of effective crisis management closely resemble core concepts of pragmatist
philosophy.  Pragmatism  is  a  philosophical  approach  that  was  originated  by  the  American
philosophers Charles S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey and others in the late 19th and early 20th
century. Philosophical pragmatism is a broad school of thought that cannot be reduced to a simple
definition or one core maxim (Lovejoy 1908; Posner 2003; Koopman 2009). Yet, pragmatism has
contributed to many philosophical discourses, ranging from questions of ethics and logic to theories
of truth and knowledge. 
What is interesting about philosophical pragmatism from the perspective of crisis management is
that  pragmatist  thinkers  claim to  have  found a  special  way to  deal  with  uncertainty,  which  is
perhaps the most defining characteristic of a crisis. According to pragmatists, most philosophical
and practical attempts towards deep uncertainty try to negate or remove it (Dewey 1929). Based on
the understanding of deep uncertainty as a irrevocable human condition, pragmatists reject such
attempts as futile and instead started to build a philosophy that enables “successful action under
conditions of uncertainty” (Joas 2000, 39). 
For pragmatists, the key to a philosophy of successful action under conditions of uncertainty can be
found in human practice. In their practical actions in daily life, people routinely face situations of
uncertainty where they are not sure what to do. Yet, people are able to make decisions under such
conditions and do not need to wait for conclusive evidence in order to make a decision. Pragmatists
have found two reasons for this ability to act under conditions of uncertainty: First, by relying on
strict beliefs or authoritarian orders (e.g. in the Catholic church, military, etc). Such absolute and
strict  principles can simply override uncertainty by providing the right decision a priori (Peirce
1997b). Pragmatists have rejected this approach as flawed since it tries to remove uncertainty by
relying on strict beliefs or orders that are uncertain themselves. 
Pragmatists  are  interested in  a  second approach towards uncertainty.  This  approach focuses  on
human action. By trying something out and seeing if  it  “works”, humans are able to explore a
situation  of  uncertainty  further  and  acquiring  more  information  about  it.  Based  on  this  novel
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information the initial decision can then be revised or adapted. Charles Sanders Peirce, an American
logician and the founder of philosophical pragmatism, has identified such an iterative and probing
approach in the scientific method of hypothesis-testing (see section  2.4.2). For John Dewey, an
American philosopher and the main proponent of pragmatism in the 20 th century, the Darwinian
theory of adaption has offered another example for such a pragmatist approach (see section 2.4.3). 
Based on these insights, pragmatists have built a pragmatist theory of action (see Joas 1993, 1997;
Menand 1997). I identify and discuss four cornerstones of such a pragmatist theory of action under
conditions of uncertainty: anti-dualism, fallibilism, experimentalism and deliberation. Pragmatist
anti-dualism rejects  strict  black-and-white  dichotomies  and  highlights  the  continuum  between
perceived extreme poles. Pragmatist  fallibilism reminds us that all knowledge remains potentially
fallible  and  that  it  might  need  to  be  revised  when  new  evidence  comes  to  light.  Pragmatist
experimentalism probes  and  tries  out  hypotheses  in  order  to  solve  a  given  problem.  Finally,
pragmatist deliberation suggests problems can be collectively solved through structured interaction
with others. 
These pragmatist concepts of anti-dualism, fallibilism, experimentalism and deliberation are close
to  what  Weick,  Klein  and  the  HRO  researchers  have  described  as  learning-while-doing,  as
enactment, as adaption, as bricolage, as trial-and-error or as hypothesis testing in their studies on
crisis management. The approaches by these researchers also share with philosophical pragmatism a
focus on the “primacy of practice”. Similar to philosophical pragmatism, their research has put
successful human practice at the center of its theories.3
Looking  at  the  works  of  philophical  pragmatists  and  their  bold  claims  on  how  to  deal  with
uncertainty on the one hand and the empirical research of Weick, Klein and the HRO researchers on
the other  hand an intriguing question arises:  Could this  pragmatism-inspired strand of research
together with philosophical pragmatism hold the key to a theory of political crisis management that
explains both failure  and success? While this is the puzzle that motivates this study it is not the
main objective of it. Because before we can provide an answer to this puzzle, we need to take a step
back and get a better understanding of what pragmatism exactly is and what it might look like in
political  crisis  management.  This  is  the main objective  of  this  study.  This  study can  be hence
3 This close connection is no coincidence. Many of the main proponents of these approaches have been
inspired  by  philosophical  pragmatism.  Karl  Weick’s  work  for  instance  is  heavily  influenced  by
pragmatist thinkers such as John Dewey and William James (Weick 1995, 2006) and HRO researcher
Todd LaPorte partly stands in the tradition of Philip Selznick’s pragmatist  institutionalism (Selznick
1996).
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understood as an explanatory study that analyzes the meaning of pragmatism for political crisis
management.
1.6 Research Objective and Methodological Approach
Based on the insights from philosophical pragmatism, I aim to build a model of pragmatist crisis
management at the political-strategic level. This model translates the core concepts of philosophical
pragmatism into a concrete structure that describes what pragmatist crisis management looks like.
In the empirical part of this study I use this model of pragmatist crisis management to analyze two
empirical cases. The research objective of this study thus is:
• Building a model of pragmatist crisis management and demonstrating how this model can be
used in empirical research.
To clarify the meaning of pragmatist crisis management I contrast it with principle-guided crisis
management.  I  argue that  a  principle-guided approach towards  crisis  management  is  the  ideal-
typical  opposite  of  pragmatist  crisis  management.  The  principle-guided  approach  mirrors  the
pragmatist  approach  on  its  four  core  dimensions  (anti-dualism,  fallibilism,  experimentalism,
deliberation).  I  define a set  of  specifications for both approaches that  guide the empirical  case
studies (see chapter 3).
The model is derived from the theoretical sources of philosophical pragmatism and not modeled
along the lines of any specific case. As such the two approaches are ideal-types in the Weberian
sense (Weber 1949, 90). They depict pragmatist and principle-guided political crisis management in
their “pure” form, implying that a continuum between both approaches exists and that hybrids of
both approaches can be expected in empirical practice.
I demonstrate how the model can be used in empirical research by applying it to a case study of the
Bush government’s handling of the financial crisis of 2008. The two cases that have been selected
for the empirical part of this study are two critical decision points in the U.S. financial crisis of
2008: (1) the decision by the Bush administration to rescue the investment bank Bear Stearns in
March 2008 and (2) the decision to let the investment bank Lehman Brothers fail in September
2008.  I  have  analyzed  both  cases  according  to  the  model  of  pragmatist  and  principle-guided
political crisis management, looking for examples where the specifications of the model could be
identified. 
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In a summarizing chapter (see chapter 7) I offer hypotheses to explain the shifts between pragmatist
and principle-guided political  crisis  management  for future research.  Since part  of the research
objective is to demonstrate how this model can be used in empirical research this chapter will pave
the way for future empirical research by briefly introducing and discussing several hypotheses and
aspects regarding the causes and combinations of pragmatist and principle-guided political crisis
management. These hypotheses can serve as starting points for future research projects and should
demonstrate the possible scope and reach of empirical research that can be based on this model. 
From a methodological perspective, it is also important to note that the two case studies do not aim
to provide conclusive evidence for the model of pragmatist  and principle-guided political  crisis
management. Instead, they should be understood as “plausibility probes” (Eckstein 1992, 147) that
are intended to explore if we can find preliminary empirical evidence for the model. The analysis of
these cases therefore should not be understood as full-blown case studies but as first probes if the
perspective  provided  by  this  study  allows  a  novel  and  fruitful  perspective  on  political  crisis
management.
As I  will  show, the application of the model  helps  us  recognize things that  we would not  see
otherwise.  In  the  study of  the  Bush administration’s  financial  crisis  management,  we can now
identify pragmatist decision making and meaning making for the Bear Stearns case (see chapter 5).
We will see how the Bush administration was able to overcome its established principles of free-
market ideology and moral hazard and rescued Bear Stearns, based on the analysis of the expected
consequences of a bankruptcy of Bear Stearns. For the Lehman case, however, I find mixed results
that include evidence for both approaches. After the Bear Stearns rescue, the decision to let Lehman
fail can be understood as a switch back to principle-guided political crisis management that was
meant to send a strong message that the Bush government had returned to its free-market principles
again (see chapter 6). But with the decisions to save the insurance company AIG and the money
market  funds  immediately  after  the  Lehman  fail,  the  Bush  administration  returned  to  a  more
pragmatist approach.
1.7 Outline of the Study
Chapter 2 provides an overview of philosophical pragmatism and its core ideas. After discussing
the  difficulties  to  define  the  term  “pragmatism”,  this  chapter  explores  the  core  elements  of
pragmatism and the key arguments that follow from it. It analyzes the central role that uncertainty
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plays in pragmatist thought and further sharpens our understanding of pragmatism by contrasting it
with  rationalism and bounded rationality.  These  general  considerations  serve  as  the  theoretical
foundation for a discussion of the pragmatist concepts of anti-dualism, fallibilism, experimentalism
and deliberation that are the building blocks of the model of pragmatist political crisis management.
In the final section of the chapter, possible constraints of pragmatism in times of crisis are discussed
on a theoretical level, focusing on the aspects of centralization and urgency.
Chapter  3 takes  the  theoretical  insights  from chapter  2  and translates  them into  the  model  of
pragmatist  and principle-guided political  crisis  management.  The model  is  structured along the
building blocks of anti-dualism, fallibilism, experimentalism and deliberation. The building blocks
provide specifications for each level that offer theory-based suggestions of what pragmatist and
principle-guided political crisis management look like in practice. These specifications guide the
empirical research process in chapter 5 and 6.
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the methodological approach of this study. It outlines why the
two  conducted  case  studies  should  be  understood  as  “plausibility  probes”,  i.e.  as  preliminary
empirical  evaluations  of  the  model  proposed  in  chapter  3.  The  methodological  chapter  also
introduces the analyzed cases and the sources that were used and how they were analyzed.
Chapter 5 analyzes the first of the two empirical cases, the Bush administration's decision to rescue
the investment bank Bear Stearns in March 2008. It identifies examples of pragmatist political crisis
management  in  all  four  dimensions.  Chapter  6 analyzes  the  case  of  the  Bush  administration's
decision to let the investment bank Lehman Brothers fail in September 2008. It finds preliminary
evidence for both pragmatist and principle-guided political crisis management.
Chapter 7  summarizes and contrasts the results of the preceding empirical chapters and provides
ideas for future research. The chapter focuses on the question why the Bush administration switched
from pragmatist to principle-guided political crisis management and then back to pragmatism again.
It offers various hypotheses that formulate answers to this question and discusses them briefly. The
concluding  part  of  the  chapter  deals  with  the  combinations  of  pragmatist  and principle-guided
political crisis management and revisits our understanding of both approaches.
The  concluding  chapter  8 briefly  summarizes  the  main  insights  from  this  study  while  also
highlighting its limitations and formulating a research agenda for future research.
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2 What is Pragmatism?
When it comes to the task of writing about pragmatism one is confronted with a thorny problem: the
varieties of pragmatism (see McDermid 2006). Even the main proponents of pragmatism differ in
their  characterization of what we are actually talking about.  Is pragmatism a “maxim of logic”
(Peirce 1998, 134), a “method” (James 2000, 27), a “philosophy of meaning and truth” (Blackburn
2005b, 286), a “mentality” (Bernstein 2005, 18), “a philosophy of evolutionary learning” (Ansell
2011,  5)  or  an  “account  of  the  way people  think”  (Menand 1997,  xi)?  Given this  plurality  of
understandings it is no wonder that Richard Posner, a prominent pragmatist himself, has come to
the conclusion that pragmatism “is a devil to define” (Posner 2003, 24). 
Still, it is essential to come up with a concrete and sharp definition for one of this dissertation’s
central  concepts.  This  chapter  will  target  this  challenge  and  carve  out  my  understanding  of
pragmatism as it will be used in the subsequent chapters. It will begin with a quick overview of the
history of pragmatism and the variety of (sometimes opposing) positions and proponents it  has
brought forward. Subsequently the role of uncertainty in pragmatist thinking and the contrast of
pragmatism  and  rationalism  will  be  discussed.  I  will  then  introduce  some  core  elements  of
pragmatist  thought  before  I  present  the  building  blocks  for  a  pragmatist  theory  of  crisis
management. A short discussion of the possible constraints of pragmatist crisis management will
conclude this chapter.
2.1 Pragmatism - A Brief Introduction
The term “pragmatism” entered the philosophical debate on August 26, 1898 when the American
philosopher William James delivered a lecture at the University of California in Berkeley and used
this term to refer to an idea originally developed by Charles Sanders Peirce (Bernstein 2010, 2).4
Peirce had developed his ideas in two groundbreaking articles twenty years earlier: “The Fixation of
Belief” (published 1877) and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (1878). In the latter he formulated
what is at the center of his understanding of pragmatism: the pragmatic maxim. “Consider what
effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception
4 Of course there are older philosophical traditions to which pragmatism refers, most notably in Kant. This
is a history that pragmatism is well aware of, as is indicated by the fact that William James published his
lectures  on  pragmatism  with  the  subtitle  “A  New  Name  for  Some  Old  Ways  of  Thinking”  (see
Kloppenberg  1996).  For  a  quick  introduction  to  pragmatism’s  philosophical  predecessors  see  J.
Campbell (1995, pt. 1.1), Posner (2003, chap. 1) and  Rescher (2000, chap. 1).
19
to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object” (Peirce
1992, 132). James picked up on this idea of “consequentialism” (meaning is defined by effects and
consequences), gave it his own twist and expanded it decisively. Most famously he developed a
distinct pragmatic theory of truth in his lectures published under the title “Pragmatism” in 1907
(James 2000). It is at this early stage of pragmatism where the roots for the blurriness of the term
can already be found. While James valued the contributions of Peirce deeply and called them his
“compass”  (James  2005,  61),  his  own ideas  of  pragmatism were  quite  different  from Peirce's
original  account.  The  contemporary  pragmatist  Richard  Bernstein  goes  so  far  as  to  state  that
pragmatism “is the movement that was founded on James' misunderstanding of Peirce” (Bernstein
2005, 20). Leaving the question of this quote’s accuracy aside, it is clear that Peirce himself wasn't
happy with the fact that James expanded the initial pragmatic maxim to an extended version of
pragmatism and lamented about the loose usage of the term (Peirce 1997a, 56). Peirce therefore
began to call his own position “pragmaticism”, a term of which he hoped that it “is ugly enough to
be safe from kidnappers” (Peirce 1934, 277). It clearly was.
The triumvirate of the founding fathers of pragmatism is completed by John Dewey, one of the
most influential American philosopher of the 20th century. Dewey's extensive work spans various
academic fields and repeatedly touches on such different topics as social psychology, aesthetics,
ethics, education and democracy. In his many books and articles Dewey developed his own version
of pragmatism and promoted the prominence of the term. After Dewey's death in 1952, pragmatism
disappeared from the philosophical stage more or less until the rise of the neo-pragmatists (Richard
Rorty, Hilary Putnam and others) put it back on the philosophical agenda in the 1980s . It has been
a vital part of especially American philosophy ever since with exponents such as Robert Brandom,
Robert Talisse, Susan Haack and Cheryl Misak.5
One reason for pragmatism's downturn in the 20th century may have been that “it is part of the
nature of pragmatism to decline the honor of becoming a 'school of thought'” (Menand 1997, xxv).
It has been an early claim of pragmatism to be able to bridge the gaps between existing positions
and dichotomies and clarify underlying common grounds. It would have therefore been a violation
of this founding rule to become just yet another school of thought.
5 This account of pragmatism's history has been labeled the “narrative of eclipse”. It is however contested
that there really was a break between Dewey's death and the rise of neo-pragmatism. Instead it can be
argued for a pragmatist  continuity in  the  philosophy of  the Twentieth century.  The most  prominent
proponent of this position is Richard Bernstein who has tried to prove this continuity by showing how
pragmatist elements can be found in the thinking of Ludwig Wittgenstein or Martin Heidegger among
others (Bernstein 2006, 2010).
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This thesis therefore cannot build on one conclusive and precise definition of pragmatism. Hence I
start  with a  broad and general  discussion of  pragmatism and then narrow the focus  towards  a
pragmatist theory of action and towards crisis management. I then build the model of pragmatist
political crisis management (chapter 3).
2.1.1 Varieties of Pragmatism 
The proclamation of pragmatism by William James was only ten years old when the discussion on
what the term actually meant started. In 1908, the American historian and philosopher Arthur O.
Lovejoy published an article labeled “The Thirteen Pragmatisms” in which he explored the reason
why there  still  wasn't  a  “single  and stable  meaning”  (Lovejoy 1908,  5)  for  the  term.  Lovejoy
explained that pragmatism consists of several “contentions which are separate not merely in the
sense of being  discriminable,  but  in the sense of being logically  independent,  so that  you may
without  inconsistency  accept  any  one  and  reject  all  the  others,  or  refute  one  and  leave  the
philosophical standing of the others unimpugned” (Lovejoy 1908, 5). From the standpoint of a
classical theory of logic this is a serious accusation. Lovejoy tried to provide evidence for it by
showing how pragmatism – after James had entered the stage – entails both a theory of meaning and
a theory of truth. 
Nicholas Rescher has discussed the diversity of pragmatism from a different direction by pointing
out how William James’ redevelopment of pragmatism cannot only be seen as an expansion of
Peirce's  original  account  but  as  a  profound  shift.  Rescher  distinguishes  between  two  kinds  of
pragmatisms: objective and subjective.6 For Rescher objective pragmatism dates back to Peirce and
is  characterized  by  concentrating  on  an  impersonal  level  (“What  works  impersonally?”)  while
James'  subjective pragmatism transfers the question to the subjective level  (“What works for a
person?”) (Rescher 2005a, 750). In terms of philosophy of science, it is the question of realism that
is at stake here: Is pragmatism built on a realist or an anti-realist ontology or does it even have the
makings to  transcend this  dichotomy (Hildebrand 2003)? Rescher  for example fiercely defends
what he regards as the realist  basis  of pragmatism where the answer to the question of “What
works?” is given by external reality. James' subjective turn on the other side is prone to shifting
pragmatism in a relativist and anti-realist direction where every individual can decide what works
6 In a more polemic way Rescher has also drawn a line between “pragmatism of the left” and “pragmatism
of  the  right”  where  the  left equals  the  subjective  Jamesian  and  the  right the  objective  Peircean
pragmatism (Rescher 2000, 64)
21
for him or her. As Rescher sees it, James gives up on the idea of an external reality that decides on
what works. James’ subjective turn thereby undermines the strongholds of pragmatism, such as the
possibility of anti-skepticism, experimentalism and collective inquiry.
2.1.2 Definitions of Pragmatism
There have been numerous attempts to describe what the core of pragmatism is and to define the
meaning of the term. Before I will outline my own understanding of pragmatism and how the term
will be used in this study, a quick look on some of these attempts seems advisable.
Among the classical pragmatists, Peirce was the one who took the challenge to come up with a
precise definition of the term most seriously. For him it was without a question that the center of a
definition  of  pragmatism  had  to  be  the  pragmatic  maxim:  “Suffice  it  to  say  once  more  that
pragmatism is, in itself, no doctrine of metaphysics, no attempt to determine any truth to things. It is
merely a method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts” (Peirce 1934,
317).  Here  Peirce  simply  assumes  the  consequentialist  position  of  his  pragmatic  maxim:
pragmatism is regarded as a method to clarify and define the meaning of terms and concepts. He
acknowledges that this simple maxim “involves a whole system of philosophy” (Peirce 1997a, 56)
and that while the pragmatic maxim is accepted by all pragmatists as the main method a certain
latitude exists: “All pragmatists of whatsoever stripe will  cordially assent to that statement [the
pragmatic  maxim – M.B.].  As to the ulterior  and indirect  effects  of practising the pragmatistic
method,  that  is  quite  another  affair”  (Peirce  1934,  317).  This  qualification  is  directed  against
William James (who Peirce mentions  explicitly  a few sentences  later).  James fully  agrees with
Peirce's  assessment  that  pragmatism “has  no dogmas,  and no doctrine save its  method” (James
2000, 27) – but only at first. Later he adds: “Such then would be the scope of pragmatism – first, a
method;  and second,  a  genetic  theory  of  what  is  meant  by truth” (James 2000,  33).  With this
broader understanding of the term, James set  the stage for the varieties of pragmatism and the
difficulties of defining it.
Among the modern attempts to capture the meaning of pragmatism, Simon Blackburn's definition in
the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy is close to Peirce's and James' original understanding when he
describes pragmatism as the “philosophy of meaning and truth especially associated with Peirce and
James” (Blackburn 2005b, 286). Nicholas Rescher on the other hand has offered a definition that
indicates the broad range and application of pragmatism: “The characteristic idea of philosophical
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pragmatism is that efficacy in practical application – 'What works out most effectively in practice' –
somehow provides a standard for the determination of truth in the case of statements, rightness in
the case of actions, and value in the case of appraisals” (Rescher 2005a, 747). 
Hilary Putnam finally, one of the most prominent neo-pragmatists, has offered his own account that
is  close  to  both  Rescher's  and  –  as  we  will  later  see  –  Richard  Bernstein's  understanding  of
pragmatism. Here he summarizes some of the key assumptions of pragmatism as they are used in
this work: 
“What I find attractive in pragmatism is not a systematic theory in the usual sense at all. It is
rather a certain group of theses […]. Cursorily summarized, those theses are (1) antiscepticism:
pragmatists  hold that  doubt  requires justification just  as much as belief  […] (2)  fallibilism:
pragmatists hold that there is never a metaphysical guarantee to be had that such-and-such a
belief will never need revision (that one can be both fallibilistic and antisceptical is perhaps the
unique insight of American pragmatism); (3) the thesis that there is no fundamental dichotomy
between “facts” and “values”; and (4) the thesis that, in a certain sense, practice is primary in
philosophy” (Putnam 1995, 152).
2.1.3 The Scope of Pragmatism
Facing these discussions on the meaning and definition of pragmatism, I follow Richard Bernstein
who has proposed to give up the quest for  one clear definition of pragmatism. Instead Bernstein
understands pragmatism as a broad mentality. A mentality for Bernstein is “a general orientation – a
cast of mind or way of thinking – that conditions the way in which we approach, understand, and
act in the world” (Bernstein 2005, 18).7 This approach has the great advantage that it allows us to
leave aside the rather wearing philosophical discussions on how to exactly define the term. At the
same time it doesn't give up on the idea that the term pragmatism actual describes a (broad) set of
shared assumptions, interests and beliefs.
Such an understanding of pragmatism also targets one of the main problems every author has to
face  who sets  out  to  work  with  pragmatism:  the  question  of  scope.  Two different  ways  seem
possible  in  this  regard.  One  can  highlight  a  special  aspect  and  focus  the  understanding  of
pragmatism on this single dimension. The works by Hans Joas (1997) and Berk and Galvan (2009),
who have concentrated on the aspect of creativity, or Richard Bernstein (2005), who highlighted the
centrality  of  fallibilism,  are  prime  examples  for  this  approach.  The  results  of  these  studies
demonstrate that limiting pragmatism's scope in various ways can be fruitful since it enables in-
7 Michael Bacon has pursued a similar course by suggesting that “pragmatism is best viewed not as a set
of doctrines but rather as a tradition of thought” (Bacon 2012, 2).
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depth analysis. Instead of concentrating on a certain dimension of pragmatism one could also try to
come up with an exhaustive list of all its dimensions. From this long list of pragmatist ideas and
positions one would then have to distill some kind of “universal essence” of pragmatism. I am not
aware of any empirical work that tries to follow this approach and even theory-oriented authors
normally concentrate on certain aspects of pragmatism when they discuss the term and reject such a
holistic endeavor.8 
Referring  to  the  scope  problem of  pragmatism,  Richard  Bernstein  has  compared  the  usage  of
pragmatism to playing an accordion (Bernstein 2010, 11). One can either stretch it to include a
broader set of positions or thinkers or one can restrict its scope and focus on certain doctrines and
ideas. His own conception of  pragmatism as a mentality seems to offer a middle ground in this
regard. While it understands pragmatism in a broad sense and does not limit it to one or a few of its
dimensions  it  still  allows  for  the  identification  of  a  set  of  pragmatist  core  elements.  More
importantly, it also enables empirical research to look for the expected effects of pragmatism.9
I  follow Bernstein’s  approach  and  understand  pragmatism as  a  set  of  closely  interrelated  core
elements  which  will  be introduced in  the  next  chapter.  By building  on Bernstein’s  concept  of
pragmatism as a “mentality” is important to note, however, that I do not want to reduce pragmatism
to  a  subjective-psychological  level.  Instead,  Bernstein’s  approach  offers  an  important  middle
ground between understanding pragmatism as a vague catch-all term or a narrow concentration on
just one of pragmatism’s many dimensions. This allows an understanding of pragmatism that is
both philosophically sound and applicable to empirical research, allowing to describe and define the
different core elements of pragmatism in greater empirical details.
8 Colin Koopman's study on pragmatism is a good example in this regard since he explicitly discusses the
problem: “My intention is not to develop a determinative statement nor is it to summarize some list of
supposedly essential features. Rather, I seek to loosen pragmatism up so that it can do even more work
and  do  that  work  better.  I  want  to  open  pragmatism  out  onto  opportunities  and  potentialities  yet
underexplored” (Koopman 2009, 1). Paradoxically he intends to open up pragmatism by concentrating
on  a  single  feature  (transitionalism)  yet  again,  although  this  feature  is  located  on  a  meta-level:
“According to this transitionalist interpretation, pragmatism's most important philosophical contribution
is  that  of  redescribing  the  philosophical  practices  of  thought,  critique,  and  inquiry  such  that  these
practices take place in time and through history” (Koopman 2009, 2).
9 Bernstein  himself  has  paved  the  way  for  empirical  analyses  by  developing  his  understanding  of
pragmatism as  mentality  in  contrast  to  a concrete  empirical  phenomenon,  namely the presidency of
George W. Bush and its construction of terrorism as an “absolute evil” (Bernstein 2005).
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2.2 Pragmatism's Take on Uncertainty and Crisis
Uncertainty and crisis have played a central role in pragmatist thinking. Two points can be made to
establish this claim: a genealogical and a theoretical one. The genealogical point traces the history
of pragmatism and finds evidence that experiences of uncertainty and crisis played a pivotal role in
the development and formulation of pragmatism. The  theoretical assertion examines pragmatist
thinking and finds profound discussions of uncertainty not only in classical writings but also in a
sub-strand of pragmatist literature: the debate on the role of tragedy in pragmatism. On the ground
of these arguments I develop the argument that pragmatism is an especially promising approach
when it comes to the analysis of crisis management. 
2.2.1 A  Genealogical  Argument  for  the  Centrality  of  Uncertainty  in
Pragmatism
The  first  argument  one  can  make  for  the  profound  role  that  uncertainty  and  crisis  play  in
pragmatism  is  a  historical  one.  It  can  draw  on  Louis  Menand's  groundbreaking  study  The
Metaphysical Club. Menand argues that the experience of a profound crisis, namely the American
Civil War, played a decisive role in the development of philosophical pragmatism.10 
According to Menand, the key proponents of pragmatism such as Charles S. Peirce, William James
and Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., learned from the experience of the Civil War that uncertainty needs
to be embraced and that acting upon strict principles can eventually lead to catastrophe. 
Menand documents this argument by using the example of Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. Later justice
at the Supreme Court of the United States, Holmes is a largely unnoticed but crucial founding figure
of pragmatism. For Menand, Holmes is the best example for the influence of the Civil War on the
early pragmatists, having served in the Union Army and being wounded several times.
According to Menand, the “lesson Holmes took from the war can be put in a sentence. It is that
10 It should be noted that this claim has been met by substantial critique from some scholars (see e.g. Blake
2001;  Fredrickson 2003;  Kuklick  2001)  who mainly  have  highlighted  additional  factors  which  also
influenced pragmatist  development. Menand himself  doesn't  concentrate on the Civil  War solely but
takes  into account  the  influence of  Darwinism as  equally important,  as  he has  re-emphasized in  an
interview: “The Civil War was very important in creating a set of conditions out of which pragmatism
emerged, but another factor was On the Origin of Species, which was published in 1859. Pragmatism is
as much influenced by Darwin as it is by the reaction against the Civil War” (Williams 2001, 146). In
summarizing Menand's position I will concentrate on his argumentation on the influence of the Civil War
though since it is the aspect that is central for this study.
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certitude leads to violence” and that uncertainty should be embraced instead (Menand 2001, 61).
Holmes  tried  to  distance  himself  from  the  approach  of  the  radical  anti-slavery  movement
abolitionism: “[...] abolitionism came to stand in his thought for the kind of superior certitude that
drives men (frequently men other than the ones who are certain) to kill one another” (Menand 2001,
62). Holmes found the solution for this problem in an environment where every voice can be heard
and balanced against different opinions. In one word: democracy. This pragmatist insight of the
importance of pluralist democracy shaped Holmes' understanding of law throughout his career: 
“What prevents the friction between competing conceptions of the way life should be from
overheating and leading to violence is democracy. In the seventy years that Holmes lived after
the war, the chief struggle in America was the struggle between capital and labor. Nearly every
judicial opinion for which he became known constituted an intervention in that struggle, and his
fundamental concern was almost always to permit all parties the democratic means to attempt to
make their interests prevail” (Menand 2001, 64). 
Holmes spelled out the importance of embracing uncertainty from a personal perspective as well,
when he was seriously wounded during the Civil War and anticipated his nearing death: “Then
came in my philosophy – I am to take a leap in the dark – but now as ever believe that whatever
shall happen is best – for it is in accordance with a general law […]” (Holmes 1946, 28). On this
passage Menand notes that Holmes “had found that he did not require a religious faith. Uncertainty
– 'I am to take a leap in the dark' – turned out to be all the certainty he needed” (Menand 2001, 37). 
Building on Holmes’ personal experiences Menand then poses the question how these experiences
and insights have influenced the founding of philosophical pragmatism. While Peirce and James did
not fight in the war (James' brother did), and Dewey was only two years when it started, Menand
argues that they were nevertheless influenced by Holmes' experience. For one thing Holmes was
part  of a group that called itself  “The Metaphysical Club” and of which Charles S.  Peirce and
William James were other main members. It was in this circle where Peirce developed and for the
first time presented his concept of “pragmatism” which formed the foundation for his later writings
(see Menand 2001, 225). 
Menand argues  that  Holmes’  experiences  of  the war  could  speak to  Peirce,  James and Dewey
although they had not fought in the war themselves. All of them, although each in his own way,
picked up on the idea that in order to prevent violence a way to formulate and settle contrasting
opinions and beliefs has to be found. This finally led them to the discovery that though 
“we may believe unreservedly in a certain set of truths, there is always the possibility that some
other set of truths might be the case. In the end, we have to act on what we believe; we cannot
wait for confirmation from the rest of the universe. But the moral justification for our actions
26
comes from the tolerance we have shown to other ways of being in the world, other ways of
considering the case. The alternative is force. Pragmatism was designed to make it harder for
people to be driven to violence by their beliefs” (Menand 2001, 440).
What the Civil War revealed for pragmatists was that under the most scrutinizing light we will
never  achieve  total  certainty  who  is  right  and  who  is  wrong.  While  this  might  be  a  rather
disillusioning insight, for pragmatists it was a necessary insight that might prevent future clashes of
superior certitudes that ultimately lead to war and violence.
Instead, what pragmatists noted was the power and necessity of adaptability. As Holmes wrote in
his reflections on getting wounded during the Civil War: 
“It is curious how rapidly the mind adjusts itself under some circumstances to entirely new
relations – I thought for awhile that I was dying, and it seemed the most natural thing in the
world – The moment the hope life returned it seemed as abhorrent to nature as ever that I should
die –” (Holmes 1946, 32).
I think Louis Menand is right when he does not dismiss this as a merely personal episode 11 but
highlights the broader significance for pragmatism when he summarizes Holmes’ reflections: “'How
rapidly the mind adjusts itself': the test of a belief is not immutability but adaptability. Our reasons
for needing reasons are always changing” (Menand 2001, 38). This already rings close to many of
the key insights pragmatists later developed: Peirce's account of how we fixate our beliefs by means
of  hypothesis-testing,  James'  defense  of  the  right  to  believe  (James  1997)  and  Dewey's  deep
appreciation of Darwin's theory of evolution and the constant adaption processes that are at its core
(see 2.4.3).
The second lesson that Holmes has drawn from this experience of uncertainty and that has later
been elaborated in more depth by other pragmatists is the importance of experimentalism. Holmes
himself got to the heart of this during his time at the Supreme Court in one of the most famous
judicial dissents in American history (Cohen 2013). In 1919 the judges had to decide in Abrams v.
United  States on  the  prosecutions  under  the  Espionage  Act  of  five  men  who  had  distributed
pamphlets that denounced the American war efforts. While the majority of the judges upheld the
decision to prosecute the men and regarded it in line with the First Amendment, Holmes fiercefully
disagreed and laid out his position in a minority dissent. According to Holmes, the constitution 
“is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year, if not every day, we have to wager
our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is
part of our system, I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the
11 After all, Holmes himself mentions that the incident of getting wounded was an opportunity to think
about his philosophy (Holmes 1946, 28).
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expression of opinions that  we loathe and believe to be fraught  with death,  unless they so
imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law
that an immediate check is required to save the country” (Abrams v. United States 1919).
While this passage was written many years after the Civil War, this argument can be traced to
Holmes’ early experiences. As he sees it, uncertainty and imperfect knowledge are a fact that we
have to live with and that we should not approach with absolute certitudes and prohibitions but with
an experimental attitude. Instead of falling prey to the “craving for absolutes” (Bernstein 2005, 18)
as both abolitionists  and slave owners did, the Civil  War taught early pragmatists an important
lesson:  that  the  most  promising  way  to  decide  upon  crucial  questions  under  conditions  of
uncertainty is careful experimentation. 
This genealogical analysis of pragmatism has revealed that there is a strong argument that can be
made about how uncertainty and crisis in the form of the American Civil War played a crucial role
during the genesis of classical pragmatism. Because of the escalation of this crisis into a violent
war, pragmatists began to think about ways to conciliate antagonistic positions while at the same
time  leaving  space  for  decisive  beliefs  and  actions.  They  rejected  attempts  to  act  upon  strict
principles  as  a  fallacy  that  would  eventually  lead  to  violence  and war.  Instead  they  identified
uncertainty as the underlying problem of this dilemma. Building on the experiences of the Civil
War  they  suggested  other  ways  to  deal  with  uncertainty,  chiefly  among them adaptability  and
experimentalism. How this strand of thought has been developed more fully in classical pragmatist
writings and how this appreciation of uncertainty has been engrained in many of its main ideas will
be examined in the next section.
2.2.2 The Prominent Role of Uncertainty in Pragmatist Thinking
After having explored the historical role uncertainty has played in the genesis of pragmatist thinking
in the form of the Civil War, I will now take a closer look at pragmatist writings to analyze how
uncertainty  is  discussed  in  these  writings.  When  exploring  the  role  that  uncertainty  plays  in
pragmatist theory it are especially two bodies of sources that will be discussed in greater depth in
this section. The first part will concentrate on some representative texts from classical pragmatism
and investigate the role of uncertainty there. The second part will take up the debate on the role of
tragedy in pragmatism which will help to examine further how a recognition of uncertainty can be
found in pragmatism.
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2.2.2.1 The Centrality of Uncertainty in Classical Pragmatism 
It is easy to see how uncertainty plays a central role from pragmatism’s beginning. Peirce's initial
development of pragmatism started with the refutation of Cartesian philosophy. What was at the
center of this rebuttal was the Cartesian position on certainty and uncertainty, or in the words of the
debate,  on  belief  and  doubt.  Cartesian  approaches  are  after  something  that  Peirce  regards  as
impossible and unnecessary: a final “test of certainty” (Peirce 1992, 29). For Peirce instead the right
way to come to our fallible beliefs is through collective reasoning and the community of inquirers.
“In sciences in which men come to agreement, when a theory has been broached, it is considered to
be  on  probation  until  this  agreement  is  reached.  After  it  is  reached,  the  question  of  certainty
becomes an idle one, because there is no one left who doubts it” (Peirce 1992, 29). Peirce does not
want to give the false impression here that after reaching such a consensus the theory is regarded as
true forever. But it is freed from the burden of real doubt for the moment. To begin an investigation
about it such a real doubt must arise again and will then trigger further inquiry. For Peirce “absolute
certainty […] can never be attained by mortals” (Peirce 1992, 158) and the whole Cartesian debate
about it is an artificial and counterproductive one.
John Dewey has significantly expanded this argument and brought it in its most prominent form in
his book The Quest for Certainty (published 1929). It is an argument that he already defended in
Human Nature and Social Conduct (published 1922). There he frames the problem with the term
tendency: 
“We have  to  admit  the  role  of  accident.  We cannot  get  beyond tendencies  […] The word
'tendency' is an attempt to combine two facts, one that habits have a certain causal efficacy, the
other that their outworking in any particular case is subject to contingencies, to circumstances
which are unforeseeable and which carry an act one side of its usual effect” (Dewey 1922, 48–
49).
Dewey discusses the consequences of such a yearning for false certainty on the example of moral
philosophy:  “[I]n  morals  a  hankering  for  certainty,  born  of  timidity  and nourished by love  of
authoritative prestige, has led to the idea that absence of immutably fixed and universally applicable
ready-made principles is equivalent to moral chaos” (Dewey 1922, 238). It is the retreat of moral
philosophy to such universal principles that Dewey finds highly problematic. For him the problem
with such a conception is that it tends to ignore “situations into which change and the unexpected
enter” (Dewey 1922, 239). That does not mean that Dewey rejects moral ideas as such. Instead we
will later see how it is easily possible to defend certain beliefs and principles from a pragmatist
stance (see p. 59). What he criticizes here is something that is discussed as principles in this study,
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i.e.  beliefs  that  are  “immutably  fixed  and  universally  applicable”  (Dewey  1922,  238).  Dewey
suggests  to  understand  principles  instead  as  “methods  of  inquiry  and  forecast  which  require
verification  by  the  event”  and “as  hypotheses  with  which  to  experiment”  (Dewey 1922,  239).
Highlighting the centrality of uncertainty in the field of moral philosophy Dewey shows that a
pragmatist position does not come to the conclusion that there are no values at all. Rather it focuses
on how values adapt (see Joas 2000).
While important aspects can be found in Dewey's early study Human Nature and Social Conduct,
the pragmatist discussion of uncertainty has probably found its clearest form in Dewey's later work
The Quest for Certainty. There Dewey defines the quest for certainty as “a quest for a peace which
is  assured,  an object  which is  unqualified  by risk and the  shadow of  fear  which  action  casts”
(Dewey 1990, 7). According to Dewey it has been the main fallacy of traditional philosophy that
this striving for certainty finally led to a separation of mind and matter, or knowledge and action.
Since ultimate certainty cannot be reached on the practical level it was lifted to the spheres of pure
intellectual  mind  games.  “Since  no  amount  of  pains  and  care  in  action  can  ensure  complete
certainty, certainty in knowledge was worshipped as a substitute” (Dewey 1990, 32). The result was
a flawed “spectator theory of knowledge” (Dewey 1990, 19). This separation has also lead to a
general disdain for practical work and activity which in turn made it impossible to integrate the
advent of modern science (which has been largely carried by practical experiments and inquiries)
sufficiently into this traditional philosophical complex.
While Dewey elaborates these problems using examples from the history of philosophy and science
he also points out how the “quest for certainty” relates to everyday life. He argues that the quest for
certainty can be traced back to an early stage of human history when people had to make sense and
find a feeling of security “in a world of hazards” (Dewey 1990, 3). Therefore, the failure to “make
action central in the search for such security as is humanly possible is a survival of the impotency of
men in those stages of civilization when he had few means of regulating and utilizing the conditions
upon which the occurrence of consequences depend” (Dewey 1990, 26). But with the involvement
of civilization and modern science the time has come to leave this outdated conception behind and
to replace it with an approach that takes into account the interaction of both knowledge and action. 
According to  Dewey,  the  dominant  mode of  such an  approach would  be  one  of  experimental
inquiry. Experimental inquiries would relieve us from the quest for certainty since they can make
productive use of the principle of  change. “Before the rise of experimental method, change was
30
simply  an  inevitable  evil;  the  world  of  phenomenal  existence,  that  is  of  change,  […]  was
nevertheless there and had to be accepted practically as it happened to occur” (Dewey 1990, 82).
But in experiments change is carefully used to find out more about the world around us and gather
new knowledge by actively engaging with and adapting to our surrounding.
To summarize, Dewey argues that the quest for absolute certainty is not only endless but has also
led to dangerous anomalies in the way we think (as he exemplifies on traditional philosophy). This
quest for certainty has initially begun with the attempt to escape the uncertainty of the world around
us and to overcome it in the  mind. Such an endeavor has not only led to the disparagement of
practice, it also strengthened “dependence upon authority and dogma” (Dewey 1990, 32). Facing
this challenge Dewey proposes an escape through his pragmatist approach of experimental inquiry.
Such an approach does  not  only avoid the identified fallacies  but  also increases  our sphere of
influence and possibilities of change: 
“[I]f we frame our conception of knowledge on the experimental model, we find that it is a way
of operating upon and with the things of ordinary experience so that we can frame our ideas of
them in terms of their interactions with one another, instead of in terms of the qualities they
directly present, and that thereby  our control of them, our ability to change them and direct
their changes as we desire, is indefinitely increased” (Dewey 1990, 86; emphasis added).
2.2.2.2 The “Tragedy”-Debate in Pragmatism
Uncertainty is deeply ingrained in pragmatist thinking. This aspect has been further elaborated in a
later debate between philosophers on how pragmatism accounts for  tragedy.  From a pragmatist
perspective,  tragedies  are  dilemmas  with  no  easy  choice.  Tragedies  require  decisions  between
options that appear equally good and are undecidable on a moral level. Tragedies are thus situations
of intense uncertainty. The way pragmatism proposes to deal with such situations of uncertainty is
through collective inquiry and meliorist optimism.
The debate began with Sidney Hook's essay “Pragmatism and the Tragic Sense of Life” (published
1960). According to Hook, pragmatism “is grounded in a recognition of the tragic sense of life”
(Hook 2002, 70). Enforcing the genealogical argument outlined before, Hook also highlights the
role that the Civil War has played in generating this sensitivity (Hook 2002, 74) and defines this
tragic sense as “rooted in the very nature of the moral experience and the phenomenon of moral
choice” (Hook 2002, 78). 
Hook identifies three approaches to deal with tragic conflicts. In the terms of this thesis these three
approaches are different ways to deal with the uncertainty of tragedies. The first approach is linked
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to Hegel. Hook calls it the approach of history. “It suggests not only that whatever cause wins and
however it wins is more just than the cause which is defeated, but that the loser is the more wicked
and not merely the weaker” (Hook 2002, 83). The second approach is the approach of love which is
a  Christian  theological  approach.  This  approach is  insufficient  for  Hook in  order  to  decide  in
situations of tragedies since we (1) cannot love everybody equally and in the end have to decide for
one conflict party and (2) cannot claim to have God's love on our side since God's love is equally
distributed (Hook 2002, 84).12 
The  third  and  most  important  approach  is  the  method  of  creative  intelligence.  It  is  Hook's
pragmatist answer to the uncertainty of tragedies. Put simply,  it  is an approach of creative and
collective inquiry. “Its categorical imperative is to inquire, to reason together, to seek in every crisis
the  creative  devices  and  inventions  that  will  not  only  make  life  fuller  and  richer  but  tragedy
bearable” (Hook 2002, 84-5). According to Hook, pragmatism is the best approach to deal with the
uncertainty of tragedies because pragmatism does not despair when confronted with uncertainty.  
The “pragmatic approach to tragedy is more serious, even more heroic, than any other approach
because it doesn't resign itself to the bare fact of tragedy or take easy ways out at the price of
truth. […] It does not conceive of tragedy as a preordained doom, but as one in which the plot to
some extent depends upon us, so that we become the creators of our own tragic history” (Hook
2002, 85).
Cornel West has later taken up this idea and also underlined how a sense for the tragic is crucial for
pragmatism.  West  finds  the  underlying  reason  for  the  pragmatist  sensitivity  for  tragedy  in  its
accentuation  of  the  future:  “The  pragmatic  emphasis  on  the  future  as  the  terrain  for  humans-
making-a-difference  (including  a  better difference)  results  in  a  full  blown  fallibilism  and
experimentalism. All facts are fallible and all experience is experimental” (West 2000, 178). For
West, the future is uncertain and may include tragedies but at least we have the potentials to make
the best out of it. Eddie Glaude Jr. has identified this as the meliorist aspect of pragmatism, i.e. “the
belief  that  our  circumstances  at  a  given  moment,  be  they  comparatively  good or  bad,  can  be
improved” (Glaude 2004, 102; also see Ansell 2016). Glaude  finds in Dewey’s pragmatism the
view 
“that  uncertainty  pervades  our  lives  and  involves  us  in  the  perils  of  evils,  that  there  are
dimensions of life that are far beyond our control […], and that this uncertainty defines our
moral life in the sense that we don’t have recourse to fix, universal rules that resolve our moral
dilemmas” (Glaude 2004, 90; also see Boisvert 1999).
12 See Lincoln's remark from his Second Inaugural Address how both parties in the Civil War prayed to the
same god and that therefore “the prayers of both could not be answered” (Lincoln 1992, 450).
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Pragmatism rejects the existence of such fix and universal rules that can help to deal with tragedies.
Building on pragmatism, Hook, West and Glaude have instead identified a different approach to the
uncertainty and dilemmas of tragedies. They have argued that through its meliorist optimism and by
employing collective creative inquiry pragmatism is very well able to deal with tragic situations
(such as crises and catastrophes).
2.2.2.3 William James and the San Francisco Earthquake
Given  pragmatism's  strong  emphasis  on  uncertainty  and  tragedy  it  might  seem surprising  that
concrete crises and catastrophes play only a minor or implicit role in most pragmatist texts. In fact I
am aware of only one classical pragmatist text that explicitly deals with a concrete situation of crisis
or catastrophe from a behavioral perspective. It is William James' report on the devastating San
Francisco earthquake of 1906. 
James was at Stanford University when the earthquake hit the Bay Area and traveled to the city
soon after the catastrophe had happened.13 His observations lead him to two conclusions: 
“The first of these was the rapidity of the improvisation of order out of chaos. It is clear that just
as in every thousand human beings there will be statistically so many artists, so many athletes,
so many thinkers, and so many potentially good soldiers, so there will be so many potential
organizers in times of emergency. In point of fact, not only in the great city, but in the outlying
towns, these natural ordermakers, whether amateurs or officials, came to the front immediately”
(James 1912, 221–22).
The second thing James'  noticed was an “universal  equanimity” (James 1912,  224) which was
contrasted by the pathos and sentimentality of the people from far-away regions of the country.
Although James noted the immense amount of damage and suffering it was a sense of community
and shared burden in which he found the reason for the good mood of the survivors. “In California
every  one,  to  some degree,  was  suffering,  and one's  private  miseries  were  merged in  the  vast
general sum of privation and in the all-absorbing practical problem of general recuperation” (James
1912, 225). James admired this spirit which for him was not a specific American or Californian
phenomenon but “a normal and universal trait of human nature” (James 1912, 225).
He later took up these insights in his well-known essay “The Moral Equivalent of War”. There he
recognizes the fact “that life is hard, that men should toil and suffer pain. The planetary conditions
once for all are such, and we can stand it” (James 1910, 467). But what James, although a strict
pacifist, admired about war are the positive virtues that it can bring forward. Virtues, as James had
13 See Solnit (2009, chap. I) for an excellent discussion of the events and James' role.
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observed in San Francisco, that can also emerge under other circumstances than war. The reason for
James why these martial virtues of “intrepidity, contempt of softness, surrender of private interest,
obedience to command” must be preserved even when wars cease to exist is the fact that mankind is
living on an “only partly hospitable globe” (James 1910, 467) where future crises and catastrophes
have to be expected all the time. 
All these insights led James to the conclusion that crises, such as wars and shipwrecks, “are the
great revealers of what men and women are able to do and bear” (James 2010, 268).14 In other
words, without glorifying war and catastrophes, James develops the “essential argument that human
beings are at their best when much is demanded of them” (Solnit 2009, 53). When it comes to crises
and  complex  problems  James,  just  as  Dewey,  is  therefore  optimistic  that  human  possess  the
capabilities and traits to deal with them successfully. Even more, he goes so far as to claim that
under such circumstances humans may discover hidden energies that enable them to act even under
these extreme conditions (James 2010, 263).
2.3 Pragmatism and the Critique of Rationalism
Pragmatism has emerged in the philosophical arena chiefly as a critique of rationalism. This section
will  further  clarify  the  meaning  of  pragmatism  by  discussing  how  pragmatism  contrasts  with
rationalism and how it relates to other approaches that are critical about rationalism. I discuss three
approaches that are close to pragmatism through their similar critique of rationalism: the works by
Charles Lindblom, Donald Schön and the bounded rationality approach as developed by Herbert
Simon and Daniel Kahneman.
For pragmatism, rationalism is linked to a certain Cartesian tradition, one that has been rejected
during the advent of pragmatism most prominently by Charles S. Peirce (see  2.4.2). Following
Peirce,  pragmatism  has  criticized  that  rationalism  has  been  paralyzed  by  its  conception  of
uncertainty as absolute doubt.  Instead pragmatism has stressed the relevance of action,  thereby
proposing a fallibilist and experimentalist way forward. In other words, stringent rational a priori
reasoning as the best  way to knowledge has  been replaced by pragmatists  with the method of
science. And contrary to the dualisms of rationalism pragmatism has established an approach that is
14 The quote is taken from James' “The Energies of Men” which was originally a talk to the American
Philosophical Association in 1906. In later versions of the text the given quote has been replaced by a
more general statement: “A new position of responsibility will usually show a man to be a far stronger
creature than was supposed” (James 1912, 244). James' general idea of course is preserved in the revised
version too.
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critical of all kind of dichotomies.
But pragmatism’s critique is not limited to the Cartesian version of rationalism. Instead it criticizes
all forms of rationalism that are “magnifying the role played by unaided reason, in the acquisition
and  justification  of  knowledge”  (Blackburn  2005c,  318).  Under  this  wider  definition  the  term
rationalism transcends its Cartesian heritage and the contrast to empiricist accounts of knowledge
(Markie 2013) but refers to a more general development. According to this understanding it is “the
position that reason has precedence over other ways of acquiring knowledge” (Garber 1999, 771)
that is characteristic for rationalist approaches.
Understood in this  broader sense,  rationalism plays a decisive role in the social  sciences.  Most
prominently, rationalism is dominant in the form of  rational choice theory, which – according to
many authors – has become “the paradigmatic way of analyzing behavior” (Oppenheimer 2010,
1150; for similar - although less absolute assessments - also see Green and Shapiro 1994; Hay 2002;
Parsons 2005). Although rational choice theory is more complex and diverse than it seems at first
glance there are some common core ideas that are summarized by the following definition: 
“Rational  choice  theories  explain  social  behavior  via  the  aggregated  actions  of  rational or
purposive actors. The actors are rational in the sense that, given a set of values and beliefs, they
calculate the relative costs and benefits of alternative actions and, from these calculations, make
a choice that maximizes their expected utility” (Simpson 2011, 494; also see Parsons 2005,
chap. 1).
Dahl and Lindblom (1992, 38) have defined the meaning of rational action similarly: “An action is
rational to the extent that it is 'correctly' designed to maximize goal achievement given the goal in
question and the real world as it exists”. Such a definition of rational action goes hand in hand with
an understanding of efficiency as its underlying principle: “[A]n action is 'correctly' designed to
maximize goal satisfaction to the extent that it is efficient, or in other words to the extent that goal
satisfaction exceeds goal cost” (Dahl and Lindblom 1992, 39).
This urge to find optimal and efficient (i.e. utility maximizing) solutions for complex decisions is
also at  the core of another  key project  of rationalism in decision and policy-making:  Evidence
Based Policy-Making. Evidence Based Policy-Making can be described as the “idea of rigorous
scientific  evidence needed for devising and evaluating public  policies” (Cartwright  2013,  296).
More precisely it follows the assumption that 
“[p]redictions  about  the  success  of  policy  interventions should  not  be  dictated  by  fashion,
ideology, political pressure, lobbying, or habit.  They should be based on  rigorous scientific
evidence, if possible on results from randomized controlled trials (RCTs), and certainly not on
anecdote, casual observation, theory without experiment, or expert opinion” (Cartwright 2013,
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296; also see Cartwright and Hardie 2012; Parkhurst and Abeysinghe 2014).
These ideas have been widely implemented especially in the Anglo-American countries (Bornstein
2012; Head 2010; Orszag 2009; Wells 2007) and led to a “revolution” (Rodrik 2010, 25) in the field
of development economics (Banerjee and Duflo 2009; Deaton 2010; Ravallion 2009). At the core of
this movement is an understanding of randomized control trials as the “gold standard” of science
(Cartwright 2010) that allows us to compare and systematically evaluate different policies and to
find a (more or less) undisputed optimal solution for complex social problems in the end. 
Despite this rationalist dominance in the field of policy- and decision-making, rationalist theories
have been challenged on theoretical and empirical grounds. Thereby pragmatism-infused ideas have
earned their  place  in  the area and are  especially  linked with three  approaches:  the theories  by
Charles Lindblom, Donald Schön and the bounded rationality  approach.  These theories will  be
introduced in the next two sections. A concluding section will then summarize their relation to
pragmatist thought.
2.3.1 Pragmatism and the Theories of Lindblom and Schön
The ideas of Charles Lindblom and Donald Schön are particularly close to  pragmatist  thought.
Lindblom  is  close  to  pragmatist  ideas  through  his  powerful  critique  of  rationalist
comprehensiveness,  his  emphasis  of  consequences,  his  emphasis  of  uncertainty  (Lindblom and
Woodhouse 1993, vii) and his appreciation of fallibilism (Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993, 17).
Schön puts forward a critique of rationalist dualism, rejects the rationalist stance towards inquiry as
“that of spectator/manipulator” (Schön 1983, 163) and understands human praxis as a certain form
of experimenting by emphasizing its hypothesis-testing character (see Argyris and Schön 1996, 30–
31).15
Lindblom has developed his approach of “muddling through” or “incrementalism” in policy-making
most  prominently  in  two  articles  in  Public  Administration  Review.  In  these  influential  texts
Lindblom described two methods of policy-making: the rational-comprehensive method (also called
15 Note how this understanding of experimentation goes far beyond the focus on randomized control trials
(RCTs) as the only form experiment as we have encountered it in the tradition of Evidence Based Policy-
Making.  This  brings  Schön in  line  with a  deeply pragmatist  understanding of  experimentation  as  a
broader movement that transcends RCTs and also includes demoractic experiments (Ansell 2012; Dorf
2012; Dorf and Sabel 1998; Sabel and Zeitlin 2010), design experiments (Stoker and John 2009) and
generative experiments (Ansell and Bartenberger 2016b).
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the root method) and the method of successive limited comparison (which he also called the branch
method  and  which  later  became  famous  under  the  terms  “muddling  through”  and
“incrementalism”).  In  using  the  first  method  a  policy-maker  would  proceed  as  follows  when
drafting a new policy: he would begin by listing and ordering all relevant values that might be
affected by a policy and rating possible policy outcomes “as more or less efficient in attaining a
maximum  of  these  values”.  These  elaborate  inquiries  and  calculations  would  be  followed  by
outlining all possible policy alternatives before the final step would be to “undertake systematic
comparison  of  his  multitude  of  alternatives  to  determine  which  attains  the  greatest  amount  of
values” (Lindblom 1959, 79, also see 1977, chap. 23). 
Such a method is very close to what Gary Klein has called “comparative evaluation strategies”
(Klein 1998, 62). Theories of comparative evaluation assume that in making decisions people go
through a list of options, evaluate and weight them according to a certain set of criteria and finally
decide on the option that fits these criteria best (see 2.6.4.2). Lindblom does not believe that policy
makers proceed in such a manner. Hence he rejects this method as “impossible and irrelevant” and
instead favors the “science of muddling through” as “both possible and relevant” (Lindblom 1959,
83). 
In advancing this approach one of Lindblom's main argument is that the comprehensiveness of the
rational method is just not possible. 
“Although such an approach can be described, it cannot be practiced except for relatively simple
problems and even then only in a somewhat modified form. It assumes intellectual capacities
and sources that men simply do not possess, and it is even more absurd as an approach to policy
when the time and money that can be allocated to a policy problem is limited, as is always the
case” (Lindblom 1959, 80).
The unrealistic expectations of the rational-comprehensive approach are therefore “a prescription
for  paralysis”  (Lindblom  and  Woodhouse  1993,  32).  While  Lindblom's  method  of  muddling
through also vindicates some form of analysis and comparison it is a deliberatively incomplete and
limited one. It starts not with a comprehensive analysis and ranking of existing values but “would
find that the policy alternatives combined objectives or values in different ways” (Lindblom 1959,
79). The analysis of value outcomes is thus conducted not in a general and comprehensive way but
via the comparison of a few concrete policy alternatives. Since each of these policy alternatives
combine “objectives or values in different ways” the final selection would “combine into one the
choice among values and the choice among instruments for reaching values” (Lindblom 1959, 79–
80). 
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But which policy alternatives are chosen for this limited comparison and how do policymakers
decide  which  policy  is  the  “best”?  Lindblom  describes  two  ways  how  the  number  of  policy
alternatives that are compared is narrowed down: First, “through limitation of policy comparisons to
those policies that differ in relatively small degree from policies presently in effect” (Lindblom
1959, 84). This promotion of small-step change is also the reason why Lindblom's approach has
most prominently been labeled as “incrementalism”.16 
Second, a policy can be chosen by a surprisingly simple test: “the test is agreement on policy itself,
which remains possible even when agreement on values is not” (Lindblom 1959, 83). The starting
point of this  argument is  the observation that  objectives and values are seldom aligned among
administrators and decision makers (Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993, 19). This is why the test of
the  rationalist  method,  ordering  and ranking  different  values  and  objectives  and  evaluating  all
possible  policies  according  to  them,  fails  from  the  beginning.  This  unrealistic  conception  is
contrasted by Lindblom with “the ease with which individuals of different ideologies often can
agree  on  concrete  policy”  (Lindblom  1959,  83).  Concentrating  on  policies  and  their  specific
consequences and leaving abstract value-debates behind is therefore the way agreement is possible.
This process is complemented by “a greater analytical preoccupation with ills to be remedied than
positive goals  to  be sought” and embedded in “a sequence of trials,  errors,  and revised trials”
(Lindblom 1979, 517).
In his book  The Reflective Practitioner  Donald Schön has taken up a similar topic and provided
another key example of a pragmatism-inspired perspective on policy and decision making. Heavily
influenced by Dewey, Schön is especially interested in the actual behavior of practitioners and how
they  make  assessments  and  decisions  when  confronted  with  complex  situations.  Exploring  the
prevalent  theories  in  his  field  of  interest  Schön  also  finds  rationalism  to  be  the  dominant
explanatory approach when it  comes to  the practice of professionals.  In a  nutshell,  rationalism
imagines professional activity as “instrumental problem solving made rigorous by the application of
scientific theory and technique” (Schön 1983, 21). It further follows a dualist conception, separating
means  from ends,  research  from practice  and knowing from doing and regards  action  only  as
“implementation and test of technical decision” (Schön 1983, 165). 
16 Against the popular description of Lindblom's approach as “incrementalism” I prefer the term “muddling
through” and will use it throughout this study. The reason for this is the fact that (as should be clear by
now) incrementalism is only one part of the broader conception of policy making that Lindblom's has in
mind.  In the  later  revision of  his  ideas  Lindblom has  tried to  target  this  problem by distinguishing
different forms of incrementalism (Lindblom 1979).
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Schön finds this  rationalist  perspective on the practice of professionals (ranging from teachers,
social workers, musicians, physicians, statisticians to architects and psychotherapists) insufficient
and incomplete. Against it he proposes the viewpoint of Reflection-in-Action. For Schön this is a
perspective that accounts for the “artistic, intuitive processes which some practitioners do bring to
situations of uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value conflict”  (Schön 1983, 49), something
that is clearly missing in the rationalist model. He summarizes what practitioners do when they
proceed in a reflective-in-action way in analyzing a situation as follows: 
“From their repertoires of examples, images, descriptions, they [the practitioners – M.B.] have
derived  […]  a  way  of  framing  the  present,  unique  situation.  They  try,  then,  to  shape  the
situation to the frame; and they evaluate the entire process by criteria […] – whether they can
solve the problem they have set;  whether they value what they get when they solve it […];
whether they achieve in the situation a coherence of artifact and idea, a congruence with their
fundamental theories and values; whether they can keep inquiry moving” (Schön 1983, 141).17
In the language of pragmatism this is an experimentalist process. Being confronted with a problem
practitioners  explore  the  situation  by  trying  things  out,  developing  and testing  hypotheses  and
finding a preliminary interpretation for it. Consequently, Schön summarizes his view: “Reflection-
in-action is a kind of experimenting” (Schön 1983, 132). 
What Schön highlights with his understanding of professional practice as Reflection-in-action is
that the behavior of professionals is not dominated by an instrumentalist weighing and comparing of
different options to reach a certain given end. Against this conception he instead shows how it is a
process that builds on existing experience, links it to the case at hand, applies an interpretative
frame to it and evaluates the consequences that arise out of this. Finally, this is an process of open
inquiry that leads only to provisional results that are always “open to the situation's  back-talk”
(Schön 1983, 164) and might be repeated when necessary.
2.3.2 Pragmatism and Bounded Rationality
Pragmatism  also  shares  key  characteristics  with  the  theory  of  bounded  rationality.  Initially
developed  by  Herbert  Simon  and  later  refined  by  Daniel  Kahneman  the  theory  of  bounded
rationality has earned both Simon (in 1978) and Kahneman (in 2002) the Nobel Prize in Economics.
17 It  is a common misunderstanding that reflective practice in Schön's sense is simply the fact that we
reflect upon our practice retrospectively. As Gary Rolfe (2014, 1179) has highlighted this is a deeply
flawed  conception  of  Schön's  ideas:  “For  Schön,  reflective  practice  is  something  that  we  do,  not
something that we sit down afterwards and think about. Reflective practice means reflection in practice,
or what he more usually refers to as reflection in-action”.
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The key argument of bounded rationality goes as follows: 
“The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small
compared with the  size  of  the  problems whose solution is  required for  objectively rational
behavior  in  the  real  world  –  or  even  for  a  reasonable  approximation  to  such  objective
rationality” (Simon 1957, 198).
Following this  insight  Simon postulates  that  humans  are unable  to  follow a utility-maximizing
strategy and instead fall back to a strategy he labels satisficing: 
“In most global models of rational choice, all alternatives are evaluated before a choice is made.
In  actual  human  decision-making,  alternatives  are  often  examined  sequentially.  […]  When
alternatives are examined sequentially, we may regard the first satisfactory alternative that is
evaluated as such as the one actually selected” (Simon 1957, 252; also see Tyson 2006).
A similar argument was made by the psychologist Daniel Kahneman. Kahneman summarizes his
research as the attempt “to obtain a map of bounded rationality, by exploring the systematic biases
that separate the beliefs that people have and the choices they make from the optimal beliefs and
choices assumed in rational-agent models” (Kahneman 2003, 1449). Similar to Simon, Kahneman’s
project is intended as a critique of the traditional model of rational-choice. Against such rationalistic
models – which Kahneman regards as “psychologically unrealistic” (Kahneman 2003, 1449) – he
divides human decision making into two “Systems”: 
“System 1 operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary
control.  System 2 allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, including
complex computations.  The operations of System 2 are often associated with the subjective
experience of agency, choice, and concentration” (Kahneman 2012, 21).
In simpler words: System 1 is the part of our mind that is commonly named intuition while System
2 is what we call reasoning. One of the key insights for Kahneman is that in making decisions we
often solely use the fast heuristics and biases of System 1 and skip the slower procedures of System
2. Kahneman and Amos Tversky have described these heuristics as a way to allow judgment under
conditions of uncertainty (Tversky and Kahneman 1974).
While this enables us to decide complex questions reasonable fast under conditions of uncertainty
this hot-wiring also makes us prone to several forms of errors and fallacies. Kahneman and his
colleagues have explored these biases and fallacies in great detail and have collected an impressive
amount of experimental data to support their claims (for an overview see Kahneman 2012). 
2.3.3 Thinking Versus Action: Pragmatism’s Distinct Critique of Rationalism
The brief discussion of Lindblom, Schön, Simon and Kahneman has shown that pragmatism is not
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the alone with its  critique of rationalism. Instead all  these authors have described the flaws of
rationalism and its assumption of a “rational man” model. By examining these flaws these authors
have shown that pragmatism is onto something. 
But while sharing many common traits, pragmatism’s critique of rationalism goes one step further
than these prominent critiques of rationalism. Pragmatism involves a much more radical break with
rationalist fundamentals then these critiques. While Lindblom, Simon and Kahneman have shown
the unrealistic assumptions and flaws of rationalism they remain in the realm of rationalist thought.
Among the discussed authors, Schön is the only one who leaves the rationalist tradition behind by
building on Dewey’s concept of experimentalism. But he also does not employ the full potential of
pragmatist philosophy as this thesis will try to do. 
The following paragraphs will substantiate this argument and recapitulate the distinct differences
between the approaches of Lindblom, Schön, Simon and Kahneman and philosophical pragmatism
towards human conduct.
The  careful  reader  might  have  noticed  that  I  have  used  the  word  conduct when  referring  to
rationalist and pragmatist approaches to human behavior in the last sentence. What might seem as a
arbitrary  usage  of  terms  points  in  fact  to  one  of  the  most  fundamental  differences  between
rationalist and pragmatist approaches. When bounded rationality theories refer to human conduct
they tend to use the terms  mind and  thinking as a quick look at Simon's definition of bounded
rationality and the book title of Kahneman's most prominent work make clear. While this is not
problematic  as  such  and  probably  a  quite  natural  decision  for  scholars  heavily  invested  in
psychological research it is an important aspect that separates bounded rationality from a pragmatist
tradition. There the key terms when examining human conduct are (inter)action and praxis.18
A quick review of pragmatist literature validates this claim. As we remember, Peirce's starting point
for the whole endeavor of pragmatism was a critique of Descartes who “sought a more natural
fountain of true principles, and professed to find it in the human mind” (Peirce 1992, 125). Against
this artificial concentration on the human mind Peirce considered it “necessary that a method should
18 Of course one should not take this juxtaposition too far. There is for instance a book by John Dewey with
the title  How We Think.  But  even there Dewey links thinking to the importance of action when he
describes what is essentially the pragmatist method of abduction (hypothesis testing): “Where there is
thought,  things  present  act  as  signs  or  tokens  of  things not  yet  experienced.  A thinking being  can,
accordingly, act on the basis of the absent and the future. Instead of being pushed into a mode of action
by the sheer urgency of forces, whether instincts or habits, of which he is not aware, a reflective agent is
drawn (to some extent at least) to action by some remoter object of which he is indirectly aware” (Dewey
1910, 14–15).
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be found by which our beliefs may be caused by nothing human, but by some external permanency
– by something upon which our thinking has no effect” (Peirce 1992, 120). Hence his method of
science as the pragmatist answer to this challenge. Dewey has continued this line of thought and put
it in its most comprehensive form, first in Human Nature and Conduct and most prominently in The
Quest for Certainty. For Dewey “all conduct is interaction between elements of human nature and
the environment, natural and social” (Dewey 1922, 10). And in even stronger terms: “It is not an
ethical 'ought' that conduct should be social. It is social, whether bad or good” (Dewey 1922, 17).
Dewey reconstructs how this knowledge has been lost on the example of the history of philosophy.
“The depreciation of action, doing and making, has been cultivated by philosophers.  […] They
glorified their own office without doubt in placing theory so much above practice” (Dewey 1990,
4).19 The messy chaos of practice and action has been left behind in the quest for certainty, i.e. 
“a quest for peace which is assured, an object which is unqualified by risk and the shadow of
fear which action casts. For it is not uncertainty per se which men dislike, but the fact that
uncertainty involves us in peril of evils. […] Quest for complete certainty can be fulfilled in
pure knowing alone” (Dewey 1990, 7).
More recently the German sociologist Hans Joas has elaborated on this pragmatist break with the
rationalist  dichotomy  of  knowledge  and  action.  He  explains  how  pragmatism-influenced
sociologists “did not accept the theoretical model of rational action as either an historical ideal type
or a psychological assumption” and “found the possibility for making this refusal in the theoretical
model of action proposed by pragmatism” (Joas 1993, 247). Against rationalist conception of a
utility-maximizing mind the main pragmatist thought is “the creative solution of problems by an
experimenting intelligence” (Joas 1993, 248).  Again this  includes the notion that  human action
cannot be reduced to the human mind following a certain set of predefined ends: 
“For the pragmatist, the setting of ends is not an act of consciousness that takes place outside of
contexts of action. Rather, the setting of an end can only be a result of reflection on resistances
encountered by the variously oriented behavior of a life form whose world is always already
schematized in a practical manner prior to all reflection” (Joas 1993, 248). 
This is an aspect that distinguishes pragmatism from Kahneman’s approach, which otherwise shares
many characteristics with pragmatism. This difference becomes clear in a joint article authored by
Daniel  Kahneman  and  Gary  Klein  (2009).  Both  scholars  have  done  extensive  research  on  the
question how people make decisions yet arrived at somehow different results. For Klein, whose
research is  influenced by pragmatism (see  2.6.4.2),  judgment and intuition is  a  great  source of
19 Note,  however,  that  for  Dewey  this  change  does  not  originate within  philosophy  but  more  in  the
historical conditions of mankind.
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wisdom and immensely useful in various situations (although he is aware of its potential flaws and
mistakes) as his research on firefighters, nurses and paramedics has shown (Klein 1998). Kahneman
on the other hand is much more skeptical when it comes to these decisions made by what he labels
System 1 and in his research has highlighted the various flawed heuristics and biases that frequently
lead  to  faulty  decisions  (Kahneman 2003,  2012).  In  their  article  the  two authors  explore  their
different stance towards intuitive judgment and – despite being able to reconcile many of their
contradictions – arrive at a fundamental insight: 
“For historical and methodological reasons, HB [Heuristics and Biases approach – Kahneman's
tradition]  researchers  generally  find  errors  more  interesting  and  instructive  than  correct
performance […] Because their intellectual attitudes developed in reaction to the HB tradition,
members  of  the  NDM [Naturalistic  Decision Making –  Klein's  school  of  thought]  have  an
aversion to the word bias and to the corresponding concept [...]” (Kahneman and Klein 2009,
525).
While Kahneman tends to see the anomalies and complexities of practice as a deficit, pragmatism
consistently highlights the strengths and potentials of practical behavior. This becomes also clear in
the appreciation of the work of practitioners in the research by Klein and Schön. As Kahneman and
Klein agree: “The members of the HB community are mostly based in academic departments, and
they  tend  to  favor  well-controlled  experiments  in  the  laboratory.  The  members  of  the  NDM
community are typically practitioners who operate in 'real-world' organizations” (Kahneman and
Klein 2009, 518). From a pragmatist point of view this limitation of the HB approach to laboratory
settings might be considered an example of the “separation of intellect from action” (Dewey 1990,
5) which has partly lead – not surprisingly – to a flawed “spectator theory of knowledge” (Dewey
1990, 29). 
Donald Schön emphasizes this importance of human practice and the role it plays in knowledge
creation.  But  while  Schön  is explicitly  building  on  Dewey's  conception  of  action  as  an
experimentalist, artistic and playful activity (Joas 1993, 249), he is not employing the full potential
of  pragmatist  thought.  The  next  sections  will  show  how  pragmatism  goes  beyond  Dewey’s
conception of experimentalism but includes other dimensions such as fallibilism, anti-dualism or
deliberation as well. These key elements will form the building blocks for a pragmatist theory of
crisis management.
2.4 The Main Pillars of Pragmatist Thinking
When discussing the main pillars of pragmatist thinking of pragmatism I will concentrate mainly on
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what has been labeled “classical pragmatism”, i.e. its early phase closely connected to the work of
Peirce,  James  and  Dewey.20 But  wherever  necessary  I  will  also  draw  on  the  works  of  other
pragmatists.  What  I  will  leave out  mainly though is  the literature on neo-pragmatism (Richard
Rorty, Hilary Putnam, Robert Brandom, etc.) and how it relates to the classical form of pragmatism.
The discussions on neo-pragmatism largely take place on a purely philosophical level and have little
to  offer  to  a  pragmatist  theory  of  political  crisis  management.  I  will  include  the  works  of
contemporary pragmatists who either discuss a pragmatist  theory of action (Hans Joas, Richard
Bernstein)  or have discussed questions that relate  to political  science and public administration
(Chris Ansell, Charles Sabel, Michael Dorf).
The discussion of the rather  abstract and sometimes dry ideas of pragmatism in this  section is
necessary  for  two  reasons:  first,  it  documents  how  this  study  is  anchored  in  philosophical
pragmatism. Second, these elements build the base for the building blocks of a pragmatist theory of
crisis management as developed in the following section: anti-dualism, fallibilism, experimentalism
and deliberation (see 2.5). These building blocks will be the guidelines for the model of pragmatist
crisis management (see chapter 3).
2.4.1 The Pragmatic Maxim
The pragmatic maxim stands at the center of pragmatism as it was originally developed by Charles
Sanders Peirce. His essay “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (published 1878) defines a simple rule to
clarify the meaning of any conception. In its most accessible form the pragmatic maxim reads:
“Thus, we come down to what is tangible and practical, as the root of every real distinction of
thought, no matter how subtile it may be; and there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist
in anything but a possible difference of practice” (Peirce 1992, 131). 
William James  illustrates  the  application  of  the  pragmatic  maxim by  referring  to  a  whimsical
example. He describes how on a camping trip a heated discussion about a squirrel and a tree began.
The situation discussed was the following: If there is a squirrel on the trunk of a tree and a man
20 The  term  “classical  pragmatism”  isn't  undisputed  though  since  it  implies  a  concentration  on  the
aforementioned triumvirate of Peirce, James and Dewey and risks excluding such important persons as
George Herbert Mead, Jane Addams, Mary Parker Follett or others who have played an eminent role for
pragmatism (see  Bernstein's  (2010,  218,  Note  8)  discussion  of  the  problem).  This  problem is  also
exemplified  by  Louis  Menand's  important  historical  study  on  pragmatism  (Menand  2001),  which
highlights  the  role  of  Oliver  Wendell  Holmes,  Jr.  who  is  seldomly  mentioned  in  the  literature  on
pragmatism. 
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begins to chase it around the tree but never sees it (because the squirrel too begins to circle and
always manages to keep the tree between itself and the chaser) then does the man go around the
squirrel or not? James vividly depicts how when he arrived at the scene two groups had already
been established: one defending the opinion that in this scenario the man indeed goes around the
squirrel while the other group fiercely denied that very fact. James set out to end this discussion by
applying the pragmatic maxim and asking for the meaning of the question at stake: 
“'Which party is  right',  I  said,  'depends on what  you practically mean by 'going round'  the
squirrel. If you mean passing from the north of him to the east, then to the south, then to the
west, and then to the north of him again, obviously the man does go round him, for he occupies
the successive positions. But if on the contrary you mean being first in front of him, then on the
right of him, then behind him, then on his left, and finally in front again, it is quite as obvious
that the man fails to go round him […]. Make the distinction, and there is no occasion for any
farther dispute” (James 2000, 24). 
One should take away two points from this example that are essential for pragmatism and which we
will encounter later. First, how according to pragmatism many (both metaphysical and practical)
conflicts and disputes are essentially puzzles that, “when they are not simply wasting the energy of
the people who spend their time trying to solve them, actually get in the way of our everyday efforts
to cope with the world” (Menand 1997, xi).  Second, pragmatism claims that it  can resolve and
clarify these false disputes and dichotomies by applying the pragmatic maxim, or as James calls it
“the pragmatic method” (James 2000, 25) as demonstrated in the squirrel example.
In other words, what the pragmatic maxim does on a philosophical level is to try to do away with
eternal principles and a priori reasoning.21 As Michael Bacon explains using examples given by
Peirce himself: 
“To say of an object such as a diamond that it is hard means that it is difficult to scratch; if we
say that something is heavy, we mean that without opposing force it will fall downwards. That
is, meaning is tied to experiment, such that, in performing an action, particular consequences
will follow” (Bacon 2012, 4).
This indicates of course that an abstract principle such as hardness or heaviness that is remote to a
concrete and practical conception does not make much sense at all and in the end is not overly
useful and necessary. William James recognized the significance of Peirce's pragmatic maxim but
expanded it significantly. 
“To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object,  then, we need only consider what
conceivable effects of  a practical  kind the object  may involve – what  sensations we are to
expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether
21 This is especially intended against Descartes as the next section will make clear.
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immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that
conception has positive significance at all” (James 2000, 25).22 
While at first glance this just seems to be a simple reformulation of Peirce's version there is indeed
a striking difference as Michael Bacon points out:
“Peirce's  version  of  the  pragmatic  maxim  anticipates  the  logical  positivists'  principle  of
verificationism, according to which meaningful statements are those (and only those) for which
we can establish whether or not such statements are true. James' understanding of pragmatism is
in  contrast  decidedly  anti-positivist.  For  him  the  practical  consequences  of  belief  are  not
exclusively  those  which  can  be  observed,  but  any kind  of  consequence  in  the  life  of  the
believer” (Bacon 2012, 27). 
Here one can already see James' separation from Peirce and how he begins to develop his own
version of a more subjective and psychological pragmatism. 
Even when considering this profound difference there still exists a lot of common ground between
Peirce and James. The most obvious one is that – either taken in Peirce's or James' form – the
pragmatic  maxim entails  an  emphasis  on  consequences.  This  emphasis  can  be  summarized  as
follows: Decisions ought to be based on the consequences,  effects and practical outcomes of a
concept not on abstract principles and a priori reasoning. This consequentialism is an important
general theme of pragmatism that distinguishes pragmatism from principle-guided approaches as
the empirical analysis will make clear (see chapter 5 and 6).
2.4.2 The Pragmatist Anti-Skepticism and Anti-Cartesianism
Pragmatism's anti-skepticism refers to the view that just as beliefs need to be founded and justified
so must be doubts. In other words, doubts cannot be abstract and general but must be founded in
concrete and practical experiences.
22 The usage of the term “consequence” in this context might  easily lead to the misunderstanding that
pragmatism is talking about causal consequences here (in the form: A follows from B, B is therefore a
consequence of A). But as far as I can see the meaning of the term “consequences” in the pragmatic
maxim – both in Peirce's and James' form – does not entail a specific idea of causality. It does not deal
with the question if the consequences of something are due to a specific causal mechanism or if we can
only understand them as correlation. Instead it simply encourages us to think about the effects we might
except from a certain object or concept. 
To pick up Peirce's example: our concept of a diamond as hard is not derived from a general principle of
“hardness” but from our observation that it is hard to scratch. In other words, the meaning of our concept
of hardness is defined by the  consequence of being hard to scratch (among others). It is not a causal
consequence where being hard to scratch would follow from the principle of “hardness”. Instead the
concept of “hardness” is reduced to the mere consequences we expect from it. 
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This  is  a  point  that  was  initially  developed  by Peirce  against  Cartesian  philosophy.23 In  “The
Fixation of Belief” Peirce criticizes Descartes’ artificial idea of doubt and contrasts it with his idea
of “a real and living doubt” (Peirce 1992, 114). This means that doubt cannot be grasped as an
abstract principle but must be founded on some evidence and a concrete situation where our beliefs
are disturbed: “[...] a belief is that which one would be prepared to act upon, with doubt defined as
the uneasy sense of dissatisfaction caused when acting according to that belief does not result in the
anticipated consequences” (Bacon 2012,  21).  According to  Peirce (1992,  114)  this  irritation of
belief through doubt triggers a “struggle to attain a state of belief” that he calls inquiry.24 
The classical example of pragmatism's anti-skepticism is found in William James' essay “The Will
to Believe” (1896). In this important piece of pragmatist philosophy James defends the idea that one
has the right to believe an assertion even if evidence for it is insufficient.25 James develops this
argument mainly with religious beliefs in mind, even going so far as to call his essay a “justification
of faith, a defence of our right to adopt a believing attitude in religious matters, in spite of the fact
that our merely logical intellect may not have been coerced” (James 1997, 69). In the essay he
fiercely argues against the principle “Better go without belief forever than believe a lie” (James
1997,  82).  Instead  he  poses  the  question:  “Are  there  not  somewhere  forced  options  in  our
speculative questions, and can we […] always wait with impunity till the coercive evidence shall
have arrived?” (James 1997, 85). James develops the standpoint that humans should have the right
to believe even if  no evidence can be found at  this  point.  James seems to differ from Peirce's
position  in  certain  regards  since  James  shifts  the  terrain  again  to  a  more  subjective  and
psychological level. His spirituality also seems to remove him from the primacy of the scientific
method  that  is  key  for  Peirce.26 But  what  unites  both  Peirce  and  James  as  pragmatists  is  the
23 It  even can be  argued that  Peirce  developed pragmatism mainly as  a  critique of  Descartes.  This  is
exemplified by the fact that both “founding papers” of pragmatism deal with Descartes explicitly.
This shouldn't imply that pragmatism rejects every element of Cartesian philosophy by and large. Dewey
for instance regarded Descartes as one of the predecessors of Darwin and admitted that as such he made
some valid points: “When Descartes said: 'The nature of physical things is much more easily conceived
when they are beheld coming gradually into existence, than when they are considered as produced at
once in a finished and perfect  state',  the modern world became self-conscious of the logic that  was
henceforth  to  control  it,  the  logic  of  which  Darwin's  'Origin  of  Species'  is  the  latest  scientific
achievement” (Dewey 2011, 144).
24 Discussing the same topic in terms of habits and impulse this discussion is later also a key theme of John
Dewey's  Human Nature and Social Conduct (Dewey 1922) and plays an implicit  role in his treatise
Experience & Education (Dewey 1938a) as well.
25 James himself has later regretted the title and instead preferred “The  Right to Believe” (see Goodman
2013) which indeed gives a much clearer idea of the text’s key argument.
26 While for Peirce beliefs have ultimately be put to the test of the scientific method James' position is
much more unclear  here.  When it  comes  to  holding  religious  beliefs  for  example  it  is  clear  that  a
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principle of “Feel free to go ahead and make the claim” (Rescher 2005a, 748). Peirce outlined this
axiom in his theory of abduction. 
Just  as  for  James,  for Peirce it  is  possible  and even necessary to  believe in  the plausibility  of
propositions, even if we haven't found evidence for them yet. Peirce develops this position in the
field of logic in contrast to the two established ways of inference, deduction and induction. He calls
his approach simply hypothesis or abduction and gives the following example for this method: 
“Suppose I enter a room and there find a number of bags, containing different kinds of beans.
On the table there is a handful of white beans; and, after some searching, I find one of the bags
contains white beans only. I at once infer as a probability, or as a fair guess, that this handful
was taken out of that bag. This sort of inference is called making an hypothesis” (Peirce 1932,
374).
While induction can be seen as one form of inversion of the method of deduction, abduction is a
different form of inversion as the following table makes clear.
 
The principles of induction and hypothesis may seem to be closely related and in fact Peirce splits
hypothesis from induction and tries to establish it as an independent mode of inference. But he finds
several important differences: 
scientific approach wouldn't be able to clarify the question if evidence for such beliefs can be found. It is
than very hard to find “objective” empirical evidence for certain sets of belief. As I understand it this is
the reason why James has to shift to the subjective level.
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Figure 1: Deduction, Induction and Hypothesis (Abduction) (in Peirce 1932, 374).
“By induction, we conclude that facts, similar to observed facts, are true in cases not examined.
By hypothesis, we conclude the existence of a fact quite different from anything observed, from
which, according to known laws, something observed would necessarily result. The former, is
reasoning  from particulars  to  the  general  law;  the  latter,  from effect  to  cause.  The  former
classifies, the latter explains” (Peirce 1932, 381).
Hypothesis also departs from the principle of induction because it transcends the limits of direct
observation: 
“The great difference between induction and hypothesis is, that the former infers the existence
of phenomena such as we have observed in cases which are similar, while hypothesis supposes
something of a different kind from what we have directly observed, and frequently something
which it would be impossible for us to observe directly” (Peirce 1932, 385).
This is the key difference between the two methods as Peirce is at pains to show. For him abduction
“infers very frequently a fact not capable of direct observation” (Peirce 1932, 386). Translated in a
language that is closer to the purpose of this study, abduction enables us to make (preliminary)
decisions under high uncertainty. This might be illustrated by the following fictional example.
Assume the  managers  of  a  tsunami  early-warning system in  Southeast  Asia  decide  to  apply  a
critical software update to their systems during tsunami season. Through an unnoticed programming
error  the  software  update  causes  all  early-warning  buoys  to  send their  data  incompletely.  The
managers of the system can therefore not identify which buoys send which data sets. The situation
is intensified by the fact that some buoys are suddenly sending alarming data which indicate an
incoming tsunami. But due to the incompleteness of the data it is impossible to tell which parts of
the coast should be evacuated. What the managers do know though is how the average data from
certain buoys looks which helps them to generate hypotheses which buoys are sending which data
sets. Formalizing their method as an approach of abduction it might look like this:
Abduction
Rule: For buoys on the west coast the value A is normally between 10 and 12.
Result: Value A is between 10 and 12 in the data sets of six buoys.
Case: These buoys are on the west coast.
Keeping the principles of this example close to Peirce's original beans example allows us to see
how abduction (or hypothetic reasoning) is an approach that allows decisions and actions under
highly uncertain circumstances. It doesn't allow us to be absolutely sure about the correctness of our
inferences but such a “quest for certainty” is only possible in the form of deduction and not able to
generate new theses. 
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Deduction
Rule: For buoys on the west coast the value A is between 10 and 12.
Case: These buoys are from the west coast.
Result: Their value A is between 10 and 12.
Induction on the other hand enables us to expand the reach of known observable facts through
generalization.
Induction
Case: These six buoys are on the west coast.
Result: Their value A is between 10 and 12.
Rule: The value A of all buoys on the west coast is between 10 and 12.
Both induction and abduction are useful in situations of uncertainty because they allow to generate
(and test) new knowledge. But as Peirce observed, there is a profound difference between the two.
As has been mentioned already, induction has to stick to observable facts, it simply “infers from one
set of facts another set of similar facts, whereas hypothesis infers from facts of one kind to facts of
another” (Peirce 1932, 386). Still,  induction is in a certain sense also “a much stronger kind of
inference” (Peirce 1932, 386). While abduction – as can be seen in the formal representation of the
three approaches – ends with a case, at the end of induction stands a new rule. For Peirce induction
expresses therefore the formation of a habit. Abduction, on the other hand, is compared by him in a
recondite way to an  emotion (Peirce 1932, 385). Fortunately, for the point that should be taken
away from the principle of abduction and its  difference from induction for this  study, it  is not
necessary to dive into this discussion. The key insight for this study is understanding abduction as a
way of inference that is experimentalist and that allows to decide and act even in situations of high
uncertainty. As will be shown later these are characteristics that make abduction a quintessentially
pragmatist approach.
From a different perspective, Peirce's principle of abduction, originally developed as a contribution
to the theory of logic and inference, can also be read as a conceptualization of learning. Because
one of the main results of abductive logic – contrary to deductive approaches – is to allow us to
generate  new  interpretations  and  hypotheses  which  can  be  exposed  to  further  testing  and
examination: “What is common for all abductive inference [...] is that the conclusion provides new
insights as an outcome of our interpreting or explaining something with the help of what Peirce
calls the rule” (Danermark et al. 2002, 90; emphasis added).
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Peirce  himself  even went  so far  as  to  state  that  abduction encompasses  the  whole meaning of
pragmatism: “If you carefully consider the question of pragmatism you will see that it is nothing
else  than  the  question  of  the  logic  of  abduction”  (Peirce  1932,  121).  Peirce  of  course  defined
“pragmatism” strictly as a way to clarify the meaning of our conceptions, i.e. the pragmatic maxim.
Since this  dissertation develops an understanding of pragmatism that  is  much wider  it  will  not
follow  this  reduction  of  pragmatism  to  abduction.  Nevertheless,  Peirce's  approach  of
hypothesis/abduction is  one of the most prominent examples of the fallibilist  and anti-skeptical
nature of pragmatism.
2.4.3 Pragmatism and Adaption 
Darwinist thinking has had a strong influence on pragmatist ideas (see Efron 2011; Schulkin 2011).
From Darwin’s theories, pragmatism has derived large parts of its understanding of the importance
of  adaptability,  open-mindedness  and  experimentalism.  Among  the  pragmatist  thinkers,  John
Dewey  has  engaged  with  Darwin's  theory  of  evolution  most  profoundly.  In  his  article  “The
Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy” Dewey makes clear how Darwin “introduced a mode of
thinking that in the end was bound to transform the logic of knowledge, and hence the treatment of
morals, politics, and religion” (Dewey 2011, 141). The traditional view that ruled philosophy before
Darwin is characterized by Dewey through the central role of purposefulness. 
“Purposefulness accounted for the intelligibility of nature and the possibility of science, while
the absolute or cosmic character of this purposefulness gave sanction and worth to the moral
and religious endeavors of man. Science was underpinned and morals authorized by one and the
same principle,  and their  mutual  agreement was  eternally guaranteed ”  (Dewey 2011,  145;
emphasis added).
Darwin's works did away with this view and shifted the work of science and philosophy to a new
level:27 “Philosophy  forswears  inquiry  after  absolute  origins  and  absolute  finalities  in  order  to
explore specific values and the specific conditions that generate them” (Dewey 2011, 146). This is
also true for the idea of history as Dewey understands it: “History, as viewed from the evolutionary
standpoint,  is  not  a  mere  collection  of  incidents  or  external  changes,  which  something  fixed
(whether spiritual or physical) has passed through, but is a process that reveals to us the conditions
under which moral practices and ideas have originated” (Dewey 1902, 113). In other words, what
27 Dewey has no illusions that such a profound shift may take longer than desirable. He builds this insight
on the pragmatist  concept of beliefs and habits:  “Old ideas give way slowly; for they are more than
abstract  logical  forms and categories.  They are  habits,  predispositions,  deeply engrained attitudes of
aversion and preference” (Dewey 2011, 148).
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Dewey takes away from Darwin is the general idea of adaption: 
“The significance of the evolutionary method in biology and social history is that every distinct
organ,  structure,  or  formation,  every  grouping  of  cells  or  elements,  is  to  be  treated  as  an
instrument of adjustment or adaptation to a particular environing situation” (Dewey 1909, 15).
Dewey even wrote a dedicated entry in  The Cyclopedia of Education (published 1911) where he
defines two different forms of adaption: passive and active. Passive adaption is a state where only
the mere adjustment to given circumstances takes place. Active adaption, which Dewey also labels
“continued growth”,28 on the other side “means that the individual does not accommodate himself to
his environment, but takes the initiative in modifying it to make it over into accord with his own
desires and purposes” (Dewey 1911a, 35). 
For humans, the process of evolution and adaption should not be understood as a simple stimulus-
response system in which we only can react to the cruel perils  of nature and an uncertain and
permanently changing environment (passive adaption). Although Dewey wrote that we live in a
“world of hazards” (Dewey 1990, 3) he emphasizes that mankind has the ability to improve its
conditions (even in times of crises and catastrophes) since it holds the potentials of intelligence and
creativity (active adaption). For (political) crisis management this is a crucial and often overlooked
point that Dewey highlights here.  Karl  Weick has emphasized the same idea in  his  concept  of
“enactment” (Weick 1988). Both for Dewey and for Weick, humans are able to influence a crisis
through their actions, for the better or the worse. In such a pragmatist conception of human action
crisis management can lead to both failure or success.
Consider the example of the economic crisis which started in 2008: Even without deciding if the
economic crisis was caused by too much or too little regulation it is clear that it was a man-made
system that caused the problems. The crisis, which in this Darwinian context is just a word for a
disruptive change in the environment, has been produced by an environment that was designed by
man. This is not overly surprising since humans have to act in a highly uncertain context with
imperfect information all  the time and are anything but infallible.  What is  crucial  according to
28 Growth for Dewey, as he explains in  Experience and Education, is closely connected to a principle of
continuity. Growth (or progress/development as one might also say) takes place when it opens the way
for new steps and doesn't limit further growth. It doesn't take place when possibilities are cut off and
further adaption isn't possible anymore, when – to put it colloquially – a dead end is reached. According
to Dewey it is is the prime task of education to promote and enable this form of growth. By enabling
growth it continuously has to be evaluated along the lines of this question: “Does this form of growth
create conditions for further growth, or does it set up conditions that shut off the person who has grown
in this particular direction from the occasions, stimuli, and opportunities for continuing growth in new
directions” (Dewey 1938a, 36). 
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Dewey, is how we meet such situations of heightened uncertainty. His argument, in essence, is that
our reaction should be informed by a general spirit of flexibility and adaption. More specifically,
our  reaction  should  follow a pragmatist  theory  of  crisis  management  (as  it  will  be  more  fully
developed in section 2.5) that builds on anti-dualism, fallibilism, experimentalism and deliberation.
What a response to a crisis shouldn't do is to rule out any possible solutions a priori on the ground
of certain eternal beliefs, principles or ideologies. This is how Dewey understands progress and
growth: as the successful overcoming of crises and disruptions. Drawing on Darwinism he points
out  how being  human  is  not  about  moving  toward  an  end  but  about  survival  and  continuous
movement.
2.4.4 The Primacy of Practice in Pragmatism 
The primacy of practice is  an aspect  of  pragmatist  thinking that,  in a  way,  underlies all  of its
thinking.  This  is  a  topic  that  we have  met  explicitly  already  in  the  definitions  of  pragmatism
(especially the ones by Putnam and Rescher, see p. 23) but which was also present implicitly in all
the elements discussed above.
What pragmatists mean with the term “primacy of practice” is basically that “efforts at inquiry can
never achieve  totality, we must settle for  sufficiency, which is ultimately a practical rather than a
theoretical matter, so that prioritizing practical over theoretical reason is an inescapable part of the
human condition” (Rescher 2005a, 747).29 
Pragmatism's emphasis of practice offers a counterpoint to what Dewey called the “spectator theory
of knowledge” (Dewey 1990, 19). Such a standpoint, according to pragmatism has been prevalent
in Western philosophy so far. It starts with the dichotomy of subject vs. object and derives from it
the idea that we gather our knowledge about the world through observation and spectatorship.
Against such a conception,  pragmatism brings in the role of action and practice as central to a
theory of knowledge. Some of the most important concepts and principles of pragmatism such as
habit, belief, action, inquiry, experimentalism, creativity, fallibilism or learning are closely linked to
this primacy of practice. The central claim thereby is that humans generate knowledge and meaning
29 One could now object that this pragmatist primacy of practice is no unique position but can also be found
in the work of Pierre Bourdieu or – to some extent – in Marxism. While this is true, pragmatism has
developed  this  emphasis  to  the  fullest  extent  and  applied  its  philosophical consequences  most
thoroughly. For a brief discussion of Dewey and Bourdieu see Berk and Galvan (2009, 551), for an
analysis of the role of praxis in Marxism from a pragmatist standpoint see Bernstein (1971, chap. 1) and
also the remarks by Hans Joas (1993, 241) and Nicholas Rescher (2000, 2).
53
of the world not through pure observation or reason but through their active engagement with it:30 
“Man  as  inquirer,  as  a  participant  in  a  community  of  inquiry,  is  no  longer  viewed  as  a
'spectator', but rather as an active participant and experimenter. Man as agent comes into the
foreground here because human agency is the key for understanding all aspects of human life,
including human inquiry and knowledge” (Bernstein 1971, 177). 
With this simple argument pragmatism shifts the ground of discussion. It replaces the view of man
as solitary observer with an understanding of humans as active participants in the world who are
essentially social and constantly conduct inquiries and experiments collectively. 
It is this mode of engagement and participation with the world and with others, in a word practice,
that has moved to the center of pragmatism’s considerations. We can find its traces in all of the
elements that have been discussed so far. They are present in the pragmatic maxim, in the rejection
of Cartesian philosophy and in the distinct anti-skeptical position pragmatism developed. Finally,
we find its elements also in pragmatism's, and especially Dewey's, admiration for the theory of
evolution. The adaption processes that were identified there have a clear practical character and
highlight again how humans interact and engage with their surroundings constantly. Taken together,
all this gives us a hint how the primacy of practice is not a mere lip service but how it plays a
central role in pragmatist thinking.
2.5 Building Blocks for a Pragmatist Theory of Crisis Management
After  elaborating  the  main  pillars  of  pragmatist  thinking  in  section  2.4 this  part  builds  the
theoretical foundation of the model of pragmatist political crisis management as it will be fully
developed in  chapter  3.  I  begin  by  discussing  the  main  opponent  of  philosophical  pragmatism
against  which  the  four  building  blocks  of  pragmatist  crisis  management  are  directed  against:
principles and false certainty (2.5.1). I then introduce the four building blocks of a pragmatist theory
of  crisis  management:  fallibilism  (2.5.2),  anti-dualism  (2.5.3),  experimentalism  (2.5.4)  and
deliberation (2.5.5). 
30 This is closely related to Weick's (1988) concept of enactment which will be discussed in more detail in
chapter 3.
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2.5.1 Pragmatism’s  Critique  of  Principle-Guided  Approaches  Towards
Uncertainty
We have already extensively discussed how pragmatism embraces uncertainty and criticizes all
approaches  that  try  to  eliminate  uncertainty  by  relying  on absolute  certitude  (e.g.  abolitionism
during the Civil War, rationalism in philosophy). This contrast between pragmatism and a principle-
guided approach towards uncertainty will play a central role in this thesis. This section will discuss
pragmatism’s critique of a principle-guided approach towards uncertainty.
Following  Peirce  we  can  assert  that  humans  want  to  reach  a  state  of  belief  since  doubt  is
uncomfortable. What is problematic for pragmatism is when these beliefs are taken for granted and
become a fixed  principle.31 A principle is defined as a belief (or set of beliefs) that has become
fixated and is not open for new experiences and arguments any more, leaving little space for doubt.
But for pragmatism it is through the “irritation of doubt” (Peirce 1992, 114) that inquiry is triggered
and new knowledge gathered.  Doubt  is  therefore  a  very productive means for  pragmatists  like
Peirce and needs to be able to prosper if warranted.
Peirce argues vigorously against people who have become entangled in a net of certainty: 
“They do not waste time in trying to make up their minds what they want, but, fastening like
lightning upon whatever alternative comes first, they hold to it to the end, whatever happens,
without  an  instant's  irresolution.  This  is  one  of  the  splendid  qualities  which  generally
accompany brilliant, unlasting success. It is impossible not to envy the man who can dismiss
reason, although we know how it must turn out at last” (Peirce 1992, 122).
He grasps this phenomenon through the first method of how we fixate our beliefs:  the method of
tenacity. The principle he identifies behind it is simple: 
“If the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry, and if belief is of the nature of a habit,
why should we not attain the desired end, by taking any answer to a question which we may
fancy, and constantly reiterating it  to ourselves, dwelling on all  which may conduce to that
belief, and learning to turn with contempt and hatred from anything which might disturb it?”
(Peirce 1992, 115). 
It is exactly this strategy of constantly reiterating and reinforcing an established answer that  the
method of tenacity follows. But while this might work on the individual level it runs into substantial
problems on a collective level as Peirce is eager to highlight. Since as social beings we influence
31 In the discussion that follows and for the rest of the work I use the term principle/principle-guided to
describe such a state where doubt has been ultimately ruled out and absolute certainty prevails. Another
term that might come to mind to describe such a “belief held unquestioningly and with undefended
certainty” (Blackburn 2005a, 109) is dogma. Because of the pejorative connotation of the term dogma I
have decided to stick with principle though.
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each other's opinions all the time it is unclear how based on this method it is possible to transfer a
fixed belief to the social level. Peirce traces this path and discovers the second method of belief
fixation, the method of authority. The best example for him is the Catholic church which evokes this
method by referring to the authority of God and the pope in order to fixate certain dogmatic beliefs.
Peirce  notes  the  success  of  this  simple  method  throughout  history  but  also  identifies  a  major
weakness of the method of authority. 
“[...] some individuals will be found who are raised above that condition. These men possess a
wider sort of social feeling; they see that men in other countries and in other ages have held to
very different doctrines from those which they themselves have been brought up to believe; and
they cannot help seeing that it is the mere accident of their having been taught as they have, and
of their having been surrounded with the manners and associations they have, that has caused
them to believe as they do and not far differently” (Peirce 1992, 118).
Historically this  method has therefore also been challenged.  First  by the  method of a priori as
Descartes has chiefly developed it and as it has been described above (see 2.4.2). Second and finally
by the method of science that Peirce champions and that is in its essence identical with the method
of  pragmatism.  This  method  contrasts  our  beliefs  with  reality  and evaluates  them through  the
collective inquiry of the scientific community. 
In The Quest for Certainty John Dewey has taken up the same topic in more general terms.32 Under
the term  “quest for certainty” Dewey unites – broadly speaking – the three methods of tenacity,
authority and a priori. The common theme he sees in all of them is that they ultimately strive for
absolute certainty. In “Pragmatic America” Dewey has reinforced this position and contrasted this
false certainty with pragmatist experimentalism. For him pragmatism “discourages dogmatism and
its  child,  intolerance.  It  arouses and heartens an experimental  spirit  which wants to know how
systems and theories work before giving complete adhesion” (Dewey 1998b, 30).
While Peirce and Dewey have discussed this topic on largely theoretical grounds it is important to
note that their arguments have practical implications. From a political perspective, for instance, it
follows that pragmatism advices politicians not to build their decisions on the false certainty of
fixed principles and ideologies but instead to keep a fallibilist and experimentalist spirit towards
new problems. 
Richard Bernstein, a prominent contemporary pragmatist, has criticized the political reaction after
9/11 along these lines. When he published his book The Abuse of Evil in 2005, George W. Bush had
32 Also see Dewey’s analysis of orthodox Marxism as an example for a political form of such a quest for
certainty (Dewey 1979; Zeldin 1991).
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just led the U.S. in two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and constantly evoked the need for a broad
“war  against  terror”  and  warned  about  the  dangers  of  Islamic  terrorism.  From  a  pragmatist
standpoint Bernstein finds Bush's statements and actions highly problematic. They exemplify for
him  an  approach  that  has  been  based  on  false  certainty  and  was  principle-guided.  Bernstein
describes it in the following words: 
“'Certainty' is used to express our certitude, our subjective personal conviction that something is
so-and-so. But all too frequently there is a slide from this subjective sense of  certitude to an
objective sense of certainty – where we act  as if  the  strength of our personal  conviction is
sufficient to justify the objective truth of what we are claiming” (Bernstein 2005, 13).
For Bernstein, the Bush administration has fallen prey to this false certainty through its evocation of
a “radical evil”33 that leaves no space for discussion or critique. 
In striking contrast to the Bush administration after 9/11, Abraham Lincoln's reaction towards the
end of the Civil War can be regarded as good example of a pragmatist counterpart that rejects to
rely on such strict  principles.  Lincoln's  approach is  most explicitly  encapsulated in  his  Second
Inaugural Address from 1865. Although the war was about to end, Lincoln used the opportunity of
this important speech to highlight the inevitability of uncertainty and cautioned his listeners to make
any predictions about the future: “With high hope for the future, no prediction in regard to it is
ventured” (Lincoln 1992, 449). But facing a deeply divided nation he also struggles to reconcile the
two parties of conflict, both of them relying on strong convictions and principles: “Both read the
same Bible and pray to the same God, and each invokes His aid against the other. […] The prayers
of both could not be answered. That of neither has been answered fully” (Lincoln 1992, 450). 
It is crucial to understand that Lincoln in no way did want to invite moral relativism here, just as
pragmatism itself should not be linked with a relativist “anything goes” attitude. Instead Lincoln
makes very clear  that  he is  baffled by the idea that  “any men should dare to ask a just  God's
assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat of other men's faces” (Lincoln 1992, 450). This
also reflects the general relation of pragmatism and ethics, as LaFollette has summarized it: 
“A pragmatic ethic is not based on principles, but it is not unprincipled. Deliberation plays a
significant role, albeit a different role than that given it on most accounts. Morality does not
seek final absolute answers, yet it is not perniciously relativistic” (LaFollette 2000, 418; also see
Joas 2000).
Lincoln seems to have taken away a lesson from the Civil War that is strikingly similar to the one
learned  by  Oliver  Wendell  Holmes,  Jr.  (see  2.2.1):  principle-guided  behavior  leads  to  a  false
certitude  and  ultimately  an  unbridgeable  clash  of  different  beliefs.  Historian  Garry  Wills  has
33 A term which he discusses by mainly drawing on the work of Hannah Arendt.
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therefore proposed to understand Lincoln's speech as a profoundly pragmatist document: 
“The Second Inaugural was meant, with great daring, to spell out a principle of not acting on
principle. In the nation's murky situation all principles — except this one of forgoing principle
— were compromised. He was giving a basis for the pragmatic position he had taken in the
Proclamation of Amnesty, which was deliberately shortsighted, looking only a step at a time
down the long, hard road ahead” (Wills 1999; for a related although slightly different discussion
see Siemers 2004).
2.5.2 Building Block 1: Fallibilism
The first building block of my theory of pragmatist crisis management is fallibilism. I argue that
fallibilism is a core element of philosophical pragmatism and it will thus be an important part of my
model of pragmatist crisis management.
In its most general form, pragmatist fallibilism is a position that states that no belief can ever be
ultimately proven.34 Instead it puts forward the idea that our knowledge might turn out to be wrong
one  day.  At  first  glance  this  sounds  like  pessimistic  advice  but  it  doesn't  aim  to  be  a  solely
normative statement. This is first and foremost an empirical statement on how humans normally
interact with the world and gather knowledge. Pragmatism takes great effort to show that it is not
contemplative  observation  which  is  the  prevalent  mode  to  create  knowledge  but  creative  and
experimental human practice. Or to put it differently: a mode of trial and error. We hold some
beliefs,  act  upon them, make new experiences that may challenge our beliefs and habits and –
ideally  –  adapt  our  beliefs  and  habits  according  to  these  new  experiences.  Fallibilism,  for
pragmatism, therefore isn't a nihilistic state of mind but instead our common mode of practice and
interaction. It is only through the rationalist bias of Western philosophy and its dualism of thinking
versus action that this basic principle of human behavior became forgotten (Dewey 1990).
A widespread misconception of pragmatist fallibilism is that pragmatists doubts everything all the
time, therefore making it impossible to hold any beliefs at all. But as we have seen this universal
doubt is exactly the same reason why pragmatism rejects Cartesian philosophy (see 2.4.2). Against
Descartes pragmatism has pointed out that doubt can't be universal but must be “real”. In other
words, pragmatism adds a temporal dimension to this problem by showing how beliefs and habits
34 Richard Rorty has given this fallibilist  insight its most radical form in his book  Philosophy and the
Mirror of  Nature by pointing out  that there is no solid foundation for our knowledge (Rorty 1979).
Instead, as Cornel West has summarized Rorty’s pragmatist position, “ideas, words and language are not
mirrors which copy the world but rather tools with which we cope with the world” (West 1982, 181).
I cannot fully discuss Rorty’s position here, however, and – as outlined in the introduction – will stick to
classical pragmatism and its position on fallibilism in this study.
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change over time. We always have to act upon certain beliefs and habits. But the fact that we start
with a certain set of beliefs and habits does not exclude them from further inquiry. Instead the
inquiry itself is a test for our current beliefs and habits and may build the starting point for their
revision: “A person may, it is true, in the course of his studies, find reason to doubt what he began
by believing; but in that case he doubts because he has a positive reason for it, and not on account
of the Cartesian maxim” (Peirce 1992, 29).
By pointing out how we are never able to doubt  all of our beliefs and habits  at the same time
pragmatism offers us a platform – although only temporarily valid – on which we can act and
interact. Even more, it encourages us to hold beliefs and develop new hypotheses which we can test
practically. 
There are two other arguments that have been brought forward against a fallibilist position and I
would like to discuss them briefly before I examine how fallibilism relates to the political sphere.
The first argument points out how it is impossible to defend our opinions and beliefs if we are not
sure that  they are right.  This  argument  collapses  very soon if  we think about  the fact  that  we
constantly hold beliefs and opinions which are based on insufficient knowledge. Not only are we
aware of this problem but we also find ourselves defending and arguing on behalf of our beliefs in
interaction with others. But pragmatism goes a step further and completely reverses the accusation:
Only  if  we assume our  beliefs  and opinions  to  be  fallible  and open  them up for  critique  and
deliberation can we defend them convincingly. Otherwise we would hide behind the insufficient
methods of tenacity, authority or a priori to rationalize them. Additionally, pragmatism points out
how the term certainty has a double meaning in this whole discussion and how a careful definition
of it can clarify the conflict: 
“In everyday life, we are practically certain about all sorts of things – even though we may
discover that we are mistaken in our beliefs. But if we mean by 'certainty' something that ins
incorrigible  –  something  that  can  never  be  questioned,  modified,  or  corrected,  then  the
pragmatists are telling us that there is no such thing!” (Bernstein 2005, 66). 
The second argument points out how it is impossible from a fallibilist standpoint to decide what is
wrong and what is right. This is an argument that not only touches on the question of fallibilism but
also problematizes pragmatism's relationship to morality. To give a concrete example: How can one
reject slavery on pragmatist and fallibilist ground? Is it not “useful” for many people, does it not
“work” for them? This is an argument that has to be taken very seriously and that has been raised in
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pragmatist circles itself.35 It is a discussion that has evolved around the role that tragedy and evil
play  in  pragmatism  and  that  has  been  discussed  in  section  2.2.2.2.  There  we  have  seen  that
pragmatism certainly offers an approach on which to decide which beliefs and habits are good/right.
But it does not judge different decisions based on fixed principles or dogmas. Instead pragmatism
looks at the decision’s consequences in order to decide upon its ethical dimension. 
It has been one of the main impetuses of pragmatism in the first place to clarify and decide existing
conflicts and dilemmas. In the example of the squirrel and the tree that William James offered (see
page  44),  the method of pragmatism was able to clarify and (in a certain sense) to decide this
conflict. So while pragmatism itself doesn't offer us a fixed set of doctrines and beliefs that can be
used to pick the right side in any conflict, it proposes a method that should help us to evaluate such
conflicts, clarify their meaning and offers some tools for decision making.36
Finally, it is important to note how the fallibilist approach as proposed by pragmatism is not mere
philosophical shadowboxing. Since it touches, among others, on the question of justification it is
highly relevant for the realm of politics: Pragmatist fallibilism “means that decisions of policy and
value are open to critical revision and that their justification is a matter of inquiry – not the sheer
tenacity of belief or closed conviction” (Thayer 1968, 351). Pragmatism itself doesn't offer us the
means to decide on certain policies and is in itself neither “left” nor “right”.37 Instead pragmatism
looks at how certain policies are chosen and how they are evaluated. 
For pragmatists,  the ideal-typical setting of policy making is a “community of inquiry” (Peirce
1997b; Shields 2003). Such a community of inquiry resembles the scientific community in its open
and  unbiased  search  for  knowledge.  A  group  of  inquirers  explores  possible  policies  together,
debates their benefits and drawbacks and ultimately agrees on one policy. Yet, this chosen policy
remains  fallible.  If  new  evidence  arises  the  existing  policy  might  be  revised  or  changed.  For
35 See  for  example  the  following  remark  by  pragmatist  Cornel  West  on  John  Dewey:  “[...]  Dewey
understood that if one takes democracy as an object of philosophical investigation, then one must grapple
with the contributions of Jefferson and Emerson. But, I suggest,  Dewey failed to seriously meet the
challenge posed by Lincoln – namely, defining the relation of democratic ways of thought and life to a
profound sense of evil” (West 2000, 175).
36 See William James' characterization: “Against rationalism as a pretension and a method pragmatism is
fully armed and militant. But, at the outset, at least, it stands for no particular results. It has no dogmas,
and no doctrines save its method” (James 2000, 28).
37 This is also exemplified by the diverse set of political views that leading pragmatists had and still have.
Contemporary pragmatism for example unites different thinkers such as philosopher Cornel West, one of
the leading socialist intellectuals in the U.S., and Richard Posner, a leading law scholar and prominent
conservative who was nominated for the United States Court of  Appeals for the Seventh Circuit  by
Ronald Reagan.
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pragmatist  fallibilism  such  a  community  of  inquiry  can  exist  either  in  the  form  of  internal
mechanisms and procedures or in the form of a critical and engaged public as Bernstein has noted:
“A fallibilistic orientation requires a genuine willingness to test one's ideas in public, and to
listen  carefully  to  those  who  criticize  them.  It  requires  the  imagination  to  formulate  new
hypotheses and conjectures, and to subject them to rigorous public testing and critique by the
community of inquirers” (Bernstein 2005, 29).
The question  if  such  an  environment  for  pragmatist  fallibilism to  prosper  has  been created  in
political institutions will therefore be part of the model of pragmatist crisis management. 
2.5.3 Building Block 2: Anti-Dualism
It is one of the key claims of pragmatism that it attempts to overcome various dualisms and entails a
“determinedly antidualistic position” (Strauss 1993, 4, also see 41). As such anti-dualism plays an
important role in crisis management as well, since crisis managers are regularly faced with either-or
dilemmas and have to find ways to make balanced decisions.
Anti-dualism is a position that can be traced back to Peirce's opposition to Cartesian philosophy
(see 2.4.2). Peirce criticizes Descartes concept of a priori reasoning (see Nolan 2011) as one of the
three deficient methods to fixate beliefs. Peirce rejects Descartes a priori reasoning on the ground
that it refers to an individual level, i.e. to an individual mind whereas “it is necessary that a method
should be found by which our beliefs may be caused by nothing human, but by some external
permanency – by something upon which our thinking has no effect” (Peirce 1992, 120). With his
profound critique of Descartes Peirce also rejects the dualistic character of Western philosophy and
the dichotomy of mind and body. 
For pragmatism, a dualism is the opposition of two poles that are regarded as strictly separated and
irreconcilable.  From  a  pragmatist  perspective,  the  dualism  of  mind  and  body  is  especially
problematic  since  it  has  conceptually  separated human thinking and human action.  Dewey has
described the historical context of this separation in The Quest for Certainty (1929). There he traces
how the role of practice and social action has been eliminated in most of Western philosophy: 
“There is also the age-long association of knowing and thinking with immaterial and spiritual
principles, and of the arts, of all practical activity in doing and making, with matter. For work is
done with the body, by means of mechanical appliances and is directed upon material things.
The disrepute which has attended the thought of material things in comparison with immaterial
thought has been transferred to everything associated with practice” (Dewey 1990, 4). 
Against this separation of thinking and acting, pragmatism has stated that both thinking and acting
61
are closely related and that human action is a crucial part of how we build our knowledge of the
world (see 2.3.3).
But the mind-body dichotomy is only one of many dualisms that pragmatism tries to overcome. As
Anselm Strauss (1993, 45) has explained: 
“In  the  writings  of  the  Pragmatists  we  can  see  a  constant  battle  against  the  separating,
dichotomizing, or opposition of what Pragmatists argued should be joined together: knowledge
and practice,  environment and actor,  biology and culture,  means and ends,  body and mind,
matter  and  mind,  object  and  subject,  logic  and inquiry,  lay  thought  and scientific  thought,
necessity and chance, cognitive and non cognitive, art and science, values and action”.
It is this general anti-dualistic attitude that is characteristic for pragmatism, an attitude that Nicholas
Rescher has labeled its “metaphysical component”: 
“This pivots on the idea that human concepts and distinctions are generally dichotomous and
on-off, while nature herself is not hard-edged. […] The subtlety and complexity of nature are
such that what we see as differences in kind are in fact differences in degree, with thought
imposing discontinuities upon a continuously standard reality” (Rescher 2005a, 748). 
Pragmatism employs three general strategies to overcome such dualisms (Ansell 2011, 10). First,
the ongoing and continuous relationship between two poles is highlighted in order to weaken a
dichotomy.  Second,  a  third  dimension  is  introduced  to  break  out  of  a  two-dimensional  space.
Finally,  pragmatism tries  to  target  dualisms  by  highlighting  that  meaning  is  explored  through
action. In other words, meaning is not fixated a priori (either by strict principles or by rationalist
reasoning) but explored through human practice, offering a way to overcome dichotomies that are
perceived as irreconcilable. As Lindblom has noted, politicians might have very different ideologies
yet they can often agree on specific policies (Lindblom 1959, 83). Meaning is discovered through
action, with policy-makers exploring the meaning of their ideologies by focusing on specific actions
(policies) and ultimately finding common ground on this “practical” level.
From this general anti-dualistic attitude also derives pragmatism's belief that conflicts are ultimately
reconcilable and – as we will later see – that open deliberation is possible. This should not imply
that pragmatism quietens controversies in a way that takes all positions and opinions to be equally
valid and true. Instead it aims at the clarification of conflicts and thereby tries to pave the way for
their settlement as exemplified in the squirrel example that William James has offered (see page
44).
For political crisis management, pragmatist anti-dualism entails the idea that crisis managers should
be careful not to frame the crisis in stark contrasts or either-or terms. Instead crises are situations
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that include nuances and gray tones. These nuances should also be reflected in the decisions that
crisis managers make and how they explain the crisis to the public. Anti-dualism will therefore be
an important part of the model of pragmatist crisis management.
2.5.4 Building Block 3: Experimentalism
In this part I will discuss another core aspect of pragmatism that will play an important role in my
model of pragmatist crisis management: experimentalism.
For  pragmatists,  the  possibility  of  inquiry  is  central.  Peirce  has  famously  formulated:  “[O]ne
corollary which itself deserves to be inscribed upon every wall of the city of philosophy: Do not
block the way of inquiry” (Peirce 1998, 48). The mode of inquiry for pragmatism is above all
experimental. In introducing the term experimentalism, pragmatists clearly refer to the scientific
method connected with it.38 But they go a step further and begin to broaden the meaning of the term
and apply it to different fields of society. Once again it is Dewey who widens the field: “Experiment
operates  to change the customary state  of things,  and thereby to present challenges to  thought,
seeming discrepancies, unexpected phenomena, that require explanation” (Dewey 1911b, 554).39 
An important aspect of pragmatist experimentalism is creativity. Building on the work of George H.
Mead, the pragmatist sociologist Hans Joas has developed the most comprehensive account of the
role  of  creativity  for  a  pragmatist  theory  of  action  (Joas  1993).  He  outlines  how  pragmatism
emphasizes the practical role of creativity: 
“For the pragmatists, the setting of ends is not an act of consciousness that takes place outside
of  contexts  of  action.  Rather,  the  setting  of  an  end  can  only  be  a  result  of  reflection  on
resistances encountered by the variously oriented behavior of a life form whose world is always
already schematized in a practical manner prior to all reflection” (Joas 1993, 248).
38 See for example the following definition offered by Dewey in one of his early writings: “The essence of
the experimental method I take to be control of the analysis or interpretation of any phenomenon by
bringing to light the exact conditions, and the only conditions, which are involved in its coming into
being.  Suppose  the  problem to be the nature  of  water.  By 'nature'  we  mean no inner  metaphysical
essence; its 'nature' is found only by experiencing it. By nature, in science, we mean a knowledge for
purposes of intellectual and practical control. Now, water simply as a given fact resists indefinitely and
obstinately any direct mode of approach. No amount of scrutiny, no amount of observation of it as given,
yields  analytic  comprehension.  Observation  but  complicates  the  problem  by  revealing  unsuspected
qualities that require additional explanation. What experimentation does is to let us see into water in the
process of making” (Dewey 1902, 109).
39 Dewey applied this experimental approach himself by playing a significant role in the founding of the
Laboratory School at the University of Chicago. As Arthur G. Wirth (1966) shows in an insightful essay,
education and the Lab School became an early focus for Dewey which allowed him to elaborate his
philosophical and psychological theories and at the same time to put them into practice.
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It is an interplay of creative experimentalism with settled beliefs, habits and routines that is central
for a pragmatist theory of action. As Joas (1993, 249) reminds us, the main examples Mead and
Dewey used to develop this theory in the first place were scientific experiments, play and art. For
pragmatists,  these  are  examples  where  such  an  experimentalist  mode  of  action  becomes  most
obvious.40 
As always it  is crucial to keep in mind that pragmatism didn't develop its  concepts of creative
experimentalism for an individual level. Instead creative experimentalism takes place mainly on a
social  and  collective  level.  Similar  to  the  collective  of  inquiry  this  means  that  creative
experimentalism is always an interactive process. Creativity isn't a talent that is given to a few
geniuses but “an anthropological universal in human action” (Joas and Kilpinen 2009, 323). It is an
empirical argument that pragmatism is making about creativity here, not a normative one: 
“From this perspective, creativity in itself is neither good nor bad; there are many reasons why
routine could be considered praiseworthy, and many a vision of permanent aesthetic or political
creativity  is  a  vision of  terror  that  would overtax  human capabilities.  Whether  a  particular
creative act is good or bad can only be settled in a discourse” (Joas 1997, 197). 
The potential of pragmatist experimentalism in the political sphere has been explored chiefly under
the  heading  of  “democratic  experimentalism”  (Dorf  and  Sabel  1998)  and  “experimentalist
governance”  (Sabel  and Zeitlin  2010,  2012).  This  school  of  thought,  which  aims  to  apply  the
pragmatist concept of experimentalism to democracy and political processes, starts with an insight
that  Dewey  initially  made  about  the  situation  at  schools  but  which  could  also  be  true  for  the
political sphere: 
“The absence of opportunity both for initial experimentation to supply stimulating challenges to
thought, and for concluding experimentation to test the worth of ideas reflects the intellectual
conditions which anteceded the gigantic forward movement in science following the general
adoption of the experimental method” (Dewey 1911b, 554).
To give a concrete example of what an application of pragmatist experimentalism to policy making
could look like: During a session of the Rational Choice Workshop at the University of Chicago I
attended in May 2012, guest speaker Debra Satz argued against a free market for organ donations.
Many of the participants from the local economics department disagreed and argued vigorously for
a free market solution. After the discussion had gone back and forth for a while Richard Posner
40 The example of children's  behavior Dewey uses is  also illustrative for  the  pragmatist  conception of
creative experimentalism: “The most casual notice of the activities of a young child reveals a ceaseless
display of exploring and testing activity. Objects are sucked, fingered, and thumped; drawn and pushed,
handled and thrown; in short, experimented with, till they cease to yield new qualities”  (Dewey 1910,
31–32).
64
finally observed how this discussion probably wouldn't be decided on the theoretical level. Facing
this situation he instead proposed to test the idea of a free market for organs with a limited scope,
i.e. in a single state. Although it cannot be said that this suggestion ended the debate in the same
abrupt way as in James' squirrel example it is still a characteristic pragmatist intervention: if unsure
what to do try ideas out in practice and see what happens. 
While this brief example doesn't cover the whole range of the approaches that were developed in
the context  of democratic  experimentalism it  allows us  to  briefly  discuss  some general  ethical
implications and offers another possibility to illustrate the empirical claim of pragmatism. 
The argument that could be brought forward against such an experimentalist approach as in the
Posner example is simple: when it comes to public policy the stakes are just too high to allow
experiments. If an experiment goes wrong it might drastically effect the lives of many people and –
as in this case – might even cost lives. I see two ways to deal with this argument. 
First,  it  can be argued that  experimentalism doesn't mean that real-life experiments are actually
carried out all the time. Instead pragmatist experimentalism reflects on the potential fallibility of our
decisions and policies and looks for possibilities to test and refine our assumptions. Sticking with
the example of a free market of organs one could think of possibilities with lower  costs, such as
mind-experiments, analogies or comparative methods, to explore this issue if the (moral) costs of a
real experiment are too high.
The second argument takes a much stronger stance on this ethical problem. It highlights how we are
always experimenting even if we don’t admit it. For pragmatism, humans gain knowledge through
practical engagement with the world. We can never be certain that something will work until we
have tried it out. By trying out different things and observing the feedback, i.e. by experimenting,
our knowledge of the world is expanded and refined. From this perspective, pragmatism simply
makes our constant experimentalist  behavior  transparent (Menand 1997, xi).  In other  words: A
pragmatist  perspective  allows  us  to  acknowledge  and  cherish  the  fact  that  we  are  acting
experimentally.  While  our incomplete  knowledge is  regarded as a  limitation in  rational  policy-
making (see 2.3) incomplete knowledge and uncertainty are irrevocable conditions for pragmatism
that we can handle through experimentalism. 
Embracing uncertainty thus provides a response to the moral problem of experimentalism. Whether
we  like  it  or  not,  we  have  to  act  experimentally  under  conditions  of  uncertainty.  Pragmatist
experimentalism is ethical because it is necessary and inevitable, especially under the conditions of
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heightened uncertainty during crises. By making this insight transparent and by providing different
means to reduce the costs of experimentalism (mind-experiments, deliberation, quick revision of
experiments) pragmatism provides important tools to crisis managers.
2.5.5 Building Block 4: Deliberation
With Dewey deliberation became an overarching theme for pragmatism. For Dewey deliberation is
a democratic way to solve conflicts that otherwise seem irreconcilable. Deliberation in this sense is
an anti-dualist way to overcome dualist either-or decisions by offering common ground and shared
understanding. But for pragmatists deliberation is mainly a potential that becomes not necessarily
realized all the time. Instead we need to create the right environment to enable the unfolding of
deliberation’s  potential.  Pragmatist  deliberation  as  I  understand  it  in  this  study  has  three
characteristics: inclusion, openness and termination.
Inclusion means that all relevant stakeholders should be included in the deliberation process who
are  potentially  affected  by  the  decision.  Without  the  inclusion  of  all  relevant  stakeholders  the
deliberation  process  does  not  make  use  of  all  the  intellectual  potential.  For  Dewey,  a  lack  of
inclusion  therefore  is  not  only  a  moral  problem but  also  a  missed  opportunity  to  broaden the
community of inquiry (Dewey 1998a, 340-1). This is especially true for dissenting and skeptical
voices that can add alternative perspectives to the deliberation process.
This inclusive imperative of pragmatist deliberation is directed against an elitist understanding of
decision making. Against such an elitism Dewey demands to have faith “in the possibilities of
human nature” (Dewey 1998a, 341) and in human intelligence. For pragmatism, intelligence is not
the privilege of a chosen few but a social category: “Intelligence is not properly understood as a
'property' of an elite few individuals. Rather it is an embodied condition of our associated life. This
means that we are intelligent together or not at all” (Gatens-Robinson 1999, 175).  
Openness refers to the fact that the process and end result of pragmatist deliberation should be not
fixated beforehand or be predetermined by any external authority or unchangeable principle:
“Every  other  form  of  moral  and  social  faith  rests  upon  the  idea  that  experience  must  be
subjected at some point or other to some form of external control; to some 'authority' alleged to
exist outside the processes of experience. Democracy is the faith that the process of experience
is more important than any special result attained, so that special results achieved are of ultimate
value only as they are used to enrich and order the ongoing process” (Dewey 1998a, 343).
Thinking in the terms of Peirce's different methods to fixate our beliefs Dewey therefore connects
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deliberation with the method of science. In pragmatist deliberation decision making doesn't need to
evoke  tenacity,  authority or  a  priori reasoning.  Instead,  it  is  the  chief  task  of  deliberation  to
consider and increase experiences. 
The centrality of experiences seems a bit odd in the first place until one realizes how experiences
are deeply connected to knowledge for Dewey (see Ansell 2015). Dewey defines experiences as
“free interaction of individual human beings with surrounding conditions,  especially the human
surroundings, which develops and satisfies need and desire by increasing knowledge of things as
they are” (Dewey 1998a, 343). Similar to Peirce, who defined philosophy as a way that doesn't
block inquiry, Dewey declares deliberation to be the state of affairs that doesn't block experiences. 
Yet, pragmatist deliberation is not endless as the termination characteristic highlights. As Bernstein
has noted, it is a “misleading caricature of the pragmatic mentality to suggest that it calls for endless
debate” (Bernstein 2005, 57). By putting a strong emphasis on human action, deliberation is no end
in itself for pragmatism. Similar to Aristotle’s conception of deliberation, pragmatist deliberation is
meant to enable action (Scarry 2011, 8) and finds an (temporary) end once a common course for
action is agreed upon.
The pragmatist understanding of deliberation stands in contrast to an authoritarian mode of decision
making where decisions are made by a single leader. This is an aspect that is especially relevant for
crisis management since they have to decide whether to handle the crisis alone or by including other
stakeholders as well (and to what extent). In this context pragmatist deliberation calls for an open-
ended  process,  the  inclusion  of  all  relevant  stakeholders  and  encourages  the  consultation  of
skeptics.  The model  of  pragmatist  crisis  management  will  spell  out  the  role  of  deliberation  in
pragmatist crisis management further.
2.6 Pragmatist Crisis Management: Possible Constraints
The preceding sections have discussed what pragmatism has to offer when it comes to dealing with
uncertainty. Yet, there are also some possible constraints that might stand in the way of pragmatist
practice in times of crisis. Some of these possible constraints have been briefly mentioned in the
discussion already. For instance: How is pragmatist deliberation possible under the time pressure of
an acute crisis? Is it realistic that political crisis managers proceed in a fallibilist and experimental
manner during a crisis? Shouldn’t we expect an increased level of centralization and self-confident
authoritarian decision making instead?
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This section will discuss these objections and examine the two possible constraints that are brought
forward by them: the role of centralization and the role of urgency during crises. I discuss each
aspect first on a theoretical and then on an empirical level. Regarding centralization I will show
how it is possible to refute the claim that crises automatically lead to a higher level of centralization
(as advanced by Carl Schmitt’s theory on the state of exception) on a theoretical level (2.6.4). I will
also show how empirical studies on political crisis management have found evidence that not all
crises lead to centralization and that traces of pragmatism can be found in empirical practice as well
(2.6.2). 
I will then discuss urgency as another possible constraint for pragmatism. On a theoretical level I
argue that pragmatism is very capable of dealing with time pressure since it is a philosophy that
emphasizes action and argues against endless deliberation. I will then present empirical examples
that indicate the role pragmatism plays under conditions of time pressure.
2.6.1 Centralization I – Pragmatism During a State of Exception?
The general theoretical argument that crises are situations that call for a centralization of power and
that leave little space for pragmatist fallibilism and deliberation can be best discussed by using the
example of Carl Schmitt’s concept of the state of exception.
In  Political Theology (1922) Schmitt famously claimed that “Sovereign is he who decides on the
exception” (Schmitt 1985, 5).41 The meaning of this laconic definition is unclear at first and has to
be put both in the context of its historical situation and Schmitt's oeuvre. 
Schmitt's  early works were published during the times of the Weimar Republic (1918-1933) in
Germany and implicitly deal with the unstable and fragile setting of its political system. Put in
“apologetic”  terms  (see  Scheuerman  1995,  135)  Schmitt  thought  about  how  the  democratic
constitution of the Republic could be defended against the challenges by the Communists on the
Left and the National Socialists on the Right. This search eventually lead him to the proposal of
authoritarian solutions for this problem that made his ideas compatible with National Socialism in
the  end.  This  authoritarian  program developed  in  two  steps:  First,  in  his  study from 1921  on
dictatorship Schmitt (1964) differentiates two kinds of dictatorship: commissarial and sovereign.
While the sovereign dictator overthrows the old constitution and becomes the source of a new law,
41 In the German original the sentence reads as “Souverän ist, wer über den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet”
(Schmitt 1996, 13). I cannot see why Ausnahmezustand has been translated as simply “exception” and
not as the more precise “state of exception”, as it has also been used by Agamben (2005).
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a  commissarial dictatorship defends the existing  constitutions  by suspending it  (or  some of  its
elements) for a limited time.42 Schmitt advocated such a commissarial dictatorship of the German
president to defend the Weimar republic (see E. Kennedy 1988; Shapiro 2008, 18). 
In a second step, in his essay  The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (published 1923), Schmitt
loosens  the  connection  of  democracy  and  parliamentarism:  “The  belief  in  parliamentarism,  in
government by discussion, belongs to the intellectual world of liberalism. It does not belong to
democracy”  (Schmitt  1988,  8).  For  Schmitt,  not  only  can  a  democratic  spirit  be  present  in  a
parliamentarian system but also in a dictatorship since “dictatorship is not antithetical to democracy.
Even during a transitional period dominated by the dictator, a democratic identity can still exist and
the will of the people can still be the exclusive criterion” (Schmitt 1988, 28). Compared to his first
argument Schmitt goes a decisive step further here: (Temporal) commissarial dictatorship becomes
not only a way to defend democracy but can have a democratic quality itself.
The  relevance  of  Schmitt  for  this  study  becomes  clear  when  one  begins  to  be  aware  of  the
importance that crisis played in his thinking. As George Schwab writes: 
“Given the  threat  of  conflict  and  the uncertainty and distress  this  could  engender,  Schmitt
focused  his  attention  on  crises  in  a  state's  existence.  A crisis,  according  to  him,  is  'more
interesting than the rule'  because 'it  confirms not only the rule but also its existence, which
derives only from the exception'” (Schwab 1985, xvi).43
What is troubling for a pragmatist approach though is that Schmitt arrives at conclusions that are
incompatible with an understanding of pragmatism as it has been advanced so far.44 
How Schmitt arrives at such different conclusions becomes most visible in his concept of the state
of exception. As Schwab explains in a footnote, 
“a state of exception includes any kind of severe economic or political disturbance that requires
the application of extraordinary measures. Whereas an exception presupposes a constitutional
42 This concept of commissarial dictatorship reflects the practice of temporal dictatorship in the Roman
Republic (see Sherwin-White and Lintott 2014)
43 The quotes are from Schmitt (1985, 15).
44 It should be noted in this context that this position is not undisputed. The conservative pragmatist and
legal  scholar  Richard  Posner  for  example  has  identified  Schmitt's  thinking  as  “pragmatic”.  Posner's
understanding of pragmatism however comes down to a shared emphasis of consequences for Schmitt
“grounded his rejection of liberal legal theory in a belief that the real logic of the law was a logic of
consequences rather than one of antecedent principles” (Posner 2003, 44). While Posner raises some
interesting points in this context I find his conception of pragmatism as mere emphasis of consequences
too thin. His claim that pragmatism “has no political valence” (Posner 2003, 44) has been convincingly
refuted  by  Knight  and  Johnson  (1996)  who  have  outlined  that  pragmatism  includes  a  priority  of
democracy.  Since  I  share  this  assumption  (see  2.5.5)  I  see  profound  differences  between Schmitt's
position and a pragmatist approach.
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order  that  provides  guidelines  on  how to  confront  crises  in  order  to  reestablish  order  and
stability, a state of emergency need not have an existing order as a reference point because
neccessitas non habet legem [necessity has no law – M.B.]” (Schmitt 1985, 5).
In the  terms of  this  study the  state  of  exception  is  an extreme crisis.  But  by emphasizing  the
exceptional character of a crisis Schmitt develops a distinct theory of sovereignty and authority.
According to  him the sovereign rises  precisely in  crises for which the existing (political-legal)
system is  ill  prepared.  But the function of the sovereign is  not  only to manage the crisis.  The
sovereign also 
“decides whether there is an extreme emergency as well as what must be done to eliminate it.
Although he stands outside the normally valid legal system, he nevertheless belongs to it, for it
is he who must decide whether the constitution needs to be suspended in its entirety” (Schmitt
1985, 7).
It is clear then how Schmitt imagines the sovereign in times of crises to be the commissarial dictator
who protects the constitution by suspending it.
Recently Giorgio Agamben has presented a systematic examination of Schmitt's theory and has
applied it to the current situation of world affairs. Building on Walter Benjamin's eight thesis on the
concept of history45 Agamben argues that the state of exception “tends increasingly to appear as the
dominant paradigm of government in contemporary politics” (Agamben 2005, 2).46 But by drawing
on Benjamin, Agamben has also been able to highlight an aspect of Schmitt's concept of the state of
exception that enables us to link it back to Dewey's theory of impulse and (pragmatist) intelligence.
With Benjamin Agamben rejects  Schmitt  attempt to  define the commissarial  suspension of the
constitution as an act of law: 
“The attempt of state power to annex anomie through the state of exception is unmasked by
Benjamin for what it is: a fictio iuris par excellence, which claims to maintain the law in its very
suspension as force-of-law. What now takes its place are civil war and revolutionary violence,
that is, a human action that has shed every relation to law” (Agamben 2005, 59).47
As Agamben (2005, 60) reads Benjamin, violence, or more precisely pure violence, is not simply
brutal force or aggression but “human action that neither makes nor preserves law”. I would suggest
45 “The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that  the 'state of emergency'  in which we live is  not  the
exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that accords with this insight. Then we
will clearly see that it is our task to bring about a real state of emergency, and this will improve our
position in the struggle against fascism” (W. Benjamin 2003a, 392).
46 Here  and  in  the  following  paragraphs  I  will  concentrate  on  Agamben's  interpretation  of  Benjamin
without  exploring the question if this  interpretation is  “correct”.  Given the immense complexity and
depth of Benjamin's writings this is an endeavor this study cannot pursue. 
47 Agamben crosses out law in force-of-law intentionally to indicated that the state of exception “is an
anomic space in which what is at stake is a force of law without law” (Agamben 2005, 39).
70
to read Agamben's idea of the state of exception (as a state of pure violence in Benjamin's sense) in
connection with Dewey's concept of impulse.
In  setting  out  to  develop his  understanding of  violence,  Benjamin made it  clear  that  he  is  not
interested  in  the  question  of  which  ends  are  pursued through  violence.  Instead  he  looks  for  a
criterion that allows to “discriminate within the sphere of means themselves, without regard for the
ends they serve” (W. Benjamin 2007, 277). As Agamben puts it: “[P]ure violence is that which does
not stand in a relation of means toward an end, but holds itself in relation to its own mentality”
(Agamben 2005, 62). 
This  understanding  of  pure  violence  closely  resonates  with  Dewey's  concept  of  impulse  as  he
developed it in  Human Nature and Social Conduct. For Dewey impulses are a kind of “chaotic,
tumultuous and confused” (Dewey 1922, 177) instincts that are released when habits are frustrated
or disrupted. As Elizabeth Anderson highlights, impulses are also characterized by being without an
end: 
“Impulsive activity is not purposive. It involves no idea of an end to be achieved by the activity.
When a newborn infant sucks on its mother's nipple, it obtains food and thereby satisfies its
hunger. But the newborn has no idea that this will be a consequence of its sucking, and does not
suck with the end in view of obtaining food” (E. Anderson 2014). 
If  we  continue  this  juxtaposition  of  Agamben's  and  Benjamin's  concept  of  pure  violence and
Dewey's concept of  impulse and put it in the context of the state of exception further similarities
arise. Following Agamben the state of exception is a “space devoid of law, a zone of anomie in
which all legal determinations […] are deactivated” (Agamben 2005, 50). What takes place in this
state  is  pure  violence,  i.e.  human  practice  that  has  no  relationship  with  law whatsoever.  It  is
violence that does not govern or execute but “purely acts and manifests” (Agamben 2005, 62).
While I am not sure where this would lead if we follow Agamben and Benjamin 48 Dewey offers a
clear  escape from this situation.  Just  as pure violence arises in states of exceptions for Dewey
impulses appear when old habits are disrupted and challenged. But Dewey believes that intelligence
48 At the end of his book Agamben (2005, 87f) offers some remarks concerning this question of how to
proceed after his analysis. For the sake of completeness I will briefly summarize them here.
Given the fact that the state of exception “has today reached its maximum worldwide employment” it is
clear for Agamben that we cannot simply “return to the state of law”. Instead Agamben insists on the
difference between life/violence and law/norm that has been shown in his analysis. The strategy that has
to be followed then is to “open a space between them for human action, which once claimed for itself the
name of 'politics'”. This space would open the possibility for a new usage of law: “We will then have
before us a 'pure' law, in the sense in which Benjamin speaks of a 'pure' language and a 'pure' violence.
To a word that does not bind, that neither commands nor prohibits anything, but says only itself, would
correspond an action as pure means, which shows only itself, without any relation to an end”.
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(through experimentalism, deliberation, fallibilism, etc.) is able to reflect on these disruptions and
can try to give them meaning in the form of adapted or new habits. 
In other words: while Schmitt has tried to grasp extreme crises (states of exception) as situations
where law has to be maintained and defended by (temporal) dictatorship, Agamben, Benjamin and
Dewey have forcefully rejected this view. They do so using different languages but their mode of
reasoning is similar: extreme crises challenge, suspend and disrupt existing habits (i.e. law) via pure
violence (Benjamin) and undirected impulses (Dewey). These are disruptions that cannot be simply
forced back under the umbrella of existing laws and habits as Schmitt imagines. Rather – and this is
Dewey's innovative contribution to this debate – they can be processed by pragmatist intelligence.
Pragmatism thus provides an answer to the theoretical challenge posed by Schmitt’s theory of the
state of exception and its tendency towards authoritarianism. On the theoretical level we thus cannot
find any absolute constraint that excludes the possibility of pragmatism in times of crisis. In the
next section we will see how this debate has continued on an empirical level.
2.6.2 Centralization II – Pragmatism and Expanded Executive Power?
In the empirical studies on political crisis management it is a common notion that in times of crises
political power gets (formally) concentrated in the hands of the executive branch of government. As
Hermann  (1963,  70)  has  noted:  “In  response  to  a  crisis  stimulus,  there  is  a  tendency  toward
contraction of authority in the organization”. The preceding section has discussed this argument on
a theoretical level and shown that Dewey offers a distinct pragmatist approach to deal with states of
exception. 
This section will target the question if pragmatism is possible during crisis despite centralization
tendencies  on  an  empirical  level.  Since  the  centralization  argument  has  been  developed  most
prominently  in  the  literature  on  the  American  Presidency  I  will  concentrate  on  this  strand  of
literature, although it could also be discussed in broader terms (see Lodge and Wegrich 2012).49 
49 It is also vital to note, that it were not only studies on American presidents in times of crisis that have
rejected or qualified the thesis of power-concentration on an empirical level, but also the more general
literature on political  crisis  management.  Most  notably,  Uriel  Rosenthal,  Paul  't  Hart  and Alexander
Kouzmin have outlined in several articles how the assumption that crises lead to increased centralization
is far too simplistic and only holds true for a very limited sample of case studies. They have argued that
variables  like  (perceived)  time  pressure,  pre-crisis  decision-making  structures  and  the  differences
between strategic and operational  levels of  decisions may also very well  lead to more decentralized
forms  of  decision  making  (’t  Hart,  Rosenthal,  and  Kouzmin  2008;  also  see  McConnell  2008).
Additionally, they have shown how through the increased importance of external experts and advisors
(Rosenthal  and  ’t  Hart  2008) and  the  crucial  role  of  bureaucratic  politics  (Rosenthal,  ’t  Hart,  and
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Following Polsky (2012), I argue that despite the higher concentration of power in the hands of
American presidents during crises, presidents have repeatedly been affected by the deep uncertainty
of  crises  and  have  fallen  short  in  achieving  their  objectives.  They  therefore  had  to  rely  on
pragmatist modes of behavior, such as muddling-through and experimentation. The mere existence
of increased power-concentration during crises  is  thus  not  necessarily  a practical  constraint  for
pragmatist crisis management.
As  the  Encyclopedia  on  the  American  Presidency summarizes  the  dominant  perspective  of
American presidents during crises: 
“In normal times, the checks and balances of the U.S. political system can be quite formidable,
severely limiting presidential initiatives. But in political crisis, most of these checks evaporate,
and the President is given wide discretionary leeway in the exercise of executive prerogative or
emergency  powers.  While  the  Constitution  contains  no  explicit  provisions  for  government
during a crisis, in an emergency a President can invoke emergency statutes or merely assume
power and become the nation's crisis manager in chief [...]” (Genovese 1994, 33).
This has become the “standard view” in the literature on the American presidency in times of wars
(Howell, Jackman, and Rogowski 2013, 15). It is a finding that can be at least traced back to the
works of Edward S. Corwin and Clinton Rossiter (Corwin 1917, 1947; Rossiter 1948, 1956; also
see  Howell  and  Johnson  2009  for  an  excellent  historical  overview).  Based  on  Corwin’s  and
Rossiter’s work Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. developed the theory of the Imperial Presidency during
the Nixon presidency (Schlesinger 1973). As Schlesinger summarizes his worries thirty years later
in an updated version of his book: “What began as emergency powers temporarily confided to
presidents  as  constitutionally  inherent  in  the  presidential  office:  thus  the  imperial  presidency”
(Schlesinger 2004, 47). 
Taken  together  Corwin,  Rossiter  and  Schlesinger  can  be  seen  as  classical  examples  for  the
predominant view in the literature that wars (and other crises) increase the power of the executive
branch, i.e. the presidency. These researchers have drawn on a rich amount of historical examples to
found this claim, reaching from the early days of the Union to the most prominent cases of Lincoln
during the Civil War, Roosevelt during the Great Depression and World War II, Johnson's war in
Vietnam, Nixon's war in Cambodia and Bush's war in Iraq.
This seems to put a constraint on the possibility of a pragmatist form of crisis management since it
resembles a principle that Peirce has called the method of authority (see 2.5.1). Presidents appear
Kouzmin 2008) crises may also bring additional stakeholders to the table and expand and decentralize
decision making further.
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either  as  tower  of  strength  and defender  of  the  constitution  (Rossiter)  or  as  non-shattered  and
calculating actors that take the opportunity of a crisis to advance their own agenda (Schlesinger). 
But by highlighting how presidents use wars and crises to expand their power and advance their
agenda this view tends to be blind for a point that Lincoln has made explicit while remarking on his
own role during the Civil  War: “I claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that
events have controlled me” (Lincoln 1953, 282). As we have seen, a pragmatist approach to crises
highlights  this  notion  by  emphasizing  the  fact  that  uncertainty  is  a  characteristic  feature  that
encompasses all actors. Faced with a crisis we cannot rely on unfounded authority and the dominant
ideologies simply because of their status. Instead pragmatism proposes that our behavior resembles
what Peirce has called the method of science.
From  a  pragmatist  perspective  it  is  therefore  noteworthy  that  over  the  last  years  remarkable
exceptions to this  standard view of presidents and crises have entered the stage and challenged
conventional wisdom. Two of the studies, those by Kriner (2010) and Howell et al. (2013), for
instance find that Congress plays a bigger role than expected. Both studies use an elaborated set of
methods to assert their claims. Kriner combines quantitative data with in-depth research of a limited
number of case studies while Howell et al. build on an elaborated game theory model to gather
evidence. While this clear-cut strategy allows them to gain innovative and valuable knowledge both
share  assumptions  from rational  choice theory and envision the actors  to  follow a  cost-benefit
approach even in times of crisis. The fundamental characteristic of a crisis as an urgent threat under
conditions  of  high  and  visible  uncertainty  is,  from  my  perspective,  therefore  not  considered
sufficiently. A third study by Polksy (2012) on the other hand offers a different approach. 
Polsky begins with the above-mentioned Lincoln quote that even presidents are driven more by
events than being able to drive them and begins to explore this “wartime power paradox” (Polsky
2012,  352).  For  his  analysis  Polsky  draws  on extensive  case  studies  from the  presidencies  of
Lincoln, Wilson, F.D. Roosevelt, Johnson, G.W. Bush and Obama and finds a mixed record on how
these presidents acted in times of wars. What is most striking is the insight that most of the analyzed
presidents suffered “the defeat of their domestic agenda and the undoing of their reform aspirations”
(Polsky 2012, 349) and had great troubles to prepare for the time after the war has ended. But what
sets Polsky's account really apart from the rest of the discussed literature is the argument that war
does not necessarily increase real presidential power but also reduces the freedom of action. Polsky
offers two main reasons for this controversial claim: first, it is the profound uncertainty of wars that
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is  never  fully  controllable.  Although  each  president  expects  “his”  war  to  end  quickly  and
successfully it is very difficult to anticipate the course of war in advance. 
Second, over the course of a war the hands of the president become increasingly tied by a certain
form of “path dependence” (Hacker 2002, 52–58): 
“In war, time is a president's true enemy. At the beginning of a conflict, he exercises agency
over a broad range of choices. He defines national objectives including the kind of peace he
seeks,  chooses  his  military  commanders,  decides  how many  troops  to  commit,  defines  or
approves strategy, and forges international coalitions. But each choice necessarily forecloses
other  possible  paths  and each one makes it  more costly  and perhaps impossible  to  reverse
direction” (Polsky 2012, 352).
While path dependency is a phenomenon that also holds true for routine political decisions, Polsky
highlights how it becomes especially influential in times of war where decisions often have to be
made under conditions of high time pressure and deep uncertainty.
From a pragmatist perspective on political crisis management Polsky's analysis therefore offers an
important qualifier. Although political crises such as wars might raise the formal powers of the
executive branch (e.g. the American president) they also raise possible restrictions that affect  all
actors. The high uncertainty of these situations can increase the constraints of path dependence and
dramatically limit president's freedom of action. Even more important, Polsky's book makes clear
that the notion of power-concentration during wars does not necessarily run contrary to the thesis
that pragmatism plays a bigger role in such times. He shows how presidents are seldom successful
in achieving objectives and are significantly limited by path dependence in their ability of utility-
maximization.  Instead,  despite  being  endowed  with  additional  executive  powers,  presidents
repeatedly  have  to  use  strategies  of  muddling-through  and experimentation  that  are  essentially
pragmatic.
Together with the theoretical discussion on Carl  Schmitt’s theory of exception,  this  section has
shown that while there might be tendencies towards formal power centralization in times of crisis,
this does not exclude the possibility of pragmatist  crisis management.  Instead as the studies by
Kriner  (2010),  Howell  et  al.  (2013) and especially  Polsky (2012) have  shown,  even American
presidents are affected by the deep uncertainty of crises and have to cooperate with other actors and
engage in pragmatic muddling through and experimentation in order to reach their objectives.
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2.6.3 Urgency I – Is Pragmatism Possible Under Time Pressure?
Our definition of “crisis” has highlighted urgency as one of its central characteristics. This might
pose a serious constraint to a pragmatist form of crisis management. The following paragraphs will
explore the argument if pragmatism under conditions of urgency is possible in more depth.
If we think back to the list of elements of pragmatism that were defined in section 2.5 (fallibilism,
anti-dualism,  experimentalism  and  deliberation)  it  may  seem  that  the  argument  of  urgency
especially works against the last of these elements: deliberation. While fallibilism, anti-dualism and
experimentalism intuitively appear to be compatible with urgency it is hard to imagine how lengthy
and inclusive deliberation processes might be possible under such circumstances. I will therefore
concentrate on the aspect of deliberation at first but eventually try to show how such an assumption
is  too  limited  and how a  more  comprehensive  understanding  of  pragmatism might  lead  to  its
compatibility with conditions of urgency.
If we take a closer look at urgency we see that it consists of two elements: complexity under time
pressure. By complexity I here simply mean a system of many interdependent variables. It is key to
note  that  both  complexity  and  time  pressure  are  essential  for  the  argument  of  urgency  as  I
understand it here. If we have to make a non-complex decision – if we should buy a red or a blue
umbrella for example – under time pressure there is no problem of urgency. On the other hand, if
there is only a complex decision to make without too much time pressure – for example if we
should bring our new umbrella on our vacation trip to China next week – we also do not face the
problem of urgency. Instead it only arises when the two elements come together, e.g. when we have
to decide whether to bring our umbrella to the vacation trip while the cab to the airport is already
waiting downstairs. Then we may have to consider many interdependent variables in a too short
amount of time (Will it rain in China? Does the umbrella fit in my luggage? What are the dangers of
it getting stolen or lost? Is it too heavy to carry around during the trip?). So when we talk about the
problem of urgency we always talk about two things: the problem of not enough time for a problem
too complex. 
When we take what we have learned about pragmatism so far and inspect how this problem of
urgency plays  out  from a pragmatist  perspective our  first  intuition would probably  tell  us  that
pragmatism is good when it comes to complexity but bad with time pressure. Dewey for example,
in  his  book  The  Public  and  its  Problems (published  1927),  has  argued  that  in  deciding  upon
complex problems we should not rely on a small group of experts and decision makers but need to
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include the broader public in the process. His main thesis there is that “when an individual or a
group of individuals performs actions that have an impact on others, those others, that is, the public,
have a right to protect themselves” (J. Campbell  2008, 21).50 Building on his understanding of
human nature and human potentials, Dewey argues that despite the high complexity of problems
upon which societies have to decide, the public – through its  social intelligence – is able to cope
with such problems. Given, of course, that democratic conditions as Dewey envisions them exist.
Doing this,  pragmatism resists  the authoritarian movement toward centralization as  well  as the
belief in the superiority of “neutral” experts and highlights that all humans can very well handle
complex problems.
Time pressure, the second component of urgency, seems to be much more difficult to fit into a
pragmatist framework. While one might agree with Dewey that in general the public is able to
decide on complex issues, the element of time pressure seems to be a game changer. Imagining
endless deliberations and the inclusion of every possible stakeholder under the circumstances of
time pressure appears to be impossible. I think this problem can be targeted in two ways. 
The first way would highlight that we can incorporate decision making under time pressure in the
context of pragmatist democracy if the way to deal with such situations has been decided upon in a
pragmatist democratic environment beforehand. In other words: under well-defined conditions and
in  special  instances  the  most  time-consuming  aspects  of  pragmatist  deliberation  might  be
constrained or suspended. As we have seen in the previous section this argument closely resembles
Carl Schmitt's concept of a state of exception where a temporal dictatorship is necessary to protect
democracy.  This  clearly  contradicts  Dewey's  (1979) position  that  means  and  ends  are  always
closely connected and that  democratic ends can only be reached by democratic  means.  Such a
defense  of  pragmatism  would  therefore  undermine  its  own  grounds  and  contradict  its  core
principles.
The second and more promising way to confront the important argument of time pressure has been
made  by  Richard  Bernstein  and  tries  to  shift  the  ground  by  pointing  out  the  importance  of
fallibilism once again: 
“[W]e frequently have to act without the opportunity to engage in full deliberative inquiry. This
is why the pragmatists stress the need to cultivate habits, dispositions, and practices that will
enable us to act decisively. It is a misleading caricature of the pragmatic mentality to suggest
50 I regard this principle as an extension and reformulation of John Stuart Mill's harm principle: “The only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against
his will, is to prevent harm to others” (Mill 1989, 13).
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that it calls for endless debate. It is difficult to think of another philosophical orientation that has
placed so much emphasis on conduct, practice, and action. There is no incompatibility between
being decisive and recognizing the fallibility and limitations of our choices and decisions. On
the contrary, this is what is required for responsible action” (Bernstein 2005, 57f).
Bernstein argues that it is not a fixed set of techniques and tools that define pragmatism, but instead
a general approach that fundamentally takes into account the significance of uncertainty and might
therefore be – as this thesis argues – especially fitting to cope with situations of crisis, even under
time pressure. Bernstein’s argument also rejects the conception that pragmatism in practice turns
out to be nothing more than a never-ending deliberation process.51 This idea has been introduced as
the termination characteristic of pragmatist deliberation in section 2.5.5. 
As the extensive discussion in this chapter has also shown pragmatism includes much more than
just a plea for deliberation. While this diversity can make it difficult to even define the meaning of
pragmatism it also points to the fact that pragmatism does not include a fixed toolkit that has to be
strictly followed in all situations. Instead pragmatism's general emphasis on adaption indicates that
such a fixed and a priori approach would be immanently anti-pragmatist (see 2.4.3). 
While this seems to neutralize the argument that pragmatism is incompatible with urgency it might
open the door for a different problem. Does it not show how pragmatism has no principles after all
and gives them up (e.g. deliberation and inclusion under conditions of urgency) as soon as the
context requires it? I would argue that this question misses the point. It assumes that pragmatism
changes fundamentally if  confronted with different circumstances.  In its most simple form, this
would look like: P1 → U → P2  where  P1 is a first version of pragmatism that is fundamentally
changed to  P2 because it adapted itself to the occurrence of urgency (U). This conception shows
how pragmatism cannot be regarded as a toolkit that we only use when we need it and can adapt to
concrete  circumstances.  Instead  pragmatism  operates  on  a  meta-level  and  highlights  how  we
develop certain habits and institutions and how it is essential to adapt and revise these habits and
institutions (or even create new ones). 
Pragmatism therefore advices us to build our  capacity for fallibilism, experimentalism, creativity
and deliberation.  This  was also mentioned in  the  quote by Bernstein when he highlighted  that
51 As Elaine Scarry notes, such an understanding would also contradict the original meaning of the term
“deliberation” in Aristotle: “[W]hat Aristotle calls 'deliberation' – has no other function than precisely to
enable  the  taking  of  actions.  In  De  Anima,  he  differentiates  thinking  that  is  directed  toward  an
apprehension of 'what  is',  which he calls  'perception'  and elsewhere 'contemplation',  from a form of
thinking  directed  toward decisions  about  'whether  to  do one  thing or  another',  which  he  designates
'deliberation'” (Scarry 2011, 8; the Aristotle quotes are from De Anima, section 434a, 216).
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“pragmatists stress the need to cultivate habits, dispositions, and practices that will enable us to act
decisively” (Bernstein 2005, 57; emphasis added). If we understand pragmatism as this process of
continual capacity building (PC) it isn't altered by urgency (U). Instead, according to pragmatism,
the  capacities  for  fallibilism,  experimentalism,  creativity  and  deliberation  will  be  useful  and
valuable under conditions of urgency too. From a pragmatist perspective these are the capacities
that need to be nurtured to prepare for situations of urgency. PC → U → PC is then the form in which
we have to understand pragmatism under urgency. 
Boin  and  Nieuwenburg  (2013)  have  empirically  demonstrated  this  practical  feasibility  of
deliberation during crises.  Similarly to the argument advanced here,  they have advised that the
capacities for deliberation should be built before a crisis hits: 
“Deliberation  is  a  rule-governed  activity,  the  exercise  of  which  requires  a  certain  level  of
competence.  In  other  words,  the  capacity  to  collectively  deliberate,  and  thus  to  exercise
practical  reason  to  meaningfully  use  one’s  discretionary  powers,  is  to  an  important  extent
learned” (Boin and Nieuwenburg 2013, 378).
According to the authors capacity-building should also prepare people to deliberate without aiming
for  consensus  since  this  would  slow  down  decision  making  significantly.  This  is  also  why
“deliberation  presents  an  attractive  alternative  to  the  dialectic  of  centralization  (rules)  and
decentralization” (Boin and Nieuwenburg 2013, 380; also see Ansell 2011, 71). On the one hand,
by  being  an  inclusive  and  transparent  form  of  decision  making  deliberation  goes  beyond
centralization.  On  the  other  hand,  by  not  necessarily  aiming  for  consensus  deliberation  also
overcomes the problems of decentralization and offers a meaningful yet efficient way to come to
decisions quickly.
This understanding of deliberation is also the key difference to the way Carl Schmitt has proposed
to deal with states of exception. By suggesting means of dictatorship to handle crises Schmitt is not
interested in building broad democratic capabilities but relies on a strong leader that supposedly
finds the optimal way to resolve the crisis by himself. Pragmatism on the other side responds by
pointing to the fact that an approach that relies on the human capacities for fallibilism, anti-dualism,
experimentalism and deliberation might be able to deal with situations of high uncertainty. As we
have seen this is a claim that even holds true for conditions of time pressure and high urgency since
all these are capacities that can be nurtured and developed before a crisis even hits. This claim is
further developed in the following section.
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2.6.4 Urgency II – Empirical Examples of Pragmatist Behavior During Crisis
Two prime examples can be found in the literature on crisis management that further bolster our
claim that pragmatist behavior during crises is possible, even under conditions of urgency. The first
one can be found in Karl Weick's discussion of the Mann Gulch disaster and how firefighters there
used creative bricolage to make sense of the situation. The second is Gary Klein's account of how
rapid  response  teams  routinely  rely  on  pragmatist  principles  such  as  hypothesis-testing  and
experimentalism when they confront emergency situations. Both authors describe a behavior that
can be described as pragmatist  and happened under immense time pressure. They thereby offer
empirical evidence that urgency does not necessarily put a constraint on pragmatism in times of
crisis. It is important to note,  however, that both examples deal with crisis management on the
operational level only.
2.6.4.1 Karl Weick and the Firefighters at Mann Gulch
When it comes to the existing literature on crisis management Karl Weick is probably the scholar
who is closest to being a pragmatist. A notable organizational theorist, Weick has especially worked
on processes of  sensemaking. He has elaborated on his ties to pragmatism most explicitly in an
article titled “Faith, Evidence and Action”. By building on the theories of – among others – Peirce,
Dewey and especially  James,  Weick puts  the process of  organizational  sensemaking in  a clear
pragmatist light:
“Order, interruption, recovery. That is sensemaking in a nutshell. And organizing is the act of
trying to hold things together by such means as text and conversation, justification, faith, mutual
effort (heedful interrelating), transactive memory, resilience, vocabulary, and by seeing what we
say in order to assign it to familiar categories. Efforts to hold it together are made necessary by
interruptions such as regression, thrownness, inconsistency, cosmology episodes, forgetting, the
unexpected, threats, and disasters” (Weick 2006, 1731–32).
Sensemaking from Weick's perspective is therefore a process where order is interrupted and need to
adapt and adjust in order to recover. 
Similar to pragmatism Weick emphasizes the role that creativity plays in this context, as he has
outlined in his article “The Collapse of Sensemaking in Organizations: The Mann Gulch Disaster”.
In this article Weick examines how in 1949 a group of firemen was trapped in a wildfire which only
three of them survived. One of them managed to survive by starting an escape fire which created a
secure  area  the  wildfire  couldn't  reach.  At  that  time  this  strategy was  not  yet  known to  most
firefighters, instead it was virtually invented on the spot. Weick draws on Claude Lévi-Strauss'
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theory of bricolage and points out how the surviving firefighter could be regarded as a bricoleur,
i.e. as “someone able to create order out of whatever materials were at hand” (Weick 1993, 639).
For Weick the reason why this particular firefighter could survive was his ability to be creative even
under these life-threatening conditions. 
“Bricoleurs  remain  creative  under  pressure,  precisely  because  they  routinely  act  in  chaotic
conditions and pull order out of them. Thus, when situations unravel, this is simply normal,
natural trouble for bricoleurs, and they proceed with whatever materials are at hand. Knowing
these materials intimately, they then are able, usually in the company of other similarly skilled
people, to form the materials or insights into novel combinations” (Weick 1993, 639f).
It is not hard to see how Weick advocates a pragmatist understanding of creativity in this context.
His  view closely  resembles  some  of  the  key  insights  by  pragmatists  on  creativity.  Instead  of
referring to Lévi-Strauss Weick just as well could have drawn on pragmatism and included the
following quote by Dewey which develops a concept that is very close to the bricoleur: “What he
has  learned  in  the  way  of  knowledge  and  skill  in  one  situation  becomes  an  instrument  of
understanding  and  dealing  effectively  with  the  situations  which  follow”  (Dewey  1938a,  44).
Another  element  of  a  pragmatist  view  on  crisis  behavior  and  crisis  management  is  thus  the
importance  to  act.  “Do  something!  Use  your  experience  and  knowledge,  try  things  out,  be
creative!” is in other words the recommendation pragmatism has to offer for crisis managers as
Weick shows. This is  an approach that might  be especially  valuable in situations of high time
pressure  where  comprehensive  rational  comparison  of  options  is  not  possible  (Boin  and
Nieuwenburg  2013,  374).  This  is  a  point  which  has  been  further  reinforced  by  Gary  Klein's
research. 
2.6.4.2 Gary Klein and the Implicit Pragmatism of Rapid Response Teams
Using extensive empirical material Klein argues against the idea that people follow what he labels
“comparative  evaluation  strategies”  (Klein  1998,  62) while  making  decisions. Coming  from a
rational choice background the theory of comparative evaluation assumes that in making decisions
people go through a list of options, evaluate and weight them according to a certain set of criteria
and  finally  decide  on  the  option  that  fits  these  criteria  best.52 In  observing  and  interviewing
firefighters, navy officers, paramedics and other persons who continuously have to decide under
conditions  of  immense  time  pressure,  Klein  and  his  team  of  researchers  have  found  that
comparative evaluation plays only a minor role. Instead they have identified single evaluation as the
52 In the field of policy-making Lindblom has arrived at a similar account of rationalist behavior (see 2.3.1).
Also see the research by Rhona Flin (1996) that goes in a similar direction as Klein’s research.
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dominant way in which decisions are made under time pressure. 
“Decision makers usually look for the first workable option they can find, not the best option.
Since the first option they consider is usually workable, they do not have to generate a large set
of options to be sure they get a good one. They generate options one at a time and do not bother
comparing the advantages and disadvantages of alternatives.  […] The emphasis is on being
poised to act rather than being paralyzed until all the evaluations have been completed” (Klein
1998, 82).
Because of their broad experience these experts in rapid decision making can rely on intuition and
mental simulation (going through different scenarios in their mind and picking the first one that
seems to work) to react to critical situations even in a matter of seconds. 
Of course this strategy of single evaluation sometimes fails. It is crucial to note therefore that it is a
process that can be adjusted and corrected if the decision maker is confronted with enough evidence
that the chosen option might be insufficient. Klein (1998, 32) provides the example of a team of
firefighters that enters a small  building under the impression that there is a fire in the kitchen.
Following this assumption, they spray water on the fire only to notice that it does not have any
impact. Further doubt about the kitchen fire hypothesis is raised by the fact that the fire appears to
be  hotter  yet  less  noisy  than  a  normal  kitchen  fire.  Added  together  this  disturbs  the  original
hypothesis so fundamentally that the commander of the firefighters orders his men to evacuate the
building. Seconds after they have left the floor of the living room collapses. This finally gives rise
to the new (and correct) hypothesis that the source of the fire was not located in the kitchen but in
the basement instead.  As Klein makes clear this  example highlights how single evaluation is  a
flexible and adjusting process of continuous hypothesis generation and evaluation: “This incident
helped us understand how commanders make decisions by recognizing when a typical situation is
developing. In this case, the events were not typical, and his reaction was to pull back, regroup, and
try to get a better sense of what was going on” (Klein 1998, 32).
We can redescribe Klein's descriptions of how people make decisions under time pressure in a way
that makes clear that pragmatist concepts play an important role in this behavior. By following a
single evaluation strategy firefighters and other rapid response decision makers proceed in a way
that  Peirce has  described as  the way of hypothesis/abduction (see chapter  2.4.2).  They quickly
gather available evidence (e.g. smoke coming out of the kitchen window) and by building on their
existing knowledge and experiences develop a hypothesis of the situation (there is a fire in the
kitchen). They then act according to their hypothesis until they are confronted with “real and living
doubt” (Peirce 1992, 114) that their hypothesis might be wrong. They thereby employ a behavior
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that from a pragmatist perspective is characterized by  experimentalism (proceeding in a way that
runs different trials,  either as a mental simulation or in practice),  fallibilism (being prepared to
refine or drop a hypothesis once contradicting pieces of evidence add up), and creativity (building
on existing knowledge but creatively adjusting and combining it to confront new situations). 
Reading  Klein's  empirical  observations  from  a  pragmatist  perspective  also  reveals  a  similar
understanding of uncertainty. In the context of decision making Klein reaches the conclusion that
“uncertainty generates confusion and lack of understanding. Where experience enables decision
makers to take action rapidly, uncertainty results in doubt” (Klein 1998, 277). He thereby draws on
the research conducted by Lipshitz  and others who have defined uncertainty in  a  similar  way:
“Uncertainty in the context of action is a sense of doubt that blocks or delays action” (Lipshitz and
Strauss 1997, 150). We have already seen how pragmatism in its  rejection of Cartesianism has
taken the same stance and claimed to have overcome this problem by permitting “successful action
under conditions of uncertainty” (Joas 2000, 39). The research by Klein and his team show how this
danger  of  blockade of  action  is  minimized in  the  context  of  rapid  decision making by largely
drawing on pragmatist principles.53 
Deliberation also plays a key role in Klein's work in two ways. First, since most of the analyzed
decision makers work in a team setting, deliberation can take place even if time constraints are
present (Klein 1998, chap. 14). But more importantly, deliberation also takes place in the mind of a
single decision maker.  By evoking mental  simulations,  the usage of  analogies  and the creative
combination of existing knowledge the mind proceeds in a deliberate fashion that does not try to
find the perfect solution but the (first) one that works.
Of course this is not a form of democratic deliberation where several individuals are given an equal
voice and engage in a discussion to come to a decision that all the involved stakeholders support.
The analysis by Klein (and also by Boin and Nieuwenburg 2013 as we have seen) suggests that
such a process is indeed impossible under extreme conditions of emergency where decisions have to
be made in a few seconds. But even pragmatists agree on this limit of inclusiveness, as the quote by
Richard Bernstein has made clear. But although it are often very important and vital decisions that
53 This shouldn't  imply that  all decision making under time pressure follow the pragmatist  elements of
experimentalism, fallibilism and deliberation. Lipshitz and Strauss (1997) have shown for example that
decision makers not  only have strategies to acknowledge and reduce uncertainty but  sometimes also
simply suppress it. If we remember Peirce's discussion of the different methods to fixate our beliefs such
a suppression of uncertainty would not be pragmatist at all. Instead of the pragmatist method of science it
evokes the dogmatic method of tenacity (see  2.5.1). My point here is only that pragmatic behavior is
possible in times of crises, even under conditions of enormous urgency.
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have to be made under this extreme form of time pressure they nevertheless present only a low
percentage of all decisions societies have to face. Therefore the mere existence of such situations
should not delude us in abolishing deliberation and democratic inclusion in general. 
This qualification is especially important since this study deals with political crisis management and
the cases that Weick and Klein discuss fall in the realm of operational crisis management. The mere
fact that democratic deliberation is not possible on the operational level during emergencies should
not lead us to the assumption that democratic principles should be suspended in political crises too.
As Agamben has shown against Schmitt this notion that crises are “states of exception” that fall
under the law yet allow its suspension is highly dangerous. Instead I have argued with Dewey that
intelligence can be regarded as a more democratic and successful way to deal with such disruptions.
Therefore a pragmatist perspective on political crisis management remains very skeptical about the
claim that democracy and deliberation should be suspended in times of political crises.54 
This argument is also in line with the fact that the level of urgency is a different one in political
crisis management than on the operational level. Whereas first responders such as firefighters or
paramedics often have to make decisions in a matter of seconds such an extreme level of time
compression  is  rare  in  the  political  sphere.  During  the  Cuban Missile  Crisis,  for  instance,  the
Kennedy  government  discussed  possible  crisis  responses  for  five  days  before  deciding  on  the
quarantine  (Allison  1971).  And  after  the  attacks  on  the  morning  of  9/11  president  Bush  first
addressed the public in a televised speech at 8:30 p.m. and the air strikes in Afghanistan started
almost a month later, on October 7 (Washington Post 2006). In contrast to the operational level,
political crisis management also has to deal with external stakeholders (Congress, citizen groups,
etc.) to a larger extent, an aspect that will be taken up in the model as developed in chapter 3.
So while  there are  substantial  differences  between operational  and political  crisis  management,
Klein's  and Weick’s  research reinforces  an argument  that  stands  at  the center  of  the model  of
pragmatist political crisis management as developed in the next chapter: the possibility to act in an
anti-dualist, fallible, experimental and deliberative way when encountering situations of crisis.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced philosophical pragmatism and has explored its various dimensions that
54 Solnit  (2009)  and  Scarry  (2011)  have  also  argued  forcefully  for  the  importance  of  democracy  and
collaboration in situations of crises and offered broad empirical material for this claim.
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are central  for this  thesis.  It  has set  out by providing a short  introduction on the meaning and
definition of pragmatism. The second part of the chapter has then explored pragmatism’s take on
uncertainty and crisis while the third part has discussed the relationship of pragmatism, rationalism
and various critiques of rationalism (Lindblom, Schön, Simon and Kahneman). The fourth part has
examined some of the main pillars of pragmatist thinking.
Based on this comprehensive overview of the core themes of pragmatism, section 2.5 has identified
four  building  blocks  for  a  pragmatist  theory  of  crisis  management:  anti-dualism,  fallibilism,
experimentalism and deliberation. Additionally, this section has outlined how a principle-guided
approach towards uncertainty can be regarded as the conceptual opposite of a pragmatist approach
towards crises.
These insights on the building blocks of a pragmatist theory of crisis management and its principle-
guided counterpart will serve as the key elements of the model of pragmatist and principle-guided
political  crisis  management as it  will  be developed in the subsequent chapter.  The chapter will
discuss the contrast of pragmatist and principle-guided crisis management in greater detail and will
spell out how these building blocks look like in the context of decision making and meaning making
in political crisis management.
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3 A Model of Pragmatist Political Crisis Management
After the theoretical chapter has elucidated the general aspects of pragmatism and how pragmatism
as a whole can be related to notions of uncertainty and crisis, this chapter sets out to translate these
theoretical conceptions into a more concrete picture of what a pragmatist approach to political crisis
management may look like.
In the preceding chapter we have seen how pragmatism can be understood as a philosophy that is
both analytical  and prescriptive.  From these analytical  and prescriptive claims an ideal  type of
pragmatist crisis management can be derived. This ideal type embodies what an optimal approach
towards crisis management would look like from a pragmatist perspective. It builds on the main
building blocks of a pragmatist theory of crisis management that we identified in section 2.5: anti-
dualism, fallibilism, experimentalism and deliberation.
The problem with pragmatism being a philosophical tradition, however, is that these claims have
never been explored empirically. In other words, while pragmatist philosophy allows us to draw a
pretty clear picture of a pragmatist approach to political crisis management in theory, it offers little
insight on if and how pragmatist political crisis management plays out on the empirical level. What
is  necessary  therefore  is  to  translate  the  theoretical  concepts  and  ideas  of  pragmatism  into  a
coherent model. 
This chapter develops such a model of pragmatist political crisis management, further elaborates it
by contrasting it with principle-guided political crisis management, and offers a comprehensive list
of conceptual specifications. Given the explorative character of this study, these specifications are
suggestions of what I expect to see in pragmatist political crisis management. They are derived from
pragmatist  theory and will  concentrate  on two aspects  of  political  crisis  management:  decision
making  and  meaning  making.  I  limit  my  dissertation  to  these  two  tasks  of  political  crisis
management to allow for an in-depth analysis. 
The chapter  proceeds  as  follows.  The first  section  builds  on  the  theoretical  discussions  of  the
preceding  chapter  and  identifies  two  possible  approaches  to  strategic  crisis  management:  a
pragmatist and a principle-guided one.
To arrive at a comprehensive understanding of pragmatism for the model, I then briefly summarize
the insights from the theoretical chapter and briefly recount our list of the four key concepts of
pragmatism:  anti-dualism,  fallibilism,  experimentalism and deliberation.  I  argue  that  these  four
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building  blocks  are  at  the  core  of  philosophical  pragmatism and  accordingly  use  them as  the
cornerstones of the model.
The model is introduced in section 3.2, including an explanation of its structure and main building
blocks. It is also shown there how two distinct theoretical approaches (pragmatism and principle-
guidedness)  are  linked  to  two  core  tasks  of  political  crisis  management:  decision  making  and
meaning making.
The final section discusses the list of conceptual specifications. When analyzing empirical cases
these specifications help us to identify and describe a pragmatist or principle-guided approach to
political crisis management. I argue that given pragmatism’s philosophical character it is impossible
to  derive  a  list  of  concrete  empirical  indicators  from  pragmatist  theory.  The  specifications
substantiate  our  four  pragmatist  building  blocks  (anti-dualism,  fallibilism,  experimentalism and
deliberation) with political crisis management in mind an offer theory-based suggestions of what
pragmatist  political  crisis  management  might  look  like.  Through  the  empirical  analysis  of  the
chapters 5 and 6 and guided by these specifications I will derive a first list of empirical indicators
for future research that will be discussed in the concluding chapter of this dissertation.
3.1 Two  Forms  of  Political  Crisis  Management:  Pragmatist  and
Principle-Guided
The last  chapter has already shown how pragmatism-inspired approaches to  policy-making and
administration  have  been  championed  by  Charles  Lindblom  and  Donald  Schön  under  stable
conditions and for routine decisions (see 2.3.1). But a crucial point that was not covered there was a
key insight from chapter 2: that pragmatism is a philosophy that might become especially useful in
times of crisis. The empirical examples delivered by Karl Weick and Gary Klein have shown how
pragmatism  can  play  a  role  during  crises  and  emergencies  and  offered  a  first  taste  of  what
pragmatist crisis management might look like. But their analyses have largely concentrated on the
operational level. 
As  explained in  the  introduction,  crisis  management  can  be  analyzed  on an  operational  and a
strategic level. This study will focus on the strategic level and – more precisely – the role that
political crisis managers (elected officials at the very top of a polity) play in crisis management.
When it comes to political crisis management we can identify a blind spot in the existing literature.
No  research  appears  to  exist  that  explicitly  brings  together  pragmatism  and  political  crisis
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management (and even the one on operational crisis management is mostly implicit in its usage of
pragmatism).55
In understanding what a pragmatist form of political crisis management could look like we build on
the theoretical insights of the previous chapter. Briefly summarizing what we have learned so far
about pragmatism and how it relates to crises and (political) crisis management the main line of
argument was the following one:
1. Pragmatism is a diverse and colorful term and philosophical school of thought that is hard to
pin down and define (see 2.1).
2. Pragmatism nevertheless can be understood as a broad approach that consists  of certain
ideas and elements. These themes were identified by extensive consultation of important
works of classical (Peirce, James, Dewey) and contemporary (Bernstein, Ansell, Putnam,
Joas) pragmatists and have led to a comprehensive characterization of pragmatism (see 2.4
and 2.5).
3. Both on a historical and theoretical level it can be shown how pragmatism is an approach
that  was  designed  to  cope  with  situations  of  high  uncertainty  (see  2.2).  Following this
insight and examining the central role uncertainty has historically played in the concept of
crisis, the study has developed the argument that pragmatism is an approach that might be
especially important in times of crises.
4. Finally, a discussion of two possible practical constraints (the arguments of centralization
and of urgency) has shown that there exist no a priori reasons why pragmatism in times of
crises  should  be  impossible  (see  2.6).  Instead,  a  brief  discussion  of  some  preliminary
empirical  examples  has  shown  that  pragmatist  modes  of  behavior  can  be  identified  in
various situations of crises and crisis management. So far these examples have remained on
the operational level though. 
We have identified four main building blocks of a pragmatist theory of crisis management: anti-
dualism, fallibilism, experimentalism and deliberation (see  2.5). Accordingly, these four building
55 Karl  Weick's  work comes closest  to a pragmatist  approach to crisis  management.  While Weick has
explicitly linked his ideas to pragmatist thinkers such as James, Dewey and Rorty (Weick 2006) I would
argue that  he is  not  developing a  systematic account of an exclusively pragmatist  approach to crisis
management. Instead pragmatism is just one of the many intellectual sources that have inspired his work.
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blocks will be at the center of the search for a pragmatist model of political crisis management.
Table 2 briefly summarizes the core theses of the four building blocks and lists some of the most
important sources from the pragmatist literature.
Building Blocks Core Thesis/Prescription Important Works
Anti-Dualism Dichotomous (on-off) concepts blind us 
for the complexities of our environment 
and should be avoided.
(Peirce 1992, chap. 7,8; 
Dewey 1990)
Fallibilism All our knowledge remains fallible and 
needs to be adapted once substantiated 
doubt emerges.
(Peirce 1992, chap. 7,8; 
James 1997; Bernstein 2010,
2005) 
Experimentalism Since we can never be sure about our 
knowledge we constantly need to assess it
in practice by trial-and-error and learning-
while-doing.
(Dewey 1911b; Dorf and 
Sabel 1998; Ansell 2012; 
Ansell and Bartenberger 
2016b)
Deliberation The best way to solve (social) problems is
to create inclusive processes building on 
communities of inquirers.
(Dewey 1998c; Misak 2004;
Bacon 2010)
Table 1: Summary of Key Pragmatist Concepts
We have already seen that pragmatism can be contrasted with another ideal-typical approach that
tries to deal with uncertainty: one that is guided by strict and fixated principles (see 2.5.1). I propose
that  the  same  is  true  for  the  field  of  crisis  management  and  that  pragmatist  political  crisis
management can be contrasted with principle-guided political crisis management. In fact, in the
context of political  crisis management such a principle-guided approach seems to be especially
prevalent. When confronted with crises politicians routinely invoke values and principles to explain
their behavior. The reaction of George W. Bush after 9/11 and François Hollande after the 2015
terrorist attacks in Paris are two prime examples for such an approach.
In his public remarks after 9/11 president Bush and his cabinet invoked strong values and principles
by contrasting the importance of “freedom” with the dangers of “absolute evil”, advocating for an
uncompromising “war on terror” (Bernstein 2005). In a similar vein French president Hollande
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declared after the Paris attacks of 2015 that France would lead a “pitiless” war against the attackers
who had committed an “act of war […] against the values we uphold” (Sharma 2015).
As the preceding chapter  has shown, contrasting pragmatist  political  crisis  management  with a
principle-guided approach is in line with pragmatist thinking. William James has put this contrast in
the most lucid form when he defined pragmatism as an “attitude of looking away from first things,
principles,  ‘categories’,  supposed  necessities  and  of  looking  towards  last  things,  fruits,
consequences, facts” (James 2000, 29). We have especially examined this consequentialist notion in
2.5.1, showing how pragmatists are highly skeptical about strict principles since they lead to a false
sense of certainty that blocks any further inquiry. In this state of false certitude there is no place left
for pragmatist anti-dualism, fallibilism, experimentalism or deliberation since the principle delivers
an a priori answer to the problem. 
Instead  we  see  elements  at  work  in  principle-guided  political  crisis  management  that  are  the
opposite of the pragmatist version. Anti-dualism and fallibilism are substituted by an attitude that
strongly relies on dualist dilemmas and claims infallibility. And whereas pragmatist political crisis
management relies on experimentalism and deliberation, a principle-guided approach to political
crisis management postulates that there is one best way to do things and that there is no need for
broad deliberation. 
It  is  thus  important  to  note  that  the  conceptualisation  of  principle-guided  political  crisis
management as developed in this study is derived from pragmatist philosophy. Principle-guided
political  crisis  management is  developed “ex negativo” in contrast  to pragmatist  political  crisis
management. This “analytical primacy” of pragmatism in this study should however not imply that
I  regard  principle-guided  political  crisis  management  as  less  important  or  less  prevalent  than
pragmatism. Instead, it simply reflects the narrow focus and research objective of this study that
aims at introducing philosophical pragmatism to the studies on (political) crisis management and
explore the characteristics of pragmatist political crisis management. 
As outlined in the introduction, this focus on pragmatism is fueled by the interest if pragmatism’s
take on uncertainty might provide the key for a theory of effective crisis management (see  1.5).
While I have worked in the pragmatist tradition myself (see Ansell and Bartenberger 2016a, 2016b)
I do not necessarily believe that pragmatism really offers the key for such a theory. I also do not
want to imply with this  juxtaposition that  pragmatist  political  crisis  management is  superior  or
“better”  than  principle-based  political  crisis  management.  Instead  I  simply  try  to  gain  a  better
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understanding  of  what  pragmatism looks  like  in  political  crisis  management  and how such an
understanding  can  be  used  in  empirical  research.  Contrasting  a  pragmatist  approach  with  a
principle-guided  one  should  help  to  sharpen  our  understanding  of  pragmatist  political  crisis
management while also highlighting how the opposite of a pragmatist approach would look like.
From a more general perspective it is understandable that principles and principle-guided behavior
might play a role in crisis management. In our definition of the term crisis in the introduction we
have identified the existence of a perceived urgent threat to core values, beliefs or life-sustaining
functions of a community as a key characteristic of crises. Crisis management therefore has to deal
with these core values and beliefs in one form or another: either by trying to reform or overcome
these values and beliefs or by trying to restore them.  Boin and 't  Hart  (2003) have shown the
inherent  tension  between  these  two  aspects  which  they  have  labeled  “reform imperative”  and
“crisis-management  imperative”.  For  principle-guided  political  crisis  management  the  second
imperative is crucial. Its main goal is to “[m]inimize the damage, alleviate the pain, and restore
order. This requires the reaffirmation of existing values and structures”  (Boin and ’t Hart 2003,
549). In other words, for public leaders who rely on principle-guided political crisis management
“[c]ore values and proven methods become anchors in stormy seas” (Boin and ’t Hart 2003, 549),
guiding their behavior when it comes to the critical tasks of political crisis management.
This should not imply that pragmatism is nothing more than instrumentalist opportunism and not
concerned about values. Instead I understand pragmatism as a value-based philosophy that asks how
our values have evolved, inquires and deliberates about them and their practical consequences (see
Joas 2000; Ansell 2016). But pragmatism criticizes that these values often become narrowed and
unquestioned principles.
From a more legal-oriented perspective a principle-guided approach could also be labeled  rule-
based.  As  I  understand  it,  legal  rules  are  codified  principles.  In  the  realm of  law pragmatism
therefore advocates against the positivist and narrow interpretation of legal rules. Instead it advices
judges to also take into account the practical consequences of their decision, a position that has been
labeled  “anti-formalism”.  Such  a  pragmatist  anti-formalist  legal  stance  is  most  prominently
personified by Richard Posner, a legal scholar at the University of Chicago and former judge at the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (see Strauss 2007; Scheuerman 1999). As
Posner has written in his dissent in United States v Marshall:
“It  is  the  disagreement  between  the  severely  positivistic  view  that  the  content  of  law  is
exhausted  in  clear,  explicit,  and  definite  enactments  by  or  under  express  delegation  from
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legislatures, and the natural lawyer's or legal pragmatist's view that the practice of interpretation
[...]  authorize judges to enrich positive law with the moral values and practical concerns of
civilized society” (United States v Marshall).
In the analysis of the Lehman Brothers decision we will see how the strict and narrow interpretation
of legal rules prevailed against a more flexible and pragmatist interpretation that took the practical
consequences on the financial markets into account (see 6.2.3). 
Yet, I have decided to use the term principle-guided instead of rule-based for the opposite approach
of pragmatist political crisis management. While an emphasis on legal rules might make sense from
a legal  perspective  I  find the  term  principle better  suited  for  a  political  analysis.  I  understand
principles to be a more general term that encompasses legal rules as well as political ideologies and
values and allows for a broader analysis.
3.2 Model  of  Pragmatist  and  Principle-Guided  Political  Crisis
Management
In developing the model of pragmatist and principle-guided political crisis management I strongly
build on Gary Goertz’s work (Goertz 2006). Goertz points out how it is especially the structure of
scientific  models  that  hugely  matters.  I  make  use  of  Goertz’s  recommendations  in  designing,
structuring and illustrating the two models. 
I here use the term model not to describe a fully mathematically formalized equation but refer to the
general practice of modeling in social science which aims at  the construction of systematic yet
simplified perspectives on the complex empirical world. As Rebecca Morton has put it: 
“[W]hen we wish to investigate the DGP [data generating process, i.e. the empirical world –
M.B.] we have to simplify it in some ways. That is, we would only be able to describe what we
can observe  and measure  in  words  that  are  available  to  us.  Whenever  we  engage  in  such
description we abstract from the DGP. We ignore details, we simplify, we assume that things
we  cannot  observe  or  measure  will  not  change  our  description  if  they  change.  This  is  the
essence  of  modeling and everyone who tries  to  talk  about  the  DGP engages  in  modeling”
(Morton 2009, 28).
Ontologically, such a definition entails a realist assumption in assuming that the empirical reality
we investigate and the models we construct about it are separated. Language plays a crucial rule
from this perspective since it is through verbal terms and concepts that we have to describe and
explain the empirical world that we confront (Sayer 2010, chap. 2). Models are in other words
regarded  as  “conceptual  lenses”  (Allison  and Zelikow 1999,  2)  through which  we look at  the
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empirical world and which help us to analyze and explain it. Through models we try to filter the
essential characteristics from the non-relevant “noise”. 
What  then makes a  “good” model?  First,  we can make usage of  some general  rules  of  model
construction  such  as  logical  consistency,  clarification  of  underlying  assumptions  and  a  proper
balance between complexity and simplicity (Bendor and Hammond 1992). Goertz (2006) has added
various more specific recommendations to this list which will be used and elaborated in more detail
in the following sections.  Yet,  despite the existence of these useful guidelines  the proof of the
pudding is in the eating. The value and quality of a model therefore must ultimately be judged
according to its usefulness and appropriateness in the process of empirical research and the results
the model yields. 
Figure  2 illustrates the elements of pragmatist and principle-guided political crisis management I
propose in this study. The left side lists the main elements of pragmatism which would be present in
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Figure 2: Pragmatist and Principle-Guided Political Crisis Management
a pure pragmatist form of political crisis management. These are the four elements that have been
extensively  introduced  in  the  preceding  chapter  and  that  have  composed  our  understanding  of
pragmatism throughout this study: anti-dualism, fallibilism, experimentalism and deliberation. The
right side contrasts this pragmatist approach with the elements of principle-guided behavior. As we
will see in much more detail later, the two approaches can be regarded as the ideal-typical extreme
poles on a continuous scale. This study will explore how both of them play out when it comes to
two major tasks of strategic crisis management: decision making and meaning making (see 3.2.2).
The vague terms “pragmatist” and “principle-guided” are filled with life by four secondary level
concepts that illuminate their meaning. For pragmatism the secondary levels concepts are our four
identified building blocks of a pragmatist  theory of political  crisis  management.  The secondary
levels of my concept of  principle-guidedness are on the other side of the scale and constitute the
opposites of the building blocks of pragmatism: they have been labeled dilemmas, infallibilism,
“one best way” and dictation (see 3.2.2 for a detailled discussion).
This distinction between pragmatism and principle-guidedness goes back to another one of Goertz's
recommendations for robust concept building. As he advises (Goertz 2006, 30) it helps to illuminate
the concrete meaning and reach of concepts and its elements if we examine (1) the negative pole of
a concept, (2) the substantive content of the continuum between the two poles and (3) the type of
continuum (dichotomous or continuous). 
Speaking of these two modes of political crisis management, pragmatist and principle-guided, I do
not think of them however in a strictly dichotomous way. Instead I see a continuum and a large
“gray zone” (Goertz 2006, 34) between the two poles. In other words, the two approaches should be
regarded as ideal types in a Weberian sense that mark the two extreme poles on a continuous scale.
In the empirical world I expect however to find most cases to be hybrid forms that use elements of
both approaches.56
56 See  Weber's  original  definition  of  such  ideal  types:  “An  ideal  type  is  formed  by  the  one-sided
accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more
or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to
those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct. In its conceptual purity, this
mental construct cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality” (Weber 1949, 90). 
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3.2.1 The Meaning of Pragmatism and Principle-Guidedness in Political Crisis
Management
It is important to note here that the relationship between pragmatism and its four building blocks is
a  constitutional (or  ontological as Goertz also calls it), not a  causal one. Just as elections are an
essential building block of democracy and constitute this broader concept, anti-dualism, fallibilism,
experimentalism and deliberation together constitute the concept of pragmatism. This goes back to
the idea that pragmatism is not a neatly defined toolkit or school of thought but a general approach
that can be expressed and realized in various forms (see 2.1.3).
Using these secondary level building blocks provides a more concrete structure of the model. As
Goertz sees it, two different modes of structuration exist: sufficient and necessary conditions and
family resemblance: “If one takes the necessary and sufficient condition approach to be expressed
as 'if and only if n characteristics are present' then the family resemblance takes the sufficiency-only
form of 'if m of  n characteristics are present'” (Goertz 2006, 36). In other words, a structure of
family resemblance requires no necessary conditions for a case to meet its criteria. Instead there are
several sufficient criteria that subsume a case under the concept. 
For my model I suggest that the secondary level elements of pragmatism (left side of the figure) and
principle-guidedness (right side of the figure) are linked with a logical OR (as indicated by the + in
figure  2) instead of an AND (which is symbolized by *). This means that in order to speak of
pragmatist crisis management from a perspective of pragmatism not all of the four secondary level
elements  have  to  be  fully  present  (anti-dualism  AND  fallibilism  AND  experimentalism  AND
deliberation).  Instead I  propose to  think of  both pragmatist  and principle-guided political  crisis
management not in “pure” terms. I regard them as ideal types in a Weberian sense (see footnote 56)
with the empirical  reality  of  crisis  management  populated by many hybrid forms of these two
approaches.
My approach thereby tries to find a middle ground between two extreme positions. The first one
states that pragmatism is a narrowly defined toolkit that includes a specific set of elements. Only if
these elements are present we are allowed to speak of “pragmatism”. For the second position the
term is  a  broad  and vague catch-all-phrase  that  merely  describes  a  practical  and opportunistic
attitude and is impossible to define. My description of pragmatism as being constituted by a set of
broad building blocks has proposed a third way against these two extreme positions.
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3.2.2 Two  Tasks  of  Political  Crisis  Management:  Decision  Making  and
Meaning Making
In the introduction I have introduced the core tasks of political  crisis management as including
sense making, decision making, meaning making, crisis termination and learning after crises. In this
study I will concentrate on two tasks that play an important role in the hot phase of a crisis: decision
making  and  meaning  making.  I  limit  my  dissertation  to  these  two  tasks  of  political  crisis
management to allow for an in-depth analysis.
Decision Making
In hindsight, situations of crisis are often reduced to the big decisions they involved: the blockade
decision  during  the  Cuban Missile  crisis,  the  decision  to  invade  Afghanistan  after  9/11  or  the
decision to bail out Greece in the eurozone crisis. Decision making is accordingly perceived as one
of the central tasks of political crisis management. Yet, it also remains one of the most mysterious
parts of crisis management as John F. Kennedy made clear in a quote that also provided the title for
Allison's study of the Cuban Missile Crisis: 
“[T]he presidential  office is  the vortex into which all  the elements of national  decision are
irresistibly  drawn.  And  it  is  mysterious  because  the  essence  of  ultimate  decision  remains
impenetrable to the observer – often, indeed, to the decider himself” (J. F. Kennedy 1964, 701).
The study of decision making during crises therefore does not merely concentrate on single leaders
but has increasingly focused on their environment, such as their cabinet, their staff or the role of
external experts. As Pfiffner has put it in the context of American presidents: 
“Both practitioners and scholars begin from the premises that no one individual can hope to
understand all of the ramifications of the decisions facing the president and that staff structures
and processes are thus necessary to enable the president to make informed decisions” (Pfiffner
2009, 365).
From such a perspective the wider context of advisory systems and group dynamics is as relevant as
the personal characteristics and the leadership style of singular leaders.
The  specifications  offered  in  the  following  section  will  spell  out  the  differences  between  a
pragmatist  and a principle-guided approach in greater detail.  Whereas principle-guided decision
making  regards  its  decision  as  fixated  and  sticks  to  them based  on  a  set  of  strict  principles,
pragmatist decision making proceeds in a probing and exploring manner, revising and adapting its
decisions along the way.
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Meaning Making
During crises, leaders must formulate a convincing frame and communicate it to the broad public in
order to gather support for their agenda. This is not only a matter of communicating the larger
meaning of the crisis to a broader public via mass media and communication channels. Since there
are different  groups competing on the question how to frame and interpret  the crisis,  meaning
making  is  also  an  inherently  political  process  (see  Edelman  1985;  ‘t  Hart  2008).  In  such  an
environment the main challenge for public leaders is to offer a convincing frame for the crisis and
show  that  they  are  in  control.  This  seemingly  easy  task  of  signifying  control  is  immensely
complicated in times of crises, since if leaders “really were in control, there would presumably be
no crisis” (Boin et al. 2005, 78).
What is crucial for our perspective is that by publicly offering frames and interpretations, leaders
also  emphasize  and communicate  core  values.  Based on our  two approaches  to  political  crisis
management  these  values  can  either  be  linked  to  absolute  and  strict  principles  or  emphasize
pragmatist  elements  as  developed  in  the  preceding  chapter.  The  specifications  offered  in  the
following section will provide us with the tools to explore these two different forms of meaning
making.  The  specifications  will  clarify  how pragmatist  meaning  making  relies  on  much  more
ambiguous and humble frames,  whereas  principle-guided meaning making constructs frames in
more definite and stronger terms.
3.3 Specifications for Pragmatist and Principle-Guided Political Crisis
Management
Figure  3 introduces  a  set  of  specifications  of  pragmatist  and  principle-guided  political  crisis
management. The specifications are structured along four dimensions that were introduced in the
model above (figure  2) and that are based on the building blocks of a pragmatist theory of crisis
management: anti-dualism and dualism; fallibilism and infallibilism; experimentalism and “one best
way”; deliberation and dictation. It is crucial to note that the two poles should not be thought of as a
strict dualist dichotomy but as ideal types located on a continuous scale that allows for gray zones
and hybrid types. 
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Figure 3: Specifications of Pragmatist and Principle-Guided Political Crisis Management
These specifications are suggestions of what I expect to see in pragmatist  and principle-guided
political  crisis  management.  This  dissertation  is  explorative  in  character  and  cannot  provide  a
definite  list  of  empirical  indicators  of  what  pragmatist  and  principle-guided  political  crisis
management look like in practice. Such concrete indicators cannot be directly derived from the
pragmatist literature. What the theory of pragmatism allows, however, is to translate its building
blocks to a set of more concrete specifications for decision and meaning making. These theory-
based specifications will guide my empirical analysis. Through this empirical analysis I will also
identify  and collect  a  first  list  of  empirical  indicators.  These  indicators  will  be  presented  and
discussed in the concluding chapter and can serve as starting point for future research.
3.3.1 Anti-Dualism and Dilemmas
We have seen already how anti-dualism is a central characteristic of pragmatist thinking (see 2.5.3).
As Anselm Strauss has explained, the struggle against dualism has been a leitmotif of pragmatism
since the beginning: 
“In  the  writings  of  the  Pragmatists  we  can  see  a  constant  battle  against  the  separating,
dichotomizing, or opposition of what Pragmatists argued should be joined together: knowledge
and practice,  environment and actor,  biology and culture,  means and ends,  body and mind,
matter  and  mind,  object  and  subject,  logic  and inquiry,  lay  thought  and scientific  thought,
necessity and chance, cognitive and noncognitive, art and science, values and action” (Strauss
1993, 45). 
Against this dualist conception, Dewey has argued for the idea of continuity. According to Dewey
knowing is a continuous act: “What makes it continuous, consecutive, or concentrated is that each
earlier act prepares the way for later acts, while these take account of or reckon with the results
already attained—the basis of all responsibility” (Dewey 1980, 347).
For pragmatism overcoming dualism is also a matter of concentrating on practical consequences. If
we remember William James' example of the camping party that debated about a squirrel going
around a tree we see how pragmatism claims to be able to overcome false dualism by pointing to
practical consequences. For James this dispute was easily solvable by pointing out how the two
opposing positions simply had different practical conceptions of the term “going round”. This also
encapsulates the meaning of the pragmatist method: By removing seemingly fixed principles and
concentrating on practical consequences instead, the absolute juxtapositions of dualisms collapse.57 
57 Eugenie Gatens-Robinson has demonstrated the relevance and capability of the pragmatic method by
identifying common ground even between pro-life and pro-choice groups in the highly contested issue of
abortion (Gatens-Robinson 1999).
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While the pragmatist emphasis on practical consequences points to the continuity (common ground,
shared assumptions, etc.) of dualisms, principle-guided crisis management invites the construction
of dualist dilemmas. I follow the Cambridge Dictionary here and define a dilemma as “a situation
in which a difficult choice has to be made between two different things you could do” (Cambridge
Dictionary  2016). McConnell  (2003)  for  instance  describes  how the  Thatcher  government  was
trapped between two principles when British envoy Terry Waite was taken hostage in Lebanon in
1987: “The dilemma facing the Thatcher government was that it  had one objective of releasing
Terry Waite and another of refusing to bargain with terrorists” (McConnell 2003, 407). I argue that
thinking  in  such  strong  dualist  dilemmas  is  a  key  feature  of  principle-guided  political  crisis
management.
Pragmatists argue that such dualisms unnecessarily limit our options and paralyze decision makers
rather than enabling action. This anti-dualist rationale can also be found in the pragmatist approach
to tragedies (see  2.2.2.2).  There we have seen how Sidney Hook has advocated the use of the
method  of  creative  intelligence  to  deal  with  tragic  dilemmas.  “Its  categorical  imperative  is  to
inquire, to reason together, to seek in every crisis the creative devices and inventions that will not
only make life fuller and richer but tragedy bearable” (Hook 2002, 84–85). It is an approach that
tries to overcome tragic dualist dilemmas via an approach of mediation and continuity and enables
action  with  its  deep  meliorist optimism (Glaude  2004).  “It  does  not  conceive  of  tragedy  as  a
preordained doom, but as one in which the plot to some extent depends upon us, so that we become
the creators of our own tragic history” (Hook 2002, 85). 
The  following  specifications  enable  us  to  explore  such  pragmatist  anti-dualism in  the  field  of
political crisis management and contrast it with a dualist principled-oriented approach.
Decision Making: As we have seen in the Terry Waite example mentioned before, decision making
during crises is often described as dealing with dilemmas, framing decisions in either-or terms.
Anti-dualist decision making tries to overcome these dualistic dilemmas by offering a mediating
concept (see Ansell 2011, 10). An example for this can be found during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
There the dualism of invasion and non-invasion was overcome by introducing a  blockade as a
mediating third option (Allison and Zelikow 1999). This anti-dualism also includes the way that
urgency is  handled.  As Rosenthal  et  al.  have pointed  out,  urgency is  about  “the  perception  of
decision makers rather than some set of predefined circumstances” (Rosenthal, Boin, and Comfort
2001,  8).  Self-imposed  commitments  such  as  arbitrary  deadlines  can  promote  such  a  dualist
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approach (“now or never”) and are therefore best avoided in pragmatist political crisis management.
Meaning Making: How a crisis is framed and which interpretation is communicated to the public is
the concern of meaning making. Following an anti-dualist approach to meaning making I would
expect to see a nuanced depiction of events and the avoidance of dichotomies. Lincoln's Second
Inaugural Address at the end of the Civil War is probably the classical example for this (see page
57). By carefully balancing out the different positions and by grasping the interests of both conflict
parties  Lincoln was avoiding dualist  meaning making by framing the war in  a  ambiguous and
complex way. A dualist  approach to meaning making, however,  will  employ a strategy heavily
relying on dichotomies. Since meaning making is chiefly concerned with identifying core values
that relate to the crisis, a principle-guided approach is expected to put these values at the center of
meaning making. A prime example for such a principle-guided dualism in meaning making can be
found in George W. Bush's framing of the 9/11 attacks as an act of “absolute evil”, or Hollande's
strategy of  “we are  at  war”  after  the  Paris  attacks  of  2015.  Following Richard Bernstein  such
responses can be described as textbook examples of dualist meaning making: “Suddenly the world
was divided in a simple (and simplistic) duality – the evil ones seeking to destroy us and those
committed to the war against evil” (Bernstein 2005, 10).
3.3.2 Fallibilism and Infallibilism
Fallibilism is the second building block of pragmatism. As Hilary Putnam has put it, pragmatist
fallibilism is the insight “that there is never a metaphysical guarantee to be had that such and such a
belief will never need revision” (Putnam 1995, 152). In other words, we can never be sure that our
beliefs are correct and need to adapt them once we have substantial reason to doubt them. As we
have seen (2.5.2) this position has been developed against all attempts to establish a position of
absolute certainty, whether they are built on religious doctrines, formal authorities or rationalist
analysis. Dewey (1990) has called such attempts a futile “quest for certainty”. 
Against this quest for absolute certainty, pragmatism highlights the centrality of uncertainty. This is
in  line  with  the  general  literature  of  crisis  management  which  has  highlighted  how crises  are
situations of “irreducible  uncertainty and imperfect knowledge” (Weick,  Sutcliffe,  and Obstfeld
2008, 47). For pragmatists, this deep uncertainty is not limited to situations of crisis (although it is
heightened during crises and becomes more visible) but an inevitable human condition: since we
cannot avoid it we better work with it. As Glaude has summarized Dewey's position, pragmatism
states 
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“that  uncertainty  pervades  our  lives  and  involves  us  in  the  perils  of  evils,  that  there  are
dimensions of life that are far beyond our control […], and that this uncertainty defines our
moral life in the sense that we don’t have recourse to fix, universal rules that resolve our moral
dilemmas” (Glaude 2004, 90).
The recourse to universal rules and principles that provide ultimate guidance for dealing with tragic
dilemmas  is  a  core  element  of  principle-guided  approach  to  political  crisis  management.
Pragmatism rejects this infallibilism of principle-guided approaches and promotes the importance of
flexibility and continuous revision. For the political sphere this means “that decisions of policy and
value are open to critical revision and that their justification is a matter of inquiry – not the sheer
tenacity of belief or closed conviction” (Thayer 1968, 351). 
William James has given pragmatist fallibilism its most radical form through his conception of
truth.  As James sees it,  a true idea is  “[a]ny idea that  helps  us to  deal,  whether practically or
intellectually,  with either the the reality or its  belongings,  that doesn't entangle our progress in
frustrations, that fits, in fact, and adapts our life to the whole setting […]. It will hold true of that
reality” (James 2000, 94). 
In other words, from a pragmatist standpoint an idea is true if it helps us to deal with reality, i.e. to
act in an effective way. Such an idea “fits” reality just as a map fits the area we have to navigate
through. What is essential to understand here, however, is that the true idea is not thought of as an
exact copy of reality. Such an understanding would suspend any further process of inquiry and
truth-making. As James writes: “When you've got your true idea of anything, there's an end of the
matter. You're in possession; you know; you have fulfilled your thinking destiny” (James 2000, 88).
Such is the case for fixed principle and ideologies that are thought to be true without feeling the
necessity for further exploration and verification. 
For pragmatism, on the other hand, finding truth is a never-ending process that calls for constant
adaption and revision, just as the maps of the world have to be continuously refined. In the literature
on crisis management, an empirical example for such a fallibilist approach has been found in the
mindfulness of high reliability organizations (HROs). As Weick et al. (2008, 28) have described it,
this  fallibilist  mindfulness is  a “persistent mindset that admits the possibility  that  any 'familiar'
event is known imperfectly and is capable of novelty. This ongoing wariness is expressed in active,
continuous  revisiting  and  revision  of  assumptions,  rather  than  in  hesitant  action“.  Likewise
fallibilism is an attitude that does not gives in to the quest for absolute certainty but constantly tests
the  truth  value  of  ideas  and  beliefs  when  confronted  with  novel  situations.  This  fundamental
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fallibilism is reflected in the specifications of pragmatist political crisis management. 
Decision Making: One key specification of fallibilist decision making is the ability to change and
overcome existing beliefs and decisions. Since from a fallibilist standpoint the right solution is not
obvious a priori fallibilist decision making would avoid decisions that are unrevisable. Because the
truth-value of an idea has to be continuously explored, it is essential that decisions that turn out to
be wrong can be revoked and adapted. A principle-guided approach, on the other hand, will not
bother with this question. Since its integral infallibilism ensures it of the correctness of its decision
potential failures are ignored. In the political psychology literature such a phenomenon is known
under the term “groupthink”, which has been defined as “a mode of thinking that people engage in
when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ strivings for unanimity
override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action (’t Hart 2011, 297;
also see Janis 1989, 59). Such a conception of invulnerability also leads to a situation where the
necessity of backup plans is neglected.
Meaning Making: I  expect  the fallibilist  insight  that  deep uncertainty can never  be completely
eliminated  to  also  be  reflected  in  the  meaning  making  process  of  pragmatist  political  crisis
management. Richard Bernstein offers a concrete example of what such fallibilist meaning making
could  look  like  and  how  it  goes  together  –  as  we  will  later  see  –  with  an  appreciation  of
deliberation: 
“A fallibilistic orientation requires a genuine willingness to test one's ideas in public, and to
listen  carefully  to  those  who  criticize  them.  It  requires  the  imagination  to  formulate  new
hypotheses and conjectures, and to subject them to rigorous public testing and critique by the
community of inquirers” (Bernstein 2005, 29). 
Fallibilism implies that uncertainty is openly communicated during crises and that possible failures
are anticipated (“we are not totally sure what to do and while we think that this solution will work it
could also fail”). For the infallibilism of a principle-guided approach to meaning making, on the
other hand a strong sense of certainty in the framing of the crisis can be expected. An example for
this are the remarks delivered by France's president Hollande after the terrorist attacks in Paris in
November 2015. With the attacks still going on while he spoke, Hollande tried to communicate a
strong sense of infallibilist certainty: “This is a terrible ordeal which once again assails us. We
know where it comes from, who these criminals are, who these terrorists are” (Sharma 2015).
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3.3.3 Experimentalism and “One Best Way”
If  our  beliefs  and  ideas  are  always  potentially  wrong and  need  to  stay  open for  revision  and
adaption, pragmatist experimentalism offers a way to proceed from this insight. While we do not
know the correct answer in many situations, experimentalism offers a way out by allowing us to try
out  different  ideas  and  see  how  they  work.  This  especially  applies  to  the  context  of  crisis
management where actors are confronted with an increased level of uncertainty. 
Donald Schön has described pragmatist experimentalism as the approach of being “open to the
situation's back-talk” (Schön 1983, 164). Peirce has formulated the same principle in his method of
abduction or hypothesis-testing (see  2.4.2). Peirce also described this method as making a “fair
guess” (Peirce 1932, 374) and showed how it is a method of inference that allows us to generate
new knowledge and deal with situations of uncertainty. 
Through  its  experimentalist  emphasis,  pragmatism  further  highlights  how  meaning  is  not
constructed and determined prior to action but discovered, employed and adapted through action.
As Donald Schön has put this: “In the most generic sense, to experiment is to act in order to see
what action leads to” (Schön 1983, 145). Karl Weick has highlighted a similar point in his concept
of “enactment”. Weick uses the term “to preserve the central point that when people act, they bring
events and structures into existence and set them in motion” (Weick 1988, 306). This is of course an
especially delicate point during crises because “action that  is  instrumental to  understanding the
crisis  often intensifies  the  crisis”  (Weick 1988,  305).  Under  such conditions,  proceeding in  an
experimentalist manner, while necessary, might also include significant risks and costs that only
become visible in hindsight. 
By resting on the solid ground of (false) certainty, a principle-guided approach to political crisis
management rejects experimentalism and contrasts it with a position that there is one best way to
react to the crisis. Since a solution can be derived from fixed principle (e.g. “financial crises can
only be tamed by reducing debt immediately”) there is no need for experiments in an (ideal-typical)
principle-guided approach. Even more, experimenting during times of crisis might be undesirable
given the risk and uncertain outcome they involve. This has been found especially for so-called high
reliability organizations such as nuclear power plants or airport control towers, where the “scale of
consequences precludes learning through experimentation” (Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 2008,
32; also see Sagan 1994, 237). 
A pragmatist argument for experimentalism would counter that we can never escape this problem of
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enactment during crises: We need to act in order to understand the crisis better, but at the same time
our  actions  might  make  the  crisis  worse.  To  minimize  the  risks  (or  ethical  implications)  of
experimentation, pragmatist experimentalism promotes the usage of small-scale experiments and
mind-experiments such as simulations (Ansell and Bartenberger 2016a). In the literature on crisis
management simulation plays a similar role: 
“Simulations improve the disaster and crisis management capacity of an organization or society.
They provide a cost-efficient, controlled environment in which individuals and teams can safely
experiment with procedures, protocols, and strategies – while testing suggested improvements
of the coping repertoire” (Boin, Kofman-Bos, and Overdijk 2004, 390).
This contrast of different approaches to experimentation is present in our two tasks of political crisis
management:
Decision Making: Following the experimentalist logic, pragmatist decisions made during crises are
regarded as hypotheses that are put into action and if necessary adapted and revised. Decisions are
accordingly regarded as experimentalist  trials  that  often are creative recombinations of existing
tools that deliver important insights into the nature of a crisis and help to improve decisions through
the feedback they provide. In other words, and as also suggested by Weick's enactment perspective,
decision making is characterized as a constant feedback loop with decisions providing the actions
necessary to better understand the crisis. In order to reduce the potential risks and costs of such an
experimentalist  approach  techniques  such  as  mind  experiments  (simulations)  and  small-scale
experiments might also be employed in this context. 
For principle-guided decision making I  expect no such experimentalist  behavior.  Instead a  best
possible solution is derived from a fixed principle and implemented by an according decision. I
expect the decision to be based on supposedly “objective” evidence (derived from the principle and
cases that support it) and that decisions from existing cases are applied unaltered.
Meaning  Making: For  the  level  of  meaning  making  I  expect  two  different  elements  of  an
experimentalist approach. On the one hand, the experimentalist response to the crisis can be part of
the frame that is used and communicated to the public. In other words, the government openly
describes its reaction as based on the experimentalist maxim of “trial-and-error”. When during the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010 oil flowed into the ocean for almost 90 days, BP’s attempts to
fix the leak clearly resembled a “trial-and-error” approach (Wheaton 2010). In a speech in June
2010, with the oil leaking for almost two months, president Obama more or less openly admitted
this fact: 
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“Because there has never been a leak of this size at this depth, stopping it has tested the limits of
human technology. That is why just after the rig sank, I assembled a team of our nation's best
scientists and engineers to tackle this challenge […]. Scientists at our national labs and experts
from academia and other oil companies have also provided ideas and advice” (Reuters 2010). 
Second, an experimentalist variant of meaning making could try out different frames and test them
to see how they work (e.g. if they raise public support for the response). In the most extreme form
this can also result in frame reversals where a frame that has been shown not to work is replaced by
a different one. A principle-guided approach on the other hand would look like the exact opposite.
Examples for this include the framing of the crisis and the response to it as “unambiguous” and
based on solid and undisputed evidence. On the procedure level, different frames would not be tried
and we would see no frame reversals. Instead one best frame is identified and the government sticks
to it throughout the crisis.
3.3.4 Deliberation and Dictation
The call for debate and inclusiveness pops up at many different occasions in pragmatist writings,
making deliberation a central element of pragmatism. For Peirce it is embodied in the community of
inquirers that advance our knowledge through the method of science (Peirce 1997b). Dewey gives
this idea a political spin and makes it the foundation of his theory of democracy (Dewey 1998a,
343). Dewey connects democracy and deliberation with Peirce's method of science. For Dewey, in
the  setting  of  creative  democracy,  where  deliberation,  collective  inquiry  and  experimentalism
flourish,  decision  making  does  not  need  to  rely  on  what  Peirce  (1997b)  has  discarded  as  the
methods of tenacity, authority and a priori reasoning. 
We have extensively discussed how pragmatism rejects the notion that the answer to a crisis can be
found by a wise leader alone. According to pragmatism, effective solutions should rely on collective
intelligence (see 2.6.1). We have also seen how pragmatism should not be regarded to be in total
contrast  to  centralization.  Instead  pragmatists  understand  very  well  that  deliberation  has  to  be
limited in certain regards, both when it comes to the number of participants and the time available
(Bernstein 2005, 57).
What this should make clear is how pragmatism is not opposed to centralization per se, i.e. the fact
that  sometimes  the  number  of  actors  has  to  be  limited  for  simple  practical  reasons  (urgency,
confidentiality, etc.). Instead pragmatism rejects an approach that can be labeled dictation. In such a
scenario, deliberation is suspended and substituted by an authoritarian principle that gives orders
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categorically and without any debate. Needless to say that in such an atmosphere other concepts of
pragmatism such as fallibilism or experimentalism can play no role. Weick has summarized this
concern of intellectual  contraction in  times of crises explicitly:  “The person in authority is  not
necessarily the most competent person to deal with a crisis, so a contraction of authority leads either
to less action or more confusion” (Weick 1988, 312).
These two ideal types of deliberation and dictation are reflected in the following specifications:
Decision Making: For decision making, the pragmatist approach heavily relies on the results from
collective  deliberation,  both  from internal  deliberation  but  also  from deliberation  with  external
stakeholders. There is encouragement of dissenting voices and internal or external skeptics. From a
pragmatist perspective this is necessary “to maintain the state of doubt and to carry on systematic
and protracted  inquiry” (Dewey 1910,  13).  This  is  also known as  devil's  advocate or  multiple
advocacy (George and Stern 2002). A prominent recent example of such an approach has been
identified in the Obama government where vice president Joe Biden has been widely identified as
playing the role of devil's advocate in the foreign policy team (Bailey 2009; Colvin 2009; Pfiffner
2011; Woodward 2010). 
A principle-guided way of decision making would strongly rely on principles established a priori to
the  crisis.  This  approach  would  exclude  dissenting  voices.  An  often-cited  example  for  this
principle-guided  decision  making  is  the  ability  of  neo-conservative  proponents  in  the  Bush
administration to use the crisis of 9/11 to push an agenda that evoked and implemented long-held
principles but had little to do with the crisis itself (see Halper and Clarke 2004).
Meaning Making: A deliberative approach would mean that  the  general  openness  to  collective
debate  and  inquiry  is  also  reflected  in  the  framing  and  public  communication  of  the  crisis.
Accordingly, it would prescribe the general encouragement of public debate and inquiry. This is
clearly an ideal-typical assumption and under conditions of high urgency such attempts have, of
course, to be limited. Yet, pragmatist political crisis management would allow as much room as
possible for this. A principle-guided approach, however, would include a general tendency that tries
to prevent and suppress such public debate and inquiry. Instead we would find a strong public
evocation of fixed principle (a missionary understanding of democracy among neo-conservatives
for instance) that can also spill over to the dimension of decision making and limit it further. 
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3.4 Conclusion
This chapter is at the core of this study as it has marked the shift from the theoretical considerations
of  chapter  2 to  a  more  empirical-oriented  direction.  It  has  tried  to  pour  the  knowledge  and
arguments from the philosophical investigations into a model that reflect the richness of pragmatist
thought while also providing specifications for empirical research. 
While its content tries to incorporate the key contributions of the preceding chapter, its structure has
been designed following guidelines  and recommendations  offered  by Gary  Goertz  (2006).  The
model has integrated the comprehensive understanding of pragmatism and its four main building
blocks (anti-dualism, fallibilism, experimentalism and deliberation) and have contrasted it with a
principle-guided  approach  to  political  crisis  management  which  populates  the  exact  opposite
position. As I have underlined, these two conceptions of political crisis management should not be
thought of in a strictly dualist manner but instead be regarded as ideal types in the Weberian sense
that help us to span the space of possibilities. 
This chapter mapped the two ideal types on two key tasks of political crisis management: decision
making and meaning making. A set of specifications has been developed that will help us to explore
pragmatist and principle-guided political crisis management (or hybrid forms of it) in the empirical
cases studied in the following chapters. But before these empirical chapters the following chapter
will provide a quick overview of important methodological considerations informing this research
project.
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4 Methodological Approach and Case Selection
The methodological approach of this study can be identified as case study research. For Blatter, a
case study is “a research approach in which one or a few instances of a phenomenon are studied in
depth” (Blatter  2008,  68).  John Gerring,  who is  one of the main methodologists  of case study
research in political science, has offered a similar definition. According to him “a case study is best
defined as an in-depth study of a single unit (a relatively bounded phenomenon) where the scholar's
aim is to elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenomenon” (Gerring 2004, 341). Yet, for
this study I find the case study approach provided by Alexander George and Andrew Bennett most
helpful.  George's  initial  interest  in  case  study  methods  was  motivated  by  the  aim to  generate
“lessons in a systematic and differentiated way from a broader range of experience that deliberately
draws upon a variety of historical cases” (George 1979, 43). His case study approach therefore
comes with a highly practical impetus and the intention to “provide policymakers with 'generic
knowledge' that will help them form effective strategies” (George and Bennett 2005, 7). 
The methodological literature has identified various advantages of the case study approach. Gerring
(2004) has identified a set of the main strengths of case studies: among them are the ability to make
causal  inferences  (with  a  special  focus  on  causal  mechanisms)  and  to  analyze  events  and
phenomenons in depth. Blatter (2008) has distinguished case study approaches from experimental
and large-N surveys and has identified additional strengths of the method, among them that case
studies are especially strong when regarding theoretical innovation, descriptive analysis and internal
validity. George and Bennett  (2005, 19–22) have underlined the same aspects but used a slightly
different terminology. According to them, case studies have the potential to achieve high conceptual
validity (what Gerring and Blatter called depth of analysis and descriptive capabilities), foster new
hypotheses (Blatter's theoretical innovations) and help in analyzing causal mechanisms and causal
complexity. 
What  is  interesting about this  register of case study strengths is  the heavy emphasis  on causal
analysis. One of the most prominent examples for this emphasis is George's method of  process-
tracing (George and Bennett 2005, chap. 10; Collier 2011). Yet the objective of this study is not a
primarily causal interest. Instead it is the relation between pragmatism and the strategic tasks of
political crisis management, a relation that is not a causal one (pragmatism does not cause political
crisis management) but rather a constitutive one (pragmatism plays a role and is a part of political
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crisis management) (see Goertz 2006 on this crucial difference).
In Gerring's words, this dissertation follows an exploratory approach, a type of research where case
studies “enjoy a natural advantage in research” (Gerring 2004, 349). George and Bennett have also
rejected the restriction on the confirmatory dimension of case studies and have stressed the broader
meaning of theory development.  In this  context  they have criticized King, Keohane and Verba
(1994) “for emphasizing almost exclusively the epistemic goal of hypothesis testing (sometimes
known as the 'logic of confirmation'), neglecting other aspects of theory development, such as the
formation of new hypotheses or the choice of new questions to study” (George and Bennett 2005,
12).
More precisely,  what I  intend to  provide in  the empirical chapters  of this  study is  what  Harry
Eckstein has called  plausibility probes.  For Eckstein,  a plausibility probe “involves probing the
'plausibility'  of  candidate-theories”  (Eckstein  1992,  147) before  they  are  tested  through  more
rigorous  and  elaborate  research.  As  George  and  Bennett  have  put  it:  “Plausibility  probes  are
preliminary  studies  on  relatively  untested  theories  and  hypotheses  to  determine  whether  more
intensive and laborious testing is warranted” (George and Bennett 2005, 75). As Eckstein further
highlights,  “a  plausibility  probe  into  theory  may  simply  attempt  to  establish  that  a  theoretical
construct is worth considering at all, that is, that an apparent empirical instance of it can be found”
(Eckstein 1992, 148). 
This  last  aspect  of  probability  probes  is  the  very  objective  of  this  study.  By  introducing  the
distinction  between  pragmatist  and  principle-guided  political  crisis  management  this  study
developed  a  new  model  that  is  derived  from  the  theoretical  considerations  of  pragmatist
philosophers.  These  theoretical  concepts  were  then  translated  into  the  model  including
specifications for both types of political crisis management. The plausibility probes of the empirical
chapters will explore if we can find preliminary empirical evidence for these two approaches, i.e. if
the  model  allows a  novel  and fruitful  perspective  on the  two cases  Bear  Stearns  and Lehman
Brothers.  The  leading  question  is:  Are  pragmatist  (and  principle-guided)  political  crisis
management plausible and useful concepts? The analysis of these two cases therefore should not be
understood  as  full-blown  case  studies  but  as  a  first  probe  if  this  model  of  political  crisis
management is worth to be considered in greater depth. 
To summarize, the case study method was chosen because it is in line with the exploratory and
probing character of this study. Its in-depth analysis allows to explore the various dimensions and
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specifications of pragmatist and principle-guided political crisis management in great detail. Since
the approach of this study is novel and untested this seems to be an advisable strategy at such an
early research stage. A larger-N study could build on the insights from this plausibility probe and
apply a refined version of the model to a wider array of cases.
4.1 Case Selection
The two cases I will analyze in this study are two decision points in the financial crisis of 2008. The
choice to analyze a financial crisis by no means should imply, that the model developed in chapter 3
is only applicable for financial and economic crises. Instead the two cases were chosen because of
their relevance for this study.
It was the U.S. financial crisis that got me starting to think about the role of pragmatism in political
crisis management. Why did the Bush administration bail out an investment bank like Bear Stearns
or an insurance company like AIG despite its strong free-market principles? And how were these
decisions made? In the terms of case study research the U.S. financial crisis was picked because
given the strong free-market principles of the Bush administration it seemed to be a “least-likely
case” (Gerring 2007, 233; George and Bennett 2005, 121; Mahoney and Goertz 2006, 242) for
pragmatist political crisis management. 
The  Bush  administration  has  been  widely  identified  with  principle-guided  and  ideological
leadership (Bernstein 2005). Its foreign policy, for instance, has been described as being influenced
either  by dogmatic  neo-conservatives  (Halper  and Clarke 2004) or  populist  Jacksonians  (Mead
2011).  Pfiffner  (2007,  2009)  has  depicted  the  general  decision  making  process  in  the  Bush
administration as hierarchical and lacking broad deliberation. Additionally, Patterson (2010) found
a strong influence of economic ideologies (i.e. supply-side economics and free-market principles)
on economic policies before the financial crisis. 
But observers have also noted the pragmatist side of the Bush presidency (Fletcher 2005). Naftali
(2010, 83) has highlighted the “new pragmatism” in the administration's foreign policy after 2006
and Herbert and Wroe have described the “administration's pragmatism in response to the financial
crisis” (Herbert and Wroe 2009, 266). This pragmatism was summarized by Bush himself when he
stated in a television interview in December 2008: “I have abandoned free market principles to save
the free market system” (CNN 2010). 
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These  two  perceived  dimensions  of  pragmatism  and  principles  in  the  response  of  the  Bush
administration to  the U.S. financial  crisis  made this  a  prime candidate to study pragmatist  and
principle-guided political crisis management. 
The two decision points, Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, were chosen because they exemplify
this contrast of pragmatist and principle-guided political crisis management. At the same time the
cases are closely connected and include similar actors, similar institutions and deal with a similar
decision (potential bankruptcy of an investment bank). This has the practical advantage that I can
concentrate on the pragmatist and principle-guided aspects of both cases without spending too much
time to introduce the different context of the cases. Initially I had contemplated for example to
discuss  the  German  reaction  to  the  European  debt  crisis  as  well  but  this  would  clearly  have
exceeded the scope and length of this study. By picking two cases from the Bush government’s
reaction to the financial crisis of 2008 I could concentrate on the research objective to explore and
demonstrate the empirical usefulness of a model of pragmatist political crisis management.
The first case I have chosen is the decision by the Bush administration to rescue the investment
bank Bear Stearns with a loan by the Federal Reserve Bank in March 2008. The second case is the
Bush administration's decision to let the investment bank Lehman Brothers fail in September 2008.
These two cases together allow an in-depth analysis of aspects of the model and to acquire insights
as to how pragmatist and principle-guided political crisis management look like in practice. Being
plausibility probes the two case studies do not intend to validate the model. Instead they present
preliminary  evidence  that  the  introduced  model  is  “plausible”  and  allows  a  novel  and  fruitful
perspective on instances of political crisis management (Eckstein 1992, 148).
While the two decision points are closely connected and share many characteristics they are clearly
distinguishable cases. Following George and Bennett (2005, 17-8) I define a “case” as an instance
of a class of events and a case study as “a well-defined aspect of a historical episode that the
investigator selects for analysis”. Both the Bear Stearns and the Lehman Brother case are instances
of the class of financial crisis decisions. In my analysis I especially focus on the aspect of decision
and meaning making and the role of pragmatist and principle-guided political crisis management.
While exploring the plausibility of my model is at the center of my dissertation I do not plan to
completely  ignore  question  concerning  causality.  Prior  analyses  of  the  two  chosen  cases  have
concentrated  on  these  causal  dimensions  and  have  reached  the  conclusion  that  the  Bush
administration let Lehman down because they gave in to increasing public pressure against more
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bailouts and were faced with legal constraints preventing the rescue of Lehman (Blinder 2013, chap.
5; Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, chap. 18; Sorkin 2009; Stewart 2009; Wallach 2015a;
Wessel 2009). I will come back to this question in chapter 7 where I introduce and discuss several
hypotheses that relate to this puzzle and that could guide future research projects.
4.2 Case Description – The Financial Crisis in the U.S.
This section will offer a brief overview of the financial crisis in the U.S. in order to provide context
for the two decisions (Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers) that will be analyzed in more depth in the
next chapters. 
I have picked August 9, 2007 as the beginning of the financial crisis, the day when BNP Paribas,
France's largest bank, halted withdrawals from its three mortgage funds (Blinder 2013, 90; Paulson
2010, 61). As became widely known in the meantime, this was the first sign of the bursting bubble
on the American housing market, especially affecting the segment of subprime mortgages that were
bundled into complex financial derivates and held by almost all financial institutions (Shiller 2008).
When the bubble did burst, the value of these constructs quickly evaporated and posed a serious
threat to many financial institutions who had them on their books. 
The really  “hot” phase  of  the crisis  began when these troubles  reached the heart  of  American
capitalism in March 2008,  represented by the investment  bank Bear  Stearns.  The Bear  Stearns
Companies was the smallest of the five big investment banks on Wall Street. As Blinder (2013,
102) has noted, amidst the growing economic turmoil on the subprime markets Bear Stearns was
being “widely viewed as that slow antelope” that would be hit first by the approaching storm. When
rumors  about  the  liquidity  of  Bear  started  in  March  2008,  trust  in  the  company  decreased
dramatically and a run on Bear began (Kolb 2011, 95–96). In a couple of days the cash reserves of
Bear vanished and the investment bank faced bankruptcy. Even though Bear Stearns had been on
the radar of the Fed and the Treasury for a while the sudden crisis surprised most actors. As Henry
Paulson, Treasury Secretary during this time, recalls: “[…] it was unclear what we could do to stop
that disaster. This was a dangerous situation and there weren't any obvious answers” (Paulson 2010,
97).  Ultimately,  and  after  intense  discussions,  the  Bush  government  decided  to  intervene  and
enabled a merger between Bear Stearns and banking giant JPMorgan, supporting it  with a $30
billion loan (Schaefer 2013). 
But even after this perceived “bailout” of Bear Stearns by the government, the markets did not calm
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down. The next financial  institutions that ran into trouble were the two government-sponsored-
enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac which were strongly entangled in the turbulent
mortgage  markets.  After  pressure  from the  Bush  administration  (especially  Treasury  Secretary
Paulson), Congress passed a law that granted the Treasury broad authority to support the two GSEs.
Soon  after  that  the  government  made  use  of  this  authority  and  put  both  enterprises  under
conservatorship, essentially taking them over. At this point in time this was, as Henry Paulson has
put it, “the biggest financial rescue in history” leaving the Bush administration confident that they
had “just saved the country – and the world – from financial catastrophe” (Paulson 2010, 18). But
the biggest problems were yet to come.
In September  2008,  the  investment  bank Lehman Brothers  reached a  similar  situation  as  Bear
Stearns had a  few months before and it  became increasingly clear that the company could not
survive on its  own. Lehman's  troubles did not  come as surprising as the case of Bear  Stearns.
Treasury Secretary Paulson for instance has stated that he began to worry about the firm shortly
after Bear got rescued and that contingency planning started immediately (Paulson 2010, 123 and
138). Following the Bear rescue, Lehman had tried to raise additional capital but could increase its
position only marginally. Various other financial actors such as the Bank of America and Barclays
Capital explored the opportunity of taking over Lehman, but the negotiations went nowhere. The
Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Bank supported Lehman's search for a buyer
but made clear that they would not put public money on the line this time. Ultimately, when no
buyer for Lehman could be found and with the Bush administration sticking to its decision to let the
investment bank fail, Lehman Brothers had to file for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008. 
Blinder (2013, 128) has called the downfall of Lehman Brothers “the watershed event of the entire
financial crisis”. With Lehman strongly connected to other financial institutions and the markets
expecting another bailout by the government the downfall of Lehman sent shock waves across the
globe. Under conditions of growing uncertainty, with nobody knowing which bank or company
would be next, trust among market participants plummeted leaving banks increasingly unwilling to
lend to other banks or companies (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 339). 
The company which experienced this drop in trust first was insurance giant AIG. Heavily invested
in the risky mortgage business,  AIG found it  increasingly hard to  obtain money via  the credit
markets. With AIG being “larger, more interconnected, and more 'consumer facing'” (Swagel 2009,
42) than Lehman it became clear that letting AIG fail would create even bigger turmoil than the
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Lehman decision and could even lead to a meltdown of the world economy. Confronted with this
gloomy  perspective  the  Bush  administration  decided  to  essentially  nationalize  the  insurance
company. But the panic on the markets continued. Blinder summarizes the dramatic events that
followed the nationalization of AIG: 
“Merrill  Lynch,  America's  best-known stock broker,  avoided oblivion only by selling itself
hastily to Bank of America. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley were saved when the Fed
declared  them  to  be  bank  holding  companies.  […]  America's  largest  thrift  institution,
Washington  mutual,  and  the  nation's  fourth-largest  bank,  Wachovia,  crashed  and  burned”
(Blinder 2013, 128; also see Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, chap. 20).
After seeing one prominent financial institution after the other stumble, the Bush administration
finally decided that after having tackled these incidents on a case-by-case approach (Bush 2010,
459) a more comprehensive response was needed. On September 18, 2008 president Bush, Treasury
Secretary Paulson and Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke went to Congress to ask the policy
makers for a $700 billion program, later known as the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), to
strengthen the financial sector.
At  first,  carried  by  the  strong  opposition  from the  left-wing  of  the  Democratic  party  and  the
Republican right, the bill was voted down in Congress. But on October 3, 2008 the bill for a $700
billion  program  to  support  the  financial  sector  by  buying  its  “troubled  assets”  finally  passed
Congress. TARP ultimately allowed the government to inject large amounts of capital into banks
and other financial institutions in order to stabilize the financial markets. It was the last big act of
the Bush government in its fight against the financial crisis. In November 2008, Barack Obama was
elected new president of the United States, inheriting an economy in deep distress.
4.2.1 Timeframe
In analyzing the financial crisis in the U.S. I will concentrate on two decision points: the bailout of
Bear Stearns (March 2008) and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (September 2008). The case
studies will therefore focus on the political crisis management of the Bush administration and will
not deal with the events that occurred during president Obama's term. 
This will limit the analysis to the peak of the financial crisis in 2008, with the tasks of decision
making and meaning making at the center of my interest. Therefore, the discussion on the exact
causes  and  mechanisms  of  the  financial  crisis  will  not  be  covered  here.  Instead  I  am merely
focusing on how the Bush administration (especially the Department of Treasury and the Federal
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Reserve Bank) has handled the evolving crisis. Also, since I am concentrating on the “hot phase” of
the crisis here, I will not deal with the question if the Bush government did well in anticipating the
crisis.
4.2.2 Key Actors
The main actors on which the analysis will concentrate are president George W. Bush, Secretary of
the Treasury Henry Paulson, chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank Ben Bernanke and president of
the  Federal  Reserve  Bank of  New York Timothy Geithner.  I  will  concentrate  on these  actors,
especially on Paulson, Bernanke and Geithner, because they were the most decisive drivers of the
Bush government's response to the financial crisis. As the Washington Post has found: 
“From the rescue of Bear Stearns to the takeovers of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and American
International Group, all  the key decisions have been made by Treasury Secretary Henry M.
Paulson Jr., Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke and Timothy F. Geithner, the president
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York” (Cho and Irwin 2008).
This account has been confirmed by Wessel who has noted: “When Paulson arrived, the pendulum
of power swung all the way from the White House to the Treasury next door. During the Great
Panic, he, Bernanke, and Geithner called the shots […]” (Wessel 2009, 201). The institutions that
will be at the center of the analysis are hence the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Federal
Reserve as the central  bank of the U.S. President  Bush will  also play a prominent  role  in  the
analysis but since he has been in the background in both cases (especially in the decision making
process but also in publicly framing these decisions) I will concentrate on Paulson, Bernanke and
Geithner and their teams.
4.3 The U.S. Financial Crisis as “Crisis” According to our Definition
In the introduction of this study I have defined a crisis as a perceived urgent threat to core values,
beliefs or life-sustaining functions of a community, which must be dealt with under conditions of
uncertainty. The three elements of urgency, threat and uncertainty have been identified as the key
characteristics of situations of crisis. This section will briefly outline how the case discussed here,
the financial crisis in the U.S., can be understood as crisis according to this definition by involving
(perceived)  urgency, a  threat to core values and life-sustaining functions of a community and an
elevated level of uncertainty.
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4.3.1 Urgency
Perceived urgency is an aspect that repeatedly pops up in the portrayals of the two decision points
analyzed in this study. Both the decision on Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers were taken over a
weekend, with the opening of the markets on Monday perceived as a hard deadline until which a
solution  had  to  be  found.  In  both  cases  the  financial  situation  of  complex  and  interconnected
investment banks had to be assessed in a short  amount of time and negotiations with potential
buyers facilitated.  Treasury Secretary Paulson therefore has called the rescue of Bear Stearns a
“race against time” (Paulson 2010, 121) and New York Fed director Geithner commented: “With
limited time and limited sleep, we would be making a momentous decision [...]” (Geithner 2014,
152). Fed chairman Bernanke has noted how this persistent urgency took its toll on government
actors: “The urgency to act on so many fronts, together with the complexity of the problems we
faced, exhausted all of us.” (Bernanke 2015, 310). 
4.3.2 Threat
The most striking indication that the financial crisis was perceived as fundamental threat in the U.S.
is the fact that a Democratic Congress granted extraordinary powers to a Republican president in
order to fight the crisis. Making this bipartisan move even more unusual was the fact that all of this
happened  during  presidential  election  season.  As  Barney  Frank,  Democratic  Congressman  and
chairman of the House Financial  Services Committee at this time, has written in a foreword to
Henry Paulson's memoirs, the reason for the Democrat's support of a Republican government was
“the threat of an economic meltdown that would have been worse than anything since the Great
Depression and might conceivably have equaled that event in its economic devastation” (Paulson
2010, xv).
This evaluation has been shared by other important policymakers involved. For president Bush the
financial crisis was an “economic calamity that could be worse than the Great Depression” (Bush
2010, 440), a fact further underlined by Treasury Secretary Paulson who called it “the economic
equivalent of war” (Paulson 2010, 254) and who noted: 
“Had it  not been for unprecedented interventions by the U.S. and other governments, many
more financial institutions would have gone under. The economic damage could easily have
equaled or even exceeded that  of  the Great  Depression,  with 25 percent  unemployment,  or
worse” (Paulson 2010, 436). 
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This sense of threat was intensified by the extremely complex and interrelated character of the
financial markets. As Timothy Geithner, president of the New York Fed and Treasury Secretary
under Obama, has put it: “There hadn't been a crisis this severe in seventy-five years, and never in a
financial system this complex” (Geithner 2014, 5).
4.3.3 Uncertainty
It is one of the most powerful characteristics of a crisis that it comes out of the blue and increases
the level of (perceived) uncertainty dramatically. This was also the case at the beginning of the U.S.
financial crisis. Treasury Secretary Paulson has called the financial crisis “unprecedented” (Paulson
2010, 265) and Bush openly concedes: “I was surprised by the sudden crisis” (Bush 2010, 453).
Similarly, Alan Greenspan, the influential Chairman of the Federal Reserve from 1987-2006, has
underlined how most economists failed to foresee it: 
“[…]  leading  up  to  the  almost  universally  unanticipated  crisis  of  September  2008,
macromodeling unequivocally failed when it  was  needed most,  much to the  chagrin of  the
economics profession. The Federal Reserve Board's highly sophisticated forecasting system did
not  foresee a recession until  the crisis  hit.  Nor did the model  developed by the prestigious
International Monetary Fund [...]” (Greenspan 2013, 7).
And even Robert J. Shiller, an economist and Nobel Laureate widely credited as one of the few who
saw the crisis on the housing market coming, has stated: “The subprime crisis was not on the list of
possible scenarios for which we might have made plans” (Shiller 2008, 104).
After  the  first  shock  of  surprise,  uncertainty  remained  high  during  the  U.S.  financial  crisis,
continuously producing new and vexing challenges for governments. Making matters worse, the
crisis affected financial markets, highly complex and interdependent systems. This made it difficult
even for  such experienced actors  as  U.S.  Treasury Secretary and former Goldman Sachs CEO
Henry  Paulson  to  make  sense  of  what  was  going  on  (Paulson  2010,  47).  The  key  decisions
throughout the crises – the rescue programs for companies like Bear Stearns or AIG or the decision
to let Lehman Brothers fail – were therefore clouded by uncertainty and left decision makers unsure
how they could improve the situation.
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4.4 Analysis of Sources
After deciding on the two decision points (Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers) I systematically
went  through  a  wide  array  of  sources,  analyzing  the  two  decision  points  and  coding  for  the
specifications of the model of political crisis management. These sources included the following:
the report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission and its numerous primary sources (internal
government materials, mails, reports, briefings, interview transcripts, etc.), the memoirs of the main
actors  involved (Bush 2010;  Bernanke 2015;  Geithner  2014;  Paulson 2010;  Cheney 2011),  the
transcripts  of Congressional hearings (U.S. Congress 2008a, 2008b, 2008c) and journalistic and
scientific  accounts of the events (e.g.  Blinder  2013; Conti-Brown 2015b; Sorkin 2009; Stewart
2009; Stiglitz 2010; Wallach 2015a; Wessel 2009). 
Additionally, I engaged in an in-depth analysis by setting a timeframe for both decision points that
covered one week before and after each decision. For these time periods (9-23 March and 7-21
September 2008) I have further analyzed all official documents (press releases, statements, press
briefings, etc.) released by the White House, the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve Bank and
examined the public speeches of the main actors. For these two time periods I have also analyzed
the articles published in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal that included the keywords
“Bear Stearns” and “Lehman“. This search returned a list of 170 articles for the Bear Stearns case
and 357 articles for the Lehman case which were especially useful in analyzing how decisions were
publicly framed.
In going through all these sources, I was looking for instances where I could find evidence for my
model  of  political  crisis  management.  If  such  instances  were  identified  I  crosschecked  their
occurrence with other sources and analyzed additional material and sources if necessary. Only if I
found sufficient evidence to identify a specification of the model and only if its occurrence was
supported by at least one other source I included it in the empirical chapters. For decision making I
especially concentrated on internal materials (reports, emails, memos, etc.), memoirs, journalistic
and scientific accounts,  reports from Congressional hearings and press articles that provided an
"inside" view of decision making processes. For the analysis of meaning making I focused on press
releases, official statements, press conferences, Congressional hearings, public speeches and the
press articles from the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal.
I added no novel material by conducting own interviews, etc. but built on the corpus of already
existing sources. This methodological approach relates to the main empirical objective of this study:
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re-analyzing two well-known cases of political  crisis  management  that  have received extensive
attention from politicians, scientists  and journalists  and see if  the theoretical framework of this
study can offer a novel perspective on these cases and if preliminary empirical evidence for this
framework  can  be  found  through  these  “plausibility  probes”.  The  empirical  results  from  this
systematic analysis will be presented in chapters 5 and 6.
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5 The Rescue of the Investment Bank Bear Stearns
The first decision I will analyze in greater depth is the rescue of the investment bank Bear Stearns.
The question  here  is  a  simple  one:  Why did  president  Bush and his  administration  rescue  the
investment bank Bear Stearns even though it clearly violated their free market principles? 
On  February  8,  2008,  only  weeks  before  the  rescue  of  Bear  Stearns,  Bush  emphasized  these
economic principles in a public speech at the Conservative Political Action Conference: “Our views
are grounded in timeless truths. [...] We believe that the most reliable guide for our country is the
collective wisdom of ordinary citizens. […] We believe in personal responsibility. […] We applied
our philosophy on issues relating to economic prosperity” (Bush 2008d).
A former CEO of the investment bank Goldman Sachs, Henry Paulson shared Bush's philosophy,
calling himself “an advocate of free markets” (Paulson 2010, 438). But Paulson also noted: “The
interventions we undertook I would have found abhorrent at any other time. I make no apology for
them, however. As first responders to an unprecedented crisis […] we had little choice” (Paulson
2010, 438). It is this fallibilist change from a position that favored free markets and skepticism
about  government  interventions  to  a  decision to  support  a  private  investment  bank with public
money that is at the center of my interest here. But before I proceed with this analysis I will briefly
introduce the case.
In March 2008, Bear Stearns was the smallest of the five big investment banks on Wall Street. Two
of Bear Stearns' hedge funds had already failed in summer 2007 because of their strong investments
in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) that were linked to subprime mortgages. In March 2008
Bear Stearns still held many investments in the housing market (Bland 2007; Creswell and Bajaj
2007). On March 10, the rating agency Moody's downgraded 15 mortgage backed securities issued
by Bear Stearns, leading to a run on the firm (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 286).
Counterparties  “refused to believe that  the firm was solvent  and refused to continue to  extend
credit” (Kolb 2011, 95). Additionally, counterparties demanded more securities from Bear Stearns
(margin calls)  which quickly decreased the financial  liquidity of Bear  Stearns (Financial  Crisis
Inquiry Commission 2011, 288). While on the morning of March 10 Bear Stearns' liquidity pool
had been around $18 billion it was down to $12.5 billion by the end of the day (Blinder 2013, 103;
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 286). 
On the morning of March 13, Alan Schwartz, CEO of Bear Stearns, called Timothy Geithner at the
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New York Federal Reserve and Bob Steele at  the United States Treasury, telling them that his
company faced serious liquidity problems (Kelly 2009, 17; Paulson 2010, 93). Treasury Secretary
Paulson subsequently called president Bush to inform him about the situation (Bush 2010, 452;
Paulson 2010,  96).  During the day of March 13, the liquidity  reserves  of  Bear  Stearns further
declined to $2 billion, leading to a conference call between representatives from Bear Stearns and
its regulator, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), at 7:30 p.m. (Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission 2011, 289). During this conference call Bear Stearns stated that it would have to file
for bankruptcy on the following day, a message that was also delivered to New York Fed director
Geithner and Treasury Secretary Paulson (Geithner 2014, 149; Paulson 2010, 97). Overnight a team
from the New York Federal Reserve analyzed the situation and assessed possible consequences of a
bankruptcy of Bear Stearns (Sidel et al. 2008). 
During a conference call on early Friday morning, March 14, 2008, members of the Federal Reserve
Bank (led by chairman Ben Bernanke and New York director Timothy Geithner), the U.S. Treasury
(led by Secretary Henry Paulson) and the SEC assessed the situation. The short amount of time
made it impossible to find a buyer for Bear Stearns or to build a consortium of other financial
institutions  that  would  lend  to  the  investment  bank  (Kelly  2009,  63).58 Anticipating  severe
consequences for financial markets and the general economy in case of a Bear Stearns bankruptcy
Timothy Geithner proposed that the Federal Reserve could lend money to Bear Stearns via the bank
JPMorgan (Geithner 2014, 152; Kelly 2009, 66). After Treasury Secretary Paulson had agreed to
protect the Federal Reserve Bank from any losses of the loan (Paulson 2010, 101), Fed chairman
Ben Bernanke supported the idea and assembled the available Fed governors to approve the loan
(Sidel et al. 2008). 
With the indirect $12.9 billion loan by the Federal Reserve Bank via JPMorgan on Friday morning,
Bear  Stearns  made  it  through  the  day  (Federal  Reserve  Bank  2008a)  but  the  rating  agencies
continued to downgrade the investment bank and the stock of Bear Stearns had fallen by 47% by
the end of the day (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 289). For the government, this was a
clear sign that trust in Bear Stearns had not been restored by the indirect loan. While initially the
loan was supposed to be available for up to 28 days, Geithner and Paulson now pushed Bear Stearns
to find a buyer over the weekend (Kelly 2009, 100). JPMorgan signaled interest to buy Bear Stearns
and began to work on a deal with the investment bank over the weekend. On Sunday, however,
58 The template of a consortium solution was based on the case of the hedge fund Long Term Capital
Management, which was bailed out by a consortium of banks and other financial institutions in 1998
(Blinder 2013, 113).
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JPMorgan told Geithner and Paulson that it would not be able to takeover Bear Stearns without
additional financial support (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 289; Paulson 2010, 109).
With  the  backing  of  president  Bush  and  Treasury  Secretary  Paulson,  Bernanke  and  Geithner
decided to invoke the emergency clause of the Federal Reserve Bank, section 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve Act, that authorizes the central bank to lend to any institution under “unusual and exigent
circumstances” (Federal Reserve Bank 2013). Under this provision the Fed purchased $30 billion of
Bear Stearns assets with the special condition that JPMorgan would cover the first $1 billion of
eventual losses from these assets (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 290). Enabled by the
support from the Federal Reserve Bank, JPMorgan and Bear Stearns announced on Sunday that
JPMorgan would takeover Bear Stearns, paying $2 per share (Kelly 2009, 219). The takeover by
JPMorgan prevented a bankruptcy of Bear Stearns and the financial markets calmed down in the
weeks that followed (Blinder 2013, 114). The following timeline summarizes the events of this
case.
Commentaries have noted the unusual character of the steps taken by the government in order to
save Bear Stearns. The Wall Street Journal concluded that the Bush administration “more or less
threw its  rule  book out  the  window” (Sidel  et  al.  2008).  And the  New York  Times quoted  an
economic  historian  saying “Traditionally  regulators  have  helped commercial  banks in  financial
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Figure 5: Timeline of the Bear Stearns Case
Figure 4: Timeline of the Bear Stearns Case
panics, but not investment banks, which do not hold customer deposits. […] I don’t remember a Fed
action aimed at a noncommercial bank” (Landon 2008b). The following analysis will show how the
actions by the government were not only unprecedented but can also be regarded as an example of
pragmatist political crisis management.
5.1 Decision Making
The following sections will concentrate on two core aspects of political crisis management and will
analyze the Bear Stearns rescue along these two dimensions: decision making and meaning making.
5.1.1 The Fallibilism of George W. Bush and Henry Paulson 
Specifications of Pragmatist Political Crisis Management:  Readiness to change existing beliefs
and decisions; Avoidance of unrevisable decisions
Fallibilism, as we have seen in the preceding chapters, is one of the building blocks of pragmatism.
As  understood  by  pragmatism,  fallibilism  is  an  approach  that  is  “anti-dogmatic  and  anti-
ideological” (Bernstein 2005, 51) and rejects absolutes and “moral certainties” (Bernstein 2005,
42). Pragmatist fallibilism argues for the revision of existing beliefs and habits when confronted
with reasonable doubt.
In the case of the Bear Stearns rescue, fallibilist behavior could be witnessed in two of the main
actors: president George W. Bush and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson. I have chosen Bush and
Paulson to elaborate this fallibilist behavior because they have shown the strongest adherence to
free market principles.59 Thus they can serve as prime examples for fallibilism. If we consider the
pre-crisis mindset of Bush and Paulson, who advocated for free markets and were skeptical about
government interventions, a government-backed bailout of Bear Stearns seemed highly unlikely.
But as we will see in this section in deciding to save the investment bank Bear Stearns Bush and
Paulson were able to overcome these existing beliefs that were grounded in free-market ideology.
As I  will  argue,  overcoming these existing beliefs and strong principles qualifies as pragmatist
fallibilism.
59 Ben Bernanke and Timothy Geithner are also interesting but less pronounced examples in this regard (for
Bernanke see Andrews 2008b).
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Departing from the Doctrine of Moral Hazard
I will start the analysis by briefly explaining the main ideological principle from which Bush and
Paulson departed: the doctrine of moral hazard. As Bush remembers in his memoirs when he first
heard about the liquidity troubles at Bear Stearns: 
“My first instinct was not to save Bear. In a free market economy, firms that fail should go out
of business. If the government stepped in, we would create a problem known as moral hazard:
Other firms would assume they would be bailed out, too, which would embolden them to take
more risks” (Bush 2010, 453). 
The discussion if moral hazard indeed is a problem is a highly ideologized one, a discussion that
runs right through economics departments and government agencies (see Bair 2012, 41). While
conservative-libertarians emphasize the danger of moral hazard to criticize public regulation and
government interventions, liberals argue that such interventions are sometimes necessary in order to
fix the deficiencies of free markets (Krugman 1999; Stiglitz 2012). 
New York Fed director Timothy Geithner, for instance, has described a group of hawkish regional
Fed presidents “[…] whose main concerns were preserving the Fed's inflation-fighting and avoiding
moral hazard. They did not expect a downturn, so they generally did not believe the upheaval in
mortgages and capital markets justified lower interest rates” (Geithner 2014, 130). Blinder paints
the picture in even bleaker colors and speaks of “moral hazards ayatollahs” (Blinder 2013, 110)
while Lawrence Summers warned about “moral hazard fundamentalists” already in 2007 (Summers
2007). 
These three remarks were all issued by persons who are regarded as close to the Democratic Party.
Timothy Geithner  built  his  career  during  the  Clinton  administration  and later  became the  first
Treasury Secretary of  the Obama administration.  Alan Blinder  was a  member of Bill  Clinton's
Council  of  Economic  Advisers  while  Lawrence  Summer  served  as  Treasury  Secretary  under
Clinton before becoming director of the National Economic Council in the Obama administration.
Kevin  Dowd,  on  the  other  hand,  has  defended the  idea  of  moral  hazard  in  the  journal  of  the
conservative Cato Institute. He notes: “moral hazard played a central role in the events leading up to
the crisis, and we need to appreciate this role if future reforms are to be well designed and prevent
further disasters down the line” (Dowd 2009, 142). This notion has been further supported by the
libertarian  Mises  Institute  (Hülsmann  2008) and by Anna Schwartz,  one  of  Milton  Friedman's
former co-authors, who called the Bear Stearns bailout a “rogue operation” (Torres 2008). 
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The Fallibilist Shift from Moral Hazard to Economic Stability
Bush himself rejected the notion to prevent the Bear bankruptcy at first, citing the danger of moral
hazard  as  main  reason  (Bush 2010,  453).  As  Bush remembers  it,  this  view was  supported  by
Treasury Secretary Paulson as well, but with a decisive shift: “Hank shared my strong inclination
against  government  intervention.  But  he explained that  a  collapse  of  Bear  Stearns  would  have
widespread repercussions […] While I was concerned about creating moral hazard, I worried more
about a financial collapse” (Bush 2010, 453). I argue that this shift from the moral hazard doctrine
to concerns about financial and economic stability is at the center of the fallibilist decision making
in the Bear Stearns case and a core example of pragmatist crisis management. It is a shift that can be
traced  back  to  the  analysis  conducted  by  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  on  the  question  what  a
bankruptcy of Bear Stearns would mean for the financial and economic system. This analysis was
carried out by New York Federal Reserve director Timothy Geithner and his team in the night of
March 13, 2008.
After  Bear  Stearns  CEO  Alan  Schwartz  had  informed  the  SEC,  the  Federal  Reserve  and  the
Treasury on the evening of March 13 that without any support his firm would have to file for
bankruptcy on the next day the three involved public agencies had different opinions on how to
proceed. The involved SEC officials, the main regulators of Bear Stearns, saw little they could do to
prevent a bankruptcy and went home after receiving the message from Schwartz (Geithner 2014,
149; Kelly 2009, 35; U.S. Congress 2008c, 106). But Geithner called his team back to the New
York Federal Reserve Bank and spent the night exploring what consequences a bankruptcy of Bear
Stearns would have for the financial system (Geithner 2014, 149; Kelly 2009, 48; Sidel et al. 2008).
The analysis quickly revealed that Bear Stearns was linked to many of the other main financial
institutions and that its bankruptcy would have broad and severe consequences (see Ip 2008): 
“The closer Fed officials looked at Bear's connections with the broader financial system, the
more they feared its sudden failure would unleash utter chaos. Bear was not that big – only the
seventeenth largest U.S. financial institution at the time – but it was completely enmeshed in the
fabric of the system” (Geithner 2014, 150).
It was this interconnectivity and the risk of contagion that raised concerns about the general stability
of the financial and economic system. As a report by the Federal Reserve Bank has put it: 
“Market  participants  were  likely  to  respond to  the  failure  of  Bear  Stearns  by  withdrawing
generally from short-term collateralized funding markets,  resulting in a dramatic drop in the
overall availability of short-term financing, and threats to the liquidity and possibly the solvency
of other large and highly leveraged financial institutions.” (Federal Reserve Bank 2008g, 2). 
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Around 5 a.m., the main government actors convened a conference call to make a decision on how
to proceed. The participants were Timothy Geithner, Ben Bernanke and members of their team from
the Federal Reserve Bank, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and his aides and Eric Sirri from SEC
(Kelly 2009, 61). Timothy Geithner presented the results of the Fed's analysis and introduced three
options: letting Bear Stearns file for bankruptcy, finding other financial institutions which could
support or takeover Bear Stearns or lending public money to Bear Stearns (Kelly 2009, 64; Sidel et
al. 2008). Given the interconnectedness of Bear Stearns and the potentially severe consequences of
its bankruptcy Bernanke and Geithner concluded that a Bear Stearns bankruptcy could potentially
be catastrophic (Bernanke 2015, 217; Geithner 2014, 151; Kelly 2009, 64). Initially, Paulson had
doubts but after he had thought through the potential consequences of a Bear Stearns failure he
supported the decision to rescue the investment bank: “Perhaps if Bear had been a one-off situation
we would have let it go down. But we realized that Bear's failure would call into question the fate of
the other financial institutions [...]” (Paulson 2010, 102).
Since there was not enough time to find institutions that were willing to support Bear Stearns60 the
only  option  that  remained  was  to  lend  public  money to  Bear  Stearns.  In  the  night  before  the
conference call Tom Baxter, the general counsel of the New York Fed had come up with the idea of
an indirect loan and during the conference call Timothy Geithner proposed the idea as a way to lend
to Bear Stearns (Bernanke 2015, 214; Geithner 2014, 151). Through this indirect loan the Federal
Reserve Bank would lend $12.9 billion to  the bank JPMorgan that  would “on-lend” it  to Bear
Stearns (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 289; U.S. Congress 2008c, 116).61 Paulson and
Bernanke supported Geithner's plan, and Paulson called president Bush to get his support. 
At first Bush was opposed to support Bear Stearns with public money, but Paulson convinced him
that financial stability was more important than moral hazard in this situation (Bernanke 2015, 216;
Bush 2010, 453; Kelly 2009, 68; Paulson 2010, 101). Bush had political concerns though. He had to
give a speech at the Economic Club in New York the same day and Paulson advised him not to
promise that there would be no bailouts (Kelly 2009, 68; Paulson 2010, 93).62 But Bush was also
60 Timothy Geithner and his team were in contact with JPMorgan during the night, and while the bank was
interested in a takeover of Bear Stearns it needed more time (Geithner 2014, 149).
61 The idea of an indirect loan was developed since the New York Fed's general counsel initially thought
that, contrary to a direct loan to Bear Stearns, it would not require the invocation of the Fed's emergency
clause section 13(3).  After  extended legal  discussions Fed chairman Ben Bernanke decided that  the
indirect loan would also require the invocation of section 13(3) (Bernanke 2015, 214).
62 In the final version of the speech, delivered on March 14, 2008, Bush did not mention his commitment
against bailouts anymore but promised more vaguely that the “Chairman of the Federal Reserve and the
Secretary of the Treasury […] will take the appropriate steps to promote stability in our markets” (Bush
2008a).
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worried about a meeting with the editors of the Wall Street Journal the same day. So Paulson sent
Bob Steele, one of his aides, to brief Bush on the rescue of Bear Stearns and to prepare him for the
meeting with the editors (Kelly 2009, 71; Paulson 2010, 102; Wessel 2009, 163). 
After Bernanke, Geithner and Paulson had discussed several options, consensually agreed on the
indirect  loan  and  president  Bush  had  supported  the  plan,  Fed  chairman  Bernanke  decided  to
implement  the  plan at  7  a.m.  (Bernanke 2015,  217;  Geithner  2014,  152;  Kelly 2009,  69;  U.S.
Congress  2008c,  116).  Bernanke  assembled  the  available  Fed  governors  who  unanimously
approved the indirect $12.9 billion loan from the Federal Reserve Bank to Bear Stearns at 9:15 a.m
(Bernanke 2015; Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 289).
Bush's and Paulson's Shift as Pragmatist Fallibilism
The readiness of Bush and Paulson to change their existing beliefs under these circumstances and
support  a  decision  that  contradicted  these  beliefs  qualifies  as  fallibilist  decision  making.  It  is
therefore an example of pragmatist decision making. 
This change of existing beliefs was something that both Bush and Paulson seemed to have been
aware of. Bush quipped that his friends back in Texas “are going to ask what happened to the free-
market guy they knew” (Bush 2010, 460). And Paulson has spoken about the instances during the
financial crisis “where I found myself forced to do the opposite of what I had believed for my entire
career” (Paulson 2010, 246). 
More evidence for fallibilist decision making can be found in Paulson's insistence that Bush should
not promise that there would be no bailouts in his speech at the Economic Club on March 14, 2008
(Bush 2008a; Kelly 2009, 68; Paulson 2010, 93). As Paulson remembers it,  the reason why he
wanted to avoid such a public commitment was the profound uncertainty of the situation: “Mr.
President, the fact is, the whole system is so fragile we don't know what we might have to do if a
financial  institution is about to go down” (Paulson 2010, 92), Paulson remembers telling Bush.
Paulson's behavior qualifies as “Avoidance of unrevisable decisions” as listed in the specifications
for fallibilist  decision making.  Given the high level  of  uncertainty Paulson insisted that  it  was
important to  avoid the unrevisable commitment of promising no bailouts and instead “preserve
optionality” as  Timothy Geithner  later  called it  (Geithner  2014,  179).  Bush followed Paulson's
advice and in the final version of the speech did not promise that there would be no further bailouts
(see footnote 62).
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5.1.2 Accepting Possible Failure as Pragmatist Decision Making
Specification  of  Pragmatist  Political  Crisis  Management: Acceptance of  possible  failure  and
unexpected consequences
When Timothy Geithner, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, initially learned
about the serious liquidity problems at Bear Stearns on March 13, he stated that his initial goals
were humble: “Even if we couldn't prevent an ugly crash, I wanted to explore ways to put 'foam on
the runway' – anything to mitigate the damage” (Geithner 2014, 149). Geithner's acceptance of
possible failure remained present throughout the weekend in parallel to the negotiations between
Bear Stearns and JPMorgan. As Geithner testified before Congress: 
“As JPMorgan and other institutions conducted due diligence, my colleagues in New York and
Washington continued to examine ways to contain the effects of a default by Bear. As part of
these  discussions,  we  began  to  design  a  new  facility  that  would  build  on  other  liquidity
initiatives taken by the Federal Reserve System, and provide a more powerful form of liquidity
to major financial institutions” (U.S. Congress 2008c, 117).
The program that was meant to “put foam on the runway” in case the bankruptcy of Bear Stearns
was labeled as Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF). To start it the Federal Reserve Bank again
had to invoke its emergency clause, section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, citing “unusual and
exigent circumstances” as the reason for the program (Federal Reserve Bank 2016b). In general
terms,  the  program was  designed to increase financial  market  stability.  As the  Fed has  put  it:
“PDCF  was  established  to  improve  the  ability  of  primary  dealers  to  provide  financing  to
participants in securities markets, and to promote the orderly functioning of financial markets more
generally” (Federal Reserve Bank 2016b). 
The Federal Reserve Bank had already issued a similar program, Terms Securities Lending Facility
(TSLF), on March 11, 2008. TSLF was launched before the troubles at Bear Stearns became known
and so the money from the program was not available to financial institutions before March 27
(Federal Reserve Bank 2008f). As Fed chairman Ben Bernanke testified before Congress, the events
around Bear  forced the Federal Reserve Bank to revise its  decision and roll  out PDCF, a new
program which would provide money to financial institutions immediately: “It was precisely the set
of conditions that we saw during the week and that led to the Bear Stearns' situation that caused us
to reconsider our previously held position […]. We made the decision to do so on Sunday” (U.S.
Congress 2008c, 23). The establishment of the PDCF was announced by the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve Bank on March 16, 2008 (Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2008; Bernanke
2015, 220; Geithner 2014, 156).
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Ben Bernanke explained the program before Congress in the following way: “At the time we did it,
we did not know whether the Bear Stearns’ deal would be consummated or not and we wanted to be
prepared, in case it was not consummated, that we would need to have this facility in order to
protect  what  we imagined would  be  pressure  on  the  other  dealers  subsequently  to  that”  (U.S.
Congress  2008c,  23).  Timothy  Geithner  has  described  PDCF  as  a  “credit  facility  intended  to
provide liquidity to the investment banks and the broader markets in case Bear collapsed” (Geithner
2014, 156; my emphasis). 
What is important to understand from a pragmatist perspective is that the PDCF was intended as a
backup instrument in case the negotiations between JPMorgan and Bear Stearns would fail and Bear
Stearns  would go bankrupt.  Fueled by the  humbleness  and skepticism of  fallibilism (Bernstein
2005) pragmatist crisis management still expects failure were other forms of crisis management are
confident that the worst is over. While this is a matter of degree, I would argue that the fact that
PDCF was established around the same time when the deal between Bear Stearns and JPMorgan
was already announced provides evidence for a strong acceptance of possible failure. The Fed's
implementation of the PDCF program therefore qualifies as fallibilist decision making since it still
expected the failure of Bear Stearns and JPMorgan when the negotiations were (almost) finished.
This provides more evidence for pragmatist decision making in the Bear Stearns case.
5.1.3 The Anti-Dualism and Experimentalism of the Bear Stearns Rescue
Specifications of Pragmatist Political Crisis Management: Actively searching for third options,
ways to transcend dilemmas; Avoiding self-imposed commitments; Decisions as hypotheses and
trials; Constant feedback monitoring
The initial decision to provide Bear Stearns with an indirect loan on March 14, 2008 was not only
fallibilist. We can also find evidence for anti-dualist and experimentalist crisis management. This
analysis will especially focus on the role of Timothy Geithner and Henry Paulson as they were the
main architects of the Bear Stearns bailout.
The initial loan to Bear Stearns can be regarded as anti-dualist crisis management since the loan was
able to overcome the dualist dilemma of either immediate bankruptcy or finding a buyer. Instead the
initial short-term loan offered an important middle ground: ensuring the financial survival of Bear
Stearns until the markets closed for the weekend and then find a buyer. But the decision can also be
analyzed  as  experimentalist  crisis  management.  The  idea  of  an  indirect  loan  was  a  novel  and
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experimentalist idea that was picked because time pressure did not allow for any other solution. The
indirect  loan  served  as  initial  trial  that  helped  to  gather  feedback  from the  financial  markets,
feedback  which  indicated  that  confidence  in  Bear  Stearns  had  not  been  restored  and  that  led
government officials to the conclusion that Bear Stearns needed to find a buyer over the weekend.
The Anti-Dualism of the Indirect Loan on Friday
From a pragmatist perspective, the decision to get Bear Stearns to the weekend with an indirect loan
qualifies as anti-dualist crisis management. Faced with the dilemma of either letting Bear Stearns go
bankrupt or finding a private buyer in a too short amount of time Timothy Geithner's team actively
searched for third options to transcend this dilemma and thereby proposed the idea of an indirect
loan (Bernanke 2015, 214; Blinder 2013, 106; Geithner 2014, 151). 
Under these circumstances of high time pressure the Federal Reserve Bank could not rely on its
“standard preference in dealing with a troubled institution” (Sidel et al. 2008) which was to bring
together  an  industry  consortium or  interested  buyers  which  then  would  take  over  the  troubled
institution (Kelly 2009, 67).  As this  option had to be excluded the primary goal  became more
humble. As Fed chairman Ben Bernanke put it: “We need to get to the weekend” (Kelly 2009, 65;
also see Geithner 2014, 152; Paulson 2010, 101). The indirect loan via JPMorgan was devised as a
way to buy time and ensure that Bear Stearns would not go bankrupt until the markets closed for the
weekend on Friday evening. As Timothy Geithner has explained in his testimony before Congress: 
“This action was designed to allow us to get to the weekend, and to enable us to pursue work
along two tracks: first, for Bear to continue to explore options with other financial institutions
that might enable it to avoid bankruptcy; and second, for policymakers to continue the work
begun on Thursday night to try to contain the risk to financial markets in the event no private-
sector solution proved possible” (U.S. Congress 2008c, 116).
The  initial  loan  can  be  regarded  as  an  example  of  pragmatist  anti-dualism,  employing  three
strategies  to  overcome  dualisms  (Ansell  2011,  10):  highlighting  the  ongoing  and  continuous
relationship between two poles, introducing a third dimension to break out of a two-dimensional
space and by linking meaning to action. First, the decision highlighted the continuous relationship
between the two possible solutions: Bear Stearns' bankruptcy and finding buyers for Bear Stearns.
The indirect loan via JPMorgan to Bear Stearns found a middle ground and supported a continuous
relationship between these two poles. It enabled a private-sector solution over the weekend without
the need to find a buyer right away. Second, with this idea of an indirect loan the Federal Reserve
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introduced a third option that transcended the stark contrast between the two-dimensional decision
space. Instead of the options “no bailout” and “unconditional support” the initial loan introduced a
third option, much as the blockade during the Cuban Missile Crisis offered an alternative to the
dualist decision space of “destroy the missiles” or “do nothing” (Allison 1971). 
Third, the one-day loan to Bear Stearns on Friday linked meaning to action by giving the Bush
administration an opportunity to further explore the situation and discovering its meaning “through
action” (Ansell 2011, 11). More precisely, the indirect loan can be regarded as a trial that by being
enacted – much like the active intervention in an experiment – revealed more information about the
financial  markets and their  exact  state  (see Ansell  and Bartenberger  2016b).  This points at  the
experimentalist aspect of the decision and will be analyzed in more detail in the next section.
Additional evidence for anti-dualist decision making can be found in the flexible 28 days period of
the indirect loan that qualifies as an example of “avoiding self-imposed commitments”. Under the
agreed conditions of the indirect loan it was stated that the loan would be available “up to 28 days”.
Bear Stearns’ CEO Alan Schwartz expected that this would give him the full 28 days to save the
investment bank (U.S. Congress 2008c, 24). But the flexible ”up to” clause of the indirect loan
agreement was deliberatively chosen to adapt to changing circumstances (U.S. Congress 2008c, 78).
When despite the indirect loan the rating agencies downgraded Bear Stearns and the price of its
stock  continued  to  fall  over  the  course  of  March  14 (see  next  section),  Geithner  and Paulson
decided that the indirect loan would not be able to save Bear Stearns for a longer period of time
(Kelly 2009, 100). As Timothy Geithner has explained before Congress: 
“So we took that extraordinary step to buy time to get to the weekend, and […] what happened
over the course of that day, you can see a little bit about the scale of the loss of confidence,
because the dynamics [...] accelerated over the course of the day. And the number of customers
and counterparties that sought to withdraw funds, the actions by rating agencies on some Bear
paper, accelerated that dynamic, despite the access to liquidity and despite the hope that that
might buy some time” (U.S. Congress 2008c, 24). 
Paulson and Geithner decided that the loan would not be extended after the weekend and that Bear
Stearns needed to find a buyer before Monday, March 17 (Kelly 2009, 99; Sidel et al. 2008). They
informed Bear Stearns CEO Schwartz about this decision Friday evening (Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission 2011, 289; Paulson 2010, 105). From an anti-dualist perspective, this “up to 28 days”
formulation was an important way to avoid a strict self-imposed commitment and allowed Geithner
and Paulson to shorten the time period of the indirect loan on March 14, after the situation of Bear
Stearns did not stabilize. For Bear Stearns, this was a surprising move as the 28 days were a time
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period also used by the Federal Reserve Bank in two of its earlier lending programs: the Term
Auction Facility (TAF) and the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), the latter being launched
just a few days earlier (Federal Reserve Bank 2016a; Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011,
286). Shortening the loan by relying on the more flexible “up to” clause was therefore a novel
decision and avoided a strict self-imposed commitment (Burrough 2008). It allowed Paulson and
Geithner to flexibly adapt the conditions of the loan and change its time span to anything from one
to 28 days. The self-imposed commitment of an early deadline was therefore avoided until more
evidence was gathered through its character as experimentalist trial (see next section).
The Indirect Loan Decision as Experimentalist Trial
From a pragmatist perspective two examples of experimentalist decision making can be identified.
First, the decision that the Federal Reserve Bank would indirectly lend to Bear Stearns was a novel
solution that was designed as a trial. The reaction from the markets on Friday, however, revealed
that confidence in Bear Stearns had not been restored (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011,
289). As a report from the Fed summarizes these findings: 
“In light of the further erosion of confidence in Bear Stearns over the weekend by its chief
short-term liquidity providers and capital markets transaction counterparties, Bear Stearns likely
would have been unable to avoid bankruptcy on Monday, March 17, without either very large
injections of liquidity from the Federal Reserve or an acquisition of Bear Stearns by a stronger
firm” (Federal Reserve Bank 2008i, 3) 
In other words, the trial of the indirect loan from Friday, March 14 raised doubts that the “liquidity
we provided would have been sufficient” after the weekend, as Timothy Geithner put it when asked
by Congress members (U.S. Congress 2008c, 24). Based on this judgment Paulson and Geithner
decided that Bear Stearns needed to find a buyer over the weekend. Second, we also find constant
feedback monitoring in this example which is crucial for such an experimentalist approach. The
reaction of the markets but also the direct feedback from banking executives that Paulson received
were crucial to gather the information that was used to assess the “trial” of the indirect loan (see
5.1.5).
The  decision  that  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  would  lend  to  the  investment  bank  Bear  Stearns
through JPMorgan was an almost unprecedented decision (Landon 2008b). To conduct it, the Fed
had  to  invoke  its  emergency  clause,  a  clause  that  had  only  been  used  once  since  the  Great
Depression (which was actually in the previous week when the Fed opened its Term Securities
133
Lending Facility (TSLF) for primary dealers; see Bernanke 2015, 208). We have already seen that
the idea for an indirect loan was born out of necessity since the standard solution (finding a buyer or
an industry consortium) was thwarted by time pressure. In this context, the idea of an indirect loan
was a novel solution and a “creative way [...] to buy time” (Paulson 2010, 101). It was a solution
that had not been tested before and at the same time can be regarded as a trial that helped to find out
more about the situation. 
When making the decision for the indirect loan, Paulson and Geithner had expected that the loan
would calm the financial markets down and stabilize Bear Stearns (U.S. Congress 2008c, 24). But
after the news about the indirect loan for Bear Stearns had been published on March 14 the situation
developed in the opposite direction: “Standard & Poor's lowered Bear's rating three levels to BBB.
Moody's and Fitch also downgraded the company. By the end of the day, Bear was out of cash. Its
stock plummeted 47%, closing below $30” (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 289). 
Based on the loan agreement, Bear Stearns CEO Alan Schwartz expected that the loan would be
available for 28 days (U.S. Congress 2008c, 76). As Schwartz testified before Congress:
“I think we interpreted it […] that the initial period would be 28 days, unless we could stabilize
the situation in a shorter period of time. As it turns out, and maybe exacerbated by the situation
with the run that continued on Friday, and since this was not stabilizing the situation, we were
informed that  their  view of  the  language  was  no,  it  could  be  up  to  28  days  but  could  be
removed” (U.S. Congress 2008c, 78–79).
When Bear Stearns had received the indirect loan Paulson had already made clear to Bear Stearns
that the government would now take control of the process, telling Bear Stearns' CEO Schwartz:
“You're in the government's hands now” (Paulson 2010, 103). When Paulson and Geithner changed
their assessment and limited the duration of the loan this change of course caught Bear Stearns by
surprise (Kelly 2009, 112; Paulson 2010, 105). 
What is especially interesting from a pragmatist perspective is that this change of course was based
on  the  feedback  from the  financial  markets.  As  we  have  seen  the  financial  markets  sent  the
unanimous message that despite the indirect loan confidence in Bear Stearns had not been restored.
On the contrary, rating agencies had downgraded the investment bank and the stock of Bear Stearns
fell drastically (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 289; Kelly 2009, 113). Paulson's and
Geithner's changed assessment was also based on the direct feedback from bankers, who warned
Paulson that Bear Stearns would not survive after the weekend (Sidel et al. 2008).
134
5.1.4 Henry Paulson's Anti-Dualist Balancing of Moral Hazard and Financial
Stability
Specification of Pragmatist  Political Crisis  Management: Actively searching for third options,
ways to transcend dilemmas
During  the  weekend  of  March 15-16,  2008 Bear  Stearns  and  JPMorgan  negotiated  a  possible
takeover  of  Bear  Stearns  by  JPMorgan.  The  government  played  an  important  role  in  these
negotiations: “Geithner would keep in touch with both Bear and J.P. Morgan throughout the day,
and Paulson would help canvass possible acquirers. In between, the government officials would
connect to give each other updates, looping in Bernanke and others as necessary” (Kelly 2009, 127).
Paulson’s  role  is  especially  noteworthy  from  an  anti-dualist  perspective  on  political  crisis
management. By influencing the price JPMorgan paid for Bear Stearns, Paulson tried to find middle
ground between two different objectives: reducing moral hazard while at the same time increasing
the stability of the financial system. Paulson’s actions were unusual because they can be regarded as
governmental  intervention  in  a  negotiation  between  two  private  companies.  This  section  will
describe Paulson’s intervention and analyze how it can be regarded as an example of pragmatist
political crisis management.
On  Sunday  morning,  JPMorgan  CEO  Jamie  Dimon  informed  both  Geithner  and  Paulson  that
JPMorgan would only be interested in taking over Bear Stearns if the Fed would provide financial
support (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 290; Paulson 2010, 109). Paulson, who had
been warned by Lloyd Blankfein, his successor as Goldman Sachs CEO, that “the market expected
a Bear rescue” (Paulson 2010, 106; also see Morgenson and Van Natta 2009) agreed with Geithner
and  Bernanke  that  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  should  enable  a  deal  between  Bear  Stearns  and
JPMorgan (Bernanke 2015, 218; Geithner 2014, 155; Kelly 2009, 197; Paulson 2010, 110; Sidel et
al. 2008). With the help of BlackRock, an external consulting firm, the Federal Reserve Bank and
the Treasury analyzed Bear Stearns’ assets and decided that the Federal Reserve Bank would take
assets worth $30 billion from Bear Stearns and put them in a newly founded entity (Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission 2011, 290; U.S. Congress 2008c, 119). Under the agreement reached between
the New York Federal Reserve Bank and JPMorgan on March 16, JPMorgan would cover the first
$1.15 billion of any eventual losses and the Fed the other $28.82 billion (Andrews 2008a; Federal
Reserve Bank 2008e; Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 290). 
What is interesting from a pragmatist perspective on political crisis management is what happened
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next. In the decision making process of the first indirect loan president Bush and Treasury Secretary
Paulson had shifted from a principled position that emphasized moral hazard to a more pragmatist
one that focused on the stability of the financial system (see  5.1.1). Henry Paulson faced another
dilemma having to decide between moral hazard and financial stability. When it came to the $30
billion loan he decided to try to balance the two poles in an anti-dualist manner. On the one hand,
Paulson supported the decision of the Federal Reserve Bank to acquire $30 billion of Bear Stearns'
assets  in order to enable a deal between Bear Stearns and JPMorgan and prevent Bear Stearns'
bankruptcy. This was a decision that catered to the financial stability pole (Axilrod 2009, 154). On
the other hand, Paulson also kept the second dimension in mind and tried to minimize the danger of
moral hazard. The chief mechanism to do this was to keep the price JPMorgan paid for Bear Stearns
low, sending a signal to Bear Stearns and other investment banks that the financial support by the
government came with a price (U.S. Congress 2008c, 30; Axilrod 2009, 154).
On Sunday afternoon, Paulson learned from Geithner that JPMorgan planned to pay between $4 and
$5  per  share  (Geithner  2014,  155;  Kelly  2009,  202;  Paulson  2010,  111).  From  the  Treasury
Secretary’s perspective, this price was too high, so he called JPMorgan's CEO Jamie Dimon and
suggested a price between $1 and $2 per share (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 290;
Geithner 2014, 155; Paulson 2010, 111). On Sunday evening JPMorgan announced that it would
buy Bear Stearns for $2 per share (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 290).63
In the hearings before Congress the representatives of the Federal Reserve Bank and the Treasury
emphasized that they did not set the exact price of the deal but conceded that they influenced it
(U.S. Congress 2008c, 22, 34, 58). As Bob Steele from the Treasury stated: “It was our perspective,
as I said, that moral hazard wanted to be protected as much as possible. And so therefore a lower
price was more appropriate” (U.S. Congress 2008c, 22). It was Treasury Secretary Paulson who
pushed for a lower price (Geithner 2014, 155; Kelly 2009, 204; Paulson 2010, 111; U.S. Congress
2008c, 80). This account has also been confirmed by JPMorgan's CEO Jamie Dimon who testified
that Paulson “made it very clear that that [the exact price] was the decision of JPMorgan Chase but
did express the point of view, which was held by a lot of people including on the JPMorgan Chase
side that the higher the price, the more the so-called moral hazard” (U.S. Congress 2008c, 80).
From a pragmatist perspective, we find evidence for the anti-dualist decision making specification
63 Kelly (2009, 210) has noted how low this price was, highlighting that this valued Bear Stearns at $236
million, “less than a quarter  of  what its building alone was worth”.  Later  the deal was renegotiated
between Bear Stearns and JPMorgan and the price increased to $10 per share (Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission 2011, 290).
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“actively search for third options, ways to transcend dilemmas” in Paulson's pressing for a lower
price. As we have seen, by suggesting to JPMorgan to pay a lower price for Bear Stearns Paulson
tried to reach two different goals at the same time and to find a middle ground between them:
providing financial stability by preventing a bankruptcy of Bear Stearns but also minimizing the
danger of moral hazard by keeping the price Bear Stearns shareholders would receive low. Timothy
Geithner has summarized the two poles of this dilemma in his testimony before Congress: 
“Two objectives, very important for us. One was there be an agreement reached that would
avert the risk of default because of the consequences for the economy as a whole. The second
was that the outcome, to the extent possible, not add to the inherent moral hazard risk in this
kind  of  intervention.  From  my  perspective,  the  outcome  reached  that  evening  and  the
subsequent  agreement reached a week later,  are fully consistent with those two objectives.”
(U.S. Congress 2008c, 21).
And Treasury's Bob Steele has emphasized the attempt to balance the two poles of these dilemma:
“This twin responsibility of wanting to be sensitive to the state of the markets and what the situation
could cause balanced with also wanting to not encourage a sense of moral hazard” (U.S. Congress
2008c, 58). 
This anti-dualist  approach to  the dilemma was also publicly communicated.  Treasury Secretary
Paulson emphasized in a television interview with George Stephanopolous, on March 16: “We’re
very aware of moral hazard. [...] But our primary concern right now — my primary concern — is
the stability  of our financial  system, the orderliness of the markets” (Landon 2008a).  And Fed
chairman  Bernanke  rejected  the  notion  that  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  had  “bailed  out”  Bear
Stearns, citing the balance that has been reached to minimize moral hazard: 
“Bear Stearns did not fare very well in this operation. The shareholders took very severe losses.
The company lost its independence. Many employees obviously are concerned about their jobs.
I do not think it is a situation that any firm would willingly choose to endure” (U.S. Congress
2008c, 30).
5.1.5 The Role of Deliberation in Decision Making During the Bear Stearns
Rescue
Specification  of  Pragmatist  Political  Crisis  Management:  Decisions  based  on  internal
deliberation
Dewey argued in Human Nature and Social Conduct that new impulses often disrupt and challenge
our existing habits. According to Dewey, we have to rely on the method of “intelligence” to solve
such a situation (Dewey 1922). For Dewey “intelligence” is enacted as deliberation or collective
inquiry. As Anderson explains: 
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“When habit is blocked, people are forced to stop their activity and reflect on the problems
posed by their situation. They must deliberate. The aim of deliberation is to find a satisfactory
means to resumption of activity by solving the problem posed by one's situation” (E. Anderson
2014).
Pragmatist  deliberation  is  closely  connected  to  other  pragmatist  elements  such  as  fallibilism,
experimentalism and its emphasis of consequences. It is characterized by an openness to all feasible
options, an emphasis on practical consequences and a quasi-experimentalist attitude. In other words,
pragmatist deliberation can be understood as “an imaginative rehearsal of alternative means” and a
“thought experiment designed to arrive at a practical judgment, action upon which is anticipated to
resolve one's predicament” (E. Anderson 2014). This aspect of deliberation is grasped in the first
two  specifications  of  deliberative  decision  making:  “Decisions  based  on  internal  deliberation”
focuses at  the internal decision making process while “Deliberation with external stakeholders”
analyses if external stakeholders were included in this deliberation process.
But there is also another aspect to pragmatist deliberation which speaks to the importance of the
diversity of opinions in the deliberation process. For pragmatists, such diversity and the inclusion of
dissenting voices is necessary to “maintain the state of doubt” (Dewey 1910, 13) and remain open
to other options. This aspect is covered by the specification “Encouragement of skeptics” which
analyses if  dissenting voices and different opinions were actively encouraged and included (see
George and Stern 2002).
The actors that will be at the center of this section are president Bush, Treasury Secretary Paulson,
New York Federal Reserve director Geithner and Federal Reserve chairman Bernanke (Ip 2008).
They all  played an important role in the decision making process. The regulator Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) also took part in the discussions around the Bear Stearns decision and
were represented by its chairman Chris Cox and his aides Erik Sirri and Bob Colby (Kelly 2009, 65;
Paulson 2010, 100).
Internal Deliberation
Deliberation was an important aspect of the decision making throughout the Bear Stearns case. The
first and most striking example can be found in the way the decision to provide an indirect loan to
Bear Stearns was made on March 13, 2008. Early in the morning, Paulson, Bernanke, Geithner and
their  aides  convened  a  conference  call  which  included  representatives  from  the  SEC  as  well
(Bernanke 2015, 214; Kelly 2009, 65; Paulson 2010, 1002; U.S. Congress 2008c, 115). The call
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lasted for over two hours during which a possible Bear Stearns rescue or bankruptcy was discussed
(Geithner 2014, 152). Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan, joined the call for a few minutes to explain
Bear Stearns' situation from his perspective and warned the government actors that a bankruptcy of
Bear Stearns would have severe consequences (Paulson 2010, 101; U.S. Congress 2008c, 72).
Bernanke led the discussion and inquired about the current situation while Geithner and Kevin
Warsh  from the  New  York  Fed  laid  out  their  assessment  that  a  bankruptcy  would  have  dire
consequences,  an assessment  that was based on their  analysis  from the night  before (Bernanke
2015, 214; Kelly 2009, 63). After examining different options, Geithner introduced the idea of an
indirect loan for Bear Stearns via JPMorgan, an idea that had been proposed by the New York Fed's
general counsel Tom Baxter only hours before the conference call (Bernanke 2015, 214; Geithner
2014,  151).  Bernanke  agreed  that  Bear  Stearns  needed  to  be  rescued  and  Paulson  concurred
(Bernanke 2015, 2014; Kelly 2009, 66; Paulson 2010, 101). 
After Paulson obtained approval from president Bush, Geithner pointed out that a decision needed
to be made soon since the markets were about to open (Geithner 2014, 152; Wessel 2009, 158). At
7 a.m. Bernanke made the final decision to extend the indirect loan to Bear Stearns.  Since the
indirect loan was issued by the Federal Reserve Bank which had to invoke the emergency section of
the Federal Reserve Act, Bernanke as Fed chairman was the person who officially had to make the
decision (Wessel 2009, 156).64 
What is interesting from a pragmatist perspective though is that despite Bernanke having the final
say, the decision was based on extended discussion and based on the consensus of all involved
government actors. As Kelly has described it: “Mr. Bernanke did a head count. All the top officials
agreed a loan was the best option. "Let's do it," Mr. Bernanke said.” (Kelly 2009, 67; also see
Bernanke 2015, 217). In other words, the decision was not made in a top-down manner and dictated
by Bernanke or Bush (as would be the case in principle-guided political crisis management) but
instead was based on a two-hour long discussion involving the main government actors (Bernanke,
Geithner, Paulson and SEC staff). 
Three different  scenarios and options were discussed and their  potential  practical  consequences
assessed: letting Bear Stearns file for bankruptcy, finding another financial institution which could
64 More precisely, it was a decision that had to be approved by the Federal Reserve Board which was
chaired by Bernanke. After the conference call ended Bernanke convened the three available governors
and they unanimously supported the decision (Bernanke 2015, 217; Blinder 2013, 105; Wessel 2009,
162).
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support or takeover Bear Stearns or lending public money to Bear Stearns (Kelly 2009, 64; Sidel et
al. 2008). After going through the scenario of a Bear Stearns' bankruptcy the group reached the
conclusion that its potential consequences could destabilize the whole economy and excluded this
option. The second option was excluded since the perceived time pressure did not allow for finding
a potential buyer on Friday. This left the third option as the most feasible way to proceed. This
collective inquiry and the weighting of different options via thought experiments qualifies as an
aspect of pragmatist deliberation. I therefore find evidence for the specification “Decisions based on
internal deliberation” in the decision making process. 
Internal deliberation continued over the course of the weekend. Treasury Secretary Paulson and
New  York  Fed  director  Geithner  stayed  in  close  contact  while  Bear  Stearns  and  JPMorgan
negotiated a possible merger, shared information and discussed the next steps (Geithner 2014, 154;
Ip 2008; Kelly 2009, 203; Paulson 2010, 103–10). The decision on Sunday, March 15 to support the
deal between Bear Stearns and JPMorgan with $30 billion from the Federal Reserve Bank was also
based on broad internal deliberation. After JPMorgan's CEO Jamie Dimon had contacted Geithner
on Sunday morning announcing that JPMorgan would not be able to takeover Bear Stearns without
any financial support, Geithner called Paulson and Bernanke (Geithner 2014, 154; Kelly 2009, 203;
Paulson 2010, 110). 
The first idea that was discussed was that the Treasury should provide the money. But since this
required an act by Congress the option was excluded as unpractical under the circumstances of high
time pressure (Wessel  2009,  167;  Geithner  2014,  155).  Geithner  suggested that  the  New York
Federal Reserve could cover Bear Stearns' assets and discussed this idea with Bernanke, Paulson
and Donald Kohn, the vice chairman of the Federal Reserve board (Geithner 2014, 155; Paulson
2010, 110). After they had agreed on this plan, Bernanke informed his colleagues at international
central banks and Paulson talked to president Bush and got his support for the decision (Bernanke
2015, 220; Bush 2008c, 453; Paulson 2010, 113). The Federal Reserve Board approved the $30
billion loan on March 15, 2008 at 3:45 p.m. (Federal Reserve Bank 2008e, 2; Bernanke 2015, 220).
I  do  not  find,  however,  any  evidence  that  allows  to  identify  the  second  aspect  of  pragmatist
deliberation in the internal decision making process, “Encouragement of skeptics”. I could find no




While the decision making during the Bear Stearns weekend was characterized by a high degree of
internal  deliberation  it  also  made  use  of  external  knowledge.  External  actors,  especially  from
financial institutions, were consulted and external advisors provided their expertise.
The main role of obtaining this external input was undertaken by the New York Federal Reserve
Bank and his director Timothy Geithner, who Ben Bernanke called “the Fed's eyes and ears on Wall
Street” (Bernanke 2015, 217). Before the crisis, Geithner had 
“initiated a series of dinners at the New York Fed's executive dining room, in which five or six
executives from a major Wall Street firm would meet his own top people. When the credit crisis
deepened, he began calling chief executives nearly every week, asking: What's changed? What's
better? What's worse? What worries you?” (Ip 2008).
This close contact with Wall Street bankers intensified during the Bear Stearns weekend and was
further supported by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson. 
During the negotiations between Bear Stearns and JPMorgan, Paulson and Geithner stayed in close
contact with the two firms, with Paulson and Geithner acting as “third partner” (Sidel et al. 2008;
also see Kelly 2009; NPR 2009). Paulson's aide Neel Kashkari played a key role in this, “shuttling
between JPMorgan's and Bear's offices” and updating Paulson on recent developments (Paulson
2010, 108; Wessel 2009, 166). Jamie Dimon, the CEO of JPMorgan briefly joined the conference
call between Paulson, Geithner, Bernanke and the SEC that resulted in the decision for the indirect
loan on March 13. Dimon offered his perspective, explaining that a failure of Bear Stearns would
have drastic consequences (Paulson 2010, 101). After the decision for the indirect loan to Bear
Stearns was made, Paulson and Geithner held a conference call with executives of the other major
banks, explaining the decision of the indirect loan to them (Kelly 2009, 77; Paulson 2010, 104;
Sidel et al. 2008). The main intent of the call was no collective deliberation though, instead Paulson
asked the other investment banks “to act in a responsible manner” and to continue to lend to Bear
Stearns (Paulson 2010, 104; Kelly 2009, 77).
After the call Geithner met with Paul Volcker, a former chairman of the Federal Reserve, to explain
the decision and seek his advice. Geithner explained that the New York Fed tried to bring Bear
Stearns  to  the  weekend and hoped to find  a  buyer  for  the  investment  bank soon,  an idea that
Volcker supported (Geithner 2014, 153; Kelly 2009, 128). The next day, Secretary Paulson received
additional external input. In the morning of March 15, 2008 he got a call from Lloyd Blankfein, his
successor as  Goldman Sachs CEO. Blankfein warned Paulson that  the consequences  of  a  Bear
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Stearns bankruptcy would be dramatic and would affect the world economy as well (Paulson 2010,
106; Morgenson and Van Natta 2009). 
These are  examples that  show how Paulson and Geithner  stayed in  close contact  with external
stakeholders, especially executives of the major Wall Street banks, throughout the weekend. The
character of these contacts was twofold: some of them primarily informed external actors about
decisions (the conference call with bank executives on March 13). Some gathered information and
different  perspectives (Paulson's  call  with Blankfein,  Geithner's  meeting with Volcker).  From a
pragmatist perspective, this does not qualify as deliberation though since it cannot be characterized
as  collective  inquiry.  Instead  it  was  a  process  of  consultation that  did  not  include  external
stakeholders in the decision making process (Fung 2006). Others acquired additional expertise, as
was the case with the hiring of the company BlackRock to help assessing the assets that would be
used to secure the $30 billion loan as discussed in the next paragraphs. Yet, from a pragmatist
perspective this does not qualify as external deliberation either. Instead this collaboration brought in
BlackRock's special expertise to assess the value of Bear Stearns' assets.
Summary
This section has examined the level of deliberation that took place in the decision making process of
the Bear Stearns decision along two dimensions. It has shown that the level of internal deliberation
was  high,  with  the  involved  government  actors  (Paulson,  Geithner,  Bernanke)  in  constant
discussion about the next steps. Both the decisions on the indirect loan for Bear Stearns on March
13 and on the $30 billion loan on March 15 to support the deal between Bear Stearns and JPMorgan
were based on a process of collective inquiry. I therefore found evidence for the first specification
of  deliberative decision  making,  “Decisions  based on internal  deliberation”.  I  did  not  find any
evidence, however, for the other two specifications. Neither were external stakeholders included in
the decision making (their role is better described as consultation and providing of expertise) nor
were skeptical and dissenting voices encouraged.
5.2 Meaning Making
The following sections will analyze the meaning making process of the Bear Stearns case, looking
for evidence of pragmatist meaning making and examining how the meaning making dimension of
political crisis management compares to decision making.
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5.2.1 Explaining  Fallibilism  with  Anti-Dualism:  Framing  the  Decision  as
Balance
Specifications for  Pragmatist  Political  Crisis  Management: Nuanced  depiction  of  events,  no
dichotomies
The Pragmatist philosopher Richard Bernstein has described president Bush's meaning making after
9/11 as a typical example of anti-pragmatist dualism that framed the events by heavily employing
black-and-white dichotomies and referring to absolute moral certainty (Bernstein 2005). Patterson
(2010) has evaluated the economic policies of the Bush government before the financial crisis and
found a strong influence of economic ideologies (i.e. supply-side economics) and principles. And
only a few weeks before the Bear Stearns weekend Bush framed his economic policies in a similar
way, referring to eternal free-market principles (see page 121).
The Bear Stearns case is interesting in this regard since it led to economic decisions that departed
from this “clear and consistent philosophy” and its “timeless” (Bush 2008d) economic principles.
Instead, as section 5.1.1 has shown, Bush and his Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson acted fallibilist
and left these strict principles behind when they decided to rescue Bear Stearns. 
The  main  question  here  is:  How  did  the  Bush  administration  publicly  frame  and  explain  the
decisions to rescue Bear Stearns? This section will examine the strategy that was chosen to frame
the decision. Its main finding is that Bush, Paulson and the other involved actors explained the
fallibilistic decision to save Bear Stearns by referring to the pragmatist idea of anti-dualism.
The Anti-Dualist Balance Between Moral Hazard and Financial Stability
On March 14, only hours after the Federal Reserve Bank had supported Bear Stearns with a $12.9
indirect loan president Bush gave a television interview on CNBC. One of the first questions by
interviewer Larry Kudlow pointed out Bush's fallibilism: “You have said time and again that you
oppose government bailouts, that you oppose the use of taxpayer money to bail out. I want to ask
you if that opposition applies to these large banks.” To which Bush responded: 
“Well, these are unusual times. These are times that - where there's a confluence of housing
market  risks and financial  risks that  require unusual  action.  And it's  very important  for the
American people to know that the Fed and the Treasury carefully weigh the - necessary to bring
some order and stability versus moral hazard. And I think they've struck the right balance in
this case, particularly when people look at the details of the transaction” (Kudlow 2008; my
emphasis).
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Bush referred here to an aspect that has been analyzed in the decision making section already and
used it to publicly defend the Bear Stearns decision: the necessity to balance financial stability and
moral hazard. From a pragmatist perspective, the balancing of these two opposing poles has been
described as anti-dualist decision making (see 5.1.3) and this motif also appears in public meaning
making. By depicting the events in a nuanced way and avoiding strict dichotomies this form of
meaning-making qualifies as anti-dualist.
This  anti-dualist  frame of  the necessity  to  balance financial  stability  and moral  hazard  can  be
identified in other examples of meaning making as well. On March 16, 2008 Treasury Secretary
explained the government's action to ABC's George Stephanopolous in similar terms: “We’re very
aware of moral hazard” […] But our primary concern right now — my primary concern — is the
stability of our financial system, the orderliness of the markets. And that’s where our focus is”
(Landon 2008a; Paulson 2010, 109). In an interview with CNN's Wolf Blitzer Paulson reiterated his
message later the same day: 
“I'm as aware as anyone is of moral hazard. I'm also aware of the importance of keeping our
economy strong, of orderly capital markets, of the stability of the financial system doing things
that promote that orderliness and minimize the disruption […] To me, this was not difficult
because the priority, at a time like this, has got to be the stability of our financial system and
minimizing the likelihood that this disruption spills over into the real economy” (CNN 2008).
In a nutshell, the message that was delivered was that financial stability had an equally important
place next to the moral hazard principles. As Treasury's Bob Steele testified before Congress on
April 3, 2008: ” This was an unusual time, as all my colleagues have said, and a specific decision
was made with regard to market protection and to the effect on the potential real economy. That was
the nature of the decision” (U.S. Congress 2008c, 28). What constitutes the genuine anti-dualist
character of this way of meaning making is how it was framed as a  balance between financial
stability and moral hazard. As Fed chairman Bernanke explained: 
“The Federal Reserve has to strike a very careful balance between actions to contain risk to the
broader economy and actions that might amplify the risk of future financial crises by insulating
investors from the consequences of imprudence” (U.S. Congress 2008c, 17; my emphasis).
Framing the decision as  balance was done primarily by pointing to the fact that the Bear Stearns
rescue was not a bailout,  and that the negative effects  of moral hazard had been mitigated and
minimized. As White House press secretary Perino explained to journalists: 
“[T]his isn't about bailing anyone out. [...] And investors in Bear Stearns are taking large and
significant losses in this transaction. And that's not what happens in a bail-out. They bought into
a company, they took a financial risk -- and it had paid off quite well for them a while ago, but
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today they're looking at a stock that's only worth $2.” (White House 2008a). 
This message was also echoed by Ben Bernanke and Timothy Geithner at a Congressional Hearing,
when confronted with the argument that the bailout of Bear Stearns would create moral hazard. As
Bernanke stated: 
“I would like to make a comment on the idea that we bailed out Bear Stearns. As President
Geithner pointed out, Bear Stearns did not fare very well in this operation. The shareholders
took very severe losses. The company lost its independence. Many employees obviously are
concerned about their jobs. I do not think it is a situation that any firm would willingly choose
to endure” (U.S. Congress 2008c, 30). 
As Bernanke further highlighted, if there was a bailout it was a bailout of the market in general and
not Bear Stearns specifically: “So we were—if you want to say we bailed out the market in general,
I guess that is true” (U.S. Congress 2008c, 35). 
More specifically, the balancing of financial stability and moral hazard was highlighted by referring
to  the  comparably  low  price  Bear  Stearns  had  received  for  its  shares  by  JPMorgan.  The
Congressional hearing on April 3, 2008 inquired about the role of the government in setting the
price that JPMorgan would pay and received mixed answers. Fed chairman rejected the idea that the
Federal Reserve had anything to do with the price JPMorgan paid for Bear Stearns' shares: “We had
no interest or no concern about the stock price that was evaluated. That was a secondary issue, as
far as we were concerned” (U.S. Congress 2008c, 21). And to Senator Dodd's follow-up question
“So there was no interjection on the part of the Fed at all in this area?” Bernanke responded: “Not to
my knowledge” (U.S. Congress 2008c, 21). But Bob Steele, who was representing Treasury at the
hearing, added an important qualifier to Bernanke's answer: 
“I  think  the  perspective  of  Treasury  was  really  twofold.  One,  was  the  idea  that  Chairman
Bernanke suggested, that a combination into safe hands would be constructive for the overall
marketplace. And No. 2, since there were Federal funds or the Government’s money involved,
that that be taken into account, and Secretary Paulson offered perspective on that. There was a
view that the price should not be very high or should be toward the low end and that it should
be, given the Government’s involvement, that was the perspective” (U.S. Congress 2008c, 21).
Timothy Geithner, who was asked next, sided with Steele's version, explicitly emphasizing that two
objectives, the stability of the financial system and the need to keep moral hazard low had to be
considered in the decision (U.S. Congress 2008c, 21). Bob Steele further emphasized this point,
stating “As I said, there was a perspective, as President Geithner suggested, that the outcome, with
all the different terms and conditions, would be consistent with communicating and making clear
moral hazard to the least degree possible.” (U.S. Congress 2008c, 22). Treasury Secretary Paulson
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told reporters on March 17, that “those worried about the government rescue creating a 'moral
hazard' should keep in mind that Bear Stearns shareholders face considerable losses with the sale of
the investment firm to JPMorgan Chase for $2 a share” (Reuters 2008). The aspect of the $2 price
was further emphasized by White House press secretary Dana Perino when asked by a reporter how
the  Bear  Stearns  decision  squares  with  the  “conservative  economic  principles  of  limited
government“. Perino replied: “Bear Stearns basically went from a company that was doing quite
well to failure, and at $2 a share, I should think that those investors are seeing -- feeling today the
consequences of that risk in a marketplace” (White House 2008a). But in explaining and framing
this decision, Bush, Paulson and Geithner stressed that the second aspect – moral hazard – had been
taken care of too.
Comparing  this  to  the  strongly  dualist  framing  after  9/11,  the  Bush  administration  offered  an
interpretation  after  the  Bear  Stearns  rescue  that  emphasized  the  balance  it  had  tried  to  reach
between two opposing poles avoiding strong black-and-white dichotomies. As the next section will
show, meaning making after the Bear Stearns rescue also included a high degree of uncertainty that
was openly communicated.
5.2.2 Fallibilist Communication of Uncertainty and Possible Failures
Specification  of  Pragmatist  Political  Crisis  Management: Communication  of  uncertainty  and
possible failures
Specification of Principle-Guided Political Crisis Management: Communication of Certainty
We have defined the communication of uncertainty and possible failure as the chief specification of
fallibilist meaning making in our model. The manner in which the Bush government has defended
its decision and depicted the possible alternative scenarios reveals no evidence for this specification.
Instead we find a high level of communicated certainty that the decision to rescue Bear Stearns was
right  and that  the  alternatives  would  have  been  dramatic.  We do,  however,  find  examples  for
communicated uncertainty in the way the Bush administration framed the Bear Stearns rescue as a
decision with an uncertain outcome. We also find evidence in the reluctance of government actors
to exclude the possibility of further bailouts, referring to the high level of uncertainty that remained.
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Communicating Certainty: The Necessity of the Decision and Its Alternatives
When it came to defending the decision of the Bear Stearns rescue, the government actors suggested
a high level of certainty. This stands in stark contrast to a pragmatist approach to political crisis
management that highlights uncertainty instead.
During a press briefing on March 17, the White House press secretary stated that 
“a major market disruption would have very damaging consequences and be very painful for
everybody, from the small business owner to the homeowner, for everybody all the way up and
down the economic food chain. And the goal here is to prevent a major disruption in financial
markets” (White House 2008a). 
In his testimony before Congress, New York Fed director Timothy Geithner similarly stated that if
Bear Stearns would have failed the “certainty of very substantial losses” (U.S. Congress 2008c, 65)
across the financial markets combined with “an abrupt and disorderly unwinding of Bear Stearns
would  have  posed  systemic  risks  to  the  financial  system and  magnified  the  downside  risk  to
economic growth in the United States” (U.S. Congress 2008c, 17). Fed chairman Ben Bernanke put
it in similar terms:
“To  prevent  a  disorderly  failure  of  Bear  Stearns  and  the  unpredictable  but  likely  severe
consequences for market functioning and the broader economy, the Federal Reserve, in close
consultation with the Treasury Department, agreed to provide funding to Bear Stearns through
JPMorgan Chase” (U.S. Congress 2008c, 12).
Treasury's deputy secretary Bob Steele supported the position of the Federal Reserve Bank: “We
believe the agreements reached were necessary and appropriate to maintain stability in our financial
system during this critical time” (U.S. Congress 2008c, 16). Only Chris Cox, director of the SEC,
raised some doubt concerning the certainty that the decision to rescue Bear Stearns rescued was the
right one:
“The question has been asked what might have happened if, not-withstanding the Fed’s action,
the  transaction  with  JPMorgan  had  not  been  agreed  to  before  Monday,  March  17th?
Unfortunately,  unlike  a  laboratory  in  which  conditions  can  be  held  constant  and  variables
changed while the experiment is repeated, in the social science of the market the selection of
one course of action forever forecloses all other approaches that might have been taken” (U.S.
Congress 2008c, 14).
But Cox also made clear that despite these doubts he agreed with the decision, noting that “a chaotic
unwinding  of  its  [Bear  Stearns']  positions  not  only  could  have  cast  doubt  on  the  stability  of
thousands  of  the  firm’s  counterparties,  but  also  created  additional  pressures  well  beyond  the
financial system through the real economy” (U.S. Congress 2008c, 14).
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The statements of government actors as a whole show that when it came to the  necessity of the
decision  to  rescue  Bear  Stearns,  the  level  of  communicated  uncertainty  was  low.  Instead  the
decision was framed as unambiguous and unavoidable. But when it comes to how the outcome of
the decision and the possible next steps were framed the picture is a very different one.
Communicating Uncertainty: The Outcome of the Decision
In his speech at the Economic Club on March 14, 2008, a couple of hours after the Federal Reserve
Bank had announced that it would lend $12.9 billion to Bear Stearns via JPMorgan, president Bush
said that “these are uncertain times” (Bush 2008a).65 Keeping the Bear Stearns decision in mind,
Bush reminded his audience that government actions often had unintended consequences: “And so
we got to be careful and mindful that any time the government intervenes in the market, it must do
so with clear purpose and great care. Government actions are - have far-reaching and unintended
consequences” (Bush 2008a).
Government officials stuck to this frame after the second loan had been issued and Bear Stearns had
been taken over by JPMorgan.66 When White House press secretary Dana Perino was asked by a
reporter on March 17 “have we seen the worst of - does the President feel we've seen the worst of
it?” she responded: ” I don't think we know. Obviously in a market economy, economies cycle and
they  go  up  and  down,  and  the  question  is  whether  or  not  they  are  mild  disruptions  or  sharp
disruptions” (White House 2008a). On the same day, the  New York Times reported that Treasury
Secretary Paulson “has been cautious about predicting the future of the markets and the possible
necessity of further action to stabilize them. [...] Associates say he has taken a pragmatic approach
to the problem and an attitude that the administration would do what it had to do to stabilize the
broader markets” (Myers 2008).67
In the Congressional hearing on April 3, Geithner and Bernanke framed the decision in a similar
65 It was the same speech in which Bush originally intended to promise that there would be no bailouts (see
7.1.1.1) but was advised by Paulson to leave this part out due to the high level of uncertainty (Paulson
2010, 92; Kelly 2009, 68).
66 Treasury Secretary Paulson has indicated that the decision to frame the Bear Stearns loan in this cautious
way was made by president Bush, recalling Bush saying that they can't promise that the Federal Reserve
Bank would get its money back (Paulson 2010, 113). But I don't find any further evidence in the sources
for this attribution.
67 It is important to note that the “pragmatic approach” that is mentioned in this quote refers to the everyday
meaning of the term pragmatism and not to the systematic model used in this study (see Posner 2003,
chap. 1).
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way, highlighting the risks and the uncertainty it entailed. The first aspect concerned the uncertainty
if the Federal Reserve Bank, and ultimately the taxpayers, would face any losses from the $30
billion loan. The way the Federal Reserve Bank framed this aspect of the decision was by openly
admitting that the $30 billion loan might result in losses but that the alternatives would have been
worse. As Timothy Geithner put it in his statement: “[A]s we have been clear, there is risk in this
transaction. There is no doubt about it” (U.S. Congress 2008c, 65). Fed chairman Bernanke further
explained that while steps had been taken to reduce the risks – such as hiring of external experts
from BlackRock (see 5.1.5) – these risks nevertheless remained:
“We do not know for sure what will transpire, but we have engaged an independent investment
advisory firm, who gives us reasonable comfort that if we can sell these assets over a period of
time, we will recover principal and interest for the American taxpayer. And certainly under no
circumstances are the risks to the taxpayer remotely close to $30 billion. There may be some
risk, but it is nothing close to the full amount. We do have collateral, and I would say a good bit
of it is very highly rated” (U.S. Congress 2008c, 35).
But as both Geithner and Bernanke made clear, the loan still included a level of risk since it was
difficult to value the assets that collateralized the loan. As Geithner explained: “That uncertainty
exists today, of course, because these are very complicated markets. It is very unclear over time
what the value of those things were likely to be” (U.S. Congress 2008c, 65). 
Taken together, the government actors’ framing of the outcome of the decision to save Bear Stearns
provides evidence for a pragmatist approach to political crisis management, more precisely to our
fallibilism specification “Communication of uncertainty and possible failure”. Additional evidence
for this approach can also be found in the way the possibility of further bailouts was communicated.
Communicating Uncertainty: The Possibility of Further Bailouts
On March 14, after the decision on an indirect loan for Bear Stearns, a press release issued by the
Federal Reserve Bank made it clear that similar measures might still be necessary: “The Federal
Reserve  is  monitoring  market  developments  closely  and  will  continue  to  provide  liquidity  as
necessary  to  promote  the  orderly  functioning  of  the  financial  system”  (Federal  Reserve  Bank
2008a). President Bush mirrored the Fed's language in his speech in New York, noting that “events
are fast-moving, but the chairman of the Federal Reserve and the Secretary of the Treasury are on
top of them, and will take the appropriate steps to promote stability in our markets” (Bush 2008a).
By framing the situation in these open and ambiguous terms the Federal Reserve and president
Bush emphasized the uncertainty of possible further steps, a decision that proved wise after the Fed
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had to support the Bear Stearns purchase by JPMorgan with a second loan (Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission 2011, 290). 
After  Bear  Stearns  was  purchased  by  JPMorgan  on  March  16,  government  officials  remained
reluctant to exclude any further bailouts or similar steps. Treasury Secretary Paulson was cautious
about the “possible necessity of further action to stabilize” the financial  markets (Myers 2008).
When  Paulson's  deputy  Bob  Steele  was  asked  by  Senator  Richard  Shelby  in  a  Congressional
hearing “You are not telling us that you have supreme confidence that there is not going to be
another problem? You cannot say that, can you?” Steele replied: “No, sir, I cannot” (U.S. Congress
2008c, 28). And Federal Reserve Bank chairman Ben Bernanke left the possibility open that the Fed
might have to react in a similar way: “We do not expect to have to do this, but we are obviously
going to be watching and monitoring the markets very carefully, and institutions” (U.S. Congress
2008c, 30). 
5.2.3 Principle-Guided Framing of an Experimentalist Decision
Specifications of Principle-Guided Political Crisis Management: Sticking to frames
When it comes to experimentalism in how meaning was made of the Bear Stearns decision I find no
evidence for the specifications that have been defined for experimentalist meaning making. Neither
was the decision making framed as  experimentalist  crisis  management  nor  could I  identify the
trying out of frames or frame reversals. Instead, when it comes to experimentalism the decision to
rescue  Bear  Stearns  is  framed  along  the  lines  of  principle-guided  political  crisis  management,
framing the decision as unambiguous and “business as usual” (Donato 2009). 
This pointing to the business-as-usual character of the decision can be found in different public
statements. In his speech on March 14, president Bush “starkly suggested that much of what was
happening was part of the natural cycles of market economies” (Myers 2008) and highlighted that
for the government's strategy “it's important to be steady” (Bush 2008a). Despite the fact that the
Federal Reserve Bank for the first time since the Great Depression68 had to invoke its emergency
clause  section  13(3)  to  extend  the  two  loans  to  Bear  Stearns  this  particular  detail  stayed
unmentioned  in  the  press  releases  issued  by  the  Fed  (Federal  Reserve  Bank  2008a,  2008c).
Subsequently this fact, that would have highlighted the unusual character of the decision, was not
taken up by media reports (Andrews 2008a; Sidel et al. 2008).
68 While section 13(3) had also been invoked in creating the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) on
March 11, 2008 this program did not start until March 27 (Bernanke 2015, 217).
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In the hearing before Congress on April 3, Fed chairman Bernanke framed the actions as the usual
business  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank:  “[Y]ou  should  recognize  that  we  loan  money  against
collateral all the time. We do not do it usually in quite these unusual circumstances, but we do have
the authority to do it” (U.S. Congress 2008c, 59). Later, in a public speech before the Economic
Club of New York on June 9, Timothy Geithner highlighted the same point: “Our actions were
guided by the same general  principles that  have governed Fed action in  crises over the years”
(Geithner 2008). As Geithner elaborated: “The Federal Reserve Act gives us very broad authority to
lend in crises. We used that authority in new and consequential ways, but in the classic tradition of
central banks and lenders of last resort” (Geithner 2008). 
On the other hand, Geithner was the one who also hinted at the experimentalist character of the
decision at the Congressional hearing, noting: 
“So Friday morning, we took the exceptional step with extreme reluctance, with the support of
the Board of Governors and the Treasury, to structure a way to get them to the weekend so that
we could buy some time to explore whether there was a possible solution [...]” (U.S. Congress
2008c, 24).
This remark summarizes the experimentalist approach of the decision by pointing to the step-by-
step approach that started by lending to Bear Stearns indirectly on Friday in order to observe the
market feedback to this intervention. After the markets had indicated that this indirect loan had not
been able to re-establish confidence in Bear Stearns, Geithner and Paulson changed course and
facilitated a purchase of Bear Stearns over the weekend (see 5.1.3). Geithner's remark, however, is
the only instance that I find in the sources that hints at the experimentalist character of the decision.
Contrasted with the statements that framed the decision as conventional and “business as usual” this
sole remark does not qualify as experimentalist meaning making.
I also do not find any instances in which government actors tried out different frames during and
after the Bear Stearns decision or even engaged in frame reversals (switching from one frame to
another). Instead the message that was delivered on the Bear Stearns decision, highlighting the anti-
dualist character that led to the overruling of moral hazard principles, was consistent over time and
voiced by all government actors (see 5.2.1).
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5.2.4 No Evidence for Deliberative Meaning Making
Specifications for Pragmatist Political Crisis Management: None
In the decision making process of the Bear Stearns decision I have identified a high level of internal
deliberation but have found no evidence for external deliberation and the encouragement of skeptics
(see 5.1.5). Analyzing the meaning making process from this perspective I also find no evidence for
the specification of deliberative meaning making, “Openness to public debate and inquiry“.69
Whilst I find no deliberative meaning making in this strict sense, there is an additional aspect that is
interesting from a deliberative perspective on meaning making: the fact that the government actors
have  strongly  emphasized  the  deliberative  character  of  the  decision  making  process  publicly,
especially in the hearing before Congress. In this context, Geithner has described a conference call
on March 14 as deliberative and collaborative decision making:
“After careful deliberation, together we decided on a course of action that would at least buy
some time to explore options to mitigate the foreseeable damage to the financial system. With
the support of the Secretary of the Treasury, Chairman Bernanke and the Board of Governors
agreed  that  the  New York  Fed  would  extend  an  overnight  non-recourse  loan  through  the
discount window to JPMorgan Chase, so that JPMorgan Chase could then “on-lend” that money
to Bear Stearns” (U.S. Congress 2008c, 116). 
Treasury Deputy Secretary Bob Steele has supported this notion, framing the information gathering
and decision making process as a deliberative and collaborative endeavor as well:  “During this
period, regulators were continually communicating with one another, working collaboratively, and
keeping each other apprised of the changing circumstances” (U.S. Congress 2008c, 116). Steele has
further emphasized the importance of deliberation in more details:
“[…] throughout this process, I can report to all of you that there was good collaboration, and I
view that as a good thing, that people were helping each other, trying to think about various
issues, and the 96 hours was fairly fraught. And the Secretary was in constant communication
and trying to be helpful to Chairman Bernanke and President Geithner as they came to work
through this and offered his perspective” (U.S. Congress 2008c, 59).
Fed chairman Ben Bernanke has also underlined the role  of deliberation and collaboration and
69 The only remark that  comes close to deliberative meaning making was issued by Timothy Geithner
during  a  Congressional  hearing.  There  Geithner  began his  testimony by  openly  inviting  inquiry  by
Congress: “These are exceptional times. We have taken some very consequential actions. They deserve
and require very careful analysis and reflection and oversight. And you are right to begin that process
now” (U.S. Congress 2008c, 17). Given that this was the only remark I found that hinted at an openness
towards public debate and that is was directed at the Senate's Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs which is authorized and obliged by Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate to inquire on
such topics anyway, in my judgment it does not qualify as an exceptional openness to public debate and
inquiry (United States Senate 2014, 27).
152
emphasized its role before Congress: 
“[T]here was excellent collaboration, and we very much valued not only the Treasury’s support
as  a  Department  but  the  market  knowledge  and  insight  of  Secretary  Paulson  and  Under
Secretary Steel. So that was a very useful collaboration, much of it taking place at the wee hours
of the morning” (U.S. Congress 2008c, 59).
While these remarks show a pattern that openly communicates and promotes the deliberative aspect
of the decision making process and frames the decision as a deliberative and collaborative one, this
does not qualify as deliberative meaning making in a strict sense. Instead, it merely highlights the
deliberative  character  of  decision  making  without  extending  deliberation  to  the  dimension  of
meaning making by inviting public debate and inquiry.
5.3 Summary: The Bear Stearns Rescue from a Pragmatist Perspective
This chapter has analyzed the rescue of the investment bank Bear Stearns along the lines of the
model of political crisis management as introduced in chapter 4. Based on a systematic review of a
broad set of sources (internal reports, memoirs, journalistic and scientific accounts, Congressional
hearings, press articles, press releases, official statements, press conferences, speeches) it has tried
to  find  evidence  for  pragmatist  decision  making  and  meaning  making.  The  following  table
summarizes the results of this analysis.
SPECIFICATIONS OF PRAGMATIST DECISION MAKING
Identified Reference
Anti-Dualism
Actively searching for third options, ways to transcend dilemmas X 5.1.3, 5.1.4
Avoiding self-imposed commitments X 5.1.3
Fallibilism
Readiness to change existing beliefs and decisions X 5.1.1
Avoidance of unrevisable decisions X 5.1.1




Recombination of existing tools
Decisions as hypotheses and trials X 5.1.3
Constant feedback monitoring X 5.1.3
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Deliberation
Decisions based on internal deliberation X 5.1.5
Deliberation with external stakeholders
Encouragement of skeptics
SPECIFICATIONS OF PRAGMATIST MEANING MAKING
Identified Reference
Anti-Dualism
Nuanced depiction of events, no dichotomies X 5.2.1
Fallibilism
Communication of uncertainty, possible failures X 5.2.2
Experimentalism
Framed as experimentalist crisis management
Trying out of frames, frame reversal
Deliberation
Openness to public debate and inquiry
SPECIFICATIONS OF PRINCIPLE-GUIDED MEANING MAKING
Identified Reference
Infallibilism
Communication of certainty X 5.2.2
“One best way”
Sticking to frames X 5.2.3
Table 2: Specifications of Pragmatist Decision and Meaning Making in the Bear Stearns Case
As  the  table  shows,  evidence  for  pragmatist  decision  making  has  been  found  in  all  the  four
dimensions of pragmatism: anti-dualism, fallibilism, experimentalism and deliberation. In contrast
to this, the results are mixed when it comes to pragmatist meaning making. I only found evidence
for anti-dualism and fallibilism. No examples for experimentalist or deliberative meaning making
could  be  identified.  This  hints  at  a  possible  hypothesis,  that  pragmatism is  more  prevalent  in
decision making than in meaning making. This point will be further discussed in chapter 7. 
When it comes to the relation of decision making and meaning making an especially interesting
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finding from the analysis is the usage of anti-dualist meaning making to frame fallibilist decision
making. Confronted with the challenge to explain the decision to rescue Bear Stearns despite their
prior beliefs and positions president Bush and Treasury Secretary Paulson invoked the anti-dualist
idea of balancing different objectives. Referring to this idea the rescue of Bear Stearns was framed
as a middle ground between the objectives of ensuring financial stability and preventing the dangers
of moral hazard (see 5.2.1).
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6 The Collapse of Lehman Brothers and the Rescue of AIG
The second decision point I analyze in this study is the collapse of the investment bank Lehman
Brothers in September 2008. At first glance the case looks very similar to the Bear Stearns case.
Yet, while Bear Stearns was rescued with financial support from the Federal Reserve Bank (see
chapter 5) Lehman did not receive such support and had to file for bankruptcy on September, 15,
2008. The question why Lehman Brothers was not saved in the same way as Bear Stearns was has
received much attention and has been analyzed from different political, journalistic and scientific
angles (see for example Ball 2016; Blinder 2013, chap. 5; Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
2011, chap. 18; Sorkin 2009; Stewart 2009; Swagel 2009; U.S. Congress 2008b, 2008c).
I will look at the Lehman Brothers case in order to find evidence for my model of pragmatist and
principle-guided political crisis management. Briefly put, this analysis reveals that in the Lehman
case government actors engaged in a less pragmatist and more principle-guided form of political
crisis management. This is especially true when it comes to the two pragmatist dimensions of anti-
dualism and fallibilism which are largely absent in the Lehman example. While I will focus on the
Lehman case I will also contrast it with two other important decisions that were made only days
later: the rescue of the insurance company AIG and the rescue of the money market mutual funds.
These two decisions show a more pragmatist form of political crisis management.
6.1 The Collapse of Lehman Brothers and the Rescue of AIG
After Bear Stearns had been rescued in March 2008, Lehman Brother quickly moved to the center
of governmental concern. Paulson, Bernanke and Geithner were worried about the stability of the
investment  bank (Blinder  2013,  121;  Financial  Crisis  Inquiry  Commission  2011,  325;  Paulson
2010, 123 and 138). Lehman Brothers held large investments in the commercial real estate market
and its business model employed high leverage, relying heavily on borrowed money (Blinder 2013,
120; Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 326). After March 2008, Lehman tried to raise its
capital and liquidity level but had to report a $2.8 billion loss for its second quarter in June 2008
(Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 326; Lehman Brothers 2008b). Following reports that
other banks were getting increasingly worried about Lehman, the Federal Reserve Bank and the
U.S.  Treasury  began  with  their  contingency  planning,  thinking  about  a  potential  Lehman
bankruptcy and developing different ways to deal with such a scenario (Financial Crisis Inquiry
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Commission 2010, 3, 2011, 328). 
On September 7,  the  U.S.  Treasury  – in  collaboration  with the Federal  Reserve  Bank and the
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) – put the two government-sponsored enterprises Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship, a form of temporary nationalization (U.S. Department
of Treasury 2008b). The FHFA served as conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Together
with the Treasury the FHFA replaced the CEOs of both companies and provided $200 billion in
loans (Blinder 2013, 118; Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 320). The New York Times
summarized  that  by  putting  Fannie  Mae  and  Freddie  Mac  under  conservatorship  the  “Bush
administration seized control of the nation’s two largest mortgage finance companies” and called it
an “an extraordinary federal intervention in private enterprise” (Labaton and Andrews 2008).
On  September  9,  2008  news  that  the  Korea  Development  Bank  would  not  invest  in  Lehman
Brothers caused the price of Lehman's stock to fall by 55% (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
2011, 331). After Lehman had to report a $3.9 billion loss for the third quarter on the next day,
banks and other financial institutions demanded more collateral from Lehman or stopped lending to
the  investment  bank  (Financial  Crisis  Inquiry  Commission  2011,  331;  Wiggins,  Piontek,  and
Metrick 2014, 9). As concerns over Lehman continued to grow, the Federal Reserve Bank began to
develop a plan that would bring together other major financial institutions in order to prevent a
Lehman  bankruptcy  (Financial  Crisis  Inquiry  Commission  2008d).  Treasury  Secretary  Paulson
contacted Bank of America and asked them to consider a takeover of Lehman Brothers while New
York Fed director Geithner established contact with the British bank Barclay's, another potential
buyer (Paulson 2010, 173; Sorkin 2009, 130; Stewart 2009). After further assessing the situation
Geithner called Paulson and Fed chairman Ben Bernanke on Thursday, September 11 and informed
them that Lehman would probably not be able to open for business after the weekend (Stewart
2009).
While  Lehman Brothers  started negotiations with Bank of  America and Barclay's,  Paulson and
Geithner convened the most important Wall Street bankers at the New York Federal Reserve Bank
on the evening of September 12 (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 334; Stewart 2009).
Paulson stated that there would be no public support for Lehman and asked the bankers to help
assess the situation and to think about ways to support a Lehman purchase (Paulson 2010, 192;
Financial  Crisis  Inquiry  Commission  2011,  334).  On  the  next  day,  the  negotiations  between
Lehman,  Bank  of  America  and  Barclay's  continued  but  it  became increasingly  clear  that  both
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potential  buyers would not purchase all  of Lehman's  assets  and therefore would need financial
support for a takeover (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 335; Sorkin 2009, 178). 
In the evening of September 13, the group of assembled bankers informed Paulson and Geithner
that they had agreed to support a takeover by Lehman with $10 billion but as no potential buyer
could be found this offer was not used in the end (Paulson 2010, 206). Bank of America had already
dropped out as a potential buyer (purchasing the investment bank Merrill Lynch instead) but on
September  14  Barclay's  indicated  its  interest  in  buying  Lehman Brothers.  Since  Barclay's  is  a
British  bank,  however,  it  needed  the  approval  of  the  British  regulator  FSA  which  denied  to
authorize  the  purchase  (Blinder  2013,  124;  Financial  Crisis  Inquiry  Commission  2011,  335).
Geithner and Paulson tried to persuade their British counterparts but the British finance minister,
Alistair Darling, vetoed the purchase of Lehman by Barclay's (Evening Standard 2010; Financial
Crisis  Inquiry  Commission  2011,  336).  On  September  15,  2008  Lehman  Brothers  filed  for
bankruptcy (Lehman Brothers 2008a).
Over  the weekend,  the Federal Reserve Bank and the Treasury had also learned that AIG, the
world’s largest insurance company, had serious liquidity problems (Federal Reserve Bank of New
York 2012;  Paulson 2010,  200;  Stewart  2009).  AIG had guaranteed a  large number of  credits
through Credit Default Swaps (CDS) without holding enough capital reserves to cover these risks.
Following the increased nervousness on the financial markets AIG was unable to meet the calls for
higher collaterals  (Blinder 2013, 130–34). Faced with these serious liquidity problems, AIG was
downgraded by the rating agencies after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy on September 15
(Financial  Crisis  Inquiry  Commission  2011,  349).  After  internal  discussions  between  Paulson,
Bernanke and Geithner, the Federal Reserve Bank announced on September 16 that it would loan
$85 billion to AIG, invoking its emergency section 13(3) (Federal Reserve Bank of New York
2012). 
Lehman was also strongly interconnected with the money market mutual fund Reserve Primary
Fund (Blinder 2013, 143; Sorkin 2009, 258). Money market funds were used by many businesses in
a similar way to bank accounts (Bernanke 2013, 79). After the Reserve Primary Fund announced on
September 16 that it would be unable to pay out the full value of its deposits, panic spread to other
money funds and affected the liquidity of non-financial firms such as General Electric and IBM
(Blinder 2013, 145). To stabilize the money market funds, Treasury Secretary Paulson announced
on September 19 that the Treasury would guarantee the value of money market funds with $50
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billion from its  Exchange Stability  Fund (ESF) (U.S. Department  of Treasury 2008c; Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 359).
The days around the Lehman decision have been described as one of the most decisive periods of
the financial crisis of 2008. For the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, it was the time where the
crisis  reached  “cataclysmic  proportions”  (Financial  Crisis  Inquiry  Commission  2011,  343),  for
Blinder  (2013,  128)  it  was  “the  watershed  event  of  the  entire  financial  crisis”  while  Stewart
(Stewart 2009) has called it the “most important week in American financial history since the Great
Depression”.
6.2 Decision Making
The following sections will analyze the political crisis management by the Bush government for the
Lehman case along the two dimensions of decision making and meaning making. It will especially
concentrate on Lehman Brothers but will also contrast this example with the decisions to save AIG
and  the  money  market  funds.  In  doing  so  I  make  use  of  the  model  and  its  specifications  as
developed in chapter  3 and search for evidence of pragmatist and principle-guided political crisis
management.
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Figure 6: Timeline of the Lehman Brothers Case
6.2.1 Dualist Decision Making
Specification of Principle-Guided Political Crisis Management: Decisions are framed in either-or
terms (dilemmas)
The U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve Bank approached the Lehman case with a strategy that
was built  on two premises:  First,  that a buyer for Lehman was needed. Second, that no public
money would be provided this time. I argue that this perspective qualifies as principle-guided crisis
management  by employing the anti-pragmatist  concept of dualism. Framing the decision in the
dichotomous contrast of  buyer or bankruptcy the Federal Reserve Bank and the Treasury limited
their scope of possible actions.
From the perspective of this study, this decision therefore qualifies as dualist crisis management
since it framed the decision as either-or dilemma: “Either we find a buyer for Lehman Brothers or
we will  let  the company fail“.  As Ben Bernanke recalls  Timothy Geithner saying: “Our whole
strategy was based on finding a buyer” (Bernanke 2015, 268). The second dilemma, excluding the
possibility of public financial support, took the form of: “Either we find a solution that does not
require public money or we will let Lehman Brothers fail“.
In highlighting these two dilemmas it is important to note that the decision to let Lehman fail was
not the first choice of the Bush administration. But by framing the decisions in the form of two
dilemmas (buyer or bankruptcy; solution without public money or bankruptcy) the only outcome
that was left after no buyer was found and the commitment to not use public money was made was
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. The previous chapter has shown how this strict dualism has
transcended with the Bear Stearns decision: First, by providing a limited indirect loan on March, 14
that was intended to allow Bear Stearns to get to the weekend and explore further options. Second,
by balancing the two poles of moral hazard and systemic stability by pushing for a low price for
Bear Stearns’ shares. For the Lehman decision, however, we find no substantial examples for such
anti-dualist decision making.
The Insistence to Find a Buyer as Dualist Crisis Management
The premise that a buyer for Lehman was necessary was developed at the Federal Reserve Bank. In
an internal mail from July 12, 2008 James McAndrews from the New York Fed suggested that from
the Fed's perspective – similar to the Bear Stearns scenario – a buyer was necessary in order to save
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Lehman: “If we think it [Lehman Brothers] can be sold, then proceed as in BS [Bear Stearns]. If
not, discuss with the Treasury its appetite for a permanent addition to the government's balance
sheet by lending to the distressed firm” (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2010, 69). If the
Treasury would not show any “appetite” to help out, Andrews suggested that Lehman would have
to file for bankruptcy.
The view that a buyer was needed for Lehman showed up in another internal e-mail of the Federal
Reserve Bank from July 20, 2008 with the subject “Our Options in the Event of a Run on LB
[Lehman Brothers]“. Written by Patrick Parkinson, director of the Division of Banking Supervision
and Regulation of the Federal Reserve Board, it summarized the Fed's position: “But even if we are
willing to extend as much as $200 billion of financing to LB [Lehman Brothers], absent an acquirer
our action would not ensure LB's survival” (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2008e, 4). An
internal Fed analysis from September 10, 2008 reached the same conclusion and found a dilemma
that included only two basic options: finding a buyer for Lehman or the failure of the company
(Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 331). As New York Fed director Geithner summarized
the position of the Federal Reserve Bank: “We had no alternative to a merger” (Geithner 2014,
185).
The view at the Treasury was in line with the Fed's assessment stating that a buyer for Lehman was
necessary. For political and legal reasons, Treasury Secretary Paulson insisted that the Treasury
wasn't willing to help Lehman Brothers (see next section) so he facilitated the negotiations between
Lehman  and  its  two  potential  buyers  (Paulson  2010,  178;  Sorkin  2009,  131).  After  these
negotiations failed, Treasury's Phillip Swagel emphasized how the absence of a buyer was the chief
reason why Lehman couldn't be rescued: “In the end there was no one prepared to buy Lehman with
any realistic amount of government assistance as had been the case with Bear Stearns” (Swagel
2009, 40). This was also how Treasury Secretary Paulson explained the decision to president Bush:
“There was just no way to save Lehman. We couldn't find a buyer even with the other private firms'
help” (Paulson 2010, 216; Bush 2010, 457; Sorkin 2009, 226).
The meeting with leading Wall Street bankers on September 12, 2008 was also structured according
to this dilemma. Geithner and Paulson had convened the executives of major financial institutions at
the New York Federal Reserve Bank to explore ways in which these financial institutions could
help to facilitate the sale of Lehman to one of the two potential  buyers: Bank of America and
Barclay's (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 334; Sorkin 2009, chap. 13; Stewart 2009).
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Geithner  divided  the  bankers  into  three  working  groups  along  the  two  lines  of  the  dilemma
(Mollenkamp et al. 2008). The first two groups prepared a sale of Lehman while the third group
prepared for the alternative, a Lehman bankruptcy (Wessel 2009, 17; Stewart 2009; Paulson 2010,
193). 
 
Excluding the Possibility of Financial Support as Dualist Crisis Management
This sense of only two possible options was further increased by Paulson's stance on the question
whether public money would be used to rescue Lehman Brothers. While the Federal Reserve Bank,
with support from president Bush and the Treasury, had supported the sale of Bear Stearns in March
2008 with $30 billion (see chapter  5) Treasury Secretary Paulson excluded a similar solution for
Lehman: 
“In a conference call with Bernanke and Geithner, Paulson stated unequivocally that he would
not publicly support spending taxpayer's money – the Fed's included – to save Lehman. 'I'm
being called Mr. Bailout,' he said. 'I can't do it again'” (Wessel 2009, 14; also see Sorkin 2009,
141).
Without the support from Paulson, Bernanke was reluctant to spend the Fed's money on a Lehman
deal as well (Wessel 2009, 14). 
The moral hazard-infused stance that no public money would be spent on Lehman Brothers was
repeated in internal discussions and public statements. In the meetings with Wall Street bankers on
the evening of September 12, 2008 both Paulson and Geithner stressed that “the government would
not bail out Lehman and that it was up to Wall Street to solve its problems” (Sorkin 2008; also see
Bajaj 2008). The reluctance to rescue Lehman Brothers is also noted in the internal agenda that the
Treasury  and  Fed prepared  for  the  meeting,  which  lists  one  of  the  key  elements  of  Paulson's
introductory  remarks:  “Paulson  conveys  willingness  of  the  official  sector  to  let  Lehman  fail”
(Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2008d, 2). Paulson and Geithner also let the two potential
buyers of Lehman Brothers early on know that there would be no public money (Paulson 2010, 184;
Stewart 2009). Additionally, Paulson believed “that we should emphasize publicly that there could
be no government money for a Lehman deal” (Paulson 2010, 181). 
President Bush stayed out of sight during the Lehman weekend and “left most of the details about
the crisis to […] Paulson” (Labaton 2008; also see Stolberg 2008; Mann 2015, 132). As Wessel
(2009,  11)  puts  it:  “Bush  and  his  team  had  delegated  almost  unconditional  responsibility  for
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managing  the  Great  Panic  to  the  Treasury  and  the  Fed“.  When  Paulson  informed  Bush  on
September 14, 2008 that Lehman would have to file for bankruptcy, Bush expressed relief that his
government would no longer be associated with government bailouts:
Bush  “told  Paulson that  he  was  unhappy about  the  bankruptcy,  but  that  allowing  Lehman
Brothers to fail would send a strong signal to the market that his administration wasn’t in the
business of bailing out Wall Street firms any longer” (Sorkin 2008, 226). 
Internally, Timothy Geithner was opposed to Paulson's position that excluded the possibility of any
public  support.  Wessel  has  described  Geithner  as  “the  one  most  ready  to  intervene  to  stop
something  bad  from  happening”  and  the  “most  'forward  leaning'”  compared  to  Paulson  and
Bernanke (Wessel 2009, 20). Geithner himself recalls how the days of the Lehman decision were
one of the few instances where there were substantial opinion differences between him, Paulson and
Bernanke (Geithner 2014, 180). Geithner sensed that Paulson and Bernanke were influenced by
political pressure and especially did not agree with Paulson's strategy to  publicly state that there
would be no financial support for Lehman (Geithner 2014, 179; Paulson 2010, 187; Stewart 2009).
Paulson later claimed that his position was part of a negotiation tactic that was meant to prevent that
Lehman, its potential buyers and other Wall Street banks would expect that the government would
step  in  again  (Paulson  2010,  187;  Wessel  2009,  14).  There  is  evidence  for  this  explanation
(Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2008d, 2011, 332; Valukas 2010, 618) but as the next section
will show Paulson's reluctance can also be traced back to increased political pressure against the
bailout of another investment bank.
Whatever the exact reasons for Paulson's position were, the internal and public exclusion of the
possibility of any financial support for the rescue of Lehman Brothers can be qualified as dualist
decision making since it included a dualist account of possible options. As Timothy Geithner, who
did not want to exclude the possibility of public financial support, has pointed out this led to a
situation where the Treasury and Federal Reserve Bank were not able to “preserve optionality“: “I
didn't want us to commit to inaction and box ourselves in” Geithner stated (Geithner 2014, 179).
Publicly reinforcing the “no-bailout” position further led to a self-imposed commitments that made
it difficult to change course. As the model has outlined, from the perspective of pragmatist political
crisis management such self-imposed commitment should be avoided. The Bear Stearns case has
provided an important example for the avoidance of self-imposed commitments. Treasury Secretary
Paulson advised  president  Bush not  to  promise  that  there  would  be  no  further  bailouts,  which
preserved optionality and enabled the Federal Reserve Bank to financially support the deal between
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Bear Stearns and JPMorgan two days later (see 5.1.1). 
For the Lehman case I found an example of dualist  decision making,  Decisions are framed in
either-or  terms  (dilemmas).  The  concluding  section  will  discuss  the  question  why  the  Bush
administration engaged in this principle-guided form of political crisis management, compared to its
earlier pragmatist approach in the Bear Stearns case.
6.2.2 The Infallibilist Lehman Decision and the Fallibilist AIG Shift
Specifications of Pragmatist Political Crisis Management:  Readiness to change existing beliefs
and decisions (AIG); Avoidance of unrevisable decisions(AIG)
Specifications of Principle-Guided Political Crisis Management:  Sticking to existing beliefs and
decisions (Lehman)
From  a  pragmatist  perspective,  the  Lehman  decision  is  notable  because  it  departed  from  the
fallibilist stance of the Bear Stearns decision and shifted back to a position of infallibilism. A key
specification that has been identified for infallibilist political crisis management in the model (see
chapter  3) is Sticking to existing beliefs and decisions.  This section will show that we can find
evidence for this specification in the Lehman decision. But with the decision to rescue the insurance
company AIG two days after Lehman filed for bankruptcy government officials reversed course
again and engaged in fallibilist decision making by leaving free market and moral hazard principles
behind. The two specifications that can be identified for the fallibilism of the AIG decision are
Readiness to change existing beliefs and decisions  and Avoidance of unrevisable decisions.  They
will be discussed in the second part of this section.
The Infallibilism of the Lehman Decision – Sticking to Existing Beliefs
In the discussion of the Bear Stearns case we have seen how the government officials in the Bush
administration initially departed from the principles of free market economics and the doctrine of
moral hazard (see 5.1.1). Confronted with the financial troubles of Bear Stearns and its importance
for the systemic stability of financial markets (“too interconnected to fail“) Paulson and Geithner
decided to leave these existing beliefs behind and rescued Bear Stearns. For the Lehman decision,
however, this was not the case. Instead, by giving in to increasing political pressure and assuming
that the financial markets were prepared for the failure of Lehman, the established beliefs in free
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market economics and the doctrine of moral hazard prevailed.70
The resistance against a bailout of Lehman was especially strong inside the Federal Reserve Bank
and carried by “a group of hawkish regional Fed presidents” (Geithner 2014, 130). On September
16, 2008, one day after Lehman Brothers had to file for bankruptcy, this resistance became obvious
during a meeting of the Federal Reserve Bank's Open Market Committee (FOMC). This committee
consists of the members of the Federal Reserve Board and five of the Fed's presidents. Thomas
Koenig, president of the Federal Reserve Bank in Kansas City, highlighted that the bailouts by the
Federal Reserve Bank had “raised some real moral hazard issues” and concluded: “I think what we
did with Lehman was the right thing because we did have a market beginning to play the Treasury
and us, and that has some pretty negative consequences as well” (Federal Reserve Bank 2008d, 50–
51). Jeffrey Lacker, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, supported this notion and
highlighted the importance of moral hazard too: “What we did with Lehman I obviously think is
good. It has had an effect on market participants’ assessment of the likelihood of other firms getting
support” (Federal Reserve Bank 2008d, 48). Concerns of moral hazards were also central again at
the Treasury, with Treasury Secretary Paulson explaining on September, 15 that he “never once
considered  that  it  was  appropriate  putting  taxpayer  money  on  the  line  in  resolving  Lehman
Brothers“,  adding: “Moral hazard is  not something I  take lightly” (White House 2008b; Cohan
2008). 
These  established  beliefs  in  the  functioning  of  free  markets  and  the  doctrine  of  moral  hazard
prevailed  in  the  decision  to  let  Lehman fail.  I  therefore  find  evidence  for  the  specification  of
infallibilist  decision  making Sticking  to  existing  beliefs  and decisions  in  the  Lehman  decision.
While the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Bank did depart from the Bear Stearns decision they
did so to return to their initial principles of free market economics and moral hazard. 
The Fallibilism of the AIG Decision – Changing Existing Beliefs and Avoiding Unrevisable
Decisions
With  the  decision  to  save  the  insurance  company  AIG  the  infallibilist  course  of  the  Lehman
decision was reversed and fallibilist decision making can be identified again. More specifically, we
70 From a  meta-perspective  this  shift  from fallibilism  (Bear  Stearns)  to  an  infallibilist  re-emphasis  of
existing principles  (Lehman)  to  a  fallibilist  of  these principles  can itself  be  described as  pragmatist
adaption. Here I will stick to the micro-analysis of these decisions and rather discuss this aspect in the
following chapter.
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can identify two specifications of fallibilist decision making in the AIG case: Readiness to change
existing beliefs and decisions and Avoidance of unrevisable decisions. 
Contradicting the assumption that the markets were prepared, the Lehman bankruptcy on September
15, 2008 had severe effects on the financial markets and caused the Dow Jones to fall by more than
500 points, the “biggest one-day point drop since Sept. 17, 2001, the first trading day after the Sept.
11 terrorist attacks” (Berenson 2008). On the same day, AIG was downgraded by the major rating
agencies  and  media  reports  emerged  that  the  Federal  Reserve  was  considering  to  support  the
insurance company with a $75 billion credit line (M. W. Walsh and Merced 2008). Initially the
Treasury and the Federal Reserve Bank had hoped that a private sector solution for AIG would
emerge, but after AIG had ended its negotiations with private investor Christopher Flowers and an
industry consortium led by the investment banks JPMorgan and Goldman Sachs who could not
agree  on  a  solution  this  scenario  became increasingly  unlikely  (Congressional  Oversight  Panel
2010, 50; Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 348). Yet, government officials were reluctant
to consider a public bailout of AIG. In a hearing of the Congressional Oversight Panel, New York
Fed president Timothy Geithner later stated that in the night in which Lehman filed for bankruptcy
“it still seemed inconceivable that the Federal Reserve could or should play any role in preventing
AIG’s collapse” (Congressional Oversight Panel 2010, 52).  At a press conference at  the White
House the day after Lehman's bankruptcy, Treasury Secretary Paulson also rejected the idea that the
government would help AIG: “Let me say, what is going on right now in New York has got nothing
to do with any bridge loan from the government. What's going on in New York is a private sector
effort” (White House 2008b). 
Inside the Fed, an assessment of AIG's situation had already started over the weekend (Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 348). In a meeting with New York Fed officials on September 12,
AIG executives had asked if they could obtain a loan from the Federal Reserve under its emergency
section (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2008a). Similar to Lehman there were concerns at the
Fed about moral hazard. In an internal memo, Adam Ashcraft from the New York Fed noted that
AIG's request for an emergency loan was an attempt to “avoid making otherwise hard but viable
options” (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2008c, 2). In another analysis, entitled “Pros and
cons of lending to AIG” the dangers of moral hazard featured prominently: A bailout of AIG, the
analysis  concluded “[c]ould diminish incentive to pursue private sector solutions […] Increases
moral  hazard  as  other  insurance  companies  seek  protection  […  and]  could  reward  poor  risk
management practices” (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2008f, 2). But the analysis also found
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reasons that supported a public bailout, chief among them that a “[c]ollapse would be extremely
complex to resolve given global nature of the firm” (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2008f, 1).
Or as another internal memo, which was sent to Timothy Geithner, noted on the topic of directly
contrasting the AIG case to the Lehman decision: “In important ways, AIG's failure […] is more
systemic in nature due to size, franchise, and, the wholesale and retail dimensions of its business”
(Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2008g, 1). 
Similar to the Bear Stearns case, the concerns about systemic stability prevailed over moral hazard
worries in the end. Internally it was Timothy Geithner who pushed for a public rescue of AIG
(Bernanke 2015, 278; Geithner 2014, 194; Sorkin 2009, 245). Together with Bernanke, Geithner
got the support of Paulson (Sorkin 2008, 247; Wessel 2009, 194).
On September 16, 2008, the Federal Reserve Bank announced that it would loan $85 billion to AIG,
invoking its emergency section 13(3) (Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2012). In exchange the
Fed took 79.9 percent of AIG's ownership and replaced its CEO (Geithner 2014, 196; Sorkin 2009,
253). President Bush resisted the bailout at first, but was convinced by Bernanke's assurances that
the $85 billion loan would be secured by good collateral and the goal to preserve systemic stability
(Sorkin 2009, 252). As Bush remembered:
“There was nothing appealing about the deal. It was basically a nationalization of America's
largest  insurance  company.  Less  than  forty-eight  hours  after  Lehman  filed  for  bankruptcy,
saving AIG would look like a glaring contradiction. But that was a hell of a lot better than a
financial collapse” (Bush 2010, 458). 
In summary, this behavior qualifies as fallibilist decision making since we find evidence for the
specification Readiness to change existing beliefs and decisions here. President Bush and Treasury
Secretary Paulson, who had pushed for a hard course in the Lehman case, had to overcome their
moral hazard principles and give in to the importance of systemic stability. Similar to the Bear
Stearns case this change of mind was triggered by the internal analysis from the Federal Reserve
Bank and its New York director Geithner that showed the severe consequences the failure of AIG,
based on its size and interconnectedness, would have.
Besides  its  size  and  global  interconnectedness  the  other  main  reasons  for  a  bailout  of  AIG
concerned the problem of contagion. The hypothesis of the Fed's internal analysis was that if a big
and well-known company as AIG would have to file for bankruptcy neither market participants nor
the general public would know which company would be next, thereby further decreasing the level
of confidence and trust in the financial system (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2008g, 1).
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This fear of the severe and unrevisable consequences of an AIG failure played a significant role in
the  decision  making  process.  An internal  Fed  analysis  noted  the  “[l]arger  surprise  factor  than
Lehman” and found that a failure of AIG would happen “on the back of Lehman bankruptcy” which
had unsettled the financial system already (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2008g, 2). Another
memo warned about possible “spillover effects on other firms involved in similar activities” such as
major companies as General Electric (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2008f, 1). Trying to
avoid the uncertain and unrevisable consequences of an AIG bankruptcy I therefore find evidence
for fallibilist decision making, more precisely its specification Avoidance of unrevisable decisions.
This attempt to avoid an unrevisable decision can be traced to the consequentialist approach of
governmental actors towards AIG. While the Lehman decision was strongly influenced by general
principles  of  moral  hazard,  governmental  actors  put  the  practical  (and  potentially  unrevisable)
consequences of an AIG bankruptcy at the center of their decision. I therefore argue that such an
approach qualifies as pragmatist political crisis management.
6.2.3 “One Best Way” and the Experimentalist Shift with the Money Market
Funds
Specifications of Pragmatist Political Crisis Management: Recombination of existing tools (money
market funds)
Specifications  of  Principle-Guided  Political  Crisis  Management: Decisions  derived  from
“objective” evidence (legally impossible to lend to Lehman, not perceived as judgment call); 
I found no evidence for pragmatist experimentalism in the case of the Lehman decision. Instead a
specification of principle-guided decision making can be identified for the Lehman case, Decisions
derived from “objective” evidence.  Similar to fallibilism, however,  we can also identify a shift
away from this principled “one best way” approach to a more pragmatist one after Lehman had to
file for bankruptcy. By experimentally using the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) to rescue the
money  market  funds  after  the  Lehman  failure  the  U.S.  Treasury's  engaged  in  the  creative
Recombination of existing tools, a specification of experimentalist decision making identified in our
model. 
What is interesting from this study's perspective is how the role of legal considerations changed
from  the  Lehman  decision  to  the  money  market  funds  rescue.  In  the  anti-experimentalist
atmosphere  of  the  Lehman decision  strict  and narrow-interpreted  legal  rules  predetermined the
possible options and dictated one way to react to the crisis: the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. For
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the experimentalist decision to save the money market funds legal considerations were interpreted
more flexibly and did not predetermine possible solutions.
Legal Principles Defining “One Best Way” for the Lehman Decision
Strictly speaking, the decision whether the Federal Reserve Bank should rescue Lehman Brothers or
not depended on the interpretation of its “emergency clause“, section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve
Act. This clause states that 
“under unusual  and exigent  circumstances,  the Board of  Governors of  the Federal  Reserve
System,  by the affirmative vote  of  not  less  than five members,  may authorize  any Federal
reserve bank” to lend to any institutions if these loans “are indorsed or otherwise secured to the
satisfaction of the Federal Reserve bank” (Federal Reserve Bank 2013; my emphasis). 
I have highlighted the two passages of this section that show how the decision to invoke section
13(3) is not a clear-cut one but always a matter of interpretation. First, the Fed's Board of Governors
must decide if the concrete situation qualifies as “unusual and exigent circumstance“. Second, if this
is the case, the governors must decide if the loan they plan to extend is “secured to the satisfaction
of the Federal Reserve Bank“. Given the general formulation of these two conditions the governors'
decision  remains  a  judgment  call  that  leaves  room for  interpretation  (Financial  Crisis  Inquiry
Commission 2011, 340–41). 
In the case of Bear Stearns, the Fed's Board of Governors had decided that both of these conditions
were met and invoked section 13(3) to lend $30 billion to Bear Stearns (see chapter 5). For Lehman,
however, this was not the case. Instead, building on a narrow interpretation of the legal clauses, the
main government actors argued that the Lehman situation couldn't meet the second condition and
that a loan to Lehman could not be covered “to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve Bank“. After
the  two potential  buyers,  Bank of  America  and  Barclay's,  had  dropped  out,  it  was  a  univocal
decision for Bernanke: “Without a buyer, and with no authority to inject fresh capital or guarantee
Lehman's assets, we had no means of saving the firm” (Bernanke 2015, 268). As Wessel indicates,
“neither Bernanke nor Geithner was prepared to nationalize Lehman without Paulson's backing”
(Wessel  2009,  21).  But  Paulson insisted  that  the  “Fed could  not  legally  lend  to  fill  a  hole  in
Lehman's capital” and that the Treasury had no authority either (Paulson 2010, 209). This was also
the way in which Paulson explained the decision to president Bush, insisting that it was impossible
to rescue the investment bank (Bush 2010, 457; Paulson 2010, 216).
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This assessment was based on the assumption that without a buyer Lehman would not only be
illiquid but insolvent, and that the Fed alone could not stop the run on the bank (Blinder 2013, 127).
When Bernanke asked Geithner about the possibility to rescue Lehman without a buyer Geithner
rejected the possibility, replying: “We would only be lending into an unstoppable run” (Geithner
2014, 267). A similar story was told to journalist James Stewart by a Treasury official: 
“So there were really two issues: legal and practical. Paulson insists that we didn’t have the
legal  authority,  and I won’t  question that.  But,  even if  we did have the authority,  it  wasn’t
practical.  All the Fed money in the world wasn’t going to stop a run on Lehman” (Stewart
2009).
Internally, the Fed assumed that the capital hole of Lehman was around $12 billion (Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission 2008b), with Bernanke insisting that the necessary authority to lend to Lehman
was first created at a later stage with the Troubled Asset Relief Program (Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission 2011, 340; Wessel 2009, 25). When Bernanke testified before Congress he indicated
that this was the main direction in which the Fed had pushed:
“On Sunday night of that weekend, what was told to me – and I have every reason to believe –
was  that  there  was  a  run  proceeding  on  Lehman  […];  that  Lehman  did  not  have  enough
collateral  to  allow  the  Fed  to  lend  it  enough  to  meet  that  run”  (Financial  Crisis  Inquiry
Commission 2011, 340). 
This argument has played an important role in how the decision to let Lehman fail was publicly
framed (see  6.3.2). Here it is crucial to note that this strict reference to legal principles and the
insistence that without a buyer bankruptcy was the best and only option for Lehman qualifies as
principle-guided political crisis management. More precisely, we find evidence for the specification
Decisions derived from “objective” evidence, with section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act serving
as quasi-objective evidence in this case. As we have seen the provision of section 13 (3) is “very
broad” (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 340), providing the Federal Reserve Bank with
a substantial amount of latitude when deciding on specific cases. Or as legal scholar Peter Conti-
Brown has put it: “The point is that 'satisfaction,' in the midst of a financial crisis, is an entirely
discretionary concept” (Conti-Brown 2015b). Yet, during the Lehman decision this latitude was
largely denied and the decision framed as inevitable. As Blinder has shown, Bernanke, Paulson and
Geithner insisted that section 13(3) unambiguously did not apply to the Lehman case, arguing that
“saving Lehman with a loan from the Fed was illegal” (Blinder 2013, 127; also see Ball 2016).
Even  the  general  counsel  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank,  Scott  Alvarez,  has  found  the  strict
interpretation in the Lehman case being too narrow, highlighting that requiring 13(3) loans to be
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fully  secured  would  “undermine  the  very  purpose  of  section  13(3),  which  was  to  make  credit
available in unusual and exigent circumstances” (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 341).
The New York Times revealed later, that there was a group inside the New York Fed that believed
that Lehman could be legally bailed out but Paulson, Bernanke and Geithner claimed that they
never learned about these findings (Stewart and Eavis 2014). 
The decision to rescue AIG only a few days later, even if there was no buyer for the insurance
company, showed that the argument that prevented a loan for Lehman could not be “objectively” be
found in the provisions of section 13(3). Instead, from the perspective of this study, the Lehman
decision was an attempt to implement a more principle-guided form of political crisis management
that  referred to  allegedly  “objective”  legal  principles  to  defend its  decision.  With AIG a  more
fallibilist approach returned to the decision making process (see 6.2.2), with Bernanke deciding that
the Fed “couldn't risk another sudden collapse of a systemic institution at a moment of such intense
turbulence”  (Geithner  2014,  194).  After  the  AIG  rescue  pragmatist  experimentalism  also  re-
emerged. More precisely, as the next section will show, experimentalism can be identified in the
Treasury's decision to rescue the money market funds.
Creative Experimentalism in Order to Rescue the Money Market Funds
Before Congress passed the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in October 2008, Treasury
Secretary Paulson insisted that the Treasury had no funds that could be used for public bailouts
(Paulson 2010,  114–15;  Geithner  2014, 156;  Wessel  2009,  169).  This  was the reason why the
Federal Reserve Bank had to provide the financial resources for the bailout of Bear Stearns and AIG
(Blinder  2013, 126).  But  after  Lehman had to file  for bankruptcy the troubles  on the financial
markets could not be tamed by the Federal Reserve Bank alone anymore, especially when it came to
money market funds.
Money market funds had a similar function for big companies as bank accounts have for single
persons, including similar expectations regarding their reliability. In the words of Ben Bernanke:
“[…] investors who put their money into a money market fund expect that they can take their
money out at any time, dollar for dollar. […] The money market funds in turn have to invest in
something, and they tend to invest in short-term assets such as commercial papers (Bernanke
2013, 79). 
These commercial papers were widely regarded as safe investments. But after Lehman failed and its
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own commercial papers became virtually worthless, many money market funds were not able to pay
back the investors the full share of their accounts (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 356–
60). This triggered a classic bank run: investors pulled out more money from the money market
funds ($350 billion in one week), making it even harder for the funds to pay out all their depositors
(Blinder 2013, 144). To regain liquidity, the money market funds had to sell an equal amount of
commercial papers, which led to a “broad-based run on commercial paper markets“, as Geithner
explained before Congress (Financial  Crisis  Inquiry Commission 2011, 145).  Since commercial
papers were used by major companies like General Electric or IBM to fund many of their short-term
transactions, concerns within the Fed and the Treasury increased that these companies might not be
able to continue their  business (Blinder 2013, 145; Cheney 2011, 505; Financial  Crisis  Inquiry
Commission 2011, 358).
To solve this problem the Federal Reserve Bank and the Treasury decided to use a twofold strategy:
The Treasury provided guarantees for money market funds through its Exchange Stabilization Fund
(ESF) and the Fed provided additional liquidity through its Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money
Market Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF). For Ben Bernanke there was nothing unusual about this
solution: “This was an absolutely classic bank run and a classic response: providing liquidity to help
the institution being run provide cash to its investors, and providing guarantees. That successfully
ended the  run”  (Bernanke 2013,  83).  But  if  we look more  closely  at  this  supposedly  “classic
response”  we  see  that  it  was  a  quite  unusual  and  creative  decision,  especially  the  Treasury's
guarantee that employed the ESF. 
The Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF), which originated in the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, had a
very “specific purpose: to stabilize the international value of the dollar when necessary by buying or
selling foreign currency” (Blinder 2013, 146; also see U.S. Congress 1934; Richardson, Komaj, and
Gou  2013).  The  ESF  was  controlled  by  the  U.S.  Treasury  and  its  usage  did  not  require
Congressional authorization, a feature that brought it to the center of public debate when the Clinton
administration used it in 1995 to loan $20 billion to Mexico to prevent a default of the country
(Geithner 2014, 49–52; Schwartz 1996). 
So while there was a precedent for the unusual usage of the ESF, the decision to use the ESF to
guarantee the deposits of the money market funds was “nevertheless quite unprecedented. Never
before had the fund been used  to  issue guarantees  of  any kind”  (Wallach 2015b,  75).  From a
pragmatist perspective, it is especially interesting to see how legal concerns were sidestepped in this
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decision. In March 2008, Timothy Geithner had asked Henry Paulson if the Treasury could use the
ESF to rescue Bear Stearns but the Treasury's lawyers declined that this was possible (Geithner
2014,  155).  With  the  troubles  of  the  money  market  funds  this  assessment  changed.  Treasury
Secretary  Paulson  tried  to  establish  a  link  between  the  money  market  funds  and  the  original
intention of the ESF to stabilize the dollar: 
“Now money market funds were being hit by massive redemptions, some of them from skittish
overseas investors. A collapse of the money fund industry could easily lead to a run on the
dollar” (Paulson 2010, 253). 
Blinder has called this reasoning “quite a stretch” (Blinder 2013, 252) and Wallach has described
how this “farcically thin legal justification was developed during exchanges between the Treasury
and the White House on the evening of Thursday, September 18, when legal fastidiousness was
clearly not  a primary concern” (Wallach 2015b, 76).  Even Robert  Hoyt,  the Treasury's  general
counsel, admitted that the decision “was a bit of a legal stretch to say how that [use of the ESF to
guarantee MMFs] related to the exchange rates, but we said, well, if you knew what would have
happened if we hadn't done this, you would understand” (Wallach 2015b, 76). In other words, the
decision making process shifted away from strict legal considerations (which were dominant in the
Lehman decision) to a consequentialist perspective. Such a perspective looks at consequences of an
action and not at its principles.
Internally, the idea to use the ESF as a guarantee for the money funds was brought up by Treasury's
Steve Shafran and Paulson supported the idea immediately (Wallach 2015b, 74; Paulson 2010,
252).  For  Paulson  the  usage  of  the  ESF  was  an  “inspired  idea”  (Paulson  2010,  252)  and  an
“extraordinary improvisation” (Paulson 2010, 263) that allowed the Treasury to do what Paulson
thought was necessary: guaranteeing the deposits in money funds to prevent a run on them that
would  affect  not  only  the  financial  sector  but  the  whole  economy  (Financial  Crisis  Inquiry
Commission 2011, 358). 
Looking back at the financial crisis, Paulson later noted how the government was often forced “to
use the inadequate tools” at hand in a novel and creative way to target an unprecedented crisis
(Paulson 2010, 438). The ESF example qualifies as such a  Recombination of existing tools and
therefore as an example of experimentalist political crisis management. The two existing tools that
were recombined in  this  example were the idea of  governmental  guarantees and the Exchange
Stabilization  Fund.  The  power  of  governmental  guarantees  was  a  concept  well-known  in  the
prevention of bank runs, with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insuring all bank
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accounts up to $100,000 (Geithner 2014, 203). The ESF, which was originally intended and used
for a very different purpose, was identified as the tool that could provide the necessary financial
resources to guarantee for the deposits of money market funds and stop the run on them (Blinder
2013, 145).
6.2.4 The Role of Deliberation in Decision Making During the Lehman Case
Specification  of  Pragmatist  Political  Crisis  Management:  Decisions  based  on  internal
deliberation
Specification of Principle-Guided Political Crisis Management: Exclusion of skeptics 
When it  comes  to  the  role  of  deliberation  in  the  decision  making process  around the  Lehman
decision, the findings are similar to the ones from the Bear Stearns case. Internally the level of
deliberation was high. The main governmental actors were in constant discussion about Lehman
and AIG. This provides evidence for a  pragmatist  approach to political  crisis  management.  An
(ideal-typical)  principle-guided  approach  to  political  crisis  management  would  refrain  from
(internal and external) deliberation. Instead, in the principle-guided mode of “dictation” decisions
would be made by a single leader, similar to what Carl Schmitt imagined for his (commissary and
sovereign) dictator (see 2.6.1).
Contrary to Bear Stearns we can also identify tensions in internal discussions for the Lehman case.
When it comes to external deliberation, however, we can only identify the inclusion of external
stakeholders in a process of consultation and find no evidence of any direct influence in decision
making.
Internal Deliberation
Similar to the Bear Stearns case the level of internal deliberation for the Lehman decision was high.
Starting with September 9, Paulson, Bernanke and Geithner stayed in daily contact either through
direct meetings or via conference calls (for a list of these meetings and calls see Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission 2010, 6). To facilitate the internal discussion Treasury Secretary Paulson and
his team flew to New York on September 12 and worked alongside Timothy Geithner and his team
in the building of the New York Federal Reserve Bank for the rest of the weekend (Geithner 2014,
182; Paulson 2010, 190). 
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Internal discussions were dominated by the question if public money should be used in order to save
Lehman or not. Geithner later noted that the Lehman weekend 
“was  one  of  the  few  times  during  the  crisis  when  there  was  any  distance  between  Hank
[Paulson] and me. There was even some distance between Ben [Bernanke] and me. I sensed
their advisers pulling them toward expedience, trying to distance them from the unpalatable
moves we had made and the even less palatable moves I thought we'd have to make soon”
(Geithner 2014, 180).
Paulson also stated that Geithner “expressed concern about my public stand on government aid”
(Paulson 2010, 187), with Wessel reporting that “Geithner lost his customary cool” (Wessel 2009,
16) when it came to the question if public money should be used for a Lehman rescue. Bernanke
took a middle ground position: On the one hand, he felt similar political pressure as Paulson and
wanted to reduce moral hazard (Geithner 2014, 180) but on the other hand, through his knowledge
of  the  policy  responses  during  the  Great  Depression,  he  also  sided  with  Geithner's  more
interventionist approach (Wessel 2009, 21). 
In the end these internal discussions were rendered obsolete after Lehman's last potential buyer, the
British bank Barclay's, did not get approval for the deal from its regulator in the UK. Until then, for
Geithner  a  “last-minute  Fed  assistance  still  seemed  possible”  (Geithner  2014,  185)  but  when
Lehman could not find a buyer he supported Paulson's position that bankruptcy was the only option
left (Geithner 2014, 187; Wessel 2009, 21). 
We therefore find evidence for the specification  Decisions based on internal deliberation in the
Lehman  case.  In  contrast  to  the  Bear  Stearns  case  we also  find  evidence  for  internal  tension,
especially between Geithner and Paulson when it came to a possible public bailout of Lehman.
President Bush played only a minor role in these discussions. He was informed by Paulson about
the  latest  events  and  supported  the  course  that  was  decided  upon  by  Paulson,  Bernanke  and
Geithner (Bush 2010, 456; Labaton 2008; Wessel 2009, 11).
I  could  not  identify  another  specification  of  deliberative  decision  making,  Encouragement  of
skeptics. Timothy Geithner was skeptical about Paulson's strict no-bailout course but he was not
actively encouraged to influence decision making. Instead he was part of the core decision making
team by virtue of his  position.  His inclusion therefore does not account  as an example for the
pragmatist specification Encouragement of skeptics. 
Another skeptic, chairman of the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) Sheila Bair,
however, was excluded from the decision making process. Bair's skepticism was coming from the
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exact opposite direction as Geithner's. Bair argued that the Bush administration should have let Bear
Stearns fail and that debt holders of AIG should have taken some losses (Nocera 2011). Geithner
therefore considered Bair a proponent of “moral hazard fundamentalism” (Geithner 2014, 217) and
the New York Times noted that Bair “favored 'market discipline'” and abhorred bailouts (Nocera
2011). 
Bair described how her dissent led to her systematic exclusion from the decision making process:
“[…] we [FDIC] were rarely consulted. They [Treasury and Federal Reserve Bank] would bring
me in after they’d made their decision on what needed to be done, and without giving me any
information they would say, ‘You have to do this or the system will go down.’ If I heard that
once,  I  heard it  a  thousand times.  ‘Citi  is  systemic,  you have to  do this.’  No analysis,  no
meaningful discussion. It was very frustrating” (Nocera 2011).
In her memoirs, Bair speculates that she was excluded because of her gender from “the all-boys
network”  in  the  Treasury  and  Federal  Reserve  but  also  because  her  moral  hazard  principles
conflicted with the decisions taken in the Bear Stearns and AIG cases (Bair 2012, 98).
In any case, this exclusion of Bair and the FDIC led to a situation where the FDIC had to actively
intervene to correct a mistake that was made in the guarantees for the money market funds. Drafting
the  guarantees  under  high  time pressure  the  Treasury  decided that  it  would  use  the  Exchange
Stabilization Fund (ESF) to guarantee all amounts in money market funds (Blinder 2013, 146–47).
For normal bank accounts, however, the insurance provided by the FDIC only covered $100,000.
Therefore, the new Treasury program created incentives for investors to withdraw their money from
their bank accounts and move it into money market funds. As Bair remarked: “Unfortunately, they
[Paulson  and  his  team]  did  not  consult  with  us  and  did  not  even  consider  that  the  unlimited
coverage  would  create  liquidity  issues  for  banks”  (Bair  2012,  108).  After  calling  Paulson and
explaining the problem, Paulson agreed to change the program so that it would only cover deposits
that were already in money market funds when the guarantee program started (Blinder 2013, 147;
Paulson 2010, 262). 
From the perspective of this study, Bair's exclusion from the decision making process provides
evidence for a specification of principle-guided decision making,  Exclusion of skeptics.  What is
interesting about Bair is that her skepticism was based on moral hazard principles. So while her
exclusion  points  at  principle-guided  political  crisis  management  it  might  have  enabled  the
pragmatism of the Bear Stearns and AIG decision (will be further discussed, see 7.2.2).
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External Deliberation
For external deliberation we find a pattern that is very similar to the Bear Stearns case. External
stakeholders were only included in consultation processes and when their help and expertise in
implementing specific measures was needed. Chief among these external stakeholders were Wall
Street bankers and finance lawyers. Officials from the Federal Reserve Bank and the Treasury were
in  contact  with  many  Wall  Street  bankers  in  the  weeks  before  the  Lehman  bankruptcy  to  get
external opinions and assessments (for an overview see Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2010).
On September 11, for instance, Goldman Sachs executive Susan McCabe sent an email to William
Dudley, who also had worked at Goldman Sachs before he joined the New York Fed, warning him
that a failure of Lehman could be worse than Bear Stearns: “They [Lehman] have much bigger
counter-party risk than Bear did, especially in Derivates market, so [t]he market is getting very
spooked,  nervous”  (Financial  Crisis  Inquiry  Commission  2011,  332).  Hayley  Boesky,  another
member of Timothy Geithner's team at the New York Fed, received the same message from hedge
fund managers  (Financial  Crisis  Inquiry  Commission  2011,  333).  Geithner  also  called  investor
Warren Buffet to get his opinion on AIG (Geithner 2014, 193). 
The most systematic inclusion of Wall Street bankers took place in the New York Fed building
from September 12-14 where leading bank executives were convened in order to form an industry
consortium that would help rescue Lehman (Mollenkamp et al. 2008; Paulson 2010, 193; Stewart
2009;  Wessel  2009,  17).  During  these  negotiations,  private  investor  Christopher  Flowers  also
provided Treasury Secretary Paulson with details about AIG's situation and advised him to replace
AIG's management (Paulson 2010, 200).
Where special expertise was needed finance lawyers were also included (Frankel 2015). In the case
of the AIG rescue “Marshall Huebner, the co-head of insolvency and restructuring at the law firm
Davis Polk & Wardwell, who was already working on AIG for JP Morgan” (Sorkin 2009, 249) was
brought  on  board  to  advise  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank.  Congress  on  the  other  hand  was  only
marginally included, with Barney Frank, chairman of the House Financial  Services Committee,
later noting: “I would say with regard to Bear Stearns or Lehman or AIG, Congress was never




To summarize, we find evidence for specifications of internal deliberation for the Lehman case but
no  evidence  for  external  deliberation  that  goes  beyond  the  level  of  consultation.  For  internal
deliberation we find a higher degree of internal tension compared to the Bear Stearns case, with
Paulson and Geithner having advocated different positions on the possibility of public financial
support for Lehman Brothers. The dispute ended when no buyer for Lehman could be found and
Geithner agreed that Lehman's bankruptcy was the only option left. For external deliberation we
find a strong inclusion of Wall Street bankers and finance lawyers. Similar to the Bear Stearns case,
however, this inclusion took place on the level of information gathering and consultation and did
not directly influence decision making.
6.3 Meaning Making
After having analyzed decision making in the Lehman case the preceding sections this part will
concentrate  on  the  meaning  making  process.  By  looking  for  specifications  of  pragmatist  and
principle-guided meaning making it will compare the meaning making dimension of political crisis
management in the Lehman case to decision making.
6.3.1 From Dualist “No More Bailouts” to Nuanced Case-by-Case Frames
Specifications  of  Pragmatist  Political  Crisis  Management: Nuanced  depiction  of  events,  no
dichotomies
Specifications of Pragmatist Political Crisis Management: Usage of black-and-white dualisms 
In  the  days  before  the  Lehman  decision  was  made,  Treasury  Secretary  Paulson  had  widely
communicated his position that there would be no public support for Lehman Brothers (Paulson
2010, 181). His press secretary intentionally leaked this position to reporters (Wessel 2009, 15;
Paulson 2010, 186) leading to media reports that Paulson was “drawing a line in the sand” and
excluding the possibility of another Bear Stearns solution (Zumbrun 2008; Wessel 2009, 15). As the
New York Times reported on September 12:
“Treasury officials let it be known that, this time, they would not be putting any taxpayer money
on the line. People with knowledge of the thinking of the Treasury secretary, Henry M. Paulson
Jr., said Friday that he was opposed to providing taxpayer money to push through a deal that
could save Lehman” (J. Anderson, Sorkin, and White 2008).
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After Lehman had to file for bankruptcy Paulson was pushed by Jim Wilkinson, his chief of staff, to
defend this position, with Wilkinson advising Paulson to emphasize that the Bush administration “is
not in the business of bailouts” (Sorkin 2009, 234). During a press conference at the White House
on September 15, Paulson reinforced his position, stating: “[…] I never once considered that it was
appropriate to put taxpayer money on the line in resolving Lehman Brothers” (White House 2008b).
When AIG was rescued with public money on the next day the government faced the problem of
perceived  inconsistency.  As  Blinder  has  highlighted:  “The  Lehman  decision  abruptly  and
surprisingly  tore  the  perceived  rulebook  into  pieces  and  tossed  it  out  the  window.  Market
participants were thus cut adrift, not longer knowing what game they were playing” (Blinder 2013,
128). 
The way this perceived inconsistency was framed at first was by pointing to the differences of the
Bear  Stearns,  Lehman  Brothers  and  AIG cases.  Bernanke  has  called  the  varying  decisions  “a
different response to different circumstances” (Bernanke 2015, 292) and Paulson has framed the
decision making process as a sequence of case-by-case decisions that took into account the diverse
characteristics  of  each  case:  “[W]e  have  worked  together  on  a  case-by-case  basis  addressing
problems at  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, working with market participants to prepare for the
failure of Lehman Brothers  and lending to AIG so it  can sell  some of its  assets  in  an orderly
manner” (U.S. Congress 2008a, 27, also see 2008c, 37). And at the White House press conference
Paulson remarked: “The situation in March and the situation and the facts around Bear Stearns were
very, very different to the situation we are looking at here in September” (White House 2008b).
The main difference between Bear Stearns and Lehman that was publicly identified by Bernanke
and  Paulson  was  that  the  markets  were  prepared  for  a  Lehman  fail  (Financial  Crisis  Inquiry
Commission  2011,  340).  In  his  testimony before  Congress  shortly  after  the  failing  of  Lehman
Bernanke explained:
“In  the  case  of  Lehman  Brothers,  a  major  investment  bank,  the  Federal  Reserve  and  the
Treasury declined to commit public funds to support the institution.  The failure of Lehman
posed risks,  but  the troubles at  Lehman had been well  known for some time and investors
clearly recognized as evidenced for example by the high cost of insuring Lehman’s debt in the
market for credit default swaps that the failure of the firm was a significant possibility. Thus, we
judge that investors and counterparties had time to take precautionary measures” (U.S. Congress
2008b, 30).
Similar to the Bear Stearns case (see  5.1.3), Bernanke and Paulson also stressed the anti-dualist
balance of two main concerns in their decisions: the systemic stability of the financial markets and
179
the problem of moral hazard. Especially for the AIG rescue they highlighted, as Bernanke put it,
“that it is a very tough deal that we struck. We did that because we wanted to protect the taxpayer.
At the same time, we were concerned about the implications for the markets of the failure of this
large company” (U.S. Congress 2008b, 44). Treasury Secretary Paulson stressed the same point:
“Let  me  just  say  that,  with  regard  to  Freddie  and  Fannie  and  AIG,  in  case  you  or  your
constituents do not know, in those cases CEOs were replaced, the Government got warrants for
79.9 percent of the equity, golden parachutes were eliminated, strong action was taken” (U.S.
Congress 2008b, 26, also see 2008a, 30).
From the perspective of our model of political crisis management, the findings are mixed for the
(anti-)dualist  dimension.  On the one hand,  Paulson's  public  absolute  exclusion of  any financial
support for Lehman Brothers qualifies as dualist meaning making by evoking a strict black-and-
white  dualism,  with  Paulson  communicating  that  he  was  “adamant  that  there  will  not  be
government money used in the resolution of the situation” (Lawder 2008). On the other hand, by
emphasizing the case-by-case character of the decisions and its nuanced differences government
officials also engaged in anti-dualist meaning making. At first, this anti-dualist emphasis of nuances
and gray tones was also the key strategy to target the problem of perceived inconsistency. But as the
next section will show, this framing strategy was later revised and replaced by a more principle-
guided approach.
6.3.2 Experimentally Changing the Frame to Principled Legalism
Specifications of pragmatist political crisis management: Trying out of frames, frame reversal
Specifications  of  principle-guided  political  crisis  management: Framed  as  unambiguous  and
“evidence-based“
The biggest challenge for the Bush administration when framing the Lehman and AIG decisions
was  to  explain  the  perceived  inconsistency.  Governmental  actors  reacted  to  this  challenge  by
experimentally  reversing  their  frame  from  the  nuanced  depiction  of  differences  to  principled
legalism.
As economist Paul Krugman has highlighted, the problem of the perceived inconsistency is closely
connected to the public’s trust in government's actions. 
“Some are saying that we should simply trust Mr. Paulson, because he’s a smart guy who knows
what he’s doing. But that’s only half true: he is a smart guy, but what, exactly, in the experience
of  the  past  year  and a  half  — a period  during which  Mr.  Paulson repeatedly  declared  the
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financial crisis “contained,” and then offered a series of unsuccessful fixes — justifies the belief
that he knows what he’s doing? He’s making it up as he goes along, just like the rest of us”
(Krugman 2008a).
In assessing the actions of the U.S. Treasury during the financial crisis, Acharya et al. have arrived
at a similar conclusion:
“It is relatively more difficult to see a coherent logic behind the US Treasury’s actions and the
design of bailout packages. Clearly, given the magnitude of the problems and the urgent need
for some solutions, a certain improvisatory quality entered into the Treasury’s actions as well.
Increasingly however, these actions have taken the form of a discretionary approach (that is, ad-
hoc or institution by institution) rather than a principles-based one” (Acharya et al. 2009, 126).
From the perspective of this study it is interesting to see how Acharya et al. criticize the provisional
and “ad-hoc” character  of the Treasury's  decisions  and argue for  a  “principle-based” approach.
Paulson rejected such a strict principle-based approach, arguing that “if you get too dug in on a
position, the facts change, and you don’t change to adapt to the facts, you will never be successful”
(Landler and Dash 2008). He noted on the AIG decision: “If we had to reverse ourselves over the
weekend,  so be  it”  (Paulson 2010,  187).  But  government  officials  worried  how to  explain  the
perceived inconsistency of the different decisions. Geithner for instance highlighted the “why-AIG-
but-not-Lehman? public relations challenge” and noted: “I don't have the burden of explaining to
the public the zig and the zag” (Geithner 2014, 194). 
As the last section has shown, the immediate explanation Paulson and Bernanke offered publicly for
the  allegedly  contradicting  decisions  was  to  highlight  the  nuanced  differences  of  the  cases,
especially noting their assumption that the markets were better prepared for a Lehman failure. Over
time, this framing strategy shifted and instead employed a more legalistic explanation, pointing to
the fact that under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act any emergency loan must be “secured
to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve bank” (Federal Reserve Bank 2013). Based on the narrow
reading of this phrase (see 6.2.3) Bernanke, Paulson and Geithner increasingly argued that Lehman
was not bailed out because it was  legally impossible. As Bernanke later told the Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission: “We are not allowed to lend without a reasonable expectation of repayment.
The loan  has  to  be  secured  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  Reserve  Bank”  (Financial  Crisis  Inquiry
Commission 2011, 340). This version was supported by Paulson (2010, 209) and Geithner, who
stated: “[W]e didn't think we could legally do the rescue ourselves” (Geithner 2014, 187). 
David Wessel has shown how the shift towards this legalistic explanation took place in the months
after the Lehman decision and summarized: “By the end of 2008, Bernanke, Paulson, and Geithner
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had coalesced around the explanation that – without a buyer – neither the Treasury nor the Fed had
the authority to spend what it would have taken to save Lehman (Wessel 2009, 24). 
From a pragmatist perspective on political crisis management, this shift away from an anti-dualist
explanation that highlighted the nuanced differences of the Lehman case to an unambiguous legal
interpretation qualifies as  frame reversal and therefore as experimentalist meaning making. After
trying out the frame that highlighted the nuanced details of the Lehman decision (assumption that
markets were prepared, hope for a private sector solution) Paulson, Bernanke and Geithner switched
to a more principle-based frame: that it was legally impossible to rescue Lehman Brothers because a
loan would not  have been secured “to  the satisfaction”  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank.  Paulson,
Bernanke and Geithner later stated that the reason why they did not use the legalistic frame earlier
was that they did not want to publicly admit that both the Treasury and the Federal Reserve had
been powerless in the Lehman case. As Bernanke stated: 
“But we [Paulson and Bernanke] had agreed in advance to be vague because we were intensely
concerned that acknowledging our inability to save Lehman would hurt market confidence and
increase pressure on other firms” (Bernanke 2015, 289; also see Geithner 2014, 190; Wessel
2009, 24).
Legal scholar Peter Conti-Brown and economist Laurence Ball found this shift to a principle-based
and legalistic framing of the Lehman decision was not a mere tactical and legal one but also a
political  decision that  reacted to  the negative feedback to the previous  explanation (Ball  2016;
Donato 2009, 55): “[T]he Fed reached for legal cover when the Lehman bankruptcy turned out very
differently than they had hoped. It was a political decision, not a legal one” (Conti-Brown 2015a).
Through the legalistic framing of the Lehman decision in the later phase we also find evidence for
principle-guided  meaning  making,  more  precisely  in  the  form of  the  specification  Framed  as
unambiguous and “evidence-based“.  By employing a narrow legalistic of section 13(3) and by
stating that a rescue of Lehman was legally impossible the decision was framed as unambiguous
and based on the  “objective” evidence of  legal  rules  (Wallach 2015a).  By evoking these  legal
principles as univocal the Lehman decision was explained as the only possible choice. As Paulson
later put it: “[…] the central bank could not legally make a loan” (Paulson 2010, 230). 
6.3.3 (In)Fallibilism – Communication of Both Certainty and Uncertainty
Specifications  of  Pragmatist  Political  Crisis  Management: Communication  of  uncertainty,
possible failures
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Specifications of Principle-Guided Political Crisis Management: Communication of certainty
When  it  comes  to  the  roles  of  fallibilism  and  infallibilism  in  meaning  making  we  find  that
government officials employed a mix of both approaches, communicating uncertainty and possible
failures while also stressing the certainty of the outcomes of their decisions at other occasions.
Communicating Uncertainty
In a press conference the day after Lehman's failure, Treasury Secretary Paulson was confronted
with questions regarding the government's next steps, especially if the Lehman decision marked the
definitive end of public bailouts. At first Paulson tried to avoid answering this question: “[…] I
think it's important that regulators remain very vigilant. We're very vigilant, but we do not take, and
I don't take, lightly ever putting the taxpayer on the line to support an institution” (White House
2008). But when reporters followed up with the question if this statement should be read as “no
more bailouts” Paulson replied: “Don't read it as no more; read it as that it's important, I think, for
us to maintain the stability and orderliness of our financial system” (White House 2008b). 
This communication of uncertainty and publicly leaving all possible options open can be found in
other instances of Paulson's answers during this press conference as well. When asked if the worst
of the financial crisis was over, Paulson again avoided public commitments: 
“I  think we've got  to  go  back to  the  housing  correction  and where are  we  in the  housing
correction. And I believe that there is a reasonable chance that the biggest part of that housing
correction can be behind us in a number of months. I'm not saying two or three months, but in
months as opposed to years. I think we're going to have housing issues in this country for -- and
mortgage issues for years, but in terms of getting by the biggest part of this correction, if we can
make this Fannie Mae-Freddie Mac effort work the way I would like to see it work, I think we'll
make real progress here.” (White House 2008b).
It is especially interesting how Paulson did not promise that the government efforts to tame the
crisis  would  work.  Instead  he  highlighted  that  a  possibility  for  ending  the  crisis  was  that  the
government's  solution “work[s] the way I  would like to see it  work“,  though at  the same time
indicating that this would not necessarily be the case. A similar argument can be found in another
statement by Paulson, framing the government's strategy in modest terms and pointing to the non-
linearity of future developments: “As I've said, we're not going to move through this in a straight
line.  There are  going to  be some real  rough spots  along the road,  but  I  believe we're  making
progress” (White House 2008b).
President Bush, in a speech on September 19, 2008, also highlighted the risk of the government's
strategy while at the same time pointing out that the risks otherwise would be even higher:
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“These measures will require us to put a significant amount of taxpayer dollars on the line. This
action does entail risk. But we expect that this money will eventually be paid back. The vast
majority of assets the government is planning to purchase have good value over time, because
the vast majority of homeowners continue to pay their mortgages. And the risk of not acting
would be far higher” (Bush 2008b).
Paulson  brought  forward  a  similar  argument  in  a  Congressional  Hearing  on  September  23,
admitting risks for taxpayers but also emphasizing that the risk of failed governmental action would
be more dramatic:
“The taxpayer is already on the hook. The taxpayer is going to suffer the consequences if things
do not work the way they should work. And so the best protection for the taxpayer and the first
protection for the taxpayer is to have this work” (U.S. Congress 2008b, 27). 
Compared to Paulson and Bush, Fed chairman Bernanke's public meaning making put a stronger
emphasis on the aspect of certainty. But when advocating for the necessity of the Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP) even Bernanke admitted that the situation had not been resolved by the
government’s intervention and remained precarious: 
“Despite the efforts of the Federal Reserve, the Treasury, and other agencies, global financial
markets remain under extraordinary stress. Action by Congress is urgently required to stabilize
the situation and avert what otherwise could be very serious consequences for our financial
markets and for our economy” (U.S. Congress 2008c, 93). 
From a pragmatist perspective, these are examples of fallibilist meaning making that highlight the
uncertainty of decisions and acknowledge the possibility of failures. For the Lehman case, however,
we also find frames used by Bush and Paulson that lean more towards principle-guided political
crisis  management,  highlighting the certainty of decisions  and future developments  as the next
section will show.
Communicating Certainty
In a press statement, released immediately after the decision to let Lehman fail, Paulson tried to
bolster public confidence and highlighted that the Treasury together with the Federal Reserve Bank,
the SEC and major investment banks had taken all steps necessary to prepare the market for a
Lehman fail  (U.S.  Department  of Treasury 2008a).  The press release published by the Federal
Reserve Bank took a similar position (Federal Reserve Bank 2008b). 
In the press conference at the White House the next day, Paulson communicated certainty, starting
off  by  remarking  “that  the  American  people  can  remain  confident  in  the  soundness  and  the
resilience of our financial system” (White House 2008b). When asked about the soundness of the
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commercial bank system Paulson reiterated this position:
“Well, I've got to say our banking system is a safe and a sound one. And since the days when
we've had federal deposit insurance in place, we haven't had a depositor who's got less than
$100,000 in an account lose a penny. So the American people can be very, very confident about
their accounts in our banking system” (White House 2008b).
President Bush framed the situation in a similar way. Speaking about the general situation of the
financial  system  Bush  emphasized  the  need  for  painful  adjustments  whilst  at  the  same  time
remarking: “In the long run, I’m confident that our capital markets are flexible and resilient, and can
deal  with  these  adjustments”  (Labaton  2008).  Bush  especially  tried  to  spread  confidence  and
emphasize certainty when it came to the security of finances:
“In  this  difficult  time,  I  know many Americans  are  wondering  about  the  security  of  their
finances. Every American should know that the federal government continues to enforce laws
and regulations protecting your money. Through the FDIC, every savings account, checking
account, and certificate of deposit is insured by the federal government for up to $100,000. The
FDIC has been in existence for 75 years, and no one has ever lost a penny on an insured deposit
-- and this will not change” (Bush 2008b).
Bush repeated this  argument  when it  came to the insurances  the Treasury provided for money
market funds (see 6.2.3): “For every dollar invested in an insured fund, you will be able to take a
dollar out” (Bush 2008b).
It is interesting to note that certainty was communicated when it came to the general stability of the
financial system and the soundness of public guarantees (as provided by the FDIC and others). For
the  proposed solutions,  however,  we find  a  larger  degree  of  communicated  uncertainty  as  the
previous section has shown, with Paulson and Bush emphasizing the risks of the government's
decisions.
6.3.4 No Evidence for Deliberative Meaning Making
Identified Specifications: none
For the Lehman and AIG case I find no evidence for deliberative meaning making. Similar to the
Bear Stearns case the only instance that at least hints in this direction is a remark by Henry Paulson
during a Congressional hearing on September, 24, 2008:
“I appreciate that we are here to discuss an unprecedented program, but these are unprecedented
times for the American people and for our economy. I also appreciate that the Congress and the
Administration are working closely together and we have been for a number of days now so that
we  can help the American people  by quickly enacting a  program to stabilize  our  financial
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system” (U.S. Congress 2008a, 26).
Just as in the Bear Stearns case I would qualify this statement not as an example of deliberative
meaning making but as a courtesy remark towards a Congressional committee that was legally
authorized to inquiry on these topics (see footnote 69). If anything, I find evidence in the direction
of non-deliberative meaning making that tried to prevent public debate and inquiry. As Treasury
Secretary Paulson remarked during the same hearing, public debate and inquiry were not the first
priority: “Many of you here also have strong views. And we must have that critical debate, but we
must get through this period first” (U.S. Congress 2008a, 28). 
We have also seen how Paulson and Bernanke claimed that they did not reveal the “real” reasons
for Lehman's fail (that they had no legal authority to do so) during the Congressional hearing (see
6.3.2),  thereby preventing public  debate on the decision.  In  a similar  notion the bailout  of  the
government-sponsored  enterprises  Fannie  Mae  and  Freddie  Mac  in  early  September  2008  was
planned and implemented in a highly secretive way that Fed chairman Bernanke has described “like
planning a surprise attack in hostile territory” (Bernanke 2015, 244; also see Paulson 2010, 163).
But since these examples are too blurry and (in the case of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) are not in
the timeframe of this case study I also find no sufficient evidence for non-deliberative meaning
making.  Instead,  from the perspective of the model,  meaning making in  the Lehman case was
somewhere  between  the  two  ideal  types  of  pragmatist  and  principle-guided  political  crisis
management when it comes to deliberation.
6.4 Summary
In short, the analysis of the Lehman case has yielded the following results: For decision making we
have found that both the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Bank took a dualist  stance towards
Lehman, insisting on a buyer for the firm and excluding the possibility of financial support. The
Lehman decision has also been described as an infallibilist shift back to ideological principles. This
infallibilist stance, however, was reversed with the decision to save the insurance company AIG
shortly after Lehman's fail. Similar mixed results were found for the role of experimentalism where
the  Lehman  decision  was  characterized  by  a  strong  principle-guided  approach  that  invoked  a
narrow reading of legal rules. Yet, for the rescue of the money market funds a more experimentalist
approach could be identified that creatively used the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) to provide
insurance for the money market funds. For deliberation we have found that the degree of internal
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deliberation was high while external deliberation remained on the level of consultation and did not
influence decision making. 
The analysis of meaning making departed from Treasury Secretary Paulson's strong dualist stance
against any further bailouts that leading to a situation in which the Bush administration's actions
were perceived as inconsistent after the AIG rescue. The way Bernanke and Paulson tried to frame
this situation at first was through anti-dualism, highlighting the nuanced differences of both cases
and by communicating their assumption that the markets were prepared for Lehman's fail. Later
they shifted the frame and brought forward a more principle-based explanation, highlighting the
legal impossibility to save Lehman. This frame reversal, from pragmatist anti-dualism to principle-
based legalism, is in itself an example for the experimentalist adaption of frames. For the dimension
of fallibilism we have found evidence for both fallibilist and non-fallibilist meaning making while
no convincing specifications could be identified for (non-) deliberation.
Taken  together  we  find  mixed  results  for  the  Lehman  case  that  include  both  elements  from
pragmatist and principle-guided political crisis management. These results are summarized in the
following table.
Pragmatist Political Crisis Management
SPECIFICATIONS OF PRAGMATIST DECISION MAKING
Identified Reference
Anti-Dualism
Actively searching for third options, ways to transcend dilemmas
Avoiding self-imposed commitments
Fallibilism
Readiness to change existing beliefs and decisions X 6.2.2
Avoidance of unrevisable decisions X 6.2.2
Acceptance of possible failure and unexpected consequences
Experimentalism
Recombination of existing tools X 6.2.3




Decisions based on internal deliberation X 6.2.4
Deliberation with external stakeholders
Encouragement of skeptics
SPECIFICATIONS OF PRAGMATIST MEANING MAKING
Identified Reference
Anti-Dualism
Nuanced depiction of events, no dichotomies X 6.3.1
Fallibilism
Communication of uncertainty, possible failures X 6.3.3
Experimentalism
Framed as experimentalist crisis management
Trying out of frames, frame reversal X 6.3.2
Deliberation
Openness to public debate and inquiry
Principle-Guided Political Crisis Management
SPECIFICATIONS OF PRINCIPLE-GUIDED DECISION MAKING
Identified Reference
Dualism
Decisions are framed in either-or terms (dilemmas) X 6.2.1
Infallibilism
Sticking to existing beliefs and decisions X 6.2.2
No expectance of failure, no backup plans
“One best way”
Decisions derived from “objective” evidence X 6.2.3
Decisions from existing cases applied unaltered
Dictation
Decisions based on a priori principles without deliberation
Exclusion of skeptics X 6.2.4




Usage of black-and-white dualisms X 6.3.1
Infallibilism
Communication of certainty X 6.3.3
“One best way”
Framed as unambiguous and “evidence-based“ X 6.3.2
Sticking to frames
Dictation
Prevention of public debate and inquiry
Table 3: Specifications of Pragmatist and Principle-Guided Decision and Meaning Making in the
Lehman/AIG Case
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7 Pragmatist  and  Principle-Guided  Political  Crisis
Management:  Comparative  Reflections  and  New
Hypotheses
The previous chapters have analyzed two decision points from the U.S. financial crisis according to
our perspective on political crisis management: the decision to rescue the investment bank Bear
Stearns  in  March  2008  and  the  decision  to  let  the  investment  bank  Lehman  Brothers  fail  in
September 2008. The following table summarizes the identified specifications of the model for both
cases.




DECISION MAKING DECISION MAKING
Anti-Dualism Dualism
Actively searching for third options, ways
to transcend dilemmas
B L Decisions are framed in either-or terms
(dilemmas)
Avoiding self-imposed commitments B
Fallibilism Infallibilism
Readiness to change existing beliefs and 
decisions
B, L L Sticking to existing beliefs and decisions
Avoidance of unrevisable decisions B, L No expectance of failure, no backup plans
Acceptance of possible failure and 
unexpected consequences
B
Experimentalism “One best way“
Recombination of existing tools L L Decisions derived from “objective”
evidence
Decisions as hypotheses and trials B Decisions from existing cases applied
unalteredConstant feedback monitoring B
Deliberation Dictation
Decisions based on internal deliberation B, L Decisions based on a priori principles 
without deliberation
Deliberation with external stakeholders L Exclusion of skeptics
Encouragement of skeptics
MEANING MAKING MEANING MAKING
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Anti-Dualism Dualism
Nuanced depiction of events, no 
dichotomies
B, L L Usage of black-and-white dualisms
Fallibilism Infallibilism
Communication of uncertainty, possible 
failures
B, L B, L Communication of certainty
Experimentalism “One best way“
Framed as experimentalist crisis 
management
L Framed as unambiguous and “evidence-
based“
Trying out of frames, frame reversal L B Sticking to frames
Deliberation Dictation
Openness to public debate and inquiry Prevention of public debate and inquiry
B = Bear Stearns, L = Lehman Brother
Table 4: Overview of the Bear Stearns and Lehman case and the identified specifications.
Many of the specifications of pragmatist political crisis management were identified in the Bear
Stearns case. The results for the Lehman case are mixed, including evidence for both pragmatist and
principle-guided political crisis management. The Lehman decision can therefore be analyzed as a
shift towards a more principle-guided form of political crisis management that was reversed again
with the bailout of AIG and the money market funds (see chapter 6). 
As explained in the introduction the main research objective of this study is the following:
• Building a model of pragmatist crisis management and demonstrating how this model can be
used in empirical research.
In the preceding chapters this model was built and used to analyze two decision points during the
U.S. financial crisis. This analysis has found evidence for specifications of both pragmatist and
principle-guided political crisis management and has found shifts between the two approaches and
hybrid forms that combined both of them. Since part of the research objective is to demonstrate how
this model can be used in empirical research this chapter will pave the way for future empirical
research by briefly introducing and discussing two questions: 
1. What were the causes for this shift from a pragmatist approach in the Bear Stearns case to a
more principle-guided approach in the Lehman case and then back to the pragmatism of the
AIG decision? This chapter will discuss several potential reasons and formulate hypotheses
that offer answers to this question.
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2. How were elements of both pragmatist  and principle-guided political  crisis  management
combined in the Lehman case? By analyzing this question, I will reconsider the general
relation of pragmatism and strict principles and briefly examine the role of hybrid forms of
pragmatist and principle-guided political crisis management. 
It  is  important  to  note  that  given  the  focus  of  this  study  and  its  methodological  approach
(plausibility probe) no definite answers can be provided for these questions. Instead the hypotheses
as presented in this  chapter can serve as starting points for future research projects  and should
demonstrate the possible scope and reach of empirical research based on this model. In other words,
the  following  sections  opens  up  questions  for  future  research  projects.  By  introducing  these
hypotheses I build on chapter  4 where the generation of hypotheses for future research has been
identified as one of the core strengths of case studies (see George and Bennett 2005, 20; Blatter
2008, 68).
7.1 Explaining  the  Shifts  between  Pragmatist  and  Principle-Guided
Political Crisis Management
One puzzle the last chapter has left us with is the following: Why did the Bush administration –
while believing in free market principles – bail out the private investment bank Bear Stearns in
March 2008? And why did the same governmental actors let Lehman Brothers fail in September
2008 while rescuing the insurance company AIG only two days later? 
Some have perceived this shift as mere political inconsistency (Acharya et al. 2009, 126; Blinder
2013, chap. 5; Krugman 2008). I argue that the conceptual framework of this study enables a novel
perspective on this shift. The perceived inconsistency between the decision regarding Bear Stearns,
AIG and the money funds on the one hand and the Lehman decision on the other can be understood
as  a  shift  between  pragmatist  and  principle-guided  political  crisis  management.  From  this
perspective, the decision to let Lehman fail was the attempt to implement a more principle-guided
form of political crisis management, an attempt that was given up again with the decisions to save
AIG and the money funds only a few days later.
So far I have not systematically dealt with the possible reasons for this shift. In other words, if we
understand the  differences  of  the  three  decisions  (Bear  Stearns  and AIG on the  one hand and
Lehman on the other) as differences of pragmatist and principle-guided political crisis management,
we may ask what caused these shifts? Exploring this question in future research could allow us to
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learn more about these two approaches to political crisis management but will also allow us to gain
new insights on the cases.
First, I will discuss the hypothesis that has been offered by many commentators in order to explain
the shifts  of  the Bush administration.  This  hypothesis  argues  that  political  pressure and public
opinion have defined the decisions of the Bush administration. While this hypothesis is valuable in
explaining the shift to the principle-guided approach of the Lehman decision I argue that it might
fall short to offer reasons for the pragmatist shifts of the Bear Stearns and AIG decision. In other
words, this explanation accounts for the shift  from pragmatist to principle-guided political crisis
management in our cases. But what explains the shift in the other direction, from a principle-guided
to a pragmatist approach? I offer four hypotheses for this shift that might be further considered in
future research.
All  these  hypotheses  are  generalizations  of  insights  derived  from  the  case  studies  of  this
dissertation. Through a process of induction they formulate in a general form what seems to have
been true for these case studies. In developing these hypotheses I have followed Karl Popper’s
advice and have tried to formulate “bold hypotheses” (see Popper 2002). As such the hypotheses
make bold generalized claims that can serve as starting points for future research projects that aim
to falsify and modify them. Consequently, by developing these hypotheses I do not want to imply
that they will stand the test of time when tested in future research and applied to other cases. 
This is especially true for hypotheses 1, 2 and 3. A priori I do not see any reasons why political
pressure  should  always  push  towards  principles  and  administrative  actors  always  towards
pragmatism. Yet, this has been the case in our case studies. The claims of the hypotheses find
additional  support  in  the  literature  on  crisis  management  and  on  the  politics-administration
dichotomy.  I  therefore  present  these  hypotheses  in  Popper’s  spirit  as  “[b]old  ideas,  unjustified
anticipations, and speculative thought” (Popper 2002, 280) that can be derived from this study but
likely will be falsified or qualified by future research projects.
Hypothesis to explain shift from Pragmatism to Principles:
• A high level of political pressure (e.g. election season) leads to principle-guided political
crisis management.
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Hypotheses to explain shift from Principles to Pragmatism: 
• A low level  of  political  pressure  (e.g.  “lame duck”)  leads  to  pragmatist  political  crisis
management.
• Administrative actors push for pragmatist political crisis management.
• A higher level of uncertainty leads to pragmatist political crisis management.
• Time pressure leads to pragmatist political crisis management.
7.1.1 Hypothesis  1:  A  high  level  of  political  pressure  leads  to  principle-
guided political crisis management. 
Hypothesis 1 is a prevalent hypothesis in the literature on the Lehman decision (see Blinder 2013,
123; Ball 2016; Sorkin 2009, 339; Stewart 2009; Wessel 2009, 14) and it has been taken up in the
empirical chapters already (see 6.2.1). In the context of our case studies, the hypothesis postulates
that the decision to let Lehman fail was caused by increasing political pressure and the negative
public opinion towards public bailouts. In this scenario, increasing political pressure disabled the
pragmatism of the earlier Bear Stearns decision and facilitated a principle-guided approach. If we
look at the empirical evidence for this hypothesis – as the following paragraphs will do – we find
that the hypothesis can very well account for the Lehman decision but falls short when it comes to
explaining the AIG decision.
Political pressure had increased against governmental bailouts after Bear Stearns was rescued in
March and the two government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were taken
over only a week before the Lehman decision. Following the bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac  Treasury  Secretary  Paulson  was  confronted  with  critique  especially  from  Conservatives
(Stewart 2009; Wessel 2009, 14). Republican Kentucky senator Jim Bunning stated that Paulson “is
acting like the minister of finance in China” (M. Benjamin 2008) and the conservative Heritage
Foundation  spoke  of  “signs  of  creeping  socialism  in  today's  America”  (Istook  2008).  Both
presidential  candidates,  Senators  Obama  and  McCain,  spoke  out  against  any  further  rescues
(Geithner  2014,  175)  and Republican  candidates  John  McCain  and  Sarah  Palin  promised  in  a
commentary for the  Wall Street Journal that they would “protect taxpayer from more bailouts”
(McCain  and  Palin  2008).  When  Henry  Paulson  met  with  leading  members  of  Congress  on
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September  11,  2008,  they  too  made  it  clear  that  they  opposed  a  bailout  of  Lehman  Brothers
(Paulson 2010, 183). As Ben Bernanke noted, “popular, political, and media views were hardening
against the idea of the Fed and the Treasury taking extraordinary measures to prevent the firm's
failure” (Bernanke 2015, 260).
Wessel points out that it  were Paulson and Bernanke who reacted to this political pressure and
became increasingly reluctant to support a Lehman purchase with public money (Wessel 2009, 20–
21). Andrew Ross Sorkin has found that “it seems undeniable that the fear of a public outcry over
another  Wall  Street  rescue  was  at  least  a  factor  in  how  he  [Paulson]  approached  Lehman’s
dilemma” (Sorkin 2009, 339). This account is supported by Timothy Geithner who, when Paulson
began to repeat his strong opposition to another bailout, 
“began to  worry  that  he  actually  meant  it.  […] I  could  hear  the  influence  of  his  political
advisers,  who had been trying to steer Hank [Paulson] away from supporting any Fed role,
urging him not to let me talk him into another Bear” (Geithner 2014, 179). 
Geithner also noted a similar development for Bernanke (Geithner 2014, 180). Inside the Treasury
Michele Davis, assistant secretary for public affairs, worried in an internal mail to Jim Wilkinson,
Paulson's  chief of staff,  on September 9: “I  just  can't  stomach us bailing out Lehman. Will  be
horrible in the press don't u think?” (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2008h, 1). And the Wall
Street Journal quoted a person involved in the internal discussions with the remark: “We've re-
established 'moral hazard'” (Solomon et al. 2008). 
After Lehman had to file for bankruptcy the decision to let Lehman fail was politically and publicly
supported.  Bush  told  Paulson  he  was  pleased  that  this  would  send  a  strong  signal  that  his
administration  did  not  support  any  further  bailouts (Sorkin  2008,  226)  and  both  presidential
candidates, Barack Obama and John McCain, “supported the government's refusal to step in with a
rescue deal”  (Timiraos and Holmes 2008).  The  Washington Post issued an editorial, finding that
“the U.S. government was right to let Lehman tank” (Washington Post 2008). Vincent Reinhart
from the conservative American Enterprise Institute found that “this  was the right time for the
government to draw the line” (Reinhart 2008) and economics professor Jeremy Siegel predicted in
the Wall Street Journal that “there is good evidence that the worst is over” (Siegel 2008).
The hypothesis that Lehman was cut loose because of political pressure also finds support in poll
data. In the case of Bear Stearns, after examining the situation closely and under Timothy Geithner's
influence, the Bush administration decided to rescue the investment bank. Bush's approval rate fell
by four points (see figure 7) but according to a survey conducted by Rasmussen Reports two thirds
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of the American voters approved the bailout, with 30% thinking that the Federal Reserve Bank did
an “excellent job” in handling the Bear Stearns situation while 37% said that it did a “fair job“.
Only 17% said that the Fed had handled the situation “poorly” (Rasmussen Reports 2008a). Yet,
over time skepticism grew and when Gallup polled Americans by the end of March 2008, 61%
opposed governmental support for Wall Street investment companies (Gallup 2008) and over the
course  of  the  following  months  public  and  political  opposition  against  further  bailouts  grew.
Paulson (2010, 183), Bernanke (2015, 260) and Geithner (2014, 175) have noted that they felt this
increasing political pressure after the rescue of Bear Stearns and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,




Figure 7: Approval rating of President Bush in 2008 (Source: Gallup 2008)
If we look at president Bush's approval rating over the course of 2008 (see figure 7) we notice not
only the drop by four points  after  the decision to  bailout  Bear  Stearns  in  March 2008. Bush's
approval rate also fell by two points after the decision to bailout Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
which was announced on September 7. Splitting up president's Bush approval rating along party
lines (see figure 8) reveals that the drop after the Bear Stearns decision was especially caused by the
decreasing support of Republicans which fell by five points. The drop after the Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac rescue was due to a eight point drop among independents,  while approval among
Republicans remained constant.
For the Lehman decision, it is difficult to derive any insights from the approval ratings. We can
observe  a  drop of  four  points  from September  8-11 to  September  26-2771 but  it  is  difficult  to
determine what caused this drop since this timeframe covers the Lehman decision, the AIG decision
71 The polls for each observation point were conducted over several days.
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Figure 8: Approval rating of President Bush in 2008 with party differences (Source: Gallup 2008)
and the beginnings of Congressional debates about the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).72
However, in a survey conducted briefly after Lehman's failure, 65% of Americans approved of the
government's  decision,  stating  that  if  “a  large  financial  institution  like  Lehman  Brothers  is  in
financial trouble” it should file for bankruptcy with only 7% favoring the usage of taxpayer funds
(Rasmussen Reports 2008b). This indicates that a broad public majority supported the decision by
the Bush administration to let Lehman fail and expected similar decisions for such cases. 
This finding is further supported by surveys conducted in the second half of September that took
into account the bailout of AIG and the plans for a comprehensive Congressional bailout package
(TARP). In a poll from September 19-22, “the vast majority of Americans say the government is
doing only a fair (44%) or poor (33%) job handling the problems on Wall Street” (Pew Research
Center  2008).  And  a  poll  by  Gallup  from  September  26-27  found  that  68%  of  Americans
disapproved of Bush's response to the financial crisis with only 28% approving the response (Jones
2008).
Taken  together,  these  findings  indicate  that  a  majority  of  the  general  public  (especially
Republicans) was highly skeptical about governmental bailouts.73 While the approval for Bush even
modestly  increased  among Democrats  in  September  (from three  to  five  points)  it  significantly
decreased  among  Republicans,  from  71%  on  September  8-11  to  55%  on  October  3-5.  This
opposition among Republicans towards public bailouts (as exemplified by AIG and TARP) was
also present in the political pressure that was predominantly exerted by (conservative) Republican
members of Congress (Sorkin 2009, 339; Stewart 2009).
The  hypothesis  therefore  offers  a  relevant  explanation  for  the  principled  shift  of  the  Lehman
decision. By pointing out how political pressure against another bailout grew it finds evidence in
survey data, the report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
2011, chap. 19) and the personal accounts of the involved actors (Bernanke 2015, 260; Geithner
2014, 175; Paulson 2010, 183). Political stakes were further increased by the upcoming presidential
and Congressional elections. 
But it  is hard to see how this  hypothesis can account for the shift  that took place in the other
72 This problem is even more pronounced in the presidential approval ratings compiled by Rasmussen,
ABC/Washington  Post,  CNN,  Fox  News  and  NBC/Wall  Street  Journal  which  are  conducted  on  a
monthly basis only. The Gallup poll that is used here is already the most fine-grained one but even it
does not allow a qualified conclusion.
73 For a long-term perspective on public opinion and government interventions see Kenworthy and Owens
(2011).
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direction, from a principle-guided approach to a pragmatist one. This is true for the initial decision
to bail out Bear Stearns despite strong free-market sentiments among the decision makers. But it is
also  true  for  the  shift  back to  a  pragmatist  form of  political  crisis  management  with  the  AIG
decision. As has been discussed above, the direction of political and public pressure did not change
during this time. The Lehman decision was met by broad approval and the majority of the general
public (as well as both presidential candidates) still were critical about any further bailouts (M.
Benjamin 2008; Geithner 2014, 175; McCain and Palin 2008; Wessel 2009, 14). To summarize,
while the hypothesis can account for the shift to a principle-guided political crisis management with
the Lehman decision it has little to offer to explain the pragmatist approaches of the Bear Stearns
and AIG decision. This is an aspect that the following hypotheses try to explain. These hypotheses
were developed based on the findings of the two case studies and provide alternative explanations
that should be further examined in future research. 
 
Future Research
Hypothesis 1 offers an explanation for the shift from pragmatist to principle-guided political crisis
management. By pointing to the fact that political and public pressure can make pragmatist political
crisis  management  difficult  to pursue this  hypothesis  offers  an idea that  is  worth to  be further
examined  by  future  research.  The  hypothesis  has  been  explored  already  for  pragmatist
experimentalism,  departing  from  Campbell's  early  insight  of  the  “political  vulnerability”  of
experimentalism (D. T. Campbell 1969, 409). Recent studies have supported Campbell's claim and
have highlighted the political difficulties of pragmatist experimentalism (Ansell and Bartenberger
2016b; Bartenberger and Sześciło 2016).  For other elements of pragmatism such research is still
needed.
7.1.2 Hypothesis  2:  A  low  level  of  political  pressure  leads  to  pragmatist
political crisis management
It is a well-established finding in the literature on the American presidency that the last phase of a
presidential term bears a special character. Presidents in this phase are described as “lame ducks”;
they lack political power and influence while at the same time are being freed from the pressure of
reelection, thereby increasing their political options (see Franklin 2014; Hedtke 2002; Shafie 2013).
In the context of our study the second aspect is important. As journalist Peter Baker has described
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the role of president Bush during the financial crisis:
“[...]Bush  recognized  that  he  was  in  a  better  position  to  confront  the  catastrophe  than  his
successor would be. He understood by now the levers of government and, moreover, could do
what was necessary without worrying about political fallout” (Baker 2013, 609).
On the same note, Norman Ornstein has written: “It is also clear that Bush has agreed to make a few
difficult or unpopular decisions on his way out so as not to burden Obama with them [...]” (Ornstein
2009).
Many  commentators  have  pointed  in  the  opposite  direction  though,  emphasizing  Bush's  weak
position in the last months of his presidency, especially after Republicans in Congress had voted
against his TARP bill (K. T. Walsh 2008). Morgan described how the “lame-duck status limited
Bush's  influence as  party leader” (Morgan 2010, 199)  and Mooney noted in  October  2008 the
“diminished role” president Bush played in the financial crisis (Mooney 2008). 
What also points in the opposite direction of the hypothesis is the fact that the year 2008 was shaped
by the presidential race between Barack Obama and John McCain. While there was no electoral
pressure  on  president  Bush personally  his  decisions  still  affected  the  Republican  party  and  its
candidates (see hypothesis 1). As media analyses have shown, media coverage of the presidential
race became increasingly shaped by the financial crisis in September 2008 (Jurkowitz 2008) leading
to a more negative tone towards the McCain campaign in the media (Holcomb 2013). For the Bush
administration  political  pressure  was  therefore  not  completely  disabled  but  had  shifted  to  the
candidates for the presidential and Congressional elections.
Hypothesis 2 can be regarded as the logical opposite of hypothesis 1. Whereas hypothesis argued
that political pressure will lead to principle-guided political crisis management hypothesis 2 claims
that the absence of political pressure will lead to pragmatist political crisis management. Taken
together,  the  two  hypotheses  allow  to  analyze  the  relation  of  political  pressure  and
pragmatist/principle-guided political crisis management from both directions.
Future Research
Hypothesis 2 has been chiefly developed in the context of the Congressional bailout bill and the
bailout of the automobile industry (see Cassidy 2012). It remains unclear if it applies to the AIG
decision as well. As the preceding section has shown, political pressure did not change in the time
between the Lehman and AIG decision. I have found no evidence in the sources that the internal
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perception  of  political  pressure  inside  the  Bush  administration  changed  in  this  time  period.
Analyzing this time phase in greater depth is a task for future challenge.
Again I  want  to  emphasize that  even if  the analyzed cases here suggest  that  a  higher  level  of
political pressure will lead to principle-guided political crisis management and a lower level will
lead to pragmatism, future research should remain open to explore this connection further. While
the literature on political crisis management has found that established principles and values might
be reinforced during crises (Boin and ’t Hart 2003, 549), I see no strict a priori reason why political
pressure should always push towards principles and away from pragmatism. But as mentioned in
the introduction to this section, this hypothesis (as well as the others) should be understood as “bold
hypothesis” in Karl Popper’s sense that was derived from my case studies but might be qualified or
falsified by future research. 
7.1.3 Hypothesis 3: Administrative actors push for pragmatist political crisis
management
“The field of administration is a field of business. It is removed from the hurry and strife of politics
[...]” (W. Wilson 1887, 209). With his article “The Study of Administration“, from which this quote
is  taken,  Woodrow Wilson established what  later  became known as  the  politics-administration
dichotomy.  This  dichotomy suggests  that  bureaucracy deals  with the  organization of  the  state's
business  and  focuses  more  on  “technical”  questions  while  being  removed  from  political
considerations and partisan politics (see DeLeon 2005; Kane and Patapan 2009). Hypothesis 3 picks
up on this idea and suggests that the main agents behind pragmatist political crisis management are
not  political but  administrative actors,  i.e.  decision  makers  and  leaders  in  public  agencies.
Hypothesis 3 thereby provides an important refinement to hypothesis 1 that stated that political
pressure was one of the main influences on the political crisis management approach. 
In the context of the cases, hypothesis 3 states that political pressure was reduced because the center
of decision making of the Bush administration throughout the financial crisis was not the White
House but the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve Bank. I have already discussed how the main
actors who shaped the government's  response were Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Ben
Bernanke and Timothy Geithner from the Federal Reserve Bank (see  4.2.2). In an interview in
December 2008, Paulson emphasized that president Bush never overruled one of his decisions and
that Bush understood “that when you’re dealing with something as unprecedented and fast-moving
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as this we need to have a different operating style” (Becker, Stolberg and Labaton 2008). This
“different  operating  style”  included Bush's  guarantee  to  Paulson “that  Treasury,  not  the  White
House, would have the dominant role in shaping economic policy” (Becker, Stolberg and Labaton
2008). Republican strategist Rich Galen suggested that Bush put Paulson in charge to depoliticize
the crisis response, noting: “It takes the politics essentially out of it” (Raum 2008).
The empirical analysis of the Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and AIG decisions has shown how
Paulson  kept  president  Bush  in  the  loop  of  decision  making  whilst  also  showing  that  Bush
supported the course that was previously agreed upon by Paulson, Bernanke and Geithner. These
decisions were strongly influenced by reports and analyses conducted by the bureaucracies of the
Treasury  and  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  that  outlined  scenarios  and  examined  potential
consequences on the financial markets (see chapters 5 and 6). 
The hypothesis states that the analyses that were drafted by the bureaucracies of the Treasury and
the  Federal  Reserve  Bank were  close  to  pragmatism's  emphasis  of  practical  consequences  and
problem solving. As Ansell has remarked, “a focus on problems does help opposing parties avoid
unproductive and dogmatic disputes” (Ansell 2011, 84, also see Ansell 2016). The Federal Reserve
Bank was no ideology-free zone (with conflicts between moral hazard hawks and interventionists,
see 5.1.1). As Mitchel Abolafia has noted, the Federal Reserve – while also allowing space for the
emphasis  of  pragmatist  consequences  –  has  been  partly  captured  by  the  “dogma  of  efficient
markets” (Abolafia 2012, 111; also see Abolafia 2010). But in our case by having the center of
decision making at the Fed and the Treasury political pressure was nevertheless reduced. Instead the
bureaucratic logic of practical consequences and problem-solving played a stronger role.
Timothy Geithner was the actor who was closest to this bureaucratic logic of efficacy and problem-
solving. Geithner himself remarked that he was glad to be removed from the political pressure that
Paulson as Treasury Secretary and Bernanke as Fed chairman had to deal with to a greater degree
(Geithner  2014,  194).  Paulson  and  Bernanke  had  to  explain  their  decisions  in  Congressional
hearings (U.S. Congress 2008a, 2008b, 2008c) while Geithner could work in the background. In the
Lehman case Paulson and Bernanke responded to the increasing political pressure and favored a




This hypothesis adds another layer to hypothesis 1 by stating that political pressure is reduced when
administrative actors play a greater role compared to political actors (in our cases, a greater role for
the more technical-oriented U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve Bank compared to the White
House). A question this hypothesis touches upon and which cannot be discussed at greater length in
this study is the question of where pragmatism is located in government. In other words, why did
the Bush administration act pragmatic in certain situations (Bear Stearns, AIG) but not in others
(Lehman, but also 9/11)? Was it because different actors were involved in these decisions or did
institutional settings play a role as well? I will briefly discuss this question in the conclusion of this
study but it also could be a fruitful departure point for future research.
7.1.4 Hypothesis  4:  A  higher  level  of  uncertainty  facilitates  pragmatist
political crisis management.
The theoretical chapter of this study has shown how the concept of uncertainty is at the center of
philosophical pragmatism. In a nutshell, pragmatism's way to confront such uncertainty is not to
look at strict principles but at the practical consequences of actions. This pragmatist emphasis of
consequences can be found in the pragmatic maxim of Peirce and James and it is encapsulated in
the pragmatist elements of anti-dualism, fallibilism, experimentalism and deliberation as they have
built the foundation of this study.
Hypothesis 4 takes up these pragmatist insights and – in the context of our cases – argues that what
enabled  the pragmatist  decisions  in  the cases  of  Bear  Stearns  and AIG was the  uncertainty  of
possible consequences that pushed abstract principles in the background. For the Lehman decision,
however, perceived uncertainty about the potential consequences was low with government actors
assuming that the markets were already prepared for the bankruptcy of the investment bank. The
low level of uncertainty in the Lehman decision enabled a principle-guided approach to political
crisis management.
The troubles  of  Bear  Stearns  caught  the  Bush administration  by  surprise  and  while  the  initial
reaction  was  to  let  the  investment  bank  fail,  a  Federal  Reserve  analysis  of  the  potential
consequences led to a change of mind (see chapter 5). It was especially the uncertainty of the size of
the threat and the question if  it  posed a risk to the systemic stability  of financial  markets that
worried governmental actors (U.S. Congress 2008c, 14). 
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A similar scenario played out in the case of AIG. As investment banker Michael Lewitt highlighted
in the New York Times:
AIG “is a central player in the unregulated, Brobdingnagian credit default swap market that is
reported to be at least $60 trillion in size. Nobody knows this market’s real size, or who owes
what to whom, because there is no central clearinghouse or regulator for it” (Lewitt 2008).
This high level of uncertainty surrounding AIG was further amplified by the global character of the
firm and the already fragile condition of financial markets after the Lehman bankruptcy (Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission 2008f, 2008g). As Fox has noted: 
“The  best  case  for  the  bailout  seems  to  be  that  nobody  has  the  faintest  idea  what  the
consequences of AIG's failure for financial markets would be, but the fear was that it could lead
to total chaos” (Fox 2008).
Fox also emphasized that the Federal Reserve Bank could not “afford to stand on principle” (Fox
2008) while Mann summarized the AIG decision as an emphasis of necessity: “The only rationale
that could serve to explain the administration's policies was one of necessity: Bush set principles
aside and did whatever he had to do to keep the economy afloat” (Mann 2015, 133). After AIG got
bailed out,  The Economist commented: “The prospect of letting such a large and interconnected
institution fail was not a gamble the government was willing to take (especially while caught in the
riptide of Lehman)” (The Economist 2009).
For the Lehman decision, the situation looked different. Since Lehman had moved to the focus of
concern right after the Bear Stearns rescue, governmental actors assumed that the financial markets
had had enough time to prepare for a Lehman bankruptcy (Hilsenrath,  Perry, and Reddy 2008;
Labaton  2008;  Swagel  2009,  40;  Wessel  2009,  11).  While  Paulson,  Bernanke  and  Geithner
anticipated that a Lehman bankruptcy would cause turmoil on the financial markets it seemed to be
a risk that could be calculated and contained (see 6.2.1). As Lewitt put it: “Regulators knew that if
Lehman went down, the world wouldn’t end” (Lewitt 2008).
According  to  hypothesis  4,  this  different  level  of  uncertainty  was  decisive  when  it  comes  to
explaining these different decisions. While the uncertainty of potential consequences was high in
the cases of Bear Stearns and AIG, uncertainty was regarded as low and controllable in the Lehman
case. From the perspective of this hypothesis, a low level of uncertainty facilitated principle-guided
political crisis management while a high level of uncertainty led to a pragmatist approach. The
reason for this seems to be found in the fact that a higher level of (perceived) uncertainty facilitates
pragmatist fallibilism, i.e. the insight “that there is never a metaphysical guarantee to be had that
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such-and-such a belief will never need revision” (Putnam 1995, 152). Under conditions of crises
(surprise, threat, uncertainty) fixed principles and beliefs are replaced by the fallibilist insight that
these principles and beliefs might be flawed after all.  As the hypothesis postulates,  under such
conditions finding guidance in strict principles is replaced by pragmatist approaches such as anti-
dualism, experimentalism and deliberation.
Future Research
Hypothesis  4  offers  a  fruitful  perspective  by  highlighting  the  role  of  uncertainty  and  how  it
influences political crisis management. Uncertainty is not only an element of crises according to our
definition but has also been identified as a key concept in pragmatist thinking. Exploring the role of
uncertainty  in  greater  detail  through  additional  research  therefore  seems  promising.  Possible
connections with the works by Karl Weick (Weick 1993, 2006, 2015), Charles Lindblom (Lindblom
1959, 1979) and the literature on “bounded rationality” (Simon 1957; Kahneman 2003) that also
emphasize the role of uncertainty/incomplete information might be further explored in this context
(see 2.3).
7.1.5 Hypothesis  5:  A  high  level  of  time  pressure  facilitates  pragmatist
political crisis management
We have seen in the theoretical discussions how Gary Klein's research (Klein 1998) has found that
under immense time pressure firefighters and rapid response teams act in a way that resembles
pragmatist behavior (see  2.6.4.2). This hypothesis, that under time pressure established principles
are replaced by a pragmatist “whatever works” approach, has been described for financial crises by
Henry B. Steagall, chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee, in 1932: 
“Of course,  it  [fixing the crisis  –  M.B.]  involves a departure  from established policies  and
ideals, but we cannot stand by when a house is on fire to engage in lengthy debates over the
methods to be employed in extinguishing the fire. In such a situation we instinctively seize upon
and  utilize  whatever  method  is  most  available  and  offers  assurance  of  speediest  success”
(quoted in Shiller 2008, 101). 
Hypothesis 5 puts this assumption in a general form and thereby highlights another key element of
situations of crises: urgency. 
Both cases where we witnessed a pragmatist approach to political crisis management (Bear Stearns,
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AIG) included a high level of time pressure. As president Bush noted for the Bear Stearns case: “I
was surprised by the sudden crisis.  […] I  assumed any major credit  troubles would have been
flagged  by  the  regulators  or  rating  agencies”  (Bush  2010,  453).  Henry  Paulson  and  Timothy
Geithner learned about a possible bankruptcy when they were called by Bear Stearns' CEO Alan
Schwartz on March 13 (Kelly 2009, 17; Paulson 2010, 93). The decision to temporarily save Bear
Stearns was made the next morning and only two days later, on March 16, the final decision to
rescue Bear Stearns was made. With Bear Stearns cash reserves melting away quickly the opening
of the markets on Monday (with the Asian markets opening Sunday night already) was perceived as
a hard deadline that mandated a quick decision. Figure 9 depicts this rapid drain of Bear Stearns'
liquidity in a matter of days.
The situation was similar  with AIG. Treasury Secretary Paulson only learned about  the severe
troubles at AIG from private investor Christopher Flowers on Saturday, September 13, three days
before the decision to rescue AIG was made (Paulson 2010, 200; Sorkin 2009, 173). When the
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Figure 9: Liquidity level of Bear Stearns in March 2008 (FinancialInquiry Commission 2011, 289)
financial markets opened on Monday the rating agencies further downgraded AIG and the stock
prices of the insurance company fell by 61% (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 349). As
figure 10 shows this drop of stock prices – which was accompanied by increased margin calls from
AIG's counterparties – happened over a couple of days, leaving governmental actors little time to
make a decision. As Fox noted: 
“[…] unlike with Lehman — where the possibility of failure was openly discussed for months
and to a certain extent planned for — federal officials and market participants don't seem to
have really focused on AIG's problems until this week” (Fox 2008).
The principle-guided Lehman decision on the other hand was anticipated for a longer period of
time, with governmental actors contemplating the scenario of a possible Lehman bankruptcy since
July 2008 (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2008e, 2010, 69). Different options and scenarios
were internally discussed and a strategy developed that resembled the Bear Stearns case: in case of
troubles find a buyer for Lehman or let Lehman go bankrupt (see 6.2.1). Although there was time
pressure involved in the Lehman decision as well (with negotiations happening over a weekend as
well)  governmental actors  to a greater degree could rely on their  prepared plans.  According to
hypothesis  5,  this  decreased  sense  of  urgency  (together  with  the  assumption  that  the  financial
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Figure 10: Stock Price of AIG in September 2008 (Source: Yahoo Finance)
markets had enough time to prepare for a failure of Lehman) promoted a principle-guided approach
to political crisis management.
Future Research
In chapter 2 the role of urgency as a potential constraint for pragmatist behavior has been discussed
at length (see  2.6). There the argument was made that no theoretical reasons can be found why
urgency would disable pragmatism as a whole but that it  might affect one of its core elements:
deliberation. For the cases analyzed here we have found a high degree of internal deliberation but
little  evidence  for  external  deliberation  that  went  beyond  consultation.  Future  research  could
explore  hypothesis  5  in  greater  details  by  analyzing  how (external)  deliberation  and the  other
elements of pragmatism are affected by urgency (for deliberation see Boin and Nieuwenburg 2013).
7.2 Intersections and Combinations of Pragmatist and Principle-Guided
Political Crisis Management 
Describing the shifts between pragmatist and principle-guided political crisis management during
the U.S. financial crisis in 2008 I do not intend to imply that these two approaches to political crisis
management can be strictly separated.74 In designing the model of pragmatist and principle-guided
political  crisis management I have noted that I consider both approaches as ideal-typical in the
Weberian sense (see 3.2). As such they mark the two poles of a continuous scale (see figure 3 in
chapter  3). I have also noted that since these two approaches are regarded as ideal types we can
expect to find combinations and hybrid forms in empirical research. 
In  this  section  I  will  briefly  discuss  instances  where  we  have  found  such  combinations  and
intersections  of  pragmatist  and  principle-guided  political  crisis  management  in  the  empirical
analysis of our two decision points. In these instances the boundaries between the model seem to be
unclear or dependent on which perspective we apply. By briefly examining these instances I hope to
clarify and refine the relation of pragmatist and principle-guided political crisis management. 
74 In this sense the tables that summarize the empirical results should also not be interpreted as depicting
dualist  on-off  dichotomies.  They  instead  try  to  summarize  important  findings  and  provide  a  rough
overview for which specifications evidence could be found and for which ones not.
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7.2.1 The  Shifts  between  Pragmatist  and  Principle-Guided  Political  Crisis
Management: A Case of Meta-Pragmatism?
The empirical analysis of chapters  5 and  6 has found a shift between pragmatist and principle-
guided political crisis management for the Bush administration's response to the financial crisis.
After the pragmatist bailout of Bear Stearns the Bush administration shifted to a more principle-
guided  approach  with  the  Lehman  decision,  just  to  shift  back  to  pragmatist  political  crisis
management with the AIG decision a few days later. From a meta-perspective, these shifts might be
interpreted  as  pragmatist  behavior  itself.  Didn't  the  Bush administration  adapt  to  the  changing
circumstances  with  these  shifts  and  chose  whatever  form  of  political  crisis  management  that
“worked“? After political pressure had increased with the bailouts of Bear Stearns and Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac wasn't the shift towards principle-guided political crisis management a pragmatist
reaction  that  reacted  flexibly  and  experimentally  to  the  external  feedback?  These  are  thorny
questions but I would argue that while these shifts might be understood as experimentalist they do
not qualify as pragmatism according to the definition of this study. 
In  general,  these  questions  take  us  back  to  the  initial  discussions  about  the  differences  of
philosophical  and  “everyday”  pragmatism  (see  2.1).  In  setting  out  to  develop  a  substantiated
understanding of pragmatism I have stated that one of the key difficulties of the term “pragmatism”
is that it encapsulates two meanings. On the one hand, it is a term that is used in our everyday
language, referring to a “practical” approach to problems that is undogmatic, concentrates on “what
works”  and  that  can  border  on  opportunism  (see  Merriam  Webster  n.d.).  On  the  other  hand,
pragmatism refers to a distinct philosophical tradition that was founded by American philosophers
such as Charles Peirce, William James and John Dewey. What makes matters complicated is that
the meaning of pragmatism is not the same in both contexts, although it is related.75
The everyday meaning of pragmatism refers to a simplified version of philosophical pragmatism
that encapsulates some of its ideas but does not include its whole depth and breadth. Emphasizing
practical  aspects  and  “whatever  works”  while  being  skeptical  about  dogmatic  principles  –  as
everyday pragmatism does – is one aspect of philosophical pragmatism, an aspect that has been
highlighted by Hilary Putnam and Nicholas Rescher as the “primacy of practice” (see  2.4.4). But
pragmatism as it has been understood in this study offers more than this. With the concepts of anti-
75 From a Hegelian perspective one might speak of an example of “Aufhebung” in this context where the
meaning of philosophical pragmatism is both preserved and at the same time abolished in the everyday
meaning of the term.
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dualism, fallibilism, experimentalism and deliberation philosophical pragmatism offers ideas that
specify  what  it  means  to  focus  on  practice  and  consequences.  These  elements  go  beyond  a
“whatever works” practicism but offer concrete approaches on how to explore the question of “what
works“.
Remembering these differences also helps to explain the shifts between pragmatist and principle-
guided political crisis management, which in our cases can be defined as pragmatist themselves. If
we understand pragmatism according to its four elements and the specifications introduced in the
model,  two  possible  specifications  are:  “Readiness  to  change  existing  beliefs  and  decisions”
(fallibilism) and “Decisions as hypotheses and trials” (experimentalism). I have argued in section
6.2.2 that the shift to principle-guided decision making with the Lehman decision is not an example
of fallibilism since the existing beliefs and decisions of the Bush administration were based on the
moral hazard doctrine which stated that troubled private companies should not be bailed out by
governments (see 5.1.1). The Bear Stearns decision revoked this doctrine and therefore qualifies as
an example for fallibilism. With the Lehman decision, however, the Bush administration returned to
their initial beliefs and did not overrule them again. According to our framework the shift towards
principle-guided political crisis management was therefore not fallibilist.
Yet,  the  shifts  between  pragmatist  and  principle-guided  political  crisis  management  qualify  as
experimentalism according to the specification “Decisions as hypotheses and trials“. Reacting to the
feedback (i.e. political pressure) after the bailouts of Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac the
Bush administration switched to a principle-guided approach that emphasized a “no more bailouts”
position.  With  the  AIG decision,  however,  this  course  was  again  adapted  and  a  shift  back  to
pragmatist  political  crisis  management  followed.  The  hypotheses  in  the  previous  section  have
discussed possible reasons for this shift. 
A similar  example for  such meta-experimentalism that  shifted from pragmatism to a principle-
guided approach has been identified in the framing of the Lehman decision (see  6.3.2). We have
identified a frame reversal in this case with government actors shifting from an explanation that
emphasized the nuanced differences of the decisions  to a strict  legalism.  This legalist  meaning
making invoked section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act as an unambiguous constraint that strictly
excluded the possibility of a Lehman rescue. While this shift was a shift away from pragmatist
towards  principle-guided  political  crisis  management  the  shift  itself  has  been  described  as
experimentalism according to the specification “Trying out of frames, frame reversal”.
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From a meta-perspective the general shifts of the Bear Stearns, Lehman and AIG decisions can be
understood in a similar way. Analyzing decision and meaning making from a micro-perspective as
chapter 6 has done the Lehman decision qualifies as principle-guided political crisis management.
But from a meta-perspective the shift towards this principle-guided political crisis management can
be analyzed as  pragmatist  experimentalism.  A similar  example for such ambiguity can also be
found on the micro level as the next section will show.
Future Research
The  importance  of  the  different  levels  of  analysis  could  be  taken  up  by  future  research.  The
question that could be at  the center of such a research project is  the following: How does our
characterization  of  pragmatist  and  principle-guided  political  crisis  management  change  if  we
change our level of analysis? Do we find further instances where we can speak of principle-guided
political crisis management on the micro level but can find elements of pragmatism on the meta
level? Such analysis would need to include additional theoretical research as well, further refining
our understanding of the exact relation between pragmatism and principles and between everyday
and philosophical pragmatism.
7.2.2 Excluding Moral-Hazard Skeptics to Enable Pragmatism?
Section  6.2.4 has discussed internal deliberation during the Lehman and AIG decisions and has
noted that Sheila Bair, chairman of the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), was
systematically excluded from decision making because of her insistence on moral hazard principles.
Bair opposed the rescue of Bear Stearns and advocated for a stricter course towards AIG (Bair
2012, 98). From the perspective of my model this exclusion of Bair qualifies as principle-guided
political crisis management according to the specification “Exclusion of skeptics”. Yet, excluding
moral  hazard  hawks,  like  Bair,  from the  decision  making processes  might  have  facilitated  the
pragmatist decisions to bailout Bear Stearns and AIG, since Bair opposed both decisions and argued
against them.
This then poses another thorny question about the relation between pragmatist and principle-guided
political  crisis  management:  Can  we  still  speak  of  pragmatist  decisions  when  the  way  these
decisions were reached also included elements that contradict main pillars of pragmatist thinking,
such as the exclusion of skeptics? 
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Dewey argued in a dispute with Leon Trotsky (Trotsky 1979; Dewey 1979) that means and ends are
closely connected and that  ends  “can be attained only by means that  accord with those ends”
(Dewey 1987, 298; original emphasis). This refers to pragmatism in its ideal-typical form. But as
this  study  has  argued  pragmatist  and  principle-guided  political  crisis  management  should  be
understood as the two opposite poles on a continuous scale that mark ideal-typical states. The space
between these ideal types is populated by gray areas and hybrid combinations of both ideal types. 
Accordingly, I would argue that the exclusion of Sheila Bair from the decision making process (see
6.2.4) is an instance for such a hybrid form that combines both pragmatism and principle-guided
political  crisis  management.  More  specifically,  the  exclusion  of  Bair  is  an  example  where
pragmatist  behavior  was facilitated  by principle-guided means,  i.e.  the exclusion of  actors  that
opposed a pragmatist approach. Focusing on these intersections and combinations of pragmatist and
principle-guided political crisis management, it is important to highlight the fact that it is not an
either-or  question  where  crisis  responses  can  be  strictly  schematized  as  either  pragmatist  or
principle-guided  political  crisis  management.  Depending  on our  level  of  analysis,  we can  find
instances and cases where pragmatist and principle-guided elements are closely intertwined. This
should not reduce the value of the model as they make it possible to analytically identify these
different elements and analyze how they relate and are combined exactly. 
Future Research
Future research could focus  on these combinations  of  pragmatist  and principle-guided political
crisis  management,  especially  on  the  instances  where  the  borders  between the  two approaches
appear  blurry.  The means and ends debate that  draws on Dewey's  arguments  could serve as  a
starting point for this, posing the question: Are pragmatist ends in political crisis management (i.e.
crisis responses and policies) achieved through a process of pragmatist means or can we also find
examples where principle-guided means are used for pragmatist ends and vice versa?
7.3 Conclusion
This chapter has discussed some of the main findings of the empirical analysis and has tried to pave
the way for future research. The two main questions that have been explored queried the causes
behind  pragmatist  and  principle-guided  political  crisis  management  and  the  intersections  and
combinations of both approaches. 
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In the first part several hypotheses were introduced that offer potential causes for the shifts between
pragmatist and principle-guided political crisis management. Political pressure has been identified
as hypothesis to explain the shift towards the principled approach of the Lehman decision. Yet, this
hypothesis has been found to be insufficient in explaining the shifts towards pragmatist political
crisis management. Hypothesis 2 and 3 have put a new angle on this hypothesis by stating that
political pressure was reduced by the “lame duck” status of the Bush administration and the fact that
the centers of decision making were not located at the White House but at the Treasury and the
Federal Reserve Bank. Hypothesis 4 and 5 have emphasized the role that uncertainty and urgency
have played in the shifts between the two approaches of political crisis management. 
The second part has further examined the relation of pragmatist and principle-guided political crisis
management by discussing two examples. The first example has found that the characterization of
pragmatist  and  principle-guided  political  crisis  management  also  depends  on  the  level  of
perspective. It has argued that from a meta-perspective the shift towards principle-guided political
crisis  management  can  be  understood as  pragmatist  experimentalism.  The  second example  has
recounted a case where the principle-guided exclusion of skeptics might have facilitated pragmatist
decisions, highlighting again how the conceptualized ideal types of pragmatist and principle-guided
political crisis management are combined and entangled in empirical practice.
Taken together, these findings pose challenges for future research to (1) explore the causes of the
two different approaches to political crisis management and (2) how these approaches are combined
in practice and how different levels of analysis change our understanding of the two approaches.
The  concluding  chapter  of  this  study  will  discuss  another  possible  future  research  objective:
identifying empirical indicators for pragmatist and principle-guided political crisis management.
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8 Conclusion
This  study  started  at  the  philosophical  roots  of  American  pragmatism and  has  ended  with  an
empirical analysis of two of the most important decision points of the financial crisis in the U.S.
The  general  aspiration  of  this  journey  was  to  develop  a  model  of  pragmatist  political  crisis
management by building on pragmatist concepts such as anti-dualism, fallibilism, experimentalism
and deliberation. In this concluding chapter I will briefly assess the outcomes of this study, reflect
on its limitations and identify elements of a possible research agenda for future research.
8.1  Aspiration and Limitations of the Study
This  study has  tried  to  bring  together  philosophical  pragmatism and  studies  on  political  crisis
management.  This  attempt  built  on  the  idea  that  through  its  specific  emphasis  of  uncertainty
pragmatism might offer the key to a theory of effective crisis management. Therefore, I have traced
the role of uncertainty in pragmatist thinking and a pragmatist form of political crisis management,
which I contrasted with a principle-guided form. I have argued that relying on strict  and fixed
principles is  a position that  is  firmly rejected by pragmatism. Contrary to this  principle-guided
“quest for certainty” (Dewey 1990) pragmatism does not try to overcome or eradicate uncertainty.
Instead pragmatism cautions us that uncertainty is part of the human condition and can never be
fully overcome. This is not an insight that leaves pragmatists in a sense of despair or nihilistic
relativism. Instead pragmatism claims to offer tools and approaches that allow us to live and act
under  such conditions  of  uncertainty.  Pragmatism can be  therefore  understood as  a  “meliorist”
philosophy  asserting  that  we  can  always  improve  our  situation,  even  under  critical  or  tragic
circumstances (Glaude 2004; Hook 2002). 
In  a  nutshell,  this  meliorism  and  the  ability  to  enable “successful  action  under  conditions  of
uncertainty”  (Joas  2000,  39) constitute  the  promise  that  pragmatism  makes  to  political  crisis
managers. This study has identified four core elements that specify what a pragmatist approach to
political  crisis  management  might  look  like:  anti-dualism,  fallibilism,  experimentalism  and
deliberation.  Defining  pragmatism  with  help  of  these  four  core  elements  of  pragmatism  has
provided  this  study  with  a  solid  theoretical  foundation  and  a  fairly  precise  understanding  of
pragmatism. Yet, this definition of pragmatism also came with a price. As I realized over the course
of  this  study,  each  of  these  four  elements  deserve  an  independent  dissertation.  Anti-dualism,
214
fallibilism, experimentalism and deliberation are such complex concepts that it is almost impossible
to do them justice in one single study.
Whilst writing this dissertation, I sometimes had the feeling I was merely scratching the surface of
the topic at hand. But as I argued in chapter 2, I deliberately chose to use a broader understanding of
pragmatism that did not narrowly focus on one of its aspects. With this definition of pragmatism as
a  broad  yet  specific  approach  I  wanted  to  present  a  fuller  range  of  pragmatist  concepts  and
introduce them to the field of political crisis management. 
The empirical chapters have provided first probes on the plausibility of this objective. By looking at
cases of political crisis management through the lenses of pragmatist and principle-guided political
crisis  management  we gain a novel  and fruitful  perspective.  The following section will  briefly
assess the analytical and practical value of the model of pragmatist political crisis management
8.2 The Analytical and Practical Value of the Model
We can evaluate the usefulness of the model developed by this study along two dimensions: an
analytical and a practical one. The analytical dimension poses the question: Does the model of
pragmatist  political  crisis management help to understand what leaders did during the financial
crisis? The practical dimension focuses on the question: Could a pragmatist approach towards crisis
management be useful for decision makers and crisis managers in practice? Should we train crisis
managers in pragmatist political crisis management? I briefly discuss these two dimensions in this
section. 
Analytical Value
I hope that the empirical analysis (see chapters 5 and 6) has shown that the model developed by this
study  has  been  able  to  provide  a  novel  and  fruitful  perspective  on  the  Bush  administration’s
handling of the financial crisis of 2008. From the perspective advanced by this study the bailing out
of Bear Stearns and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers was not mere political inconsistency as
many other observers have noted (Acharya et al. 2009, 126; Blinder 2013, chap. 5; Krugman 2008)
but  can  be  traced back to  two different  modes  of  political  crisis  management:  pragmatist  and
principle-guided political crisis management. In our examples, these different modes of political
crisis management were based on different understandings of the crisis at hand. 
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For the Bear Stearns case the model has helped to identify pragmatist decision making and meaning
making. The empirical analysis has shown how the Bush administration was able to overcome its
established principles of free-market ideology and moral hazard. Instead Bear Stearns was rescued
based  on  the  analysis  of  the  expected  consequences  of  Bear  Stearns’  bankruptcy.  The  Bush
administration’s response departed from a high level of uncertainty concerning the importance of
Bear Stearns for the stability of the entire financial system. Worrying that Bear Stearns might be too
big (and to intertwined) to fail and fearing the negative consequences for the global economy the
Bush administration decided to rescue the investment firm. 
The case was different with Lehman Brothers. When confronted with the troubles at Lehman, the
Bush administration was relatively certain that the financial system was prepared for the bankruptcy
of the investment bank. This decreased level of uncertainty allowed for a shift  back to a more
principle-guided approach of political crisis management that was meant to send a strong message
that the Bush government had returned to its free-market principles again. But with the decisions to
save the insurance company AIG and the money market funds immediately after the Lehman fail,
the Bush administration returned to a more pragmatist approach.
By revealing how (perceived) uncertainty has led to different forms of political crisis management
and by emphasizing the role that pragmatism and principles have played in the crisis responses this
model has shown its analytical value. It has developed an important complementary perspective on
political crisis management, offering a broad set of building blocks and specifications that might be
the starting point for additional research projects. 
While this study has helped to gain a deeper understanding of what was happening in the Bush
government  during  the  crisis  it  could  not  explore  the  reasons  why  pragmatist  political  crisis
management  was  favored  at  certain  times  and  principle-guided  political  crisis  management  at
others. Chapter 7 has thus offered a set of hypotheses on the possible reasons that can guide future
research projects. 
Practical Value
While I hope that the model of pragmatist  political crisis management has shown its  analytical
value and plausibility, it is more difficult to evaluate its practical value for decision makers and
crisis managers. In the introduction and chapter  2 (see 2.6.4) I have mentioned that other authors
have (implicitly) described pragmatist modes of crisis management on the operational level. While
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using different terms, these empirical studies by Karl Weick, Gary Klein and the research on so-
called  high  reliability  organizations  have  described  pragmatist  anti-dualism,  fallibilism,
experimentalism and deliberation in the operational practice of crisis managers. I think it is thus fair
to assume that some operational crisis managers might recognize their own behavior in the model of
pragmatist crisis management. For them the main value of the model lies in the systematic portrayal
of the pragmatist approach. The systematic elaboration of the pragmatist approach can also provide
an  important  counterweight  to  the  prevalent  rationalism  in  the  practical  literature  on  crisis
management (see Harvard Business School 2004). 
But what is the value of this study for political crisis managers? The results of this study indicate
that – compared to crisis managers on the operational level – a pragmatist approach might be more
difficult for political crisis managers. While handling a crisis, political crisis managers cannot solely
concentrate  on practical  consequences  and functional  problem-solving.  Political  crisis  managers
must keep the symbolic dimension of politics in mind (Edelman 1985; ‘t Hart 2008) and think about
about the political dimensions of a crisis and its public perception as well. 
For a pragmatist approach to political crisis management the difficulties lie especially in the area of
meaning making. Publicly admitting possible failures, emphasizing the uncertainty of decisions and
inviting public debate and critique might prove to be a difficult task for political leaders. Depending
on the political culture, such a pragmatist behavior might lead to severe political costs for public
leaders (see 8.4).
Despite all these difficulties, a pragmatist approach might be valuable for political crisis managers
when confronted with two forms of crisis: crises that involve a high level of deep uncertainty and
crises that strongly challenge established values. As defined in the introduction, all crises involve
some degree of uncertainty and a threat to established values. But I would argue that a pragmatist
approach to  crises  might  be  more  valuable  to  political  crisis  managers  the  higher  the  level  of
uncertainty and the threat to established values are.
As  pragmatists  argue,  the  uncertainty  of  a  crisis  often  disables  the  ability  of  comprehensive
rationalist analysis. During such crises, strict principles and fixed dogmas often become uncertain a
well, leaving a pragmatist approach as a valuable alternative on how to respond to the crisis. 
Crises that strongly challenge established values might make it impossible for governments to draw
on these values and principles in order to respond to the crisis. When the Fukushima catastrophe
challenged the established principle that nuclear energy was necessary for a prospering economy in
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Germany, the crisis made it impossible for the conservative German government to draw on this
principle in order to respond to the crisis. Instead, in a surprising and pragmatic move, the German
government drafted and passed a bill in order to ban nuclear energy from Germany in the near
future (Wittneben 2012).
But in the end the practical usefulness of the model of pragmatist political crisis management also
depends  on  the  personal  character  of  a  crisis  manager.  More  precisely,  whether  you  think  if
pragmatist  crisis  management  has  practical  value  or  not  also depends  on  your  ontological  and
epistemological position (see Marsh and Furlong 2010). A crisis manager who holds the position
that  it  is  possible  to  identify  fixed  laws  and  principles  that  provide  the  definitive  answers  to
decisions will reject the value of a pragmatist approach towards crisis management. On the other
hand, a crisis manager who holds the position that answers to decisions can only be found through
an open and probing search and that all our beliefs remain fallible, might be open to a pragmatist
approach and willing to employ it in practice.
To sum up, the value of the model of pragmatist political crisis management needs to be further
explored in future research. In the remainder of this conclusion I will therefore briefly sketch out
elements of a research agenda that could build on this study. Chief among them is the identification
of specific empirical indicators for pragmatist and principle-guided political crisis management.
8.3 Indicators  for  Pragmatist  and  Principle-Guided  Political  Crisis
Management
In chapter 3 I suggested a list of specifications of what I expect to see in pragmatist and principle-
guided  political  crisis  management.  These  specifications  built  on  the  theoretical  writings  of
pragmatism. I also argued that it is impossible to derive a list of specific empirical indicators from
the pragmatist literature. After having finished the empirical analysis of my plausibility probe I can,
however, present a list of potential empirical indicators that might be useful for future research. 
These empirical indicators have been identified in the course of the analysis of my cases. I do not
argue  this  to  be  the  definitive  list  of  empirical  indicators  for  pragmatist  and  principle-guided
political crisis management. These are just first suggestions based on my research. I hope that this
list can be further refined, expanded and corrected in additional research projects.
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 Pragmatist Political Crisis Management
 DECISION MAKING
Anti-Dualism
• Working groups are established to explore additional options
• Decisions and contracts are formulated in flexible terms
 Fallibilism
• Stated objectives of the crisis management process are changed
• Established approaches and solutions are not used
• Decisions try to buy time not to conclusively solve the problem
• Continuous preparation of backup plans throughout the crisis
 Experimentalism
• Tools  (agencies,  programs,  resources)  are  used  in  a  way that  is  not  in  line  with  their
intended purpose or area of expertise
• Unprecedented solutions are used to manage the crises
• Mechanisms are implemented that allow the continuous monitoring of feedback
 Deliberation
• Regular meetings to discuss decisions
• External stakeholders are involved in decision making




• Importance  of  a  “balance”  between  different  aspects  is  publicly  communicated  by
government actors
 Fallibilism
• Public acknowledgement by government actors that the planned solution might not solve
the crisis
• Government actors avoid making any promises about the future
 Experimentalism
• Decisions are explained differently by government actors in the course of time
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 Principle-Guided Political Crisis Management
 DECISION MAKING
 Dualism
• Strategy to solve the crisis is based on one option
 Infallibilism
• Established standard solutions are used to solve the crisis
 “One best way”
• Legal rules are emphasized and narrowly interpreted
 Dictation
• Internal critics are cut off from decision making
 MEANING MAKING
 Dualism
• Dichotomous interpretations are publicly communicated by government actors
 “One best way”
• Decisions are publicly framed by referring to strict legal principles
• Decisions are framed in the same way over the course of time
8.3.1 Indicators for Pragmatist Political Crisis Management
DECISION MAKING
Working groups are established to explore additional options (Anti-Dualism)
An important feature of pragmatist anti-dualism is the avoidance of dilemmas and the exploration of
additional  options.  In  crisis  management,  an  indicator  for  such  an  anti-dualist  exploration  of
additional  options  (and  hence  an  indicator  for  pragmatist  political  crisis  management)  is  the
establishment of working groups that explore these options. 
In the case of Bear Stearns’ rescue the indirect loan via JPMorgan can be regarded as such an
additional  option  that  left  behind  the  dilemma of  finding  a  buyer  or  letting  Bear  Stearns  fail.
Timothy Geithner created an ad hoc working group with his team at the New York Fed to explore
this  option.  The establishment  of this  working group provides an example for this  indicator  of
pragmatist political crisis management.
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Decisions and contracts are formulated in flexible terms (Anti-Dualism)
The avoidance of self-imposed commitments has been identified as an important aspect of anti-
dualism in  our  model  of  pragmatist  political  crisis  management.  One indicator  to  identify  this
specification is the formulation of decisions and contracts in flexible terms. 
In the case of the indirect loan that the Federal Reserve Bank provided Bear Stearns with,  for
instance, the loan agreement determined that the loan would be available “up to 28 days”. This
flexible formulation allowed Paulson and Geithner to shorten the duration of the loan when they
anticipated that Bear Stearns needed to find a buyer immediately. This flexible “up to” formulation
prevented a self-imposed commitment and allowed Paulson and Geithner to change course as the
crisis developed. This flexible formulation of the contract with Bear Stearns therefore is a good
example for this indicator of pragmatist political crisis management.
Stated objectives of the crisis management process are changed (Fallibilism)
This indicator tries to identify the fallibilist changing of existing beliefs and decisions. In the case of
Bear Stearns, for example, both president Bush and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson departed
from a position that emphasized “moral hazard”. At the center of this position was the belief that the
economic policies should secure the functioning of the free market and that companies which ran
into troubles should fail. But with the Bear Stearns case this objective shifted and was replaced by
the importance of “systemic stability”. From this perspective of “systemic stability” Bear Stearns
needed to be saved in order to save the financial and economic system as a whole.
Such a change of stated objective indicates the change of existing beliefs and thus the presence of
pragmatist political crisis management.
Established approaches and solutions are not used (Fallibilism)
Existing  beliefs  and  decisions  are  often  “codified”  in  established  approaches,  processes  and
solutions that can be used to target a specific type of crisis. If these established routines are left
behind in order to solve the crisis, this is an indicator for pragmatist political crisis management
since it leaves behind existing beliefs and decisions in a fallibilist way.
For a financial crisis at a major bank the main precedent has been set by the hedge fund Long Term
Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998, which was saved by a consortium of banks and financial
institutions that where brought together by the Federal Reserve Bank. 
In the case of Bear Stearns this established approach of creating a consortium of private buyers was
not used due to time constraints, instead the novel idea of an indirect loan was chosen. The usage of
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the indirect loan is thus an example for this indicator of pragmatist political crisis management.
Decisions try to buy time not to conclusively solve the problem (Fallibilism)
The indirect loan that was intended to rescue Bear Stearns over the weekend was not meant to be a
solution to conclusively solve the crisis but to buy time instead. I regard such decisions that try to
buy  time  as  indicator  of  pragmatist  political  crisis  management  since  they  avoid  unrevisable
decisions (e.g. the collapse of Bear Stearns). Such time-buying decisions emphasize that a definite
solution might not be available at an early stage of a crisis and that a probing step-by-step approach
might be more appropriate.
Continuous preparation of backup plans throughout the crisis (Fallibilism)
Backup  plans  are  not  an  exclusive  characteristic  of  pragmatist  political  crisis  management.
Nonetheless, I argue that pragmatist political crisis management puts an especially strong emphasis
on backup plans and continues to develop them where other forms of crisis management might
already  be  convinced that  the  crisis  is  solved  and that  backups  plans  are  no  longer  needed.  I
therefore regard the continuous preparation of backup plans as an indicator of pragmatist political
crisis management.
I find this indicator in the case of Bear Stearns, where the Federal Reserve Bank rolled out the
Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) in order to prepare for a bankruptcy of Bear Stearns. The
PDCF was  developed at  a  stage  when negotiations  between Bear  Stearns  and JPMorgan were
already progressing and where it became increasingly clear that Bear Stearns probably could be
saved.  Preparing  backup  plans  at  such  a  late  stage  during  a  crisis  where  the  solution  seems
imminent already qualifies as an indicator of pragmatist fallibilism.
Tools (agencies, programs, resources) are used in a way that is not in line with their intended
purpose or area of expertise (Experimentalism)
The recombination of existing tools has been identified as one of the specifications of pragmatist
experimentalism in our model of pragmatist  political  crisis  management.  This indicator tries  to
identify this recombinations by checking if “tools” (agencies, programs, resources, etc.) are used in
a way that is not in line with their intended purpose.
After Lehman‘s fail, for instance, money market funds were saved by the Bush administration with
help of the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF). As its name indicates, the ESF was not intended to
be used for such a purpose, instead it was originally designed to be used to internationally stabilize
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the U.S. dollar. This creative usage of the ESF indicates an experimentalist approach and qualifies
as pragmatist political crisis management.
Unprecedented solutions are used to manage the crises (Experimentalism)
The fact that “established approaches and solutions are not used” has already been identified as an
indicator for pragmatist fallibilism. This indicator complements this insight by looking for examples
where unprecedented solutions are used to manage a crisis.  I argue that such a usage of novel
solutions qualifies as pragmatist political crisis management.
In the case of Bear Stearns we have seen how the government’s standard preference, an industry
consortium that would rescue the investment bank, was not possible due to time constraints. Instead
the novel solution of an indirect loan was devised, an approach that made it necessary to invoke the
Federal  Reserve  Bank‘s  emergency  clause.  This  provides  an  example  for  this  indicator  of
pragmatist political crisis management.
Mechanisms are implemented that allow the continuous monitoring of feedback (Experimentalism)
While feedback monitoring alone is not a sufficient indicator for pragmatist experimentalism it is a
necessary  one  since  feedback  monitoring  is  an  important  prerequisite  of  pragmatist
experimentalism. Through constant feedback monitoring, the outcome of pragmatist experiments is
evaluated and the experimentalist “intervention” can be adapted accordingly. The implementation
of continuous feedback monitoring mechanisms therefore qualifies as an (although weak) indicator
of pragmatist experimentalism.
In  our  empirical  cases  we  have  seen  how government  actors  monitored  market  developments
closely and stayed in constant contact with external experts (banking executives, lawyers) to gather
feedback. In the case of the indirect loan for Bear Stearns, this feedback led to a change of course
when the duration of the loan was limited to the weekend. This incident thus can be regarded as an
example for this indicator of pragmatist political crisis management.
Regular meetings to discuss decisions (Deliberation)
This indicator tries to identify internal deliberation, one of the characteristics of pragmatist political
crisis management. It analyzes if internal meetings took place regularly and were used to discuss
possible options and make decisions. 
In  our  cases  we  have  seen  how discussions  in  internal  meetings  (especially  between  Paulson,
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Bernanke and Geithner) played an important role in the decision making process. This deliberative
approach provides an example for this indicator of pragmatist political crisis management.
External stakeholders are involved in decision making (Deliberation)
This indicator looks for evidence of external deliberation with external stakeholders being actively
involved in decision making. To identify external deliberation, this involvement must go beyond the
level of consultation. Instead external stakeholders must have an active influence on the decisions
that are being made in order to identify this indicator.
In our cases I have found little evidence for this indicator since external stakeholders were only
included in a consulting role and had no direct influence on the decision making process.
Skeptics are actively invited and included in decision making (devil‘s advocate, multiple advocacy,
etc.) (Deliberation)
Pragmatist deliberation puts a strong emphasis on the included actors’ diversity. This indicator tries
to identify pragmatist  deliberation by looking at  the fact if skeptics and dissenting voices were
actively included in the decision making process.  This  might  be accomplished by the usage of
techniques such as devil‘s advocate or multiple advocacy that make sure that these dissenting voices
are heard.
MEANING MAKING
Importance of  a  “balance” between different  aspects  is  publicly  communicated by government
actors (Anti-Dualism)
This indicator aims at pragmatist anti-dualism in meaning making. Anti-dualist meaning making
depicts events in a nuanced way and avoids dichotomies. One possible indicator to measure anti-
dualist  meaning  making  is  to  analyze  if  the  importance  to  “balance”  different  aspects  is
communicated by government actors. 
In the case of Bear Stearns, for example, government actors have emphasized how their decision to
rescue Bear Stearns balanced the aspects of moral hazard and financial stability. In explaining the
decision, the Bush government indicated that both aspects were important and that the decision tried
to take care of both aspects at the same time. This approach therefore provides an example for this
indicator of pragmatist political crisis management.
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Public acknowledgement by government actors that the planned solution might not solve the crisis
(Fallibilism)
In  our  model  of  pragmatist  political  crisis  management,  fallibilist  meaning  making  has  been
identified  as  the  communication  of  uncertainty  and  possible  failures.  This  communication  of
uncertainty can refer (1) to the planned solution and (2) the possible outcome of the crisis. The two
indicators regarding fallibilist meaning making try to measure these two aspects.
This indicator targets the first aspect by searching for public acknowledgements by government
actors that the planned solution might not have been necessary and that other solutions would have
worked  as  well.  Admitting  this  publicly  qualifies  as  fallibilist  meaning  making  since  it
communicates uncertainty and the government‘s fallibility.
I could find no evidence for this indicator in my cases.
Government actors avoid making any promises about the future (Fallibilism)
The second indicator of fallibilist meaning making targets the question if uncertainty concerning the
outcome of the crisis is communicated. It measures this communicated uncertainty by searching for
instances where government actors have avoided to make any promises about the future. 
When president Bush was about to give a speech briefly before the Bear Stearns rescue, Treasury
Secretary  Paulson  advised  him not  to  make  any  promises  that  there  would  be  no  bailout.  In
Congressional  Hearings after  the Bear  Stearns  bailout,  government  officials  also left  it  open if
further bailouts might be needed. This behavior provides an example for this indicator of pragmatist
political crisis management.
Decisions are explained differently by government actors over the course of time (Experimentalism)
Frame reversals and trying out different frames are key characteristics of experimentalist meaning
making according to our model of pragmatist political crisis management. This indicator tries to
measure experimentalist meaning making by looking at how decisions are explained over time and
if these explanations change. 
In the Lehman Brothers case, for example, the decision to let the investment bank fail was at first
explained by government officials by pointing to the fact that the markets were already prepared for
a  Lehman  bankruptcy.  After  this  argument  had  been  proven  wrong  by  the  turmoil  caused  by
Lehman‘s demise, government officials like Paulson and Bernanke shifted to a different framing of
the decision that highlighted how it was legally impossible to save Lehman. This shift in meaning
making provides an example for this indicator of pragmatist political crisis management.
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8.3.2 Indicators for Principle-Guided Political Crisis Management
In many ways, just as the specifications of our model (see chapter 4), the empirical indicators of
principle-guided political crisis management can be thought of as the counterparts of the pragmatist
political crisis management indicators. Yet, principle guided political crisis management cannot be
identified through the absence of  pragmatist  political  crisis  management  alone (this  would just
identify  non-pragmatist political  crisis  management).  Instead  to  further  empirical  research  on
principle guided political crisis management a set of separate indicators is needed. The following
list hopes to provide a starting point for this endeavor, based on my empirical analysis.
DECISION MAKING
Strategy to solve the crisis is based on one option (Dualism)
Our  model  has  identified  the  announcement  of  decisions  in  either-or  dilemmas  as  a  key
characteristic of principle-guided political crisis management. To identify this principled approach
to decision making we can examine the strategy to solve the crisis and check if it was based on one
or more options. If the strategy was based on one option such an approach qualifies as principle-
guided political crisis management.
The Lehman decisions has provided an example for such a principle-guided approach to political
crisis management. In this case the strategy to solve the crisis was based on one option: to find a
buyer for Lehman Brothers. After no buyer could be found, Lehman had to file for bankruptcy.
To find support for this indicator it is useful to analyze internal materials (memos, mails, minutes
from meetings, etc.) and see if different options were considered or if the crisis-solving strategy was
based on one option. In my cases it has also proven useful to examine if working groups were
formed to explore different options (see indicators of pragmatist political crisis management). For
Lehman this was apparently not the case.
Established standard solutions are used to solve the crisis (Infallibilism)
Principle-guided political crisis management sticks to existing beliefs and decisions (see chapter 4).
An indicator for this infallibilist approach to decision making is that established standard solutions
are used to solve a crisis. 
In  the  case  of  Lehman  Brothers  we have  seen  how the  Bush administration  has  followed the
established standard solution by trying to find a private buyer for Lehman. The Lehman example
therefore has been qualified as an example of principle-guided political crisis management.
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Legal rules are emphasized and narrowly interpreted (“One best way”)
In  principle-guided  political  crisis  management,  decisions  are  based  on  what  is  regarded  as
“objective  evidence”  (see  chapter  4).  The Lehman case has  shown how one example for  such
“objective evidence” is legal rules and regulations. Internally Paulson and Bernanke argued that a
bailout of Lehman Brothers would be illegal, a stance that was based on a narrow interpretation of
the Federal Reserve’s emergency clause.
The  emphasis  and  narrow  interpretation  of  legal  rules  therefore  can  serve  as  an  indicator  for
principle-guided political crisis management.
Internal critics are cut off from decision making (Dictation)
Chapter 4 has shown how the exclusion of skeptical and dissenting voices from the decision making
process is characteristic for principle-guided political crisis management. An indicator to identify
this exclusion of skeptics is to examine if people were cut off from the information and decision
making process because of their skeptical stance (even if their formal position would have required
their inclusion).
One such internal critic who was cut off during the financial crisis was Sheila Bair, the head of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Bair was highly skeptical about public bailouts and
opposed the pragmatist approach that the Bush administration took in the Bear Stearns and AIG
decision. While her formal position as the head of an important banking-related agency would have
made her a prime candidate for the governmental crisis management team, evidence suggests that
she was excluded from the information and decision making process because of her skeptical and
dissenting opinions (see 7.2.2).
MEANING MAKING
Dichotomous interpretations are publicly communicated by government actors (Dualism)
The usage of black-and-white dualisms is an important aspect of principle-guided political crisis
management. The framing of 9/11 as “war against terror” against an “axis of evil” provides an
example for such dualist meaning making. In a similar notion, the decision to let Lehman Brothers
fail was framed by strongly excluding the possibility of a public rescue and “drawing a line in the
sand”. 
I argue that such univocal and dichotomous interpretations of crises that are publicly communicated
227
by  government  actors  qualify  as  an  indicator  for  principle-guided  political  crisis  management
because they frame decisions in dualist terms.
Decisions are publicly framed by referring to strict legal principles (“One best way”)
Just as strict legal principles are important in principle-guided decision making, they might also be
used  in  public  meaning  making.  I  argue  that  framing  decisions  in  an  unambiguous  way  and
underlining that “there was no alternative” qualifies as indicator for principle-guided political crisis
management.
The Lehman decision has been framed in such a strict legalist way as we have seen in the empirical
analysis.  By  pointing  out  that  it  was  legally  impossible  to  save  Lehman  Brothers,  Treasury
Secretary Paulson and Fed chairman Bernanke framed the decision as unambiguous and without
any  alternative.  This  provides  an  example  for  this  indicator  of  principle-guided  political  crisis
management.
Decisions are framed in the same way over time (“One best way”)
A final indicator for principle-guided meaning making is the fact that decisions are framed the same
way over time. While pragmatist meaning making is characterized by the changing of frames over
time (frame reversals) principle-guided meaning making sticks to the frames it uses. 
In our empirical cases, the meaning making of the Bear Stearns decision followed such a pattern of
sticking to frames. The decision to save Bear Stearns was consistently explained by referring to the
importance of systemic stability. This consistent framing provides an example for this indicator of
principle-guided political crisis management.
8.4  Additional Objectives for Future Research
Aside from extending and refining the list of empirical indicators the following general issues might
also be worth considering in future research.
The Locus of Pragmatism
This dissertation has focused on the role of the Bush government in shaping the response to the
financial crisis of 2008. It has shown how the influence of government actors has varied over the
course of the crisis  and how diverse the positions within the government  were.  This speaks to
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Allison’s “Organizational Process“  and “Governmental Politics” models that have outlined how
governments in crises are no unified entity but consist of different actors and interests (Allison
1971). In this context, it is interesting to ask where  the locus of pragmatist crisis management is
located. In other words, who or what exactly are the drivers of pragmatist and principle-guided
political  crisis  management?  Why  for  example  did  the  Bush  government  act  (at  least  partly)
pragmatist in the financial crisis but not after 9/11 (see Bernstein 2005; Halper and Clarke 2004)? Is
it  because different people were involved (with Paulson and Geithner  pushing for a pragmatist
approach during the financial crisis and the neo-conservatives for a principle-guided approach after
9/11)? Or does it also have to do with the fact that different organizations and departments dealt
with  these  different  crises?  In  other  words,  is  pragmatism located  in  persons,  routines  and/or
institutions?
The last chapter has taken up this issue already and formulated a specific hypothesis in this regard:
A greater role of administrative actors facilitates pragmatist political crisis management.  But I
would argue that this question of where pragmatism is located should also be taken up in a more
general light. As we have seen in the theoretical chapter, pragmatist thinking stresses the social
character of human action.  Pragmatists  have therefore especially focused on the level of social
interaction,  routines  and  institutions  (see  e.g.  Dewey  1922;  Joas  1997).  For  institutionalist
approaches the works by Ansell (2009) and Berk and Galvan (2009) might prove to be fruitful
starting points for future research. Given the prominent role of “pragmatist” actors such as Henry
Paulson and Timothy Geithner in our cases such research should nevertheless be complemented
with an analysis of the role of individuals in pragmatist political crisis management.
The Relation of Decision and Meaning Making and Beyond
Two dimensions of political crisis management were at the center of this study: decision making
and meaning making. Both dimensions were analyzed according to a set of specifications and the
results were compared and contrasted. One of the results that can be derived from this analysis is
that in our cases meaning making was less pragmatist than decision making. This poses the question
of “political vulnerability” (D. T. Campbell 1969). Or to put it more bluntly: Do governments act
pragmatic but do not admit it publicly? 
This is a question that could be further explored along the lines of the four elements of pragmatism:
anti-dualism, fallibilism, experimentalism and deliberation. This question has been analyzed already
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for  experimentalism  (Ansell  and  Bartenberger  2016b;  Bartenberger  and  Sześciło  2016;  D.  T.
Campbell 1969) but research on the other elements is still missing. Such research could also include
other important dimensions of political crisis management that haven‘t been discussed in this study:
early recognition of crises, sense making during crises and learning and accountability after crises.
Expand to Other Types of Crisis
This study has tried to show the usefulness of the model of pragmatist and principle-guided political
crisis management by analyzing two decision points from the financial crisis of 2008. This should
not imply that the usefulness of the model is limited to financial crises only. Expanding the reach by
applying the model to other types of crises, such as natural catastrophes, terror attacks or major
accidents, could therefore be one of the main objectives of future research.
The analysis of the political  response to terror attacks might be a field worth considering here,
especially when it comes to principle-guided political crisis management. Strong principles (“war
against  terror”,  “no negotiations with terrorists”)  are  often at  center  of political  responses after
terrorist attacks, as the examples of 9/11 and the recent attacks in Paris have shown (Bernstein
2005;  Sharma  2015).  Analyzing  if  we  can  also  find  examples  of  pragmatist  political  crisis
management  that  refrain from evoking strict  principles  in the aftermath of  terror  attacks might
therefore be a promising endeavor. Possible example that are worth to be examined in greater depth
are  the  response  to  the  2011  terror  attacks  in  Norway  or  the  adaptive  approach  the  Austrian
government took towards terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s (see Riegler 2011).
Economic crises are another field where principle-guided political crisis management might play an
important role. As we have seen in our case,  economic ideologies often take the form of strict
principles and dogmas that can influence the government’s response to economic turmoil. At first
glance, a prime example for such a principled approach might be the role the German government
has played in the eurozone crisis. Many commentators have noted the strong ordo-liberal principles
that have guided the response to the eurozone crisis, especially towards Greece (e.g. Beck 2013;
Habermas 2010; Kollewe 2012; Van Esch 2014; Van Esch and Swinkels 2015). Initially I had
planned to include the German case in this study as well but this would clearly have overstretched
the scope of this dissertation. Yet, the role of the German government in the eurozone crisis could
provide  a  valuable  starting  point  to  further  analyze  the  role  of  principle-guided political  crisis
management.
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8.5  Final Words
To summarize, this study has tried to develop a model of pragmatist and principle-guided political
crisis management. Yet, I have to admit that even after I have studied philosophical pragmatism for
several years the term “pragmatism” remains a thorny concept I still find hard to grasp in all its
diversity. But thinking about pragmatism not as a grand and blurry term but specifying it via the
four elements of anti-dualism, fallibilism, experimentalism and deliberation has not only improved
my own understanding of the term but has also provided a solid foundation for the model advanced
by  this  study.  Together  with  the  distinction  of  pragmatist  and  principle-guided  political  crisis
management I regard this to be the major contribution of this study.
Given the current state of world affairs, political crisis management unfortunately is still a very
current topic. I hope that this study provides a small step in advancing our understanding of this
phenomenon and can help foster a broader debate about political crisis management. After all, it
seems to me that the political  response to crises (be it  terrorist  attacks,  natural catastrophes or
economic  turmoil)  are  one  of  the  biggest  challenges  to  modern  democracies  right  now.  Re-
evaluating what kind of political crisis management we want in our democracies, and what role
pragmatism and principles should play, seems to be as relevant as ever.
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10  Dutch Summary
Crisisbeheer is uitgegroeid tot één van de belangrijkste uitdagingen voor regeringen in Europa en de
rest van de wereld. Publiek leiderschap wordt vaak beschouwd als cruciaal voor crisismanagement.
In tijden van crisis verwachten de burgers dat hun politieke leiders de bedreigingen en gevaren van
de crisis bedwingen, uitleggen waarom de crisis überhaupt heeft plaatsgevonden en vertellen hoe
soortgelijke crises in de toekomst vermeden kunnen worden. 
Toch bestaat er geen overkoepelende theorie van effectief publiek crisisbeheer. Een groot deel van
de literatuur over de effectiviteit van crisisbeheer is ofwel gericht op operationele crisisbeheerders
"ter plaatse" ofwel op gevallen waarin crisismanagement mislukt is.
Ik argumenteer dat het filosofisch pragmatisme de sleutel kan bieden voor een theorie van effectief
crisismanagement in de publieke sector. Ik identificeer en bespreek vier zuilen voor een dergelijke
theorie: antidualisme, fallibilisme, experimentalisme en deliberatie. 
Op basis van deze concepten uit het filosofische pragmatisme wordt in dit onderzoek een model van
pragmatisch  crisisbeheer  op  politiek-strategisch  niveau  geformuleerd.  Om  de  betekenis  van
pragmatisch crisisbeheer te verduidelijken plaats ik mijn model tegenover het model van principe-
gestuurd crisismanagement. Ik beargumenteer dat principe-gestuurd crisismanagement het ideaal-
typische  tegenbeeld  is  van  pragmatisch  crisismanagement.  In  dit  onderzoek  wordt  een  reeks
specificaties  geïdentificeerd  voor  beide  benaderingen  die  vervolgens  de  empirische  casestudies
leiden.
De twee  cases  geselecteerd  voor  het  empirische  gedeelte  van  dit  onderzoek  zijn  twee  kritieke
beslissingspunten in de Amerikaanse financiële crisis van 2008: (1) de beslissing van de regering-
Bush om de investeringsbank Bear Stearns te redden in maart 2008 en (2) de beslissing om de
investeringsbank Lehman Brothers over de kop te laten gaan in september 2008. Ik heb beide cases
geanalyseerd volgens het model van pragmatistisch en principe-geleid crisismanagement en zocht
daarbij naar voorbeelden waar de specificaties van het pragmatische model geïdentificeerd konden
worden. 
De empirische toepassing van de theoretische modellen onthult nieuwe inzichten in het aanpakken
van de financiële crisis door de regering-Bush. De empirische analyse van de redding van Bear
Stearns  toont  hoe  de  regering-Bush  aan  pragmatisch  crisisbeheer  deed  door  haar  gevestigde
beginselen van vrijemarktideologie en moreel gevaar achterwege te laten. Na de redding van Bear
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Stearns kan de beslissing om Lehman failliet te laten gaan, beschouwd worden als een terugkeer
naar principe-gestuurd crisismanagement. Het was bedoeld om duidelijk te maken dat de regering-
Bush  was  teruggekeerd  naar  haar  vrijemarktbeginselen.  Maar  met  de  beslissingen  om  de
verzekeringsmaatschappij AIG en de geldmarktfondsen te redden, onmiddellijk na het faillissement
van Lehman, keerde de regering-Bush weer terug naar een pragmatischere aanpak.
Bouwend op deze empirische analyse bespreek ik in de conclusie van het onderzoek waarom de
regering-Bush overschakelde van pragmatistisch naar door principe-gestuurd crisisbeheer tijdens de
financiële crisis.  Ik formuleer verschillende hypotheses waarin een antwoord wordt gegeven op
deze vraag en leg ze kort uit.
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11  English Summary
Crisis management has become one of the core challenges of governments in Europe and around
the globe. Public leadership is often thought to be crucial in handling crises. In times of crisis,
citizens expect their political leaders to mitigate the threats and dangers of a crisis, to explain why it
happened in the first place and to outline how similar crises can be prevented in the future. 
Yet,  an overarching theory  of  effective  public  crisis  management  does  not  exist.  Much of  the
literature that  portends to say anything about  crisis  management performance focuses either on
operational crisis responders “on the ground” or on cases where crisis management failed.
I argue that philosophical pragmatism might offer the key for a theory of effective public crisis
management. I identify and discuss four cornerstones of such a pragmatist theory of effective crisis
management: anti-dualism, fallibilism, experimentalism and deliberation. 
Based on these concepts from philosophical pragmatism, the study builds a model of pragmatist
crisis  management  at  the  political-strategic  level.  To  clarify  the  meaning  of  pragmatist  crisis
management I contrast it with principle-guided crisis management and argue that a principle-guided
approach towards crisis management is the ideal-typical opposite of pragmatist crisis management.
The model defines a set of specifications for both approaches that guide the empirical case studies.
The two cases that have been selected for the empirical part of this study are two critical decision
points in the U.S. financial crisis of 2008: (1) the decision by the Bush administration to rescue the
investment  bank Bear  Stearns  in  March 2008 and  (2)  the  decision  to  let  the  investment  bank
Lehman Brothers fail in September 2008. I have analyzed both cases according to the model of
pragmatist  and  principle-guided  political  crisis  management,  looking  for  examples  where  the
specifications of the model could be identified. 
The application of the model reveals new insights into the Bush administration’s handling of the
financial  crisis.  The  empirical  analysis  of  the  Bear  Stearns  rescue  shows  how  the  Bush
administration engaged in pragmatist crisis management by being able to overcome its established
principles of free-market ideology and moral hazard. After the Bear Stearns rescue, the decision to
let Lehman fail can be understood as a switch back to principle-guided political crisis management
that was meant to send a strong message that the Bush government had returned to its free-market
principles again. But with the decisions to save the insurance company AIG and the money market
funds immediately after the Lehman fail, the Bush administration returned to a more pragmatist
approach again.
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Building on this empirical analysis I discuss the question why the Bush administration switched
from pragmatist and principle-guided political crisis management during the financial crisis in the
concluding part of the study. I offer various hypotheses that formulate answers to this question and
discuss them briefly.
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